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2026 DAILYLAW 31388 (CAL)

M/S SHITAL ICE FACTORY AND COLD STORAGE v. SATYAJIT ROY AND ORS

FMAT/6/2026 · 2026-07-28

Shampa Sarkar, Smita Das De

body2026

Judgment text

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Item 01 28.07.2026 Court. No. 11 Cp/GB Calcutta High Court In the Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri FMAT/6/2026 IA NO: CAN/1/2026 M/s. Shital Ice Factory and Cold Storage Vs. Satyajit Roy & Ors. Mr. Surajit Nath Mitra, Sr. Advocate Mr. Partha Pratim Roy Mr. Debasish Mukhopadhyay Mr. Rajat Das Ms. Bipasha Mrug …for the appellant. Mr. Amit Lal Chakrabrty Mr. Bapi Sarkar Mr. Roumyadip Saha Mr. Prabhat Singha ….for the respondent no. 27. Mr. Kallol Basu, Sr. Advocate Mr. Saheb Banerjee Mr. Prasenjit Pal …..for the respondent nos. 1 & 2. 1. The issue involved in this appeal is whether the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sadar Court, Jalpaiguri erred in directing the defendant nos. 23, 24, 27 and 28 to maintain the status quo with regard to the nature, character, possession and ownership of the suit land, and in restraining the said defendants from making any construction over the 2 suit land, as described in the schedule of the plaint. The schedule of the plaint is quoted below:- “ SCHEDULE Dist. Jalpaiguri, P.S. NJP, Mouza- Debgram, R.S. sheet No. 5 corresponding to L.R. Sheet No.4, J.L. No. 2, R.S. Khatian No. 83/1, R.S. Plot No. 132, 133/369 corresponding to L.R. Plot No. 526, 527 total land in two plots measuring 4.30 acres (99+331).” 2. Mr. Mitra, learned senior advocate, appears on behalf of the appellant/ defendant no.24 in the suit and submits that the suit is not maintainable. As per the plaint case, the share of the plaintiffs will be subject to cancellation of Deeds of Conveyance which were 60 years old. Unless the two deeds of 1963 and one deed of 1965 as also the subsequent deeds of 1974 and 1984 were held to be null and void, the plaintiff could not have any claim over the suit property. The plaintiff failed to prove, prima facie title as a co-sharer, in respect of the schedule property. 3. It is next contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The predecessors of the plaintiffs had sold the suit property by various deeds of conveyance, and as such, the plaintiffs cannot claim any right over 3 the suit property by way of inheritance. Although the plaintiffs claim that Bhupendra Nath Roy did not have any right to represent the minors while selling part of the suit property by the deed of 1965, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff No. 2 who was represented by Bhupendra Nath Roy as his guardian, never raised any objection with regard to such sale. The minor brothers of Bhupendra Nath Roy did not challenge his right to represent them as guardian. 4. It is contended that, the learned court failed to consider the deeds which were submitted by the appellant, especially the deed of 1974, which would indicate that the predecessors of the plaintiffs, as heirs of Ram Chandra Roy had also sold out parts of the suit property in favour of Tarakeswar Prasad. The appellant claims through Tarakeswar Prasad and others. It is submitted that, the opinion of the learned court that the interest of the plaintiff should be protected, as they would have a right to the property in the event the deeds of conveyance were cancelled, was perverse and not legally sustainable. The plaintiffs’ claim as co- 4 sharers of the property, cannot be subject to the defendant Nos. 23, 24, 27 and 28 proving the validity of the deeds through which they acquired the property. The deeds have been placed before this court in support of the contention that, Ram Chandra Roy did not have any children with Phulonswari @ Phalanswari Devi and he was her sole heir and legal representative. Thus, the lands belonging to Phulonswari @ Phalanswari Devi measuring about 4.30 acres in R.S. Plot Nos. 132, 133/369, corresponding to L.R. Plot Nos. 526 and 527 were sold by Ram Chandra by various deeds and the recitals of those deeds would indicate that Ram Chandra was the sole heir of Phulonswari @ Phalanswari Devi. The record of rights have been relied upon to demonstrate possession of the suit land. 5. The positive case of the defendants before the suit court was that, Phulonswari @ Phalanswari Devi was the recorded owner of 4.30 acres of land. She died intestate and issueless, leaving behind her husband Ram Chandra Roy as her only legal heir and successor. Ram Chandra Roy during his lifetime sold and transferred the land 5 measuring 0.69 acres in R.S. Plot No.133/369 by a deed of conveyance No. 1137, dated February 12, 1963 to one Kumari Santosh Setthi. The said Ram Chandra Roy also sold land measuring 0.83 acres in R.S. Plot No. 132 and 133/369 to Tarkeshwar Prasad by a registered deed of conveyance being No.6798 dated October 5, 1963. Ram Chandra Roy had two more wives apart from Phulonswari @ Phalanswari Devi and after the demise of Ram Chandra Roy, the remaining property devolved upon his heirs and legal representatives. The family of Ram Chandra Roy was a joint Hindu family and after the death of Ram Chandra Roy, the adult members of the family comprised a Joint Hindu Family. Thus, Bhupendra Nath Roy represented the minors through one of whom the plaintiff No. 2 claims and sold the properties by the deed of 1965. Again in 1974, the heirs of Ram Chandra sold the remaining property to Tarakeswar Prasad. 6. According to Mr. Mitra, the averments in the plaint were contradictory to the deeds of conveyance of 1963, 1965 and 1974. Monoranjan Roy also executed a deed of 6 rectification to the deed of 1963 without raising any claim of right, title and interest in respect of the land sold by Ram Chandra Roy, by claiming inheritance from Phulonswari Debi. 7. It is submitted by the appellant that the plaint case was completely based on an assumption that upon declaration of the deeds as invalid, they would have a share in the suit property. Thus, the share of the plaintiffs was not, prima facie, established. On the other hand, the deeds of gift, the development agreement and other deeds of conveyance indicated that the appellant had acquired right, title and interest in the suit property and the defendant nos. 23, 27 and 28 formed a consortium with the appellant, in order to develop the property. The work was in progress. It is prayed that the order impugned should be set aside and the consortium should be allowed to continue with the construction. 8. Mr. Bose, learned advocate for the plaintiffs/respondent nos.1 and 2 submits that Bhupendra Nath Roy did not have the right to transfer properties on behalf of the minors. Secondly, Ram Chandra Roy was 7 not the sole heir of Phulonswari Debi. Thirdly, the shares of the heirs of Monoranjan would come to 71.5 decimals. When the plaintiffs came to know about the alleged deeds of 1963 and 1965, the suit was filed. The suit was not barred by limitation. The period of limitation should be calculated from the date of the knowledge of the plaintiffs about the said deeds. The averments in the plaint should be harmoniously read. The positive plaint case was that the children of Ram Chandra Roy and Phulonswari Debi, had equal share in the suit property along with Ram Chandra Roy and Ram Chandra Roy could not have unilaterally transferred the lands to third parties. Bhupendra Nath Roy could not also have transferred the properties on behalf of his minor brothers. The plaintiff No. 2 claims through a minor brother of Bhupendra, whose share in the suit property was sold out illegally, both by Ram Chandra Roy and, thereafter, by Bhupendra Nath Roy. In the deed of 1974, the heirs of Phulonswari Debi had clearly traced their title to the actual owner, i.e. their mother Phulonswari Debi. 8 9. According to Mr. Bose, unless the construction on the suit property was prohibited by an order of injunction, the situation will become irreversible by the time the suit is decided. In support of the findings of the learned court, Mr. Bose submits that the court was also alive to the problem which the plaintiffs would face, in the event the project was completed before the suit could be disposed of and the rights of the rival parties vis-à-vis the suit property was decided. By applying the tests for grant of an interim injunction, that is, prima facie case, balance of convenience and inconvenience and irreparable loss and injury, the order was passed directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard to nature, character and possession and the defendants No. 23, 24, 27 and 28 were restrained from making any construction on the suit land. 10. We have heard the parties. The contesting defendants are before us. The other defendants did not participate in the proceeding in which the order impugned was passed. Service of notice on those 9 non-appearing defendants is dispensed with. 11. Admittedly, Phulonswari Debi was the owner of 4.30 acres of land in R.S. Plot Nos.132 and 133/369 corresponding to L.R. Plot Nos.526 and 527. The plaintiff no.1 claims through Tulamoni Roy, as her grandson. Tulamoni Roy was the daughter of Phulonswari Debi and Ram Chandra Roy, as per the plaint case. The plaintiff no.2 claims through Monoranjan Roy and as the grandson of Phulonswari Debi and Ram Chandra Roy. As per the plaint case, the defendant nos.1 to 22 are the descendants of Ram Chandra Roy and Phulonswari Debi. They have been impleaded as defendants in the suit by the plaintiffs as co-sharers. 12. As per the plaint case, Phulonswari Debi and Ram Chandra Roy had five children. Paragraphs 8 to 16 in the plaint provide the genealogy. In paragraph 18 of the plaint, it has been stated that Bhupendra Nath Roy had illegally sold lands comprised in the scheduled property, for himself and on behalf of minors and as such, the sale was null and void. The plaintiffs prayed that their share 10 should be declared by the court, upon holding that such sale by Bhupendra Nath Roy was bad in law. Thereafter, in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the plaint other sale deeds have been discussed and the same plea has been taken that, Ram Chandra Roy could not have sold the property as the sole legal heir, of the deceased. It was alleged that Ram Chandra sold land in excess of what he was entitled to. It was also alleged that, Bhupendra Nath Roy colluded with Laxmi Debi and Sushila Debi and created other instruments, thereby, depriving the other heirs of Phulonswari Debi and Ram Chandra Roy. 13. Thus, the entire claim of co- sharership in the plaint case is based on allegation of illegality in execution of the Deeds of Conveyance by Ram Chandra Roy and Bhupendra Nath Roy. Significantly, the deeds were never challenged by the predecessors of the plaintiffs during their lifetime. In paragraph 24 of the plaint, it has been clearly stated that the L.R. record was either in the name of the contesting defendants or their vendors or third 11 parties. The order of the appellate authority under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 indicates that the entry of the name of the appellant in respect of the suit land had been upheld. 14. It appears that the learned trial Judge considered the documents filed by both parties and came to a finding that, unless the elder brother, namely, Bhupendra Nath Roy was appointed by a competent Court to be a guardian of the minors (children of Phulonswari Debi and Ram Chandra Roy), he had no legal competence to transfer the shares belonging to his minor brothers and as such, such deed would be treated as voidable at the instance of the minors and the minors upon attainment of majority, could challenge such transfer. Thus, the plaintiffs were to be protected, according to the learned Judge. Strangely, the minors on behalf of whom Bhupendra Nath Roy had sold the property, namely, Monoranjan Roy and Sushil Roy, never challenged such conveyance during their lifetime. The learned Judge lost sight of this aspect. Monoranjan Roy had also 12 executed a deed of rectification in respect of the 1963 deed executed by Ram Chandra Roy who had claimed to be the sole heir of Phulonswari Debi. We refer to the said deed only to record that Monoranjan did not dispute that Ram Chandra Roy was the sole heir and legal representative of Phulonswari Debi. Thus, the reasoning of the learned Court while granting the order of injunction is faulty. 15. We further find that the learned court proceeded on the basis that, in the event it was proved that the deed executed by Bhupendra Nath Roy during the minority of Monoranjan Roy and his brother was valid, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to have a share. Thus, the learned court applied the reverse logic and held that till such time such decision was arrived at, the plaintiff no.2 would be entitled to a share. With regard to Tulamoni Roy, there are no observations apart from the fact that she, as the daughter of Ram Chandra Roy had a share and, as such, the plaintiff no.1 would also have a share. The deed of 1974, which was produced by the appellant was not considered. By the said 13 deed, the heirs of Ram Chandra Roy had sold the lands to Tarakeswar Prasad. Tulamoni was also one of the vendors. 16. In any event, these are matters of trial. While granting an injunction, a mini trial is not conducted. Hence, the title of the plaintiffs or their claim to a share in the suit property, is contingent upon cancellation of the deeds of conveyance. Thus, at this stage, the learned Court should not have passed the order of injunction. The conclusion arrived at by the learned court is erroneous, inasmuch as, the court proceeded on the principle that every co-sharer has a right over every inch of the property and absence of physical possession would not disentitle the co-sharers from seeking temporary injunction. However, from the analysis of the deeds and the reasoning of the court, we are of the view that the facts in this case do not support the claim of co- sharership at this stage and the matter has to be decided on evidence. At least a prima facie title to the property ought to have been established. 17. We also find that the court did not decide the issue of limitation. We keep it 14 open for the time being for a decision at the trial. However, we note that the plaintiffs approached the Court long after the lands were sold. The deeds are 60 years old. The trial Court then found that the balance of convenience and inconvenience was in favour of the plaintiffs, whereas, we are of the view that the balance of convenience and inconvenience tilts in favour of allowing the construction, in view of the investments that have been made by the consortium and as the project was in progress. 18. The defendant Nos. 23, 24, 27 and 28 in the suit, relied on various deeds. The validity of such deeds have been challenged and will be subject to final adjudication in the suit. The appellant has possession over the property as per the land records. Documents reveal that a development agreement had been entered into and the construction was in progress. At this juncture, to restrain the construction would result in huge loss of business. At the instance of two persons whose co-sharership in respect of the property is not prima facie established, 15 the order impugned cannot be sustained. It is too harsh and will cause irreparable loss and injury to the defendants Nos. 23, 24, 27 and 28. The plaintiffs can be adequately compensated in monetary terms, if the suit is decreed. 19. Under such circumstances, if the appellant has to wait for years together before the project can be restarted, the situation will become irreversible. Thus, we set aside the order impugned and we hold that the construction shall continue and such construction will be subject to the final decision in the suit. The defendant nos. 23, 24, 27 and 28 shall not claim any equity in respect of such construction. In the event the plaintiffs succeed, they can be adequately compensated and/or their share can be determined and partitioned proportionately. This order is subject to any other interim order which has been passed in the suit of Arpit Maheswari. 20. Accordingly, the appeal and the connected application are disposed of. The order impugned is set aside. All observations are tentative and the suit will proceed independently, without being 16 influenced by our observations hereinabove. 21. Parties are directed to act on the basis of the server copy of this order. (Shampa Sarkar, J.) (Smita Das De, J.)