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2026 DAILYLAW 316 (KER)

Rose Mary @ Seema v. State Of Kerala Represented By Public Prosecutor

2026-03-17

Syam Kumar V M

body2026
ORDER : Syam Kumar V.M., J. This Criminal Miscellaneous Case is filed by the petitioner seeking to quash Annexure A1 FIR and Annexure A2 Final Report in Crime No.913 of 2016 of Ernakulam Town North Police Station, pending as C.P.No.12 of 2020 before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam. 2. Petitioner is arrayed as 3 rd accused in the above crime and is charged with having committed offences punishable under Sections 370 (3), 370 (4) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and Section 79 (1) of the Juvenile Justice Act , 2015 (for short 'JJ Act'). 3. The prosecution case is that pursuant to the complaint received from the Child Welfare Committee, the statement of CW1 was recorded, wherein she had stated that she, who hails from Orissa and was aged 17 years, had been brought to Kerala by the 1 st accused and was handed over to the 2nd accused, who is also a native of Orissa. The 2 nd accused thereafter handed her over to the petitioner, who, in turn, after receiving a consideration of Rs.6,000/-, delivered her to the 4 th accused for employment as a domestic help. Based on the said statement, the above crime was registered wherein the petitioner was arrayed as the 3rd accused. She seeks to quash the charge and the proceedings initiated against her, terming them illegal and unsustainable. 4. Heard Sri. Manu Roy, Advocate for the petitioner and Sri.Alex M. Thombra, the learned Public Prosecutor. Regarding service on the 3rd respondent, the Registry has reported that the notice issued to her at her Orissa address has not been returned. 5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though it is alleged that CW1 is a minor during the relevant time, her birth certificate or any other proof of age had not been obtained or produced to prove her age. According to the learned counsel, Section 79 (1) of the JJ Act is thus not attracted, and no prima facie case to attract a charge under the said Section has been made out. On the said count itself, it is submitted that the charge laid against the petitioner is fit to be quashed. 6. According to the learned counsel, Section 79 (1) of the JJ Act is thus not attracted, and no prima facie case to attract a charge under the said Section has been made out. On the said count itself, it is submitted that the charge laid against the petitioner is fit to be quashed. 6. Further, it is contended by the learned counsel that at the time of registering the FIR, the petitioner was not even arrayed as an accused nor was her role anywhere mentioned. Later, she was added to the list of the accused in the Final Report solely to wrongly implicate her in a criminal case. It is submitted that, even taking into account the statements in the Final Report, the purported role of the petitioner is not mentioned or revealed, even prima facie, in any manner. Based on Section 370 (3) of the IPC , it is contended that the said Section contemplates a situation where the offence of trafficking involves more than one person. The said Section, according to the learned counsel, would thus be attracted only in situations where more than one person had been subjected to trafficking. Materials on record disclose allegations only with respect to a single victim, namely CW1. Thus, the charge laid under 370 (3) of the IPC  the is unsustainable. It is further submitted that 370 (4) IPC specifically deals with the trafficking of a minor. However, to invoke the said provision, the prosecution must prima facie establish that the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged occurrence. In the present case, no reliable documentary evidence, even prima facie, to substantiate that CW1 was a minor has been produced. In view of such stark absence of any material to prove the age of the alleged minor involved, the ingredients of 370 (4) IPC are not made out. It is thus prayed that the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner pursuant to Annexure A1 FIR and Annexure A2 Final Report is wholly unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the contentions vehemently and submitted that Annexure A2 Final Report, when read in its entirety, clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences charged. 7. The learned Public Prosecutor opposed the contentions vehemently and submitted that Annexure A2 Final Report, when read in its entirety, clearly disclose the ingredients of the offences charged. It is submitted that the materials collected during the investigation, including the statement of CW1 and other witnesses, disclose the elements of recruitment, transportation, transfer and receipt of a person for the purpose of exploitation, which squarely fall within the definition of “trafficking” under Section 370 IPC . It is further contended by the Public Prosecutor that with respect to Section 370 (4) IPC , the statement of CW1 clearly indicates that she was aged 17 years at the relevant time. Production of documentary proof of age is a matter of evidence and can be done during the trial through appropriate records and witnesses. The absence of documentary proof at this stage does not ipso facto render 370(4) inapplicable. The learned Public Prosecutor thus prays that the Crl.M.C. may be dismissed. 8. I have heard both sides in detail and considered the contentions put forth. It is pertinent to note that the charges levelled against the petitioner are under Sections 370 (3), 370(4) and 34 of the IPC and Section 79 (1) of the JJ Act. It would be relevant to reproduce Section 370 of the . It reads as follows: "370. Trafficking of person. -- (1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation,(a)recruits,(b)transport (c)harbours, (d)transfers, or (e)receives, a person or persons, by Firstly - using threats, or Secondly- using force, or any other form of coercion, or Thirdly - by abduction, or Fourthly - by practising fraud, or deception, or Fifthly - by abuse of power, or Sixthly - by inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received, commits the offence of trafficking. Explanation 1.--The expression "exploitation" shall include any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs. Explanation 2.The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of the offence of trafficking. (2)Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 2.The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of the offence of trafficking. (2)Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. (3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person , it shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one minor, it shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than fourteen years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (6) If a person is convicted of the offence of trafficking of minor on more than one occasion, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. (7) When a public servant or a police officer is involved in the trafficking of any person then, such public servant or police officer shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine." 9. It is seen from Annexure A2 Final Report that the petitioner has been charged under Section 370 (3) of the IPC . A plain reading of Section 370 (3) of the IPC of the reveals that the said provision is attracted only when the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person. In the case at hand, the prosecution allegation pertains only to a single person as the victim. The essential ingredient required to invoke Section 370(3) IPC is thus not satisfied. Hence, prima facie, the offence under Section 370 (3) IPC is not attracted against the accused. 10. In the case at hand, the prosecution allegation pertains only to a single person as the victim. The essential ingredient required to invoke Section 370(3) IPC is thus not satisfied. Hence, prima facie, the offence under Section 370 (3) IPC is not attracted against the accused. 10. Coming to Section 370 (4) of the IPC , with which the petitioner has been charged, the said provision specifically relates to the trafficking of a minor, and in order to attract the same, the prosecution must prima facie establish that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident. In the present case, no materials or documents have been produced or even referred to in the Final Report to prove the age of the de facto complainant. Not even a prima facie substantiation to maintain the charge that the alleged victim is a minor is revealed from the Final report. In the absence of any such material, the essential ingredient required to invoke Section 370 (4) IPC cannot be stated to have been even prima facie satisfied. It is also pertinent to note that no document regarding the de facto complainant's age has been produced or even referred to in the Final Report. Despite such a glaring absence of any material to show that the de facto complainant was a minor, the Investigating Officer has proceeded to incorporate Section 370 (4) IPC in the FIR as well as in the Final Report. 11. As regards the charge laid under Section 79 of the JJ Act, the said provision relates to the exploitation of a child employee and keeping a child in bondage for employment. A perusal of the FIS given by the de facto complainant does not disclose any material implicating the petitioner of an offence under . Similarly, the Final Report does not even prima facie indicate that the alleged victim was engaged by the petitioner or had kept her in bondage for the purpose of any employment. No allegation of the petitioner withholding the earnings of the alleged victim or using such earnings by the petitioner for her own purposes has been alleged or made out. In the absence of specific allegations or supporting materials to even prima facie point to the existence of the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under of the JJ Act, the invocation of the said provision is legally unsustainable. In the absence of specific allegations or supporting materials to even prima facie point to the existence of the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under of the JJ Act, the invocation of the said provision is legally unsustainable. It has to be concluded that no case under has even been made out against the petitioner in the Final Report. 12. It is also pertinent to note that the name of the petitioner does not appear in the list of the accused in the FIR, and no overt act has been alleged against the petitioner in the FIR. The petitioner was subsequently arrayed as an accused only upon filing of the Final Report. The version in the FIR regarding the chain of events leading up to the alleged incident materially differs from the version presented in the Final Report. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and others [1988 SCC OnLine SC 80] has referred to the "Bleak Chances of Conviction test” which allows courts, particularly under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., in India to quash criminal proceedings when evidence is so weak that a conviction is highly improbable. The said course, it has been noted, prevents the misuse of judicial time and also spares the accused from unnecessary, long-term legal harassment. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage .” In view of the facts and circumstances discussed above and the settled principles of law, this Court finds that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. The Final report does not disclose ingredients to attract the offences under Sections 370 (3), 370 (4) and 34 of the IPC and Section 79 (1) of the JJ Act. Therefore, Annexure A1 FIR and Annexure A2 Final Report in Crime No.913 of 2016 of Ernakulam Town North Police Station, pending as C.P.No.12 of 2020 and all proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the same on the files of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam, are hereby quashed. Crl.M.C. is allowed.