1 CGHC010218022026 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1360 of 2026 1 - Dayaram Khairwar @ Shubham Khairwar S/o Late Shri Koshiram Khairwar Aged About 49 Years R/o Barbaspur, Police Station- Akaltara, District- Janjgir- Champa (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House O0cer, Police Station Ambikapur, District- Sarguja (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant : Shri Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate For Respondent : Shri Anand Gupta, Deputy Government Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Order on Board 07/08/2026 1. This is a criminal appeal under Section 14A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short ‘the PoA Act’). 2. This appeal arises out of the order dated 14.5.2026 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocities), Ambikapur, District Surguja in Digitally signed by GOPAL SINGH Date: 2026.08.07 18:42:26 +0530 2 Special Sessions (Atrocities) Case No.26 of 2022. By the impugned order, second application of the appellant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘the BNSS’) for grant of bail has been rejected. 3. The appellant has been arrested on 2.4.2022 in connection with Crime No.278 of 2022 registered at Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja for o>ences punishable under Sections 376(2) (n), 376(D), 294, 506, 109, 115 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’), Section 3(2)(v) of the PoA Act and Sections 67, 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short ‘the IT Act’). He is facing trial before the learned Special Judge and charges under Sections 376(2)(n), 509B and 506 Part II of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the PoA Act have been framed against him. 4. Case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is that in the year 2019, the prosecutrix was residing in the house of Nurjahan Nusrat and Musarrat Ali. Accused Shavnam and Alam informed the prosecutrix that there is an occultist (tantrik), namely, Shubham Khairwar, who possesses super natural power and can generate money from the body of a virgin girl. After this, Shubham Khairwar came to the house of Nurjahan, took measurement of the prosecutrix and in the name of generating money, he raped her. 5. Learned counsel appearing for appellant Dayaram Khairwar alias Shubham Khairwar submits that this is the Brst application of the 3 appellant before this Court for grant of bail. The appellant was arrested on 2.4.2022 and since then he is in jail and has already spent more than 4 years and 4 months as an under trial prisoner. The prosecution has projected 14 witnesses in the charge-sheet and till date, examination of the prosecutrix is under way from 2.3.2023 and has not been completed as yet. The trial is progressing at a very slow pace and is not likely to be completed in near future. He submits that from perusal of the order sheets of the learned Trial Court, it would be quite evident that barring one or two occasions before framing of the charges the trial has not been delayed on account of the appellant. The charges against the appellant were framed on 3.1.2023 and for lapse of more than 3 years and 6 months the trial has not been concluded. Thus, he further submits that speedy trial is a fundamental right of the appellant. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, as the trial is delayed on one or other pretext, the examination of prosecutrix could not be completed. Thus, the appellant is entitled to grant of bail on account of delay of trial. On merits, he submits that the prosecutrix is a major girl, the story put forth by her is unrealistic. First Information Report was lodged after about delay of more than 2 years. Medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution. He submits that looking to the detention period of the appellant and delay in lodging the FIR, medical evidence, the impugned order may be set aside and the appellant may be granted regular bail. 4 6. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that apart from the appellant, there are 5 other accused persons, who have also been charged with the aforesaid o>ences with the aid of Section 120B of the IPC and co-accused Musarrat Ali, Smt. Nurjahan, Shavnam Parveen, Mohmood Alam Mobeen have been granted bail by this Court in Criminal Appeals No.778 of 2023 and 906 of 2023 vide order dated 28.4.2023 relying upon the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court granting bail to another co- accused Bhagmaniya alias Sandhya Singh in Criminal Appeal No.921 of 2023 vide order dated 24.3.2023. 7. To buttress his submission, learned counsel for the appellant places reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3539, Prabhakar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 11 SCC 648, Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170, Parkash Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2019) 5 SCC 628, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman alias Ara alias Mir Usman Ali, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2066, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813. He further places reliance upon the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in the case of Dattatray Shrikrushna Shejole v. State of Maharashtra through Police Station O>cer, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 5584 and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Yusuf Aajam v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 4329. Lastly, he places reliance upon the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of 5 Sandeep Kumar Mishra v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 56. 8. Opposing the appeal, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent submits that delay in lodging the FIR is always not fatal to the case of the prosecution. The allegations against the appellant are serious in nature. He submits that the conviction of any accused can sustain only on solitary statement of prosecutrix if the evidence is of sterling quality and highly exceptional and she could be terms as a sterling witness. Thus, even if medical evidence may not support the case of the prosecution, the conviction can sustain. He further submits that the prosecutrix is being examined and since there are large number of accused persons the case is being adjourned as they could not conclude the cross-examination. He submits that long detention of the appellant may not be the sole ground for grant of bail looking to the serious allegations levelled against him. There is also a criminal antecedent of the appellant of similar nature. Thus, he submits that the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed and the appellant is not entitled for grant of bail. 9. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the case diary and other material available with due care. 10. The victim/prosecutrix had appeared before this Court through video conferencing through concerned District Legal Aid Services 6 Authority, Ambikapur, District Surguja on 1.7.2026 and raised objection on grant of bail to the appellant. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before this Court the order sheets of trial pending before the learned Special Judge from the date of Bling of the charge-sheet till 25.6.2026. He has also placed on record the certiBed copy of the evidence of the prosecutrix recorded till 10.4.2026. Perusal of the order sheets of the Trial Court would indicate that the charge-sheet against the appellant and other co-accused was Bled on 30.5.2022. Later on, the case remained pending on di>erent occasions on applications of bail Bled by di>erent accused persons. The matter was posted on 4.8.2022 for framing of charges against the accused persons. On couple of occasions, adjournments were sought by learned counsel for the accused persons on argument on charge and ultimately on 3.1.2023 the charges against the accused persons including the appellant were framed. On 6.1.2023, the trial programme was presented by the Special Public Prosecutor and the case was Brstly listed for evidence on 1st, 2nd and 3rd of February, 2023. The trial was adjourned on one or the other pretext and ultimately the trial was again listed on 2nd, 3rd and 4th of March, 2023 for evidence of the prosecution witnesses. In between, the case was listed on di>erent dates for bail applications of the accused persons. The prosecutrix appeared before the learned Trial Court on 2.3.2023. Her examination-in-chief was completed and as the time of the Court was over, she was bound over for 3.3.2023. Her cross- examination could also not be completed on 3.3.2023 and time 7 of the Court was over. Thus, her cross-examination was adjourned for the next day. The matter remained pending before the learned Trial Court and di>erent applications Bled by the accused persons were decided. The cross-examination of the prosecutrix resumed after 3.3.2023 and it appears that her cross-examination resumed on 19.12.2025 and thereafter her cross-examination again resumed on 10.4.2026. 12. It has not been disputed by learned counsel appearing for the parties that barring the prosecutrix the examination of any other prosecution witnesses have started. When this matter was listed on 14.7.2026, it was informed that the case before the Trial Court was listed on 25.7.2026 for further evidence of the prosecutrix and on request of learned counsel for the appellant, the matter was listed on 30.7.2026 in the Bnal hearing list and thereafter it appears that the prosecutrix evidence has not concluded as yet. 13. In case of X (supra), an FIR under Sections 376(D) and 342 IPC was lodged against the accused in that case by the petitioner and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was also Bled. The bail application of the accused in that case was allowed by the High Court upon consideration of some discrepancies emanating between the FIR and the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. That order was challenged by the petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in which the Supreme Court observed thus: 8 “16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach to its Bnal conclusion which may either result in the conviction of the accused or acquittal of the accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the accused and orders release of the accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only in the event if the trial gets unduly delayed and that too for no fault on the part of the accused, the Court may be justiAed in ordering his release on bail on the ground that right of the accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed. 20. In such circumstances, without disturbing the order of bail passed by the High Court, we direct that the Respondent No. 2 herein shall not enter the said village till the completion of the trial. As we have asked the respondent No. 2 accused not to enter the village, he shall furnish address of his new residence to the investigating o0cer attached with the concerned police station. The Respondent No. 2 shall not try to inGuence any of the prosecution witnesses in any manner or directly or indirectly try to contact the victim and her family.” 14. In case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of 9 the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.” 15. Further, in case of Central Bureau of Investigation (supra), following has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “20. Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 346 of the BNSS, 2023) contains a mandatory provision that in every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day basis until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the Court Bnds the adjournment of the case beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. The emphasis of this Section cannot be overlooked and must not be overlooked by any Judicial O0cer who tries a criminal case, much less by the higher o0cers, like the Sessions Judges presiding over the Sessions Court, where serious o>ences are being tried day in and day out. 21. It is true that the court has the discretion to defer the cross-examination. But we do not approve the practice prevailing in the trial courts across the country that the examination-in-chief of a particular witness is recorded in a particular month and his cross- examination would follow in particular subsequent month. The legal position is that once the examination of witnesses starts the court concerned must continue the trial from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined (except those whom the public prosecutor has given up). We are at pains to note that it is almost a common practice and regular 10 occurrence that the trial courts Gout the said mandate with impunity. Even when witnesses are present, cases are adjourned on far less serious reasons or even on Gimsy grounds. The legislature itself has frowned at granting adjournment on Gimsy grounds. 31. The right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Brst written articulation of the right to speedy trial appeared in 1215 in the Magna Carta: "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." Article 21 of the Indian constitution declares that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure laid by law." Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Babu Singh v. State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579 AIR 1978 SC 527 remarked, "Our justice system even in grave cases, su>ers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to "fair trial" whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and Bnally punished within a reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings." In the case of Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 632 (1986) 3 SCR 562, this Court has held that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right. Further it was stated by this Court that the consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of fundamental right.” 16. In case of Dattatray Shrikrushna Shejole (supra), the Bombay High Court, relying upon the judgment in case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) and also considering the oral evidence, medical evidence and delay in trial granted bail to the petitioner 11 therein who was charged for o>ences punishable under Sections 366, 376, 376(AB), 504, 506 IPC and Sections 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual O>ences Act. 17. The Allahabad High Court in case of Sandeep Kumar Mishra (supra) observed as under: “21. Much water has Gown down the ganges since passing of the aforesaid judgment by the Apex Court. The Indian society has undergone a complete change during the said period of about 40 years and now it is more often observed that false implication in sexual o>ences is on a rise. The inordinate delay in lodging the FIR is to be considered at the time of adjudicating the bail. 22. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, the evidence on record, taking into consideration the inordinate delay in lodging of the FIR by the informant and also the fact that the trial is at its conclusive end, and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the Court is of the view that the applicants have made out a case for bail. The bail applications are allowed.” 18. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid supra cases, upon examination of the facts of the present case, it appear that the FIR was lodged after 2 years of the alleged incident. The appellant is in jail since 2.4.2022. The victim was Brstly examined on 2.3.2023 and despite of passing of 3 years her evidence has not been concluded as yet. It is settled position that speedy trial is a 12 fundamental right of the accused. The other co-accused persons are enlarged on bail. Thus, the delay cannot be attributed solely upon the appellant. Of course, there is a criminal antecedent of the appellant of similar nature, however, in case of Yusuf Aajam (supra), it has been observed that though criminal antecedents are relevant, however, prior involvement alone, without any conviction or any demonstrated misuse of liberty, cannot override all other relevant factors. In this context, learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the FIR lodged against the appellant in the other o>ences of similar nature was also belated by 7 months and he is still required to be held guilty for that. Thus, presumption of innocence would prevail in his favour. Thus, taking into consideration all relevant factors, particularly, the period of detention of the appellant and delay in trial and the discussion made hereinabove, in the opinion of this Court, without entering into the merits of the case, the appellant is held to be entitled for grant of bail. 19. Thus, the criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 14.5.2026 is hereby set aside. The appellant is directed to be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond of Rs.50,000 (Fifty Thousand) with one surety of the like sum to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court for his appearance before the Trial Court as and when directed till disposal of the trial. It is directed that the appellant shall not act in any manner which will be prejudicial to fair and expeditious trial and he shall not involve himself in any o>ence of similar nature in future. He 13 shall not enter the residence and village of the prosecutrix till completion of the trial. 20. It is made clear that the above observations are only for the purposes of deciding the bail application. The Trial Court will hear and decide the trial on its own merits without being inGuenced by any of the observations made herein-above. 21. As a result, this criminal appeal is allowed. 22. Copy of this order be sent to the Trial Court for information and necessary action. 23. The appellant/accused be informed about this order accordingly. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) JUDGE Gopal