31.07.2026 Ct. No.18 Sl. No.4 akd W. P. A. 16444 of 2026 [Amirul Haque & Ors. -Vs- The State of West Bengal & Ors.] Mr. Subir Sanyal .. Sr. Advocate Mr. Udaynarayan Betal Mr. Mriganka Patra … … for the petitioners Mr. Indrajit Roy Chowdhury Ms. Sudipa Banerjee Mr. Jaydipta Mandal … … for the State 1. The petitioners are aggrieved that they have been transferred from the market committee where they are employed to the District/Block office for implementation of various schemes of the Government of West Bengal. This transfer has been made in the garb of the term „placement‟. 2. Before adverting the issues raised by both parties, it is essential to deal with the point of maintainability as raised by Mr. Indrajit Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing for the State. 3. The basis of this argument that the writ petition is not maintainable, stems from Section 27 of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the „said Act‟). According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, Section 27 stipulates a mode and manner in which the authorities (whether the Board or the Director of the Committee) can call for and examine records and take steps in accordance with the statutory provisions and the Rules framed thereunder, in the event the authorities are not satisfied with it. Mr. Roy Chowdhury places reliance on this provision to establish that there is an alternative and efficacious remedy 2 available to the petitioners on account whereof this writ petition should not be entertained. 4. For the sake of convenience, Section 27 is set out hereunder :- “S.27. Supervisory power of the Director and the Board and appeal to the State Government. – (1) The Director or the Board may at any time call for and examine any record from a market committee for the purposes of satisfying himself or itself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by such market committee and may, after giving an opportunity to the market committee of being heard, pass such order thereon as considered fit and proper : Provided that the Director or the Board when he or it, as the case may be, calls for any record from a market committee, shall also notify the other about such action and the other, as the case may be, shall not in such a case take any action. (2) The Director or the Board may, pending the examination and disposal of the matter under sub-section (1), direct that the execution of the decision or order of the market committee be stayed. (3) The market committee, if dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or the Board under sub-section (1), or any person aggrieved by the refusal to stay the execution of the decision or order of the market committee, may prefer an appeal to the State Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed.” 5. The tenor of the Section is clear and unequivocal. It does not give a right to the petitioners to approach the Director or the Board. The Section merely states that the authorities, whether the Director or the Board can call for and examine records of the market committee for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by such committee. This mechanism has been formulated in the Statute to ensure that the market committee functions smoothly and decisions taken by it are subject to some sort of scrutiny by these authorities, the Director or the Board thereof. The finding of the Director and the Board can be challenged and reviewed only between the committee and the authority, whether the Director or the Board. There is absolutely no provision in the Statute or in Section 27 thereof which would entail a remedy for 3 an aggrieved person or employee of the committee, irrespective of the fact whether he is a member of the committee or not. 6. In any event, the question of maintainability as raised is more on the lines of entertainability. Entertainability, since the question of courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have always imposed this restriction on themselves, that in the event there is an alternative and efficacious remedy available to the petitioners, the courts would not interfere. 7. The basis of Section 27 is not to resolve disputes or grievances of individual employees of the committee but more to ensure that the committee carries on its functions as stipulated in the Statute, within the set parameters. Thus, I do not find any reason to hold that the writ petition cannot be entertained. 8. Mr. Subir Sanyal, learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners while submitting on merits has raised the following issues : (i) The petitioners have all been employed in the market committee and are bound by the Statute on account whereof, in terms of Sections 2(g) & (ga), Section 3, Section 12(xii), Sections 14 (3) & (4) and Section 16 make it clear that the petitioners as employees of the market committee are meant to work or discharge their duties only within the domain of the market committee. The domain of the market committee is restricted to the market area and not anything beyond that. 4 (ii) The appointment of the petitioners all stems from Section 14(3) which gives exclusive authority and power to the market committee to engage such employees. In addition thereto, Section 14(4) makes it clear that the salaries and allowances of the officers and employees of the market committee shall be paid from the market committee fund. Section 12(xii) makes this issue absolutely clear in so far as rendering duties by the employees are concerned. (iii) The petitioners have been referred to as public servants under Section 31 of the said Act, within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which is pari passu with Sections 198 to 205 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. (iv) The petitioners whether in the garb or nomenclature of „placement‟, even if it is temporary, cannot be transferred from one department to another. Transfer, if at all has to be made within the department itself. Clearly a transfer effected upon the petitioners dated July 8, 2026 seeks to put the petitioners from the market committee to the office of the respective district Block Development Officers (BDOs) to implement various schemes of the Government of West Bengal. This has been mentioned in no uncertain terms in the impugned order dated July 8, 2026. According to Mr. Sanyal, this transfer made inter- 5 departmental wise of the petitioners is not sustainable. (v) Mr. Sanyal has placed reliance on the Treatise by Sri Samaraditya Pal, on Law Relating to Public Service. Chapter 18 of the said Treatise makes it clear in Clause 18.1 thereof that „transfer in relation to service, reduced to simple terms, means a change of place of employment within an organization. It is an incident of public service and, generally, does not require the consent of the employee.‟ (vi) The transfer order itself dated July 8, 2026 has been issued by the concerned District Magistrate acting as the Chairperson of the North 24- Parganas Zilla Regulated Market Committee. The concerned District Magistrate may be the Chairperson, but he does not have the authority on his own to take a decision of transferring/placing the petitioners from the regulated market committee to a separate organization to discharge functions thereat. (vii) Mr. Sanyal has also brought to the notice of the Court that the designation of the concerned District Magistrate as the Chairperson of the Regulated Market Committee is erroneous as the word „Zilla‟ is an addition thereto and there exists no such Zilla Regulated Market Committee. (viii) The natural corollary of this point is that any transfer can take place only through the orders of 6 the employer. The Chairperson alone is not the employer and since this Committee is a body corporate, the employer is the market committee itself which is constituted by several other persons. Thus, this transfer order issued by the Chairperson ought to be set aside. (ix) The Chairperson is not authorized to communicate the order of the market committee. Such communication has to be in terms of Rule 26 of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Rules, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the „said Rules‟). Rule 26(2) specifies that the Secretary as the principal officer has to carry into effect the resolution of the market committee. Hence, the Chairperson was not authorized even to communicate the order to the petitioners. (x) Mr. Sanyal has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India : a) 1997 Supreme (SC) 1316 [State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Inder Singh & Ors.] b) (2004) 2 SCC 120 [Ajay Gandhi & Anr. vs. B. Singh & Ors.] (Paragraph 14) c) (2006) 8 SCC 129 [Indu Shekhar Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.] (Paragraph 40) 9. Mr. Indrajit Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing for the State-respondents has made the following submissions to defend the order of transfer dated July 8, 2026 : 7 (i) The petitioners are all employees of the market committee, which is a statutory corporation under the State of West Bengal. It is the State which exercises a deep and pervasive control over such corporation and the employees of the market committee have to be construed as employees of the State. (ii) The transfer is not a matter of right. Unless, transfers can be shown to be mala fide or in violation of the Statute or not in public interest, the Courts would be cautious to interfere with an order of transfer. (iii) Mr. Roy Chowdhury places reliance on a decision of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 532 (Paragraph 4). (iv) The authorities have decided to place the services of the petitioners from one department i.e. the market committee to another department of the Government of West Bengal. Hence, even if this „placement‟ is construed as a transfer, the same ought not to be interfered as there is no case made out by the petitioners that the same is prejudicial to the public at large or is mala fide or that it is against any standing orders/executive orders. (v) Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also placed reliance on a decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sri Pubi Lombi vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors. [Civil Appeal 8 No. 4129 of 2024], where it has been held in no uncertain terms that the scope of judicial review is rather limited in case of transfer. (vi) Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also referred to a resolution taken by the regulated market committee of the North 24-Parganas district, though not placed on record, by which the „placement‟ of the petitioners has been duly vetted. Thus, the question of the Chairperson, the concerned District Magistrate not being authorized is redundant as the decision has been taken by the committee itself and the Chairperson had merely communicated the same to the petitioners by way of the impugned order dated July 8, 2026. 10. I have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and perused the documents on record as well as the decisions placed by them. 11. That the petitioners are employees of the regulated market committee is not in doubt. It is also not in doubt that as a regulated market committee, the said body corporate is under the deep and pervasive control of the Government of West Bengal. 12. The only question which falls for consideration is whether the petitioners are liable to be transferred from their place of appointment to a separate place being the office of the district Block Development Officers (BDOs) in order to implement the schemes formulated by the Government of West Bengal? 9 13. Irrespective of the nomenclature of placement, which has been construed to be a transfer, so much is clear that the petitioners have been placed, by the impugned order dated July 8, 2026 to serve in implementation of the schemes and not in their place of appointment i.e. the market committees. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the market committees and the implementation of the schemes are connected in any manner or have been undertaken by the same authority, the market committee, to enable the petitioners as employees of the market committee to be transferred from one limb of its function to another. 14. It is absolutely clear that the petitioners are being transferred from the market committee to the office of the Block Development Officers (BDOs) in their respective districts to assist in the implementation of the schemes. Thus, it can be safely concluded that the market committees are in no way concerned with the implementation of the schemes formulated by the Government and are not in any manner concerned with the implementation either. 15. The schemes are administrative schemes which are to be implemented by the Administration of the State. This would mean employees in any administrative office of the State can be engaged to implement such schemes. The petitioners have specific work contours, which is clear from Sections 2(g) and (ga) of the said Act. Their work is limited to that of the market committee, which works within its domain, which is a market area and which has to be duly declared under Section 3 of the said Act. 10 16. This is a declared market area where the petitioners are engaged. The petitioners cannot be uprooted from their place of employment and service to a completely different department with unknown work contours as that is clearly against the very basis of the Act under which the committee has been established and the employment of the petitioners are prescribed. 17. It is true that under Sections 5(3) and 5(5) as well as Section 10 of the said Act, the State Government exercises a deep and pervasive control over the statutory corporation as submitted by Mr. Roy Chowdhury. However, the exercise of control by the State Government does not make the petitioners employees of the State Government. They are employed by the committee and are bound by the committee‟s decisions, so long as these decisions are within the contours of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The decisions taken by the committee in violation of the Statute or any of the other provisions guiding their acts of commission and/or omission cannot be sustained in law. 18. The petitioners are squarely covered under Sections 14(3) and 14(4) of the said Act which specifies that it is the committee who has a right to appoint not just officers but also employees such as the petitioners herein. Section 14(4) of the said Act further specifically stipulates that the salaries and allowances of the officers and employees of the market committee shall be paid from the market committee fund. In fact, all other receivables of the employees such as leave allowance, pension, gratuity and provident fund are to be provided by the committee. Clearly the committee is somewhat 11 independent while dealing with its employees. Independent from control not from complying with the statutory provisions by which the committee itself is guided. 19. Section 12(xii) of the said Act also specifies that the employees are to perform such other duties and discharge such other functions, which has been qualified by the term imposed or conferred upon it by or under this Act or the Rules made thereunder. Hence, the obligation to discharge duties by the employees can vary and be enhanced as long as these duties and obligations have been cast in the Statute. There is no such duty discernable from the Statute or the Rules framed thereunder that the petitioners are obliged to perform any duty beyond the realm or domain of the Statute, in administrative offices as has sought to be cast upon them by the impugned order of „placement‟ dated July 8, 2026. 20. The authorities are clearly asking for a favour from the petitioners, even though for a limited period, to engage their services in administrative offices to implement the schemes formulated by the Government. This is clearly in violation of the statutory provisions. 21. The decision to transfer may have been taken by the committee, as submitted by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, though not placed on record. However, the same has been communicated by way of the impugned order of July 8, 2026 by the Chairperson, which is not strictly in line with Rule 26(2) of the said Rules. As the principal officer, it is the Secretary of the committee who ought to have issued such a letter. However, this is merely an infraction and cannot be said to clothe the 12 petitioner with any further rights seeking annulment of the order dated July 8, 2026. 22. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab & Ors. (Supra) and Indu Shekhar Singh & Ors. (Supra) has in no uncertain terms stated that deputation is the concept of transferring an employee to a post outside his cadre. If, this particular case is construed to be a deputation, there has to be a prior consent of the petitioners. The petitioners cannot be deputed without consent. This term „placement‟ has not been defined anywhere and since this is an inter-organizational transfer or a transfer outside the cadre in which the petitioners are employed, it has to be construed as a deputation. This deputation, without obtaining consent of the petitioners is clearly unsustainable. 23. The decision of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Ajay Gandhi & Anr. (Supra) may not be applicable in the instant case, if the submission of the State authorities that the Committee had itself taken the decision as the market committee is accepted. The committee as the employer has taken a decision. 24. The decision relied upon by the State-respondents in Sri Puri Lombi (Supra) makes it clear that in judicial review, a Court can interfere if it is a case of mala fide or infraction of any professed, norm or principle. This case falls clearly within those parameters as the professed norm of transfer that it cannot be done on an inter-departmental basis has been violated. Even if, one were to construe this „placement‟ as a deputation, there is still an infraction as deputation has to be with the prior consent 13 of the concerned employee. In this case, there has been no such prior consent, which entails judicial interference. 25. The second decision relied upon by the State- respondents in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose & Ors. (Supra) makes it clear that not only a ground of mala fide or public interest but also a transfer made in violation of the Statute would become the subject matter of judicial interference. 26. On the basis of the afore-stated discussion, the following conclusions are inevitable :- a) The petitioners are the employees of the market committee and are bound by the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder. b) The respondent authorities are all creatures of a Statute (the said Act) and are bound by it. c) The respondent authorities cannot exercise any power not bestowed on them by the Statute. d) The Statute (said Act) does not provide the committee with any power to transfer its employees to any other department of the State Government. e) The petitioners have been transferred beyond their prescribed work contours as specified in the said Act and Rules. f) The petitioners cannot be asked to render service in a separate department/cadre, merely because the committee has issued an order of transfer. The communication of the order of transfer, is an infraction which can be overlooked in this case as the Secretary and not the Chairperson ought to have done the same. 14 g) The petitioners cannot be asked to serve in a department which is completely independent of and not within the realm or dominion of the employer of the petitioners i.e. the market committee. h) The petitioners have been „placed‟ on deputation from one department to another, without any prior consent, which is impermissible in law. 27. In view of the afore-stated conclusions, the order dated July 8, 2026 transferring the petitioners cannot be sustained and is accordingly, set aside. 28. However, the order of transfer dated July 8, 2026 makes no reference to any resolution on the basis whereof such order was passed though such resolution has been referred to by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, but not placed on record, the existence whereof is disputed by Mr. Subir Sanyal. 29. With the afore-stated directions, WPA 16444 of 2026 is disposed of. 30. There shall be no order as to costs. 31. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. (Reetobroto Kumar Mitra, J.)