1 CGHC010060322022 2026:CGHC:35890-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 330 of 2022 Deepak Kumar @ Terra S/o Ramprasad Khakha Aged About 18 Years R/o Vill. Poksari Bandhwatikra, P.S. Batauli, Dist. Sarguja (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station House Officer, Police Station Batauli, Dist. Sarguja (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dheeraj Wankhede, Amicus Curiae For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ 13.08.2026 1. Ms. Himanjali, learned counsel assisting Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, Advocate, submits that Mr. Arun Kumar Shukla, learned counsel appointed through Legal Aid, could not appear to argue the matter due to a medical emergency. MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.08.14 10:38:06 +0530 2 2. The victim (PW-11), along with her father and mother, has appeared through DLSA, Ambikapur, by way of video conferencing and opposed the appeal. 3. Considering the fact that the victim is connected with the Court through video conferencing, Mr. Dheeraj Wankhede, Advocate who is present in Court, is appointed as Amicus Curiae to argue the appeal on behalf of the appellant. Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the State is also ready with the brief. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard finally. 4. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.01.2022 passed by the learned Upper Sessions Judge (F.T.S.C.) (POCSO Act), Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial Case No. 65/2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted as under:- Conviction under Section Sentences Section 363 of the IPC R.I. for 03 years and fine of Rs.500/-. Section 366 of the IPC R.I. for 05 years and fine of Rs.500/-. Section 376(A)(B) of the IPC Life Imprisonment (till natural death) and fine of Rs.5000/-. Section 05(I)/6 of the POCSO Act Life Imprisonment (till natural death) and fine of Rs.5000/-. (All the sentences are directed to run concurrently) 3 5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 18.09.2019, the father of the victim lodged a written report at Police Station- Batouli alleging that on 13.09.2019 at about 4:00 p.m., while he had gone towards the house of his brother and his wife was cutting grass near their house, his three-year-old daughter was found missing. On searching for her, the victim came from the direction of the house of the appellant and disclosed circumstances indicating that she had been taken there by the appellant. The informant noticed abnormal condition of the victim’s clothing and private parts. Thereafter, his nephew also informed him that he had seen the appellant taking the victim inside his house and committing an act of sexual assault upon her. 6. It is further the case of the prosecution that the father of the victim informed the father of the appellant about the incident, who assured him that the child would be treated. However, when no treatment was provided for several days and the condition of the victim deteriorated, she was taken to the hospital at Sitapur. On being informed about the incident, the doctor advised the informant to report the matter to the police. Accordingly, the written report was lodged, on the basis of which Crime No. 84/2019 was registered at Police Station Batouli for the offences under Sections 363, 376-A and 376-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(ठ) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 4 7. During investigation, the Investigating Officer prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of the witnesses, arranged for the medical examination of the victim and seized the clothes worn by her at the time of occurrence. The appellant was arrested and medically examined and his clothing was also seized. The statement of the victim was recorded during investigation and the statement of her brother was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The seized articles were forwarded for forensic examination and, after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court. 8. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the appellant under Sections 363, 366, 376-A and 376-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(ठ)/6, 5(ड)/6 and 5(झ)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses and relied upon the documentary evidence brought on record. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant denied the incriminating circumstances and pleaded false implication. He did not lead any evidence in defence. 9. Upon appreciation of the evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences proved against him and sentenced him accordingly. Being aggrieved by 5 the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 10. Learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant submits that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is not sustainable on the evidence available on record. It is submitted that the victim herself could not be examined before the Trial Court and the prosecution case substantially rests upon the testimony of PW-6, an eight-year-old child witness, whose evidence requires cautious and careful scrutiny. It is further submitted that there are material omissions and inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, particularly with regard to the manner of occurrence and the circumstances in which the report came to be lodged after a delay of five days. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the medical evidence does not conclusively establish the prosecution version, as PW-5 has admitted that the injury found on the victim could also be caused by falling upon a hard object, while PW-7 admittedly could not conduct a proper examination of the victim. It is also contended that the FSL report Ex.P-23, showing semen stains and human spermatozoa on the seized undergarments, by itself does not establish that the said biological material belonged to the appellant or that it was connected with the alleged occurrence in the absence of unimpeachable proof regarding the chain of custody. It is submitted that PW-1 and PW-2 are not eyewitnesses 6 to the alleged act and their evidence regarding the occurrence is based upon what they subsequently came to know. Learned Amicus Curiae, therefore, submits that the prosecution evidence, when appreciated as a whole, gives rise to reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of the appellant and, consequently, the appellant deserves to be acquitted by extending to him the benefit of doubt. 11. Learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State opposed the appeal and submitted that the learned Trial Court has passed a well-reasoned judgment after duly appreciating the oral, documentary, medical and scientific evidence available on record and there is no perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. It was submitted that the prosecution has proved the age of the victim through the evidence of her father (PW-1), mother (PW-2), the medical evidence of Dr. Smt. Snehalata Tirkey (PW-5) and, most importantly, the original birth certificate (Ex.P-2) and its mechanically prepared copy (Ex.P-2C), as well as the delivery certificate (Ex.P-1C), establishing her date of birth as 25.07.2016 and consequently her age as about three years on the date of occurrence, i.e. 13.09.2019. Learned State counsel further submitted that the factum of the occurrence and involvement of the appellant stand established from the consistent testimony of the victim’s father (PW-1), mother (PW-2) and, particularly, the child eyewitness (PW-6), who was found competent by the learned Trial Court after preliminary questioning 7 and whose testimony remained substantially consistent with his statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It was contended that the evidence of PW-6 receives material corroboration from the medical evidence of Dr. Smt. Archana Mishra (PW-7), who noticed that the child was in pain, was crying and had swelling in the thighs, as well as from the subsequent medical examination conducted by Dr. Smt. Snehalata Tirkey (PW-5), who found a tear/injury near the vaginal opening, bleeding on touch and pain, and opined that the injury could have been caused by a hard and blunt object. Learned State counsel also relied upon the FSL report (Ex.P-23), which recorded the presence of semen stains and human spermatozoa on the seized undergarments of the victim and the appellant, thereby providing significant scientific corroboration to the prosecution case. It was further submitted that the evidence regarding seizure of the victim’s undergarment is corroborated by the Investigating Officer Inspector Manish Dhurwe (PW-9) and Sarpanch Sanjay Singh (PW-8), while the preparation of the spot map is supported by Patwari Vinod Kumar Yadav (PW-3). The investigation conducted by PW-9 and the evidence of Head Constable Smt. Subhashini Minj (PW-10) regarding recording of the victim’s statement were also relied upon to demonstrate that the investigation was duly conducted in accordance with law. 12. Learned State counsel submitted that the five-day delay in lodging the FIR dated 18.09.2019, in respect of the incident dated 8 13.09.2019, has been satisfactorily explained by PW-1 and PW-2, who stated that immediately after the incident they first approached the appellant’s parents, thereafter took the child for medical treatment and, upon being advised by the doctor, lodged the report. It was therefore contended that such explained delay cannot by itself create doubt in an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Learned State counsel further submitted that the defence has failed to establish any previous enmity or motive on the part of the victim’s family for falsely implicating the appellant, and no material contradiction, omission or circumstance has been brought on record which would discredit the prosecution witnesses. It was argued that the fact that the victim herself could not be examined owing to her tender age and inability to respond to questions does not demolish the prosecution case, particularly when the testimony of PW-6, the eyewitness, is legally admissible and has been found reliable by the learned Trial Court and is corroborated by medical and scientific evidence. Learned State counsel further submitted that, considering the tender age of the victim and the nature of the offence, the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act operates against the appellant, and the appellant has failed to rebut the same by placing any credible evidence on record. It was further argued that the appellant was a major at the time of occurrence and the victim was merely three years old, and therefore the gravity of the offence, the physical injury caused to the child and the lasting 9 impact upon her cannot be overlooked while considering suspension of sentence. 13. On the question of kidnapping, learned State counsel submitted that the victim was admittedly a child far below the age of majority and was taken away from the lawful guardianship of her parents, and therefore her consent, if any, was wholly immaterial in view of Section 361 IPC. It was lastly submitted that the learned Trial Court, after a comprehensive appreciation of the entire evidence, has rightly convicted the appellant under Sections 363, 366 and 376(A)(B) of the IPC and Sections 5(d), 5(j)/6 of the POCSO Act, while acquitting him of the charge under Section 5(ठ)/6 of the POCSO Act where the prosecution failed to establish the allegation of repeated sexual assault. Thus, according to the learned State counsel, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity, the conviction is based upon cogent and corroborated evidence, and having regard to the gravity of the offence and the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant’s natural life, the present appeal deserves to be rejected. 14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 15. The issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the testimony of the victim deserves acceptance and 10 whether the prosecution has established the case of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 16. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments and has held that the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature deserves acceptance. 17. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that, on the date of the incident, the victim was below the age prescribed under the relevant provisions of law and was therefore a child within the meaning of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 18. In this regard, the learned Trial Court has considered the question of age of the victim on the basis of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The victim was admittedly a child at the time of the incident and was only about three years of age. The father of the victim, examined as PW-1, stated that the victim was three years old at the time of the incident and that she was born at the Sub-Health Centre, Mangari, Block Batouli. He further proved the delivery certificate 11 and birth certificate relating to the victim. The mother of the victim, examined as PW-2, also stated that the victim was three years old and was born at the Sub-Health Centre, Mangari, Block Batouli. 19. The medical witness, Dr. Smt. Snehlata Tirkey, examined as PW- 5, also recorded the age of the victim as three years at the time of her medical examination. The original birth certificate and the delivery certificate placed on record show the date of birth of the victim as 25.07.2016. The said documentary evidence has remained substantially unchallenged in cross-examination. The defence has neither brought on record any material suggesting a different date of birth nor adduced any oral or documentary evidence to rebut the said documents. 20. Thus, from the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the medical evidence and the documentary evidence (birth certificate) relating to the date of birth of the victim, it is established that she was born on 25.07.2016. Consequently, on the date of occurrence, i.e. 13.09.2019, the victim was aged about three years and was clearly below eighteen years of age. She was therefore a “child” within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The finding of the learned Trial Court on this aspect is based on proper appreciation of the evidence and calls for no interference. 21. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that on 12 13.09.2019 at about 4:00 p.m., at the place of occurrence, the appellant took the three-year-old victim away from the lawful guardianship of her parents without their consent and thereby committed the offence of kidnapping punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. 22. In this regard, the victim herself was examined as PW-11. However, at the time of her examination before the Trial Court, she was about five years of age and appeared uncomfortable and did not respond to the questions put to her. Consequently, her substantive evidence could not be recorded. The prosecution case, therefore, has to be examined on the basis of the evidence of her parents, the child witness PW-6, the medical witnesses, the Investigating Officer and the documentary and forensic evidence available on record. 23. PW-1 is the father of the victim and the informant. He has stated that the appellant was known to him and was residing in his neighbourhood. According to him, on the date of the incident, his wife had gone near the house for cutting grass while he had gone towards the house of his brother. When he returned, he found that his three-year-old daughter was not present near the house. On calling her, the victim came towards him from the direction of the appellant’s house. PW-1 has further stated that the victim indicated that the appellant had taken her to his house and that he 13 noticed an abnormal substance on her clothing and abnormality in the condition of her private parts. 24. PW-1 has further stated that PW-6, who is the son of his elder brother, informed him about the incident. According to PW-1, PW- 6 disclosed that the appellant had taken the victim inside his house and had subjected her to sexual assault. PW-1 thereafter informed the parents of the appellant about the incident. He has stated that the appellant’s father assured them that the child would be treated. When the condition of the victim did not improve, she was taken for medical treatment and thereafter, on the advice of the doctor, the matter was reported to the police. 25. PW-1 has also proved the written complaint lodged by him, which has been marked as Ex.P-3. On the basis of Ex.P-3, FIR Ex.P-4 was registered at Police Station Batouli. The evidence of PW-1 regarding registration of the FIR finds corroboration from the evidence of PW-9, the Investigating Officer, who has stated that on 18.09.2019, the written complaint submitted by PW-1 was received and Crime No.84/2019 was registered on its basis. The FIR and the corresponding receipt have been proved as Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-4A respectively. 26. PW-1 has further proved the consent given for medical examination of the victim as Ex.P-5. He has also stated that the police prepared the spot map in his presence, which has been marked as Ex.P-6. The clothing of the victim was seized in his 14 presence and the seizure memo has been marked as Ex.P-8. The evidence of PW-1 regarding these aspects is corroborated by the evidence of PW-9 and PW-8. 27. PW-2, the mother of the victim, has also supported the prosecution case. She has stated that on the date of occurrence she had gone near the house to cut grass and the children were playing nearby. According to her, the appellant took the victim inside his house and subjected her to sexual assault. PW-2 has further stated that after the victim returned, her condition appeared abnormal and that the family members thereafter came to know about the incident. 28. PW-2 has also corroborated the evidence of PW-1 regarding the steps taken after the incident. She stated that the appellant’s parents were informed and that thereafter the victim was taken for medical treatment. She further stated that the matter was subsequently reported to the police and her consent for medical examination was obtained vide Ex.P-10. Her evidence regarding the subsequent conduct of the family is therefore consistent with the testimony of PW-1. 29. During cross-examination, PW-2 admitted that the house of the appellant was situated adjoining their house. She also stated that there was no land dispute between them. The defence has not been able to establish any previous enmity or dispute which could provide a plausible reason for false implication of the appellant. 15 Her evidence on the material aspects of the prosecution case has remained substantially intact. 30. The evidence of PW-6 is of considerable significance. PW-6 was about eight years of age at the time of his examination. Before recording his testimony, the Trial Court put preliminary questions to him and, upon satisfying itself that he was capable of understanding the questions and giving rational answers, permitted his evidence to be recorded. PW-6 stated that at the relevant time he was playing with the victim and that the appellant took the victim towards his house. He thereafter described the sexual assault committed upon the victim inside the house. 31. PW-6 further stated that after the incident the victim returned to her house and the matter was disclosed to the family members. He also stated that his statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been recorded. During cross- examination, the defence suggested to him that the appellant had not committed any such act in his presence and that he had been tutored by the parents of the victim. PW-6 denied these suggestions. His testimony on the material particulars has remained substantially consistent. 32. The mere fact that PW-6 was a child witness does not render his testimony unreliable. Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not prescribe any minimum age for a witness. The relevant consideration is whether the witness is capable of understanding 16 the questions and giving rational answers. In the present case, the Trial Court had specifically assessed the competency of PW-6 before recording his evidence. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the assessment made by the Trial Court was erroneous. 33. In Ratansinh Dalsukhbai Nayak v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 1 SCC 64], Hon’ble Supreme Court stated the law, thus: "6. Pivotal submission of the appellant is regarding acceptability of PW-11's evidence. Age of the witness during examination was taken to be about 10 years. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease- whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer J in Wheeler v. United States. The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the 17 quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon" 34. In the matter of Panchhi v. State of UP 1 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “.....It cannot be said that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring.” 35. With regard to the testimony of child witness the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shantappa Madivalappa Galapuji & others 2 had noticed the case law and held as under: “The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease -- whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on 1 (1998) 7 SCC 177 2 (2009) 12 SCC 731 18 being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. {See Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka (2001) 9 SCC 129}. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [(1997) 5 SCC 341] it was held as follows : (SCC p.343, para 5) :- “A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to given rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored.” 36. Thus, although PW-6 is a child witness, there is no material contradiction between his statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and his testimony before the Court. The witness has also denied the specific suggestion that he was deposing at the instance of or after being tutored by the parents of the victim. His testimony is consistent on the material particulars and is corroborated by the surrounding circumstances and medical and scientific evidence available on record. Therefore, there is no sufficient ground to 19 discard or disbelieve the testimony of PW-6 merely on account of his age. The defence, consequently, cannot derive any benefit from the said objection. 37. More importantly, the testimony of PW-6 cannot be considered in isolation. His evidence receives corroboration from the immediate circumstances narrated by PW-1 and PW-2, the medical evidence, the seizure of the victim’s clothing vide Ex.P-8 and the forensic evidence contained in Ex.P-23. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any material contradiction between the earlier statement of PW-6 and his testimony before the Court which would render his evidence inherently unreliable. 38. Inspector Manish Dhurwe (PW-9), is the Investigating Officer. He has proved the various steps taken during investigation. He stated that after registration of FIR (Ex.P-4), he prepared the spot map (Ex.P-6), arranged for the medical examination of the victim, seized her clothing vide Ex.P-8 and arrested the appellant vide arrest memo (Ex.P-18). He also proved the intimation of arrest (Ex.P-18A). 39. The medical evidence is also material, Dr. Smt. Archana Mishra (PW-7), stated that the three-year-old victim was brought before her for examination on 18.09.2019. She found that the child was suffering from pain and other physical discomfort. She further stated that the child was not permitting examination and was crying. Since the child was below six years of age and detailed 20 examination required appropriate medical facilities, she advised examination by a specialist and referred the victim to District Hospital, Ambikapur. The referral report has been proved as Ex.P- 16 and the treatment document as Ex.P-17. 40. Dr. Smt. Snehlata Tirkey (PW-5), conducted the medical examination of the victim on 19.09.2019. She proved the medical examination report Ex.P-14. She stated that the victim was three years old and was suffering from fever and swelling in both legs. She also noticed an injury in the genital region, which was associated with bleeding and pain on examination. According to her opinion, the injury was caused by a hard and blunt object and was within the relevant period. 41. PW-5 has also referred to the FSL report Ex.P-23. According to the said report, semen stains and human spermatozoa were detected on the seized articles marked as Exhibits A and B. The said forensic finding assumes significance when considered along with the evidence regarding seizure of the clothing of the victim vide (Ex.P-8) and the seizure of the appellant’s clothing vide (Ex.P-9). 42. Dr. Ganesh Beck (PW-4), examined the appellant and proved the medical examination report (Ex.P-13). He stated that the appellant’s secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed and that he was capable of sexual intercourse. Though the doctor did not find any external injury upon the appellant, absence of 21 such injury is not, by itself, inconsistent with the prosecution case. The medical examination of the appellant was principally relevant to establish his physical capability. 43. The evidence of PW-9 further establishes that the seized articles were forwarded for forensic examination through the competent authority. The forwarding letter is Ex.P-22 and the corresponding receipt is Ex.P-22A. The FSL report is Ex.P-23. Thus, the prosecution has established the chain of seizure and forwarding of the relevant articles for scientific examination. 44. On a cumulative assessment of the entire evidence, we find that the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 regarding the circumstances in which the victim was found missing and subsequently returned from the direction of the appellant’s house is consistent with the testimony of PW-6. The testimony of PW-6 is supported by the medical findings and the forensic evidence. The defence has not been able to demonstrate any material contradiction or omission which goes to the root of the prosecution case. 45. The fact that the victim herself could not be examined before the Trial Court does not, in the circumstances of the present case, create a reasonable doubt. Her inability to give evidence was attributable to her tender age and her inability to respond to the questions put to her. The prosecution case is required to be assessed on the evidence which was legally and properly brought 22 on record, and such evidence, in the present case, is sufficient to establish the material circumstances against the appellant. 46. So far as the offence of kidnapping is concerned, the victim was admittedly about three years of age. Her consent, even if assumed, would have no legal significance. The relevant question is whether she was taken or enticed out of the keeping of her lawful guardian without the consent of such guardian. The evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 establishes that the appellant took the child towards his house without the knowledge or consent of her parents. 47. The contention that there was no evidence of force being used in taking the victim away also does not advance the case of the appellant. In the case of a child of about three years of age, the prosecution is not required to establish that physical force was necessarily employed. The statutory protection is intended to safeguard the lawful guardianship of such a child. The subsequent conduct of the appellant, as established through the testimony of PW-6, further connects him with the removal of the victim from the lawful guardianship of her parents. 48. The evidence further establishes that the victim was subjected to penetrative sexual assault after being taken towards the appellant’s house. The testimony of PW-6 on this material aspect is supported by the medical evidence of PW-5 and the forensic report Ex.P-23. The injury found upon the victim and the detection 23 of human spermatozoa on the seized articles constitute important corroborative circumstances. 49. The appellant has not been able to furnish any satisfactory explanation for the incriminating circumstances established by the prosecution. The defence has neither produced any evidence showing that the victim had sustained the injuries in an accidental manner nor offered any plausible explanation for the forensic findings recorded in Ex.P-23. 50. Upon independent re-appreciation of the entire evidence, we find no material illegality, perversity or misreading of evidence in the conclusions reached by the learned Trial Court. The finding that the appellant removed the three-year-old victim from the lawful guardianship of her parents and thereafter subjected her to penetrative sexual assault is supported by the evidence on record. The grounds raised in appeal do not create any reasonable doubt warranting interference with the findings of conviction. 51. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court regarding the taking away of the victim from the lawful guardianship of her parents and the commission of sexual intercourse with her are neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence available on record. 24 52. The findings of conviction and sentenced are based upon proper appreciation of the oral, documentary, medical and forensic evidence and do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or material misappreciation of evidence warranting interference by this Court. 53. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the present criminal appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed. The appellant shall undergo the remaining part of the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court. 54. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 55. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet