2026:CGHC:6372 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 225 of 2025 1 - Sandeep Kumar Sonkar S/o Shri Gopi Aged About 27 Years, R/o H 30, Civil Ward P.W.D. Colony, Tahsil And District Damoh, Madhya Pradesh, Presently Residing At Village Sendha, Police Station Poudi, District M.C.B. (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Ramgopal S/o Venkat Aged About 56 Years, R/o Village Saindha, P.S. Podi, Tahsil Manendragarh, District M.C.B. (C.G.) 2 - Abhimanyu (Died) S/o Venkat, Aged About 38 Years, Through Legal Heirs 2.1 - (A) Fumani Sahu W/o Late Abhimanyu Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Sendha, P.S. Podi, District Korea Now District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 2.2 - (B) Rinki Sahu D/o Late Abhimanyu Aged About 4 Years Minor Through Legal Natural Guardian Mother Fumani Sahu, W/o Late Abhimanyu, Aged About 27 Years, R/o Village Sendha, P.S. Podi, District Korea Now District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 2.3 - (C) Kanti Sahu D/o Late Abhimanyu Aged About 2 Years Minor Through Legal Natural Guardian Mother Fumani Sahu, W/o Late Abhimanyu, Aged About 27 Years, R/o Village Sendha, P.S. Podi, District Korea Now District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 3 - Musammat Geeta W/o Vishnu Aged About 36 Years , R/o Village Bardar, P.S. Khadgawa, Tahsil Khadgawa, District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 4 - Anirudh S/o Venkat Aged About 40 Years, R/o Village Sendha, P.S. Podi, Tahsil Manendragarh, District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Baikunthpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh 6 - Indramani Thakur W/o Shri Netlal Thakur Aged About 40 Years, R/o Ward No. 15, Bhulsikala, Tahsil Kusmi, District Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 7 - Abdul Karim S/o Shri Abdul Rahim Aged About 55 Years, R/o Nagpur, P.S. Podi, Tahsil Manendragarh, District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 8 - Jibael Alag S/o Shri Rasul Miya Aged About 60 Years, R/o Ward No. 40, Nehru Colony Chirmiri, District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2026.02.11 16:39:30 +0530 2 9 - Mahelaka Siddiqui W/o Shri Rahat Hussain Aged About 31 Years, R/o 13 Railway Fatak, Napur. P.S. Podi, Tahsil Manendragarh, District M.C.B., Chhattisgarh 10 - Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Through Chief Regional Manager, Vyapar Vihar Road, Bajpai Peliya, First Floor, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore and Manisha Yadav, Advocte For Respondent No. 1 : MR. Parag Kotecha, Advocate For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Mayur Khandelwal, PL For respondents No. 10 : Mr. Ali Asgar, Advocate For other respondents : None despite of service Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Order On Board 04.02.2026 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the legality, correctness, and judicial propriety of the order dated 08.01.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned First District Judge, Manendragarh, District Koriya (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the learned DJ) in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 97/2024, arising out of the order dated 22.01.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-II, Manendragarh, District Koriya (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the learned Civil Judge) in Civil Suit No. 3-A/2020 (Annexure P/2). By the impugned order, the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed as being barred by limitation. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No.1 (plaintiff) had instituted a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. Initially, the petitioner was not arrayed as a party to the said suit. It is contended that the petitioner purchased 0.121 hectare of land which formed part of Khasra No. 16/3 from its owner Aniruddha (respondent No.3) through a registered sale deed after payment of due consideration. Subsequently, a registered exchange deed was executed between the petitioner and respondent No.4 whereby the petitioner exchanged the purchased land for land bearing Khasra 3 Nos. 16/6 and 16/8, and was put in possession thereof. It is further submitted that the said property was also claimed by respondent No.1 (plaintiff) in the civil suit. Respondent No.1 filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short CPC) seeking grant of temporary injunction. The learned Civil Judge rejected the said application vide order dated 27.10.2021 which was challenged by respondent No.1 in a miscellaneous appeal before the learned ADJ. The appeal was allowed on 16.02.2023 and injunction was granted, as a result of which the petitioner was restrained from continuing construction over the suit property. Thereafter, respondent No.1 filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC and impleaded the petitioner as a party defendant. On 22.01.2024, another application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC was taken up for consideration. The learned Civil Judge while disposing of the application observed that the earlier application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC had been rejected on 27.10.2021, but the appellate court had directed the parties to maintain status quo. Holding that the order passed by the learned DJ was binding upon all parties including the petitioner, the learned Civil Judge disposed of the application by directing maintenance of status quo. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a civil miscellaneous appeal before the learned DJ which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 97/2024 but the same was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 3. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner further contended that when the earlier miscellaneous appeal was allowed by the learned DJ, the petitioner was not a party to the civil suit. The subsequent order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is based solely on the earlier appellate order without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The petitioner challenged the order dated 22.01.2024 with a delay of about 8–9 months which was 4 rejected by holding that no sufficient cause was shown and that each day’s delay had not been explained. He further submits that the petitioner is left remediless as he is facing an injunction order despite not being a party at the relevant time, restraining him from raising construction over property lawfully purchased by him. It is submitted that the rejection of the appeal on the ground of delay is bad in law particularly when the application for condonation of delay specifically pleaded illness supported by medical documents. The learned DJ ought to have taken a liberal approach in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also submitted that the petitioner had earlier challenged the order dated 22.01.2024 by filing W.P. No. 227/923/2024 which was withdrawn on 16.10.2024 with liberty to file an appropriate appeal. Hence, the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 deserves to be set aside and the learned DJ may be directed to decide the appeal on merits. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Parag Kotecha and Mr. Ali Asgar, opposed the petition and submitted that the petitioner was grossly negligent in approaching the appellate court belatedly. Though initially not arrayed as a party, the petitioner was subsequently impleaded as a defendant and the injunction had already been granted earlier by the learned DJ. The learned Civil Judge merely followed the said order while directing maintenance of status quo. As the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity warranting interference. 5. Learned State counsel submits that the State is only a formal party and the dispute is between the petitioner and the private respondents. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5 7. From the submissions and material available on record, it is apparent that respondent No.1 had filed a civil suit for declaration of title and injunction and the property claimed by the petitioner was also part of the subject matter of the suit. The initial application for injunction was rejected by the learned Civil Judge, but the appellate court granted injunction while the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. Subsequently, the petitioner was impleaded as a defendant and another application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC was disposed of by relying upon the earlier appellate order and directing maintenance of status quo. The said order was challenged by the petitioner before the learned DJ. Undoubtedly, the period of limitation for filing such appeal is 30 days and the appeal was filed with a delay of about 8–9 months. However, the petitioner contended that the delay occurred due to ill health and that he is a bona fide purchaser whose rights have been adversely affected without being afforded an opportunity of hearing. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 held as under:- “A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749]. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite 6 party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss. In this case explanation for the delay set up by the appellant was found satisfactory to the trial court in the exercise of its discretion and the High Court went wrong in upsetting the finding, more so when the High Court was exercising reversional jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the respondent must be compensated particularly because the appellant has secured a sum of Rs. Fifty thousand from the delinquent advocate through the Consumer Disputes Riderless Forum. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned order by restoring the order passed by the trial court but on a condition that appellant shall pay a sum of Rupee Ten thousand to the respondent (or deposit it in this court within one month from this date.” 9. Parameters to allow the application for condonation of delay has been well settled by the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 450 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 21 observed as under:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 7 vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant S.A. No.331 of 2013 not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking Page 7 of 8 recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 10. It is well settled that the length of delay is not determinative by itself. A short delay may not merit condonation, whereas a longer delay may be condoned if sufficient cause is shown. The guiding principle is whether the party has been able to demonstrate bona fide reasons for the delay. 11. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings when the injunction order was initially passed by the appellate court. Such an order cannot automatically bind him. After his impleadment, the learned Civil Judge relied upon the earlier order and directed maintenance of status quo thereby affecting the petitioner’s rights. In the interest of justice, 8 the petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to contest the matter on merits before the appellate court, particularly when this Court had earlier granted liberty to avail the appropriate remedy. 12. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by the learned DJ is hereby set aside. The delay in filing Civil Appeal No. 97/2024 is condoned, and the appeal is restored to its original number. The learned DJ is expected to decide the appeal on merits in accordance with law, expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of appearance of the parties. The parties are directed to appear before the learned DJ on 28 February, 2026. 13. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge H.Ansari