1 Reserved on : 22.04.2026 Pronounced on : 29.07.2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION No. 588 OF 2026 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: RANGANATHA GOWDA H, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, S/O HALAPPA, R/A RANGANATHAPURA, HUYIL DORE POST, BUKKAPATTANA HOBLI, SIRA TALUK, TUMKUR DISTRICT, KARNATAKA 572 115. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI MAYUR D BHANU, ADVOCATE A/W SRI SHAMANTH GOWDA J., AND SRI CHARAN N.S, ADVOCATES) AND: 1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY THE SHO, VIDYARANYAPURA POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY THE HCGP, HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka 2 BENGALURU 560 001. 2 . XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI CHANNAPPA ERAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1; SMT. XXXXX, PARTY-IN-PERSON/R-2) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF THE BNNS, 2023 PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN S.C.NO.1727/2025 (ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO.244/2025) PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED LIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BENGALURU (CCH-54) REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 69, 79, 115(2), 318(2), 351(3), 352 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONER IS CONCERNED; (ANNEXURE ‘C’ AND ‘D’). THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 22.04.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CAV ORDER The petitioner is before the Court calling in question proceedings in S.C.No.1727/2025, pending before the LIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-54), 3 registered for offences punishable under Sections 69, 79, 115(2), 318(2), 351(3) and 352 of the BNS. 2. Heard Sri Mayur D.Bhanu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Channappa Earappa, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and xxxxx, respondent No.2 – party in person. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: - The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The complainant and the petitioner met on social media i.e., Facebook. The meeting results in friendship; friendship blossomed into relationship and the relationship led the petitioner and the 2nd respondent to reside together in a rented establishment within the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent/Police. Five years passed by of such live-in relationship. The petitioner is said to have gained knowledge of the 2nd respondent being already married to one Rudreshaiah and on some squabble, the petitioner vacates the rented establishment and goes away to his home town. On the score that the petitioner has had sexual relationship with the complainant for over five years, the 2nd 4 respondent seeks to register a complaint on 27-03-2025 before the North East Women Police Station, Bangalore. Upon receipt of the information from the 2nd respondent, the Police register a Lower Petition (‘LPT’) in LPT No.112 of 2025. Statements of both the petitioner and the 2nd respondent/complainant were recorded and the concerned Police Station closes LPT No.112 of 2025 on 23.06.2025. The complainant then approaches Vidyaranyapura Police Station and registers a complaint on 24-07-2025, which now becomes a crime in Crime No.244 of 2025. The police conduct investigation, file a charge sheet for the afore-quoted offences and the concerned Court takes cognizance of the offences. Taking of cognizance of the offences and committal of the matter to the Court of Sessions, is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel Sri Mayur D.Bhanu appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were in live-in relationship for over 5 years. The petitioner then gains knowledge of the fact that the complainant was already married to the aforesaid Rudreshaiah and was living 5 with him at the same time, when the petitioner had a relationship with the complainant. The learned counsel would submit that during the period of five years, the petitioner had innumerable times enquired about the family members of the complainant only to be informed that she is a single woman with two siblings and her parents had expired long ago. Therefore, the petitioner was given to understand that the complainant was not married at all. The learned counsel further submits that when he comes to know that the complainant is married to one Rudreshaiah long ago and she had initiated crimes against several individuals on identical circumstances, started distancing himself from her. The learned counsel submits that it is then the complainant begins the act of blackmailing the petitioner. He would submit that the complainant contradicts herself in one breath when she says that the petitioner has tied her a thali/mangalya chain in a temple but seeks to register a crime for the offence under Section 69 of the BNS, which deals with having sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage. The learned counsel would submit that five years of live-in relationship cannot be alleged to become the ingredients of Section 69 or 79 of the BNS. 6 5. Per contra, the 2nd respondent/complainant appears in person and vehemently refutes the submissions by contending that for 5 years she has taken care of the petitioner who came to her with nothing and all the years he has promised that he would marry the complainant and has had sexual relationship with the complainant for over 5 years. He has now breached the said promise of marriage. Police have filed a charge sheet against the petitioner and, therefore, the trial must be permitted to be continued, failing which, it would amount to permitting the petitioner exploiting the complainant and walking away from her life. 6. The learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No. 1 would toe the line of respondent No. 2 in submitting that the trial should be permitted to continue against the petitioner, as the charge sheet filed makes out a prima facie case against the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would refute the submissions of the 2nd respondent, by placing a memo appending to 7 it a statement recorded under Section 183 of the BNSS / Section 164 of the Cr.P.C., rendered by the complainant, not in the present proceedings but in a criminal case - C.C.No.19282 of 2016, which arose out of Crime No.446 of 2015 registered against one Thammanna Vittal Badiger, to demonstrate that the complainant is in the habit of registering criminal cases against several persons on the same kind of allegations. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, party-in-person. 9. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are all a matter of record. The petitioner is a man of 37 years of age and the complainant, a woman is 54 years of age. The two appear to have met on Facebook, started messaging, messaging results in friendship, friendship blossomed into relationship and the relationship blossomed into sexual intercourse. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent/complainant began to live together in a rented accommodation on the belief that the complainant was single. The live-in relationship between the two goes on for five long years. In 8 2024, it is the averment in the petition, that the petitioner learns that the complainant is already married. When the petitioner comes to know of this, he begins to distance himself from the complainant. This results in registering a complaint on 27-03-2025 before the North East Women Police Station. The Police register an LPT in LPT No.112 of 2025 and they tried to settle the matter between the parties. When consensus could not be reached, the complainant on 23.06.2025 withdraws the complaint to explore other possibilities. The closure endorsement issued by the Police on 23-06-2025 reads as follows: ““““ಂಬರಹ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ಮೂಲಕ ಮೂಲಕ ಮೂಲಕ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಮ ೆ ಯಪಸುವೇೆಂದೆ ಯಪಸುವೇೆಂದೆ ಯಪಸುವೇೆಂದೆ ಯಪಸುವೇೆಂದೆ ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ:27/03/2025 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ೕದ ೕದ ೕದ ೕದ ದೂನ ದೂನ ದೂನ ದೂನ !ೕೆ ೆ !ೕೆ ೆ !ೕೆ ೆ !ೕೆ ೆ "ಾ#ಾ "ಾ#ಾ "ಾ#ಾ "ಾ#ಾ ಎ% ಎ% ಎ% ಎ%.&&&&.'''' ಅ)* ಅ)* ಅ)* ಅ)* ಸಂ+ೆ, ಸಂ+ೆ, ಸಂ+ೆ, ಸಂ+ೆ,. 112/2025ರ-. ರ-. ರ-. ರ-. ಾಖ0ಾ1ರುತ3ೆ ಾಖ0ಾ1ರುತ3ೆ ಾಖ0ಾ1ರುತ3ೆ ಾಖ0ಾ1ರುತ3ೆ. ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಸಂಬಂದ ಸಂಬಂದ ಸಂಬಂದ ಸಂಬಂದ ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ದೂ ೆ ದೂ ೆ ದೂ ೆ ದೂ ೆ ಸಂಬಂ5ದಂ6ೆ ಸಂಬಂ5ದಂ6ೆ ಸಂಬಂ5ದಂ6ೆ ಸಂಬಂ5ದಂ6ೆ ಹಲವ ಹಲವ ಹಲವ ಹಲವ 7ಾ 7ಾ 7ಾ 7ಾ ಅಪ3 ಅಪ3 ಅಪ3 ಅಪ3 ಸ8ಾ0ೋಚೆಯನು: ಸ8ಾ0ೋಚೆಯನು: ಸ8ಾ0ೋಚೆಯನು: ಸ8ಾ0ೋಚೆಯನು: 8ಾ 8ಾ 8ಾ 8ಾ ;<ಾರ#ೆಯನು: ;<ಾರ#ೆಯನು: ;<ಾರ#ೆಯನು: ;<ಾರ#ೆಯನು: 8ಾದರು 8ಾದರು 8ಾದರು 8ಾದರು ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಸಹ ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ಸಮ=ೆ, ಸಮ=ೆ, ಸಮ=ೆ, ಸಮ=ೆ, ಇ6ಾ, ಇ6ಾ, ಇ6ಾ, ಇ6ಾ,ಥ*@ಾಗದ ಥ*@ಾಗದ ಥ*@ಾಗದ ಥ*@ಾಗದ Bಾರಣ Bಾರಣ Bಾರಣ Bಾರಣ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 Bಾನೂನು Bಾನೂನು Bಾನೂನು Bಾನೂನು ಸಲDೆ ಾರರನು: ಸಲDೆ ಾರರನು: ಸಲDೆ ಾರರನು: ಸಲDೆ ಾರರನು: ಸಂಪE*5 ಸಂಪE*5 ಸಂಪE*5 ಸಂಪE*5 ಮುಂನ ಮುಂನ ಮುಂನ ಮುಂನ ನಗಳ-. ನಗಳ-. ನಗಳ-. ನಗಳ-. ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಬ ೆG ಬ ೆG ಬ ೆG ಬ ೆG -Hತ -Hತ -Hತ -Hತ ದೂರನು: ದೂರನು: ದೂರನು: ದೂರನು: ಾಖ-5ರುವಾ1 ಾಖ-5ರುವಾ1 ಾಖ-5ರುವಾ1 ಾಖ-5ರುವಾ1 5 5 5 5, ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ೕವ ೕರುವ ೕರುವ ೕರುವ ೕರುವ ದೂರು ದೂರು ದೂರು ದೂರು ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ 8ಾಡುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾಡುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾಡುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾಡುವಂ6ೆ DೇBೆಯನು: DೇBೆಯನು: DೇBೆಯನು: DೇBೆಯನು: ೕರುವದಂದ ೕರುವದಂದ ೕರುವದಂದ ೕರುವದಂದ ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ಮ4 ದೂರು ದೂರು ದೂರು ದೂರು ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಅ)*ಯನು: ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ ಮುBಾ3ಯ 8ಾರುತ3ೆ 8ಾರುತ3ೆ 8ಾರುತ3ೆ 8ಾರುತ3ೆ.” (Emphasis added) 9 The complainant then files a complaint before the Vidyaranyapura Police Station. This becomes the subject crime in Crime No.244 of 2025. The complaint so registered reads as follows: “Bengaluru, Dated: 24-07-2025 From: XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX To The Station House Officer, Vidyaranyapura Police, Bengaluru. Subject: Mr. Ranganath Gowda. H, S/o Halappa, “Topline Integrated Services”, 1st Floor, PSR Marvel, Vinayaka Nagar, Bellary Road, Hebbal, Bengaluru-560024 cheating and playing fraud is concerned. Sir, 1) I have been living in the above-mentioned address since 5 years. I am a single lady staying in a rented house. Through Facebook Mr. Ranganath Gowda contacted me and intimated that he is working and staying in a room but finding it difficult to manage the food. The said Mr. Ranganath Gowda expressed his intention to be a paying guest with me and for which he has agreed to pay a sum of ₹12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand only) per month. Since I am alone excepting support, I have allowed him as the paying guest in my rented house. From the beginning he was pretending to be a gentleman and behaved like a gentleman. Taking me being single, has promised to support me morally and promised to marry 10 me, when I told him about the age gap between me and him, he said it will not be an issue as older woman having relationship with young man. By deceiving me, virtually raped me by committing an offence under Section 375 of the old Act and Section 63 in the present Act which is punishable under Section 376 of the old Act and Section 64 of the new Act, committing an offence under Section 393, 394 of the old Act and Section 81 and 82 of the new Act and those intimate scenes have been videographed by him without my knowledge and consent by playing fraud upon me. By showing the video he was harassing for sex and when I refused, I have been physically assaulted. The said person started harassing me for sex and insisted me to perform like the blue films and did not allow me to sleep at nights as he is a sex maniac, used to attack me and was doing unrealistic acts in sex and played and cheated me. 2) The said person used to take me to his native and insisted me to intimate his family members; she is the manager of the company where he was working. Further in public places as well as in the neighbourhood forced me to lie that I should tell public including the land lord that I am his maternal aunt (father’s sister). He was using criminal force by showing the video and assaulting me by confining me wrongfully at house thereby committed an offence under Section 348 of the old Act and Section 127 under the new Act, 349, 350 & 351 under the old Act and Section 128, 129 and 130 of the new Act and the accused needs to be punished under Section 352, 353, 354, 354/A & 355/B of the old Act and Sections 131, 132, 74, 75 & 76 under the new Act and made me as his sex slave and to obey his instructions. 3) I further bring it to your notice that slowly started discontinuing in paying the P.G. charges of ₹12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand only) from June 2021. Whenever I insisted the P.G. charges, he was assaulting me by using criminal force, which attracts Section 354 of the Old Act and Section 74 of the new Act. After lot of persuasion he has agreed to pay a sum of ₹5,04,000/- (Rupees five lakhs four thousand only) being the arrears of P.G. charges, promising to pay interest @ 2% per 11 month. Similarly, by using force, made me to transfer a sum of ₹30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to buy a two-wheeler electric bike and forcibly made me to pay ₹30,000/-(Rupees thirty thousand only) with a promise to arrange the registration in my name but he got it to his name thereby cheated me under Section 415 of the old Act and Section 318 of the new Act. Added to it, he induced me to buy a Maruti Ritz, a pre-owned car by using criminal force, made me to release a sum of ₹2,40,000/- (Rupees two lakhs forty thousand only) with a promise to arrange the registration in my name but again by cheating under Section 415 of the old Act and Section 318 of the present Act he got the vehicle registered in his name by cheating me. As such the accused is to be punished under old Section 417 and under Section 318 of the new Act but so far the amount paid towards the vehicle had not been paid. Further by using criminal force and blackmailing me, my golden ornaments have been pledged at his Catholic Syrian Bank and availed a loan of ₹3,20,000/- (Rupees three lakhs twenty thousand only) and at Muthoot Finance by pleading my gold has raised a loan of ₹80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) but did not discharge it and committed the offence of extraction under Section 383 of the old Act and Section 308 of the new Act which is punishable under Section 384 of the old Act and 308 of the new Act. 4) The accused further by using criminal force had borrowed in all a sum of ₹7,24,850/- (Rupees seven lakhs twenty four thousand eight hundred and fifty only) from 2019 to 27-12-2024 promising to clear but did not choose to do so and cheated me for not returning the amount by committing the offence of cheating under the 415 of the old Act and 318 of the new Act and punishable under Section 417 of the old Act and 318 under the new Act and also further under compelling circumstances and also by using criminal force and also made me to release a sum of 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to him to the names suggested by him. In all he has to pay a sum of ₹35,17,902/- (Rupees thirty-five lakhs seventeen thousand nine hundred and two only). It has become impossible for me to stay with him as he is inhuman, 12 barbaric and a psycho. After prolonged domestic violence, left me on 27-12-2024 even after when I insisted my money was posing threat to my life and started blackmailing me. When he posed threat to my life, I had to prefer a police complaint on 28-03-2025 at Mahila Police Station, North-East Division, Bengaluru. However, the said police yet to register a complaint against the accused. 5) After the complaint and conciliation on 24-06-2025 the accused by calculating the outstanding payable to me has issued a cheque for the afore said outstanding and cheated me as he has not arranged any funds in his account and played fraud upon me by issuing the cheque in the account no money is available and accordingly played a fraud punishable under Section 419 under the old Act and Section 318 under the new Act, committing criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 491 of the old Act and Section 357 under the new Act. Thus, the accused has committed the afore said offences against me and for which he is liable to be prosecuted. I hope your good office be pleased to take necessary strict action against the accused and oblige. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/- XXXXX.” The gist of the complaint is that, for five years the petitioner has been living with the complainant. He came to the doors of the complainant on the score that he had no food to eat and, therefore, the complainant has given him shelter and has also indulged in sexual activities with the petitioner on the pretext of marriage. 13 The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner. The summary of the charge sheet is as follows: “17. Bೇ5ನ ಸಂJಪ3 =ಾಾಂಶ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಸದ ಪLಕರಣದ ಪLಕರಣದ ಪLಕರಣದ ಪLಕರಣದ Bಾಲಂ Bಾಲಂ Bಾಲಂ Bಾಲಂ-12 ರ-. ರ-. ರ-. ರ-., ನಮೂ5ರುವ ನಮೂ5ರುವ ನಮೂ5ರುವ ನಮೂ5ರುವ ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು 2019 ೇ ೇ ೇ ೇ =ಾ-ನ-. =ಾ-ನ-. =ಾ-ನ-. =ಾ-ನ-., =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ಪNತಾ1ದುO ಪNತಾ1ದುO ಪNತಾ1ದುO ಪNತಾ1ದುO ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: &Lೕ5 &Lೕ5 &Lೕ5 &Lೕ5, ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ:30.08.2019 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಯಲಹಂಕದ ಯಲಹಂಕದ ಯಲಹಂಕದ ಯಲಹಂಕದ ಾಘ@ೇಂದL ಾಘ@ೇಂದL ಾಘ@ೇಂದL ಾಘ@ೇಂದL =ಾQR =ಾQR =ಾQR =ಾQR ಮಠದ ಮಠದ ಮಠದ ಮಠದ ಮುಂೆ ಮುಂೆ ಮುಂೆ ಮುಂೆ Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-., =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ 6ಾ 6ಾ 6ಾ 6ಾ ಕ'T ಕ'T ಕ'T ಕ'T, ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತಂ1ಯ ತಂ1ಯ ತಂ1ಯ ತಂ1ಯ ಮದು@ೆಯ ಮದು@ೆಯ ಮದು@ೆಯ ಮದು@ೆಯ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ೊಂದU ೊಂದU ೊಂದU ೊಂದU 8ಾಸುವಾ1 8ಾಸುವಾ1 8ಾಸುವಾ1 8ಾಸುವಾ1 ಭರವ=ೆ ಭರವ=ೆ ಭರವ=ೆ ಭರವ=ೆ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ 6ಾ 6ಾ 6ಾ 6ಾ ಕ'Tರುವದನು: ಕ'Tರುವದನು: ಕ'Tರುವದನು: ಕ'Tರುವದನು: ೌಪ,@ಾ1 ೌಪ,@ಾ1 ೌಪ,@ಾ1 ೌಪ,@ಾ1 ಇಡುವಂ6ೆ ಇಡುವಂ6ೆ ಇಡುವಂ6ೆ ಇಡುವಂ6ೆ ನಂX5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ನಂX5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ನಂX5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ನಂX5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. =ಾJ-1 ರವರು ಮತು3 ಆೋ&ಯು =ೇ ;ಾ,ರಣ,ಪರ Y-ೕZ "ಾ#ಾ ಸರಹOನ ೊಡ[7ೊಮ4ಸಂದLದ \Lೕ ಆBೆ*] ಬ^ಾವ#ೆ 2ೇ BಾLZ, ಮೆ ನಂ.20 ರ-.ನ ೆಲಮಹಯ ಮೆಯನು: 7ಾ ೆ ೆ ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂಡು =ಾJ-1 ರವೊಂ ೆ ಸದ ಮೆಯ-. @ಾಸ@ಾ1ದುO, ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ _ಾ1ದOರೂ _ಾ1ದOರೂ _ಾ1ದOರೂ _ಾ1ದOರೂ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ನ: ನ: ನ: ನ: ಗಂಡ ಗಂಡ ಗಂಡ ಗಂಡ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು _ಾಗೂ _ಾಗೂ _ಾಗೂ _ಾಗೂ Dೇಳ7ಾರದು Dೇಳ7ಾರದು Dೇಳ7ಾರದು Dೇಳ7ಾರದು ನನ: ನನ: ನನ: ನನ: ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಲ. ಗೂ ಎಲ. ಗೂ ಎಲ. ಗೂ ಎಲ. ಗೂ Dೇಳ7ೇBೆಂದು Dೇಳ7ೇBೆಂದು Dೇಳ7ೇBೆಂದು Dೇಳ7ೇBೆಂದು Dೇ Dೇ Dೇ Dೇ, ಅೇ ಅೇ ಅೇ ಅೇ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ಅ6ೆ3 ಅ6ೆ3 ಅ6ೆ3 ಅ6ೆ3 ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಮೆಯ ಮೆಯ ಮೆಯ ಮೆಯ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ DೇBೊಂದುO DೇBೊಂದುO DೇBೊಂದುO DೇBೊಂದುO =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರೂ ರವರೂ ರವರೂ ರವರೂ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಸDಾ ಆೋ&ಯನು: ಆೋ&ಯನು: ಆೋ&ಯನು: ಆೋ&ಯನು: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಅಣ`ನ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಅಲ.ೆ ಅಲ.ೆ ಅಲ.ೆ ಅಲ.ೆ ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ಊ ೆ ಊ ೆ ಊ ೆ ಊ ೆ ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 Dೋ1 Dೋ1 Dೋ1 ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತಂೆ ತಂೆ ತಂೆ ತಂೆ 6ಾa ೆ 6ಾa ೆ 6ಾa ೆ 6ಾa ೆ =ಾ =ಾ =ಾ =ಾJJJJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ಕಂಪಯ ಕಂಪಯ ಕಂಪಯ ಕಂಪಯ 8ಾ,ೇಜd 8ಾ,ೇಜd 8ಾ,ೇಜd 8ಾ,ೇಜd ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಎಂದು ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ ಪಚa5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ತದನಂತರದ-. ತದನಂತರದ-. ತದನಂತರದ-. ತದನಂತರದ-. ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ;ಾ,ರಣ,ಪರದ ;ಾ,ರಣ,ಪರದ ;ಾ,ರಣ,ಪರದ ;ಾ,ರಣ,ಪರದ ದು ಾ* ದು ಾ* ದು ಾ* ದು ಾ* ಪರ!ೕಶQನ ಪರ!ೕಶQನ ಪರ!ೕಶQನ ಪರ!ೕಶQನ ೇವ=ಾeನದ ೇವ=ಾeನದ ೇವ=ಾeನದ ೇವ=ಾeನದ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಧಮ*ಸ4ಳದ-. ಧಮ*ಸ4ಳದ-. ಧಮ*ಸ4ಳದ-. ಧಮ*ಸ4ಳದ-., =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ಮ6ೆ3 ಮ6ೆ3 ಮ6ೆ3 ಮ6ೆ3 2 7ಾ 7ಾ 7ಾ 7ಾ Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-. Bಾನ-. 6ಾಯನು: 6ಾಯನು: 6ಾಯನು: 6ಾಯನು: ಕ'Tರು6ಾ3ೆ ಕ'Tರು6ಾ3ೆ ಕ'Tರು6ಾ3ೆ ಕ'Tರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಇಂಟd ಇಂಟd ಇಂಟd ಇಂಟd ೆh ೆh ೆh ೆh ನ-. ನ-. ನ-. ನ-. 5ಗುವ 5ಗುವ 5ಗುವ 5ಗುವ ಆ\.ೕಲ ಆ\.ೕಲ ಆ\.ೕಲ ಆ\.ೕಲ &iೕ &iೕ &iೕ &iೕಗಳನು: ಗಳನು: ಗಳನು: ಗಳನು: =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ 6ೋ5 6ೋ5 6ೋ5 6ೋ5 ಅೇ ಅೇ ಅೇ ಅೇ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ತೊ:ಂ ೆ ತೊ:ಂ ೆ ತೊ:ಂ ೆ ತೊ:ಂ ೆ 0ೈಂ1ಕ 0ೈಂ1ಕ 0ೈಂ1ಕ 0ೈಂ1ಕ ಸುಖ ಸುಖ ಸುಖ ಸುಖ ೕ ೕ ೕ ೕ ಸಹಕಸುವಂ6ೆ ಸಹಕಸುವಂ6ೆ ಸಹಕಸುವಂ6ೆ ಸಹಕಸುವಂ6ೆ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾಡು3ದುO 8ಾಡು3ದುO 8ಾಡು3ದುO 8ಾಡು3ದುO, ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಸಣ` ಸಣ` ಸಣ` ಸಣ` ಪಟT ಪಟT ಪಟT ಪಟT ;<ಾರಗ ೆ ;<ಾರಗ ೆ ;<ಾರಗ ೆ ;<ಾರಗ ೆ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ !ೕ0ೆ !ೕ0ೆ !ೕ0ೆ !ೕ0ೆ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ ಜಗಳ 8ಾ 8ಾ 8ಾ 8ಾ Dೊ^ೆದು Dೊ^ೆದು Dೊ^ೆದು Dೊ^ೆದು, 7ೈದು 7ೈದು 7ೈದು 7ೈದು, 8ಾನ5ಕ 8ಾನ5ಕ 8ಾನ5ಕ 8ಾನ5ಕ ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ೈಕ ೈಕ ೈಕ ೈಕ Eರುಕುಳವನು: Eರುಕುಳವನು: Eರುಕುಳವನು: Eರುಕುಳವನು: ೕರು6ಾ3ೆ ೕರು6ಾ3ೆ ೕರು6ಾ3ೆ ೕರು6ಾ3ೆ ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಮತು3 ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ಆೋ&ಯು ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: ತನ: @ೈಯುE3ಕ @ೈಯುE3ಕ @ೈಯುE3ಕ @ೈಯುE3ಕ ಖN* ೆ ಖN* ೆ ಖN* ೆ ಖN* ೆ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ಎZ ಎZ ಎZ ಎZ XXXX ಐಐಐಐ +ಾ6ೆ +ಾ6ೆ +ಾ6ೆ +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ....20028355385 ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಆೋ&ಯ ಆೋ&ಯ ಆೋ&ಯ ಆೋ&ಯ 7ಾ,ಂm 7ಾ,ಂm 7ಾ,ಂm 7ಾ,ಂm +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ +ಾ6ೆ ನಂ.2727118000367 ೆ ೆ ೆ ೆ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ::01/01/2019 ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಂದ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ:27.12.2024 ರರರರ ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಅವoಯ-. ಹಂತ ಹಂತ ಹಂತ ಹಂತ ಹಂತ@ಾ1 ಹಂತ@ಾ1 ಹಂತ@ಾ1 ಹಂತ@ಾ1 ಒಟುT ಒಟುT ಒಟುT ಒಟುT 8,80,778/- ರೂಗಳನು: ರೂಗಳನು: ರೂಗಳನು: ರೂಗಳನು: ಪ^ೆದು ಪ^ೆದು ಪ^ೆದು ಪ^ೆದು BೊಂದುO BೊಂದುO BೊಂದುO BೊಂದುO, ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ ನಂತರ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: 6ೊೆದು 6ೊೆದು 6ೊೆದು 6ೊೆದು Dೊರಟು Dೊರಟು Dೊರಟು Dೊರಟು Dೋ1 Dೋ1 Dೋ1 Dೋ1 =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವಂದ ರವಂದ ರವಂದ ರವಂದ ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂ ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂ ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂ ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂದO ದO ದO ದO ಹಣವನು: ಹಣವನು: ಹಣವನು: ಹಣವನು: @ಾpಾZ @ಾpಾZ @ಾpಾZ @ಾpಾZ ೕಡೇ ೕಡೇ ೕಡೇ ೕಡೇ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ Dಾಗೂ 6ಾನು 6ಾನು 6ಾನು 6ಾನು ಈ ಈ ಈ ಈ ಂೆ ಂೆ ಂೆ ಂೆ ೕದ ೕದ ೕದ ೕದ ಭರಸ@ೆಯಂ6ೆ ಭರಸ@ೆಯಂ6ೆ ಭರಸ@ೆಯಂ6ೆ ಭರಸ@ೆಯಂ6ೆ 14 =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ =ಾJ-1 ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: ರವರನು: qಾ=ೊLೕಕ3@ಾ1 qಾ=ೊLೕಕ3@ಾ1 qಾ=ೊLೕಕ3@ಾ1 qಾ=ೊLೕಕ3@ಾ1 ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ ಮದು@ೆ 8ಾBೊಂಡು 8ಾBೊಂಡು 8ಾBೊಂಡು 8ಾBೊಂಡು ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ಮದು@ೆಯನು: ೊಂದU ೊಂದU ೊಂದU ೊಂದU 8ಾಸೇ 8ಾಸೇ 8ಾಸೇ 8ಾಸೇ ವಂN5ರುವದು ವಂN5ರುವದು ವಂN5ರುವದು ವಂN5ರುವದು ತ+ೆಯ-. ತ+ೆಯ-. ತ+ೆಯ-. ತ+ೆಯ-. ಸಂಗL5ರುವ ಸಂಗL5ರುವ ಸಂಗL5ರುವ ಸಂಗL5ರುವ =ಾrಾsಾರ =ಾrಾsಾರ =ಾrಾsಾರ =ಾrಾsಾರ ಗಂದ ಗಂದ ಗಂದ ಗಂದ !ೕ0ೊ:ೕಟಕ !ೕ0ೊ:ೕಟಕ !ೕ0ೊ:ೕಟಕ !ೕ0ೊ:ೕಟಕ ದೃಢ ದೃಢ ದೃಢ ದೃಢ ಪ'Tರುತ3ೆ ಪ'Tರುತ3ೆ ಪ'Tರುತ3ೆ ಪ'Tರುತ3ೆ. ಆದOಂದ ಆೋ&ಯು !ೕಲvಂಡ BಾwO ಮತು3 ಕಲಂ ಅನQಯ \rಾಹ* ಅಪಾದ ಎಸ1ರು6ಾ3ೆಂದು ೋxಾೋಪ#ಾ ಪ 'T.” (Emphasis added) The summary of the charge sheet indicates that the petitioner and the 2nd respondent have had relationship and also certain financial transactions. 10. The issue now would be whether the live-in relationship for over 5 years could become the ingredients of Section 69 of the BNS. Section 69 is for the first time introduced in BNS, which was not there in the earlier regime, IPC. Section 69 of the BNS reads as follows: “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.—Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.” (Emphasis supplied) 15 Section 69 of the BNS punishes a person who indulges in sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means or by making false promise of marriage to a woman. Deceitful means would include inducement, false promise of employment or promotion or marrying by suppressing identity. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent, as observed hereinabove, have been in live-in relationship for about 5 years. In live-in relationship, it is ununderstandable as to how one can project the accused having sexual intercourse with the complainant on promise of marriage. It would not require 5 years to know whether the accused is having sexual relationship with the complainant on promise of marriage or on consensus with the complainant. 11. A perusal at the complaint would clearly indicate that the acts between the two over 5 years were purely consensual. This Court in the case of XXX v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA1, has held as follows: 1 2026 SCC OnLine Kar 303 16 “…. …. …. 11. A perusal at the complaint would indicate that even if it is taken on its face value, they were consensual acts for two years whether on the pretext of marriage or otherwise. Jurisprudence is replete with the judgments rendered by the Apex Court from time to time, which has intertwined the concept of rape and consensual sex and how consensual sex on the promise of marriage cannot amount to rape. I deem it appropriate to notice the said judgments. JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE: 12.1. The Apex Court in the case of DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 11. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as under : (SCC p. 94, para 6) “6. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” … … … 23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, 17 must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home”. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged 18 the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis supplied) 12.2. Later, the Apex Court in the case of SHAMBHU KHARWAR v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1032 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 9. In Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] a two-Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.), held in Sonu v. State of U.P. [Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) 18 SCC 517] observed that: (Pramod SuryabhanPawar case [Pramod SuryabhanPawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , SCC pp. 616-18 & 620, paras 12, 14, 16 & 18) “12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. … *** 14. … Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a 19 promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. … *** 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. … *** 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” (emphasis supplied) … … … 11. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge-sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under Section 376IPC. The crucial issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 375IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above, was in existence prior to the marriage of the second respondent and continued to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent. 20 12. The High Court, in the course of its judgment, has merely observed that the dispute raises a question of fact which cannot be considered in an application under Section 482CrPC. As demonstrated in the above analysis, the facts as they stand, which are not in dispute, would indicate that the ingredients of the offence under Section 376IPC were not established. The High Court has, therefore, proceeded to dismiss the application under Section 482CrPC on a completely misconceived basis.” (Emphasis supplied) 12.3. In XXXX v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported in (2024) 3 SCC 496 the Apex Court holds as follows: “…. …. …. 9. While getting her statement recorded under Section 164CrPC, she admitted that she knew the appellant since 2017. On account of dispute with her husband, she was living with her parents. As she got acquainted with the appellant, they fell in love. In 2018, the appellant went to Maharashtra for job. However, he used to visit her home and take care of the complainant as well as her daughter. In 2019, the appellant assured the complainant that he will marry her in case she takes divorce from her husband who used to harass and beat her. For this reason, she divorced her husband and solemnised marriage with the appellant in a temple in January 2019. Thereafter, they started living together with her daughter born from the previous marriage. Despite assurance, the appellant did not solemnise court marriage. After marriage was solemnised in temple, treating the appellant as her husband, they both started leading a married life having physical relations from January 2019 till June 2020. The appellant treated the complainant as his wife. Thereafter, the appellant refused to respond to her calls and even marry her. … … … 11. Further, in the FIR the complainant stated that she got divorce from her earlier husband on 10-12- 2018. In the statement under Section 164CrPC, she stated that marriage between the appellant and the complainant was solemnised in a temple in January 2019. However, the date of divorce as claimed by the complainant is belied from the copy of the decree annexed with the appeal as Annexure P-9, where 21 divorce by mutual consent was granted to the complainant and her husband vide judgment dated 13- 1-2021. The aforesaid fact could not be disputed. Meaning thereby, the complainant besides the facts in the FIR and also in the statement under Section 164CrPC regarding her divorce from the earlier marriage, sought to claim that she had remarried with the appellant during subsistence of her earlier marriage. 12. From the contents of the complaint, on the basis of which FIR was got registered and the statement got recorded by the complainant, it is evident that there was no promise to marry initially when the relations between the parties started in the year 2017. In any case, even on the dates when the complainant alleges that the parties had physical relations, she was already married. She falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage took place on 10-12-2018. However, the fact remains that decree of divorce was passed only on 13-1-2021. It is not a case where the complainant was of an immature age who could not foresee her welfare and take right decision. She was a grown up lady about ten years elder to the appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to understand the consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it was a case of betraying her husband. It is the admitted case of the prosecutrix that even after the appellant shifted to Maharashtra for his job, he used to come and stay with the family and they were living as husband and wife. It was also the stand taken by the appellant that he had advanced loan of Rs 1,00,000 to the prosecutrix through banking channel which was not returned back.” (Emphasis supplied) 12.4. In JASPAL SINGH KAURAL v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI reported in (2025) 5 SCC 756 the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. 22 13. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] whereby this Hon'ble Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship with the appellant-accused, upon an assurance to marry. The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three children, had continued to have such relationship with the appellant-accused, at least for about five years till she gave the complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this Court had observed as under : (SCC pp. 398-99, paras 21-22) “21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. 22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was mature and intelligent 23 enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC.” (emphasis supplied) 14. The decision in Naim Ahamed [Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385] is squarely applicable to the conspectus of present case. It has been time and again settled by this Hon'ble Court, that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An offence under Section 375IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. [Mahesh DamuKhare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] 24 15. Upon a bare perusal of the FIR and the charge-sheet, the following facts are clearly established: 15.1. The physical relationship between the appellant and Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted, there is no material on record to show that there was any dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant.” 15.2. There is also no material on record, to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506IPC against the appellant. In fact, it is apparent from the conduct of the appellant, that he was acting in furtherance of the promise to marry. It is the own observation of the High Court, that the appellant had made a promise to marry Respondent 2 and was acting accordingly. The mangalsutra being prepared with the initials of the name of Respondent 2 complainant does reflect his intention and promise to marry. However, in the eventuality of a fall out or split between the parties, it cannot be said that the promise to marry was false, and the corresponding conduct dishonest. 15.3. There is also no element of criminality that can be accrued to the appellant, insofar as it is the own case of the prosecutrix, that she was in a relationship with the appellant, while being in a subsisting marriage. It is also hard to believe that the prosecutrix could have sustained a physical relationship for a prolonged period of five years [Prashant v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 5 SCC 764] , while being in a subsisting marriage, and even subsequently obtaining divorce to sustain the relationship. The prolonged period of the relationship, during which the sexual relations continued between the parties, is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship. [Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471] The prosecutrix was thus, conscious and cognizant of the consequences of her actions, and had given her consent after an active and reasoned deliberation. [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903]” (Emphasis supplied) 12.5. In SAMADHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528, the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. 25 28. We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No. 2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. 29. This Court has, on numerous occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation. 30. In Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764, this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna, J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage. The relevant portion is extracted as under: “20. In our view, taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under Section 376(2)(n)IPC are absent. A review of the FIR and the complainant's statement under Section 164CrPC discloses no indication that any promise of marriage was extended at the outset of their relationship in 2017. Therefore, even if the prosecution's case is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the complainant engaged in a sexual relationship with the appellant solely on account of any assurance of marriage from the appellant. The relationship between the parties was cordial and also consensual in nature. A mere break up of a relationship 26 between a consenting couple cannot result in initiation of criminal proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marital relationship. Further, both parties are now married to someone else and have moved on in their respective lives. Thus, in our view, the continuation of the prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law. Therefore, no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution.” (underlining by us) 31. This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture. … …. … 33. The appellant has unequivocally asserted that, during the subsistence of the relationship, no grievance or allegation was ever raised by respondent No. 2 regarding the absence of consent in their physical relations. It was only upon the appellant's refusal to fulfil her demand for payment of the sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- that the present criminal proceedings came to be instituted. Furthermore, the alleged incidents are stated to have occurred between 12.03.2022 and 20.05.2024; however, the FIR was lodged only on 31.08.2024, i.e. nearly three months after the last alleged act of sexual intimacy. 34. The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No. 2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or 27 inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No. 2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No. 2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No. 2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable. 35. We deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of this Court in Rajnish Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) 4 SCC 197, whereby it was held that when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted as under: “33. There is no dispute that from the year 2006 onwards, the complainant and the appellant were residing in different towns. The complainant is an educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage. On many occasions, she even portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant thereby, dispelling the allegation that the intention of the appellant was to cheat her right from the inception of the relationship. 34. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that it was mostly the complainant who used to travel to meet the appellant at his place of posting. Therefore, we are convinced that the relationship between the complainant and the appellant was consensual without the existence of any element of deceit or misconception. 35. Further, the application filed by the complainant at One Stop Centre, Lalitpur on 23-3- 2022, makes it abundantly clear that she was in a consensual relationship with the appellant since 2006. It is alleged in the complaint that when she had proposed that they should marry and live together, the 28 appellant physically abused her and beat her up. If at all there was an iota of truth in this allegation then the FIR should have been registered immediately after this incident. However, it is only when it came to the knowledge of the complainant that the appellant was getting married to another woman, in an attempt to stop his marriage, she filed aforesaid complaint at the One Stop Centre wherein she also admitted that she was equally guilty as the appellant and therefore, his marriage must be stopped. xxx 39. It is, therefore, clear that the accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognised that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused.” (underlining by us) 36. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2025, the High Court observed that although it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the relationship between him and respondent No. 2 was consensual in nature, no such categorical statement was made by him in the memo of application and that the plea of consent was merely inferred. In this regard, reliance was placed by the High Court on the case of Ganga Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 7 SCC 278 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 505 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 314, wherein this Court had stated that unless there was a specific defence of a consensual relationship, such a defence cannot be inferred. 37. The said finding of the High Court, however, fails to appreciate that a plain reading of the FIR in question itself reveals that the relationship between the parties was, in fact, consensual, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 met the appellant whenever he expressed a desire to meet her. Furthermore, respondent No. 2, being a major and an educated individual, voluntarily associated with the appellant and entered into physical intimacy on her own volition. It is also pertinent to note that, at the relevant time, the marriage of respondent No. 2 was subsisting. In light of the foregoing circumstances, even upon a bare reading of the material on record, it is manifest that the relationship between the parties was consensual, and therefore, the absence of an express statement to that effect in the memo of application, as emphasised in the impugned order, cannot be held 29 against the appellant when the same can be otherwise clearly discerned. 38. At this stage it is material to refer to the decision of this Court in Mahesh Damu, wherein the following observations were made: “29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false promise to amount to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90IPC, it must have been made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore, if it is established that such consent was given under a misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not a valid consent. In this regard we may refer to Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660], in which it was held as follows : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. xxx 30 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The ‘failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance’. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (underlining by us)” (Emphasis supplied) 12.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG v. STATE OF TELANGANA, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1258 the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. …. 25. In the chats which have been placed on record along with the additional documents, the de- facto complainant, who is referred to by the name ‘Muffin’, has admitted that she was manipulative and was trying to “get a green card holder”. At one point of time, she also stated that it would not be difficult for her to trap the next one. In the very same breath, she mentions that she would not waste time with the accused appellant and needs to “invest on the next victim”. She also mentions that she would irritate her victims to the extent that they dump her, and she could happily start with the next one. She also stated that she was using the accused appellant. 26. These chats depict the stark reality about the behavioral pattern of the de- facto complainant who appears to be having manipulative and vindictive tendency. 31 27. Thus, in our opinion, the accused appellant was absolutely justified in panicking and backing out from the proposed marriage upon coming to know of the aggressive sexual behaviour and the obsessive nature of the de- facto complainant. 28. Hence, even assuming that the accused appellant retracted from his promise to marry the complainant, it cannot be said that he indulged in sexual intercourse with the de-facto complainant under a false promise of marriage or that the offence was committed by him with the de- facto complainant on the ground that she belonged to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community. 29. It is also relevant to mention here that in FIR No. 751 of 2021, the de-facto complainant has not even made a whisper about the accused appellant dumping her on the ground of her caste. Thus, apparently this allegation which has been set out in the subsequent FIR No. 103 of 2022 lodged almost after seven months is nothing but a sheer exaggeration which must be discarded. 30. Having considered the entirety of facts and circumstances as available on record, we are of the firm opinion that allowing prosecution of the accused appellant to continue in the impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 would be nothing short of a travesty of justice in addition to being a gross abuse of the process of Court. The impugned FIR No. 103 of 2022 is nothing but a bundle of lies full of fabricated and malicious unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the complainant. The facts on record clearly establish the vindictive and manipulative tendencies of the complainant and these aspects have a great bearing on the controversy.” (Emphasis supplied) 12.7. Again, in the case of AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230 the Apex Court has held as follows: 32 “…. …. …. 8. Having heard both sides in this case and after carefully considering the material on record, the following attributes come to the fore: (a) Even if the allegations in the FIR are taken as a true and correct depiction of circumstances, it does not appear from the record that the consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 was obtained against her will and merely on an assurance to marry. The Appellant and the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 were acquainted since 08.06.2022, and she herself admits that they interacted frequently and fell in love. The Complainant/Respondent no. 2 engaged in a physical relationship alleging that the Appellant had done so without her consent, however she not only sustained her relationship for over 12 months, but continued to visit him in lodges on two separate occasions. The narrative of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 does not corroborate with her conduct. (b) The consent of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 as defined under section 90 IPC also cannot be said to have been obtained under a misconception of fact. There is no material to substantiate “inducement or misrepresentation” on the part of the Appellant to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise. Investigation has also revealed that the Khulanama, was executed on 29.12.2022 which the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 had obtained from her ex-husband. During this time, the parties were already in a relationship and the alleged incident had already taken place. It is inconceivable that the Complainant had engaged in a physical relationship with the Appellant, on the assurance of marriage, while she was already married to someone else. Even otherwise, such promise to begin with was illegal and unenforceable qua the Appellant. (c) There is no evidence of coercion or threat of injury to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2, to attract an offence under section 506 IPC. It is improbable that there was any threat caused to the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 by the Appellant when all along the relationship was cordial, and it was only when the Appellant graduated and left for his hometown to Ahmednagar, the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 became agitated. We also cannot ignore the conduct of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 in visiting the native village of the Appellant without any intimation, which is also unacceptable and reflects the agitated and 33 unnerved state of mind of the Complainant/Respondent no. 2. For the same reason, the criminal prosecution against the Appellant herein is probably with an underlying motive and disgruntled state of mind. (d) There is also no reasonable possibility that the Complainant/Respondent no. 2 or any woman being married before and having a child of four years, would continue to be deceived by the Appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with an individual who has sexually assaulted and exploited her. 9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly3 to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) 13.1. The Apex Court, in the case of Dr. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR supra, draws with unmistakable clarity, the doctrinal line that separates rape from consensual intimacy, where two adults of their own volition, engage in consensual sexual relation over a sustained period, the subsequent refusal of the man to marry the woman, howsoever regrettable, does not, ipso facto, transmute such intimacy into the offence of rape as punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. 13.2. The principle is reaffirmed in SHAMBHU KHARWAR supra where the Apex Court interdicted the criminal process at the threshold holding that the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and accordingly quashed the crime as well as the charge sheet. 13.3. Likewise, in NAIM AHAMED v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) [(2023) 15 SCC 385], the Apex Court addressed an identical factual complexion, where the complainant had even become pregnant on account of the relationship, 34 and yet held that such circumstance, by itself cannot clothe the relationship with criminality, for pregnancy arising out of consensual intimacy. 13.4. In SAMADHAN supra the Apex Court sounded a note of stern caution against the disquieting tendency of coloring failed relationships, with the hue of heinous crimes. The Apex Court holds that mere breakdown of a relationship between the consenting adults, cannot constitute rape nor can the criminal law be set into motion as a retaliatory instrument, merely because the relationship did not ultimately culminate in marriage. 13.5. Further, in AMOL BHAGWAN NEHUL, the Apex Court observes that where the complainant is already married, the allegation of physical intimacy induced by promise of marriage stands on infirm grounds, for a promise which is ex-facie unenforceable, cannot in those circumstances, be elevated into a foundation of imputing criminality. 13.6. In BATLANKI KESHAV (KESAVA) KUMAR ANURAG supra the Apex Court goes even further, on a perusal of contemporaneous chats, it found that the complainant had exhibited manipulative and vindictive tendencies and held that man backing out of marriage, even assuming such promise existed, cannot automatically attract the offence of rape. Holding the prosecution to be malicious and fabricated, the Apex Court obliterates the proceedings against the accused. 13.7. In the light of the overwhelming majority of such decisions, the Apex Court has exercised its Constitutional and inherent jurisdiction to arrest the criminal process, even at the stage of registration of the crime, where the allegation taken to their highest, disclose nothing beyond a consensual relationship subsequently turning sore. APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE: 14. In the case at hand, the relationship between the complainant and the petitioner, at its inception, was plainly that of a client and a counsel. Yet to determine 35 whether the complaint is a bonafide invocation of criminal law or an endeavour covered by manipulation and vendetta, it becomes necessary to notice certain antecedent facts, which emerge not from conjecture, but from documents placed on record. Manipulation and Malafides of the complainant: A brief chronology bears mention: 14.2. The complainant is said to have married one Yathish Kumar T. R. in the year 2014. The said marriage, by an order dated 22-10-2016, was annulled. However in the year 2020, it appears that a child was born to the complainant, the date of birth being 21-08-2020. The birth certificate is placed on record. The birth certificate depicts the date of birth of the child born to Yathish Kumar T. R. and the complainant is as follows: The birth certificate placed on record is not without significance. It indicates two distinct and telling 36 circumstances; first, that notwithstanding the annulment decree dated 22-10-2016 in M.C.No.3017 of 2015, a child is born on 21-08-2020 to the complainant and the very same Yathish Kumar T. R. and second, that the complainant appears to have continued association with the said Yathish Kumar T. R. even long after the severance of the marital tie. Photographs are also produced to demonstrate that the child now about 4 years of age, has been living with the complainant and Yathish Kumar T. R., as a family. The matter does not rest there: 14.3. The petitioner has also produced another birth certificate evidencing the birth of a child on 15-12-2008 where the father’s name is shown as Nagaraju and the mother, the complainant. The said birth certificate is as follows: 37 The inevitable inference is that the complainant has two children, the first born on 15-12-2008 from Nagaraju and the second born on 21-08-2020 from Yathish Kumar T. R., long after the annulment of marriage dated 22-10-2016. These circumstances do not float in isolation. They connect with yet another material episode. 14.4. A crime comes to be registered on 28-11-2022 and on the basis of the said complainant a crime in Crime No.602 of 2022 for offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC is alleged. The gravamen of the complaint is that the child born from their earlier relationship, went missing on 25-11-2022. The child was about 13 years at that point in time. In the complaint, the complainant narrates that she is married and settled with another person. The gist of the complaint is as follows: “&_ಾ*ಯು "ಾ#ೆ ೆ Dಾಜಾ1 ೕದ ದೂನ =ಾಾಂಶ@ೇೆಂದೆ &_ಾ*ಯು ಸು8ಾರು 4 ವಷ*ಗಂದ 7ಾ ೆ ಮೆಯ-. ಕುಟುಂಬ ಸ!ೕತ @ಾಸ@ಾ1ದುOBೊಂಡು ಗೃU_ಾ1ರು6ಾ3ೆ, &_ಾ*ಯ ಮಗ ಹ|*} ಾ~-13ವಷ* ಈತನು ಅಂಜಾನಗರದ-.ರುವ \Lೕ;ಾಯಕ ಸೂvಲ:-. 9ೇ ತರಗಯ-. @ಾ,=ಾಂಗ 8ಾಡು3ರು6ಾ3ೆ. &_ಾ*ಯ ಮಗ ಈ ಂೆ ಸು8ಾರು 2 ವಷ*ಗಂದ 4-5 7ಾ ಮೆ XಟುT Dೋ1 7ೇೆಯವರ ಮು+ಾಂತರ Yೕ• 8ಾ5 @ಾಪಸು€ ಮೆ ೆ ಬಂರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಾಂಕ:25/11/2022 ರಂದು ಾL: 08-00 ಗಂ•ೆ ೆ ಮೆaಂದ Dೊರಗ^ೆ Dೋದವನು @ಾಪಸು€ ಮೆ ೆ ಬಂರುವ0ಾ., &_ಾ*ಯ =ೆ:ೕ6ೆ ಪ‚U*ಮ ರವರು ಮಂಡ,ದ-. @ಾಸ@ಾ1ದುO, ಇವರ ƒೊ6ೆ &_ಾ*ಯ ಮಗ Dೆಚು„ ಒಡಾಟ;ಟುTBೊಂದುO, ಪ‚Uೕ*ಮ ರವರನು: ಕೆ5 ;<ಾರ#ೆ 8ಾಡ7ೇBೆಂದು Bೋರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ನಂತರ &_ಾ*ಯು ಸಂಬಂoಕರು ಮತು3 =ೆ:ೕತರ ಬ ;<ಾರ 8ಾಡ0ಾ1 _ಾವೇ ಉಪಯುಕ3 8ಾ ೊೆರುವ0ಾ., ಆದOಂದ Bಾ#ೆ_ಾ1ರುವ ಹ|*} ಾ~-13ವಷ* ರವರನು: ಪ6ೆ3 8ಾBೊಡ7ೇBೆಂದು BೊಟT ದೂರು ಇ6ಾ,..” 14.5. Yet another record is placed before this Court; the complainant filed Crl.Misc.No.1467 of 2023 invoking Section 13(3) of the Karnataka Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and in the cause title therein, in the year 2023, the complainant describes herself to be the wife of Yathish Kumar. The cause title reads as follows: “IN THE COURT OF THE CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE. BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU 38 Present:- Sri. SUNIL.R., B.COM., LL.B., CJM., Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru. Dated this the 20th day of January, 2024. Crl. Misc. No. 1467/2023 PETITIONER: Smt. Nagarathna, W/o. Sri. Yathish Kumar, 31 years, R/at No.458, Muddinapalya Main Road, Anjananahara, Bengaluru North, Bengaluru-560 061. (By Sri.B.L.Jayarama, Adv) - V/S - RESPONDENT: The Chief Registrar, Births and Deaths, Office of the Tahsildar, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru. (Respondent placed exparte) *************” The prayer sought therein is follows: “The petitioner has filed the petition under Section 13(3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 seeking direction of this Court to direct the respondent to enter the date of death of Renukamma, W/o Late Nagaraja, as 19.07.2011 in the death register.” When all these facts, borne out from official records, are considered cumulatively, it becomes difficult to comprehend, far less accept, how the complainant could credibly assert that she consented to sexual relationship on a “promise of marriage”, when she appears to have been in a subsisting marital relationship or at the very least, in a continuing 39 domestic association, and is also mother of 2 children, one about 13 years old and the other about 4 years. 14.6. What is more disturbing is the disquieting fashion in which the complainant has sought to implicate other members of the family of the petitioner. They are arraigned on a tenuous allegation that they did not cooperate or support the petitioner’s marriage with the complainant, thereby attempting to create a narrative of cheating. Criminal law cannot be permitted to be expanded by such facile insinuation. 15. The offences alleged included Section 69 of the BNS. Section 69 of BNS reads as follows: “69. Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.—Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—“deceitful means” shall include inducement for, or false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.” Section 69 criminalizes sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means including a promise of marriage, without intention of fulfilment. The provision though newly introduced, cannot be interpreted, in a manner that allows it to become an instrument of retroactive criminalization of consensual relationships upon the mere recital of “promise”. The statute punishes deceit, not disappointment; fraud, not failed affection; and exploitation, not the collapse of relationship. On the facts presented, it is difficult to discern where from the offence under Section 69 could even spring. The complainant on her own showing and on admitted records, appears to have been married/associated in other relationships, and to have children. In such circumstances, the allegation of sexual intercourse, induced solely on promise of marriage is inherently implausible and legally unsustainable, consequently, 40 neither Section 96 BNS nor Section 64 BNS (Section 376 of the earlier regime, the IPC) can be attracted. 16. The offence under Section 89 of the BNS (Section 313 of the earlier regime) is also not made out. In view of the principle enunciated by the Apex Court in NAIM AHAMED supra, consensual sexual acts, do not by themselves, invite such provision, in the absence of essential legal ingredients. 17. What then remains is, Section 318(2) of the BNS (Section 420 of the earlier regime, the IPC), even that cannot be invoked merely because a relationship did not culminate in marriage. The settle position of law is that, breach of a marriage to marry, howsoever morally questionable, is not per se cheating in the criminal sense, unless dishonest intention at the inception is established, which is conspicuously absent in the case at hand." (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the judicial landscape as quoted hereinabove, permitting further trial against the petitioner would on the face of it become an abuse of the process of law. It also becomes necessary to notice the manipulation of the complainant. 12. The complainant is alleged to have registered several crimes against several men on the same score, one such crime was against Thammanna Vittal Badiger in Crime No.446 of 2015, which was tried as C.C.No.19282 of 2016. The statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. recorded therein is necessary to be noticed. It reads as follows: 41 “=ಾJಾರರ Dೆಸರು: XXXXXX ತಂೆಯ Dೆಸರು : XXXXXX ವಯಸು€ : XXXXXX ಉೊ,ೕಗ : XXXXXX @ಾಸ : XXXXXX ಾಂಕ: 09-12-2015 ಸತ, ಪL8ಾಣ ‡ೋoಸ0ಾaತು. ದಂಡ ದಂಡ ದಂಡ ದಂಡ ಪLELಯ ಪLELಯ ಪLELಯ ಪLELಯ ಸಂ6ೆಯ ಸಂ6ೆಯ ಸಂ6ೆಯ ಸಂ6ೆಯ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ 164 (5) ರಯ-. ರಯ-. ರಯ-. ರಯ-. ಸQ ಸQ ಸQ ಸQ ಇ<ಾˆ ಇ<ಾˆ ಇ<ಾˆ ಇ<ಾˆ DೇBೆ DೇBೆ DೇBೆ DೇBೆ ಸQತಃ ಸQತಃ ಸQತಃ ಸQತಃ =ಾJaಂದ =ಾJaಂದ =ಾJaಂದ =ಾJaಂದ 7ೆಂಗಳŠನ DೆಗG^ೆ ನಗರದ-.ರುವ ಾxೊ‹ೕ6ಾeನ &ಯು Bಾ0ೇ)ನ-. ಾನು ಏ&L% 2013 ಂದ ಆಗZT 2014 ರ ವೆ ೆ pಾLಶುಂpಾಲಾ1 Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡು3ೆOನು. •ೆಬLವ 2014 ಂದ ತಮ4ಣ` ;ಠŽ% ಬ ೇ ಎಂಬುವರ ಪಚಯ 7ೆ•ೆaತು. ನಮ4 ಪಚಯವ ಾಢ@ಾ1 ಇತು3, ನಂತರ ಸದ ಬ ೇ ಅವರು ಾನು Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡು3ದO Bಾ0ೇ) ೆ ಬಂದು ಮಕv ೆ 5. 6ೋಸ7ೇBೆಂದುBೊಂೆOೕೆ ಅದBೆv ಅನುಮ Bೊ ಎಂದು Bೇದರು. ನಂತರ ಾನು ಅದನು: ೋ ನಂತರ ಾನು ಒ&•ದೆ ಅನುಮ Bೊಡು6ೆ3ೕೆ ಎಂದು Dೇೆನು. ಅದಲ.ೆ ಾನು ಅಮೃತXಂದು ಎಂಬ 58ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯ7ೇBೆಂದುBೊಂೆOೕೆ ನನ ೆ ಬಂಡ@ಾಳ ಇಲ. ನನ ೆ ಸDಾಯ 8ಾಡುವವರು ಯೂರೂ ಇಲ. ಸDಾಯ 8ಾ ಎಂದು ನನ:ನು: ಪೇ ಪೇ Bೇಳ‘3ದOರು. ನಂತರ ಸದ ಬ ೇd ನ:ಂದ ನನ: @ೈಯE3ಕ ;ಷಯದ ಬ ೆG 8ಾಯನು: ಪ^ೆದು ಾನು ತನ1ಂತ 23 ವಷ* ವಯ5€ನ-. ೊಡ[ವಾದ Dೆಂಗಸನು: ಮದು@ೆ 8ಾBೊಂದುO ಅವ ೆ 2009 ರ-. ಹೃದಯದ ಶಸ’NE6ೆ€ ಆ1ದುO ಆದಲ.ೆ, ಅವ ೆ “ೈಾ”[ ಸಮ=ೆ, ಇರುವ Bಾರಣ ನಮ4 ಾಂಪತ, )ೕವನ ಸ ಇಲ. ನನ ೆ ಮಕv•ಾಗುವಲ. ಎಂದು Dೇಳ‘6ಾ3 ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ 8ಾBೊಳ‘•6ೆ3ೕೆ ಎಂದು ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾದರು. ಇಾದ !ೕ0ೆ ಸದ ಬ ೇd –ದಲೆ @ಾರ 8ಾ—* 2014 ರ-. ನನ:ನು: ಮಂ6ಾLಲಯBೆv ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ೇವರ !ೕ0ೆ ಪL8ಾಣ 8ಾ ಮತು3 ಅವರ ಮೆೇವಾದ \ರಸಂ1ಗೂ ಸಹ ನನ:ನು: ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಇನು: ಮುಂೆ ೕೇ ನನ: Dೆಂಡ ಎಂದು ೇವರ !ೕ0ೆ ಪL8ಾಣ 8ಾ ನನ ೆ ಅವರ !ೕ0ೆ ನಂXBೆ ಬರುವ ೕಯ-. ನ^ೆದುBೊಂಡರು. ನಂತರ ಅವರು ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ೈಕ 42 ಸಂಪಕ*ವನು: ಸಹ DೊಂದOರು. ನಂತರ ಸದ ಬ ೇd ಅವರ ಊ ೆ ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಅವರ ತಂೆ 6ಾaಯನು: ‡ೇ' 8ಾ5ದರು. ಅ-.ಂದ ಅವರು ಮತು3 ಾನು 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಬಂೆವ. ಅಾದ ನಂತರ ಬ ೇ ಮತು3 ಆತನ Dೆಂಡಯ ನಡು@ೆ ಜಗಳ ಆ1 ಬ ೇd ಅವರ ಮೆ ೆ Dೋಗ-ಲ.. ನಂತರ Bೆಲವ ನ ಅವರ =ೆ:ೕತರ ಮೆಯ-. ಇದOರು. ನಂತರ ಾನು @ಾಸ8ಾಡು3ದO `ಮೆಯನು: ಬ ೇd ಅವ ೆ XಟುTBೊಟುT ಾನು ನನ: ಅಕvನ ಮೆಯ-. ಇೆOನು. !ೕ ಂಗನ-. ಾನು ಗಭ*ಧ5ದುO ಆ ;ಷಯ ದು –ದ- ೆ ಅವರು ಖು|ಪಟTರು ನಂತರ 58ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯುವ Bಾರಣ Dೇ ಈಗ ಮಗು 7ೇಡ ಎಂದು Dೇ ಬಸ@ೇಶQರನಗರದ-.ರುವ ಪಣ, ಆಸ•6ೆLಯ-. ನನ ೆ ಗಭ*pಾತವನು: 8ಾ5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಗಭ*pಾತ ಮೂ5Bೊಳ•ಲು ನನ ೆ ಇಷT ಇಲ.ೆ ಇದOರೂ ಅವರ ಒ6ಾ3ಯBೆv ಮUದು ಗಭ*pಾತ 8ಾ5Bೊಂರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ಗಭ*pಾತ 8ಾ5Bೊಂಡು ಒಂದು @ಾರ ಸಹ ಆ1ರ-ಲ.. ಆದರೂ ಬ ೇd ಒ6ಾ3ಯಪ‚ವ*ಕ@ಾ1 ನನ:ನು: ಾನು XಟುTBೊಟT ಮೆ ೆ ಕೆ5Bೊಂಡು ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: . ಮುಂದುವೆ5ದರು. ಆ ಸಮಯದ-. ನನ ೆ ಆಗುವಲ. ಮತು3 ಇಷT ಇಲ. ಎಂದು Dೇದರೂ ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: ಮುಂದುವೆ5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಾನು ಆತನ ƒೊ6ೆ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ 8ಾಡುವದು ಸ ಅಲ. ಎಂದು ಆತ ೆ Dೇದರೂ ಆತ ಅದನು: Bೇಳೇ ನನ ೆ 7ೆದ5 ಮತು3 ಆತ4ಹ6ೆ, 8ಾBೊಳ‘•ಕು•˜6ೆ3ೕೆ ಎಂದು Dೆದ5 ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: ಮುಂದುವೆ5ದರು ನನ ೆ ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಒಂೇ ಮೆಯ-. @ಾಸ8ಾಡುವದು ಇಷT ಇಲ.ೆ ಇದOರೂ ಬಲವಂತ@ಾ1 ನನ:ನು: ಾನು ಅವ ೆ XಟುTBೊಟT ಮೆಯ-. ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಉಯುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾದರು. ಸದ ಬ ೇd ೕನು ನನ: Dೆಂಡ, ಾನು ನ: ಗಂಡ ಾನು ನ: ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಇೆOೕೆ, ೕನು BೆಲಸBೆv Dೋಗುವದು 7ೇಡ ಾನು ನ:ನು: ೋBೊಳ‘•6ೆ3ೕೆ, ಾನು 58ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯ7ೇBೆಂದುBೊಂೆOೕೆ ೕನು ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆಯ-. ಇದOೆ =ಾಕು. ಎಂದು Dೇ ನಂX5 ನನ:ನು: Bಾ0ೇ) ೆ ಾ)ೕಾ! Bೊಡುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾದುO Bಾರಣ ಾನು ಆಗZT 2014 ರ-. ನನ: BೆಲಸBೆv ಾ)ೕಾ!ಯನು: Bೊ'Tರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ಸದ ಬ ೇd ನನ: ಗಂಡನ ೕಯ-. ನನ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಆ53, ಹಣ, ಒಡ@ೆ ಮತು3 ಎ0ಾ. ವ,ವDಾರಗಳನು: ಸಂಪ‚ಣ*@ಾ1 ತನ: ಹ6ೋ' ೆ 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು ಾನು ನ: ಗಂಡ ಎಂದು Dೇಳ‘3ದOರು. ಾನು Bೆಲಸ XಟT ನಂತರ ಬ ೇd 5ಸT™ ^ೊ!ೖ• ಎಂಬ ಕಂಪಯ-. ಕಂಪ‚,ಟd •ೆBಾ:ಲ) ಬ ೆG ೆZT •ಾ,ಕ-T ಆ1, ಉಪಾ,ಸವನು: Bೊಡು6ಾ3 ಹಣವನು: ಸಂpಾದೆ 8ಾಡಲು pಾLರಂš5ದರು. ಆಗ ಅವ ೆ ಂಗ ೆ ಐದಂದ ಎಂಟು =ಾ;ರ - ಬರು3ತು3. ಬ ೇd =ಾ›T@ೇd ಇಂ)ಯd ಆದ Bಾರಣ 58ಾ 6ೆ ೆಯುವ ƒೊ6ೆ ೆ ಮ4 YL•ೇಶ• ೆ ಗಮನ Bೊ ಎಂದು Dೇಾಗ ಬ ೇ ತನ: ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು: 43 ತರಲು 8ಾಗ ರ=ೆ3ಯ Y-ೕಸರ ಮು+ಾಂತರ ಅವರ Dೆಂಡಯ ಮೆ ೆ Dೋ1 Bೇಾಗ ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ‘ ಇಲ. ಅವನು: ಅವೇ 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1ಾOೆ ಎಂದು ಸುಳ‘• Dೇದ Bಾರಣ Y-ೕಸಂದ ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ‘ ಕ•ೆದುDೋ1@ೆ ಎಂದು ಂಬರಹ ಪ^ೆದು ನಂತರ ನಕ- ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು: ಪ^ೆದುBೊಂರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಸದ ನಕ- ಾಖ0ೆಗಳನು: ಪ^ೆಯಲು ಾನು ನನ: ಆಭರಣಗಳನು: ಅಡ8ಾನ;ಟುT ಸDಾಯ 8ಾರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ಇದರ ƒೊ6ೆ ೆ 58ಾ ;<ಾರBೆv ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟTಂ6ೆ ಹಣ Bೇಾಗ0ೆ0ಾ. =ಾಲ 8ಾ ಸು8ಾರು 30 ಲœ ಹಣವನು: ಅವ ೆ Bೊ'Tರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ಸದ ಹಣBೆv ಾನು ಬ[ಯನು: ಕಟT7ೇBಾ1ದುO Bೆಲಸ ಇಲ.ದ Bಾರಣ ಬ[ಯನು: ಕಟುT3ಲ.. ನ@ೆಂಬd 2014 ರ-. ನನ: ಒ6ಾ3ಯ ಮತು3 ನನ: ಸDಾಯಂದ ಬ ೇd ಅವ ೆ ಚೆ:ೖನ-. ಇರುವ Dೆ—5ಎ% ಕಂಪಯ-. 'ೕಂ -ೕಡd ಆ1 Bೆಲಸ 5Evರುತ3ೆ. ಚೆ:ೖ ೆ BೆಲಸBೆv Dೋಾಗ ನನ:ನು: ಬ ೇd ಒ6ಾ3ಯ 8ಾ ಾನು ಇದO ಕ^ೆ ೕನು ಇರ7ೇಕು ಏನು ಬಂದರೂ ಾನು ಅದನು: ಹದಸು6ೆ3ೕೆ, ಇದOೆ ಇಬ•ರೂ ƒೊ6ೆಯ0ೆ. ಇೋಣ ಸತ3ೆ ƒೊ6ೆಯ0ೆ. =ಾiೕಣ ಎಂದು Dೇ ನನ:ನು: ನಂX5 ನನ:ನು: ಚೆ:ೖ ೆ ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಅವ ೆ BೊಟT ಕಂಪಯ ೆZT DೌZನ-. ನನ:ನು: ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆ ಒಂದೂವೆ ಂಗಳ‘ ಇ5BೊಂದOರು. <ೆೆ:ೖನ-. ಸತ,ೇž ಎಂಬ 8ಾ,5m ^ೈೆಕTd ಇದO Bಾರಣ ಅವರ ಸDಾಯ ಪ^ೆದು ಅಮೃತXಂದು 58ಾವನು: <ೆೆ:ೖನ0ೆ. 8ಾಡ7ೇBೆಂಬ ಉೆOೕಶಂದ <ೆೆ:ೖನ !ೕಡ@ಾಕಂನ-. ರೂ. 11,000/- 7ಾ ೆ ೆ ಮೆಯನು: ಸಹ 8ಾ 7ೆಂಗಳŠನ ಮೆಯ-.ದO ಅಗತ,;ರುವ ಗೃDೋಪiೕ1 =ಾ8ಾನುಗಳನು: ಆ ಮೆ ೆ 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1 ಜನವ 2015 ಂದ ಆಗZT 2015 ರವೆ ೆ ಆ ಮೆಯ-. ಇೆOವ. ಆಗZT 2015 ರಂದು 7ೆಂಗಳŠನ-. ನನ: ಅಕvನ ಮಗಳ \„6ಾಥ* ಇದುO ಬ ೇ ನನ:ನು: ನನ: ಅಕvನ ಮಗಳ \„6ಾಥ*Bೆv 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು ಬಂದು XಟುT ಅಕvನ ಮೆಯ-. ಇರು ರƒಾ DಾE ಬರು6ೆ3ೕೆ ಎಂದು Dೇ <ೆೆ:ೖ ೆ Dೋದರು. <ೆೆ:ೖನ-. 2 ನ ಇದುO ನಂತರ `7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಬಂದರು. ನಂತರ ಾಂಕ 02-09-2015 ಂದ ಾಂಕ 25- 09-2015 ರವೆ ೆ ನನ:ನು: ಬ ೇd Ÿಲಂ ಶ 'ಂ¡ =ಾThಗಳನು: ೋಡ7ೇBೆಂದು ಸು8ಾರು 25-30 ಪL@ಾ56ಾಣಗ ೆ ಕೆದುBೊಂಡು Dೋ1ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಾಂಕ 25-09-2015 ರಂದು ತುಮಕೂನ ನ;ೕ• ƒೆ€ Dೋ•ೆ%ನ-. ಾನು ಮತು3 ಬ ೇd ತಂ1ೆOವ. ಆ ನ ೕವ Bೆಲಸವನು: 8ಾಡು3ಲ., 58ಾ ಸಹ 8ಾಡು3ಲ. ಈ ಾಗ0ೇ ಅದBೆv =ಾಕಷುT ಬಂಡ@ಾಳನು: DಾEOೕಾ ಾನು ಸಹ =ಾಲ 8ಾ ಹಣ Bೊ'TೆOೕೆ, ಬ[ಯನು: ಕಟುT3ಲ.. ನನ:ನು: ಸಹ Bೆಲಸಂದ X5Oೕಾ, ನನ: )ೕವನದ ಗ ಏನು ಎಂದು Dೇ ೕ ೆ ಇದOೆ ಹಣBಾ5ನ 5e ಸುsಾಸುವಲ. ಬದುಕಲು ಕಷT ಆಗುತ3ೆ ಎಂದು Dೇಾಗ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ 44 ಜಗಳ 8ಾ ನನ ೆ Dೊ^ೆದು ನನ ೆ Dೇಳೆ Bೇಳೆ ನ ಅವರು ನನ:ನು: Dೋ•ೆ%ನ-. XಟುT DೊರಟುDೋದರು. ಅವರು XಟುT Dೋದ ನಂತರ <ೆೆ:ೖನ 7ಾ ೆ ಮೆಯ 8ಾ-ೕಕ ೆ ಾನು 2 ಂಗಂದ 7ಾ ೆ ಕ'Tಲ. ಾನು =ೋಮ@ಾರ ಬಂದು 7ಾ ೆ ಕಟುT6ೆ3ೕೆ, 7ೇƒಾರು 8ಾBೊಳ•7ೇ ಎಂದು !=ೇ~ ಕಳ‘5ೆOನು. ಅದBೆv ಅವರು ನನ ೆ ಕೆ 8ಾ ಆಗZT 31 ರಂೇ ಮ4 ಗಂಡ ಮೆ +ಾ- 8ಾBೊಂಡು Dೋ1ಾOೆ ಎಂದು 5ದರು. ನನ:ನು: 7ೆಂಗಳŠ ೆ ಕಳ‘5 ನನ ೆ ಸದ Dಾ ೆ ಮೆಯ-. ಇದO ಎ0ಾ. ಹಣ, ನನ: ಆಭರಣ, ನನ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ‘, 58ಾ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟT ಾಖ0ೆಗಳ‘, ಆ ಮೆಯ-. ಇದO 3 ಲœ 7ೆ0ೆ7ಾಳ‘ವ ಗೃDೋಪiೕ1 ವಸು3ಗಳ‘, ನನ: ಬ•ೆT ಮತು3 ಮೆಯ-. ಇದO ಎ0ಾ. ವಸು3ಗಳನು: 6ೆ ೆದುBೊಂಡು ಮೆ +ಾ- 8ಾಾOೆ ಎಂದು ಾಂಕ 25-09- 2015 ರಂದು ನನ ೆ ದುಬಂತು. ಇಾದ ನಂತರ ಬ ೇd Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡು3ದO Dೆ— 5ಎ% ಕಂಪ ೆ ಾನು ಇ-!ೕ% ಮು+ಾಂತರ ಬ ೇd ಅವರ ;ಷಯBೆv ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟTಂ6ೆ Dೆ—ಆd 8ಾ,ೇಜd ೆ ಇ-!ೕ% ಕಳ‘5ಾಗ ಾಂಕ 21-08-2015 ಂದ ಬ ೇd ಅ¢=ಾvಂಂ¡ ಎಂದು ಅವರ ಾಖ0ೆಯ-. ಾಖ0ೆ_ಾ1ೆ ಎಂದು ನನ ೆ ಉತ3ರವನು: ಕಳ‘5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಅವರು Bೆಲಸ 8ಾಡುವ ಕಂಪಯ-. ನನ:ನು: Dೆಂಡ_ಾ1 6ೋ5ದOರು. ಬ ೇd =ಾಲ 8ಾರುವ 7ಾ,ಂmಗಳ-. ನನ: Dೆಸರನು: Dೆಂಡ_ಾ1 BೊಟುT ನನ: –7ೈ% ನಂಬd ಅನು: ಅ-. ಾಖ-5ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ ಆಗು6ೆ3ೕೆ ಎಂದು ನಂX5 ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ ಆಗೆ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧವನು: 7ೆ•ೆ5, ನನ: ಹಣ, ಒಡ@ೆ ಎಲ.ವನೂ: ದುರುಪiೕಗ 8ಾBೊಂಡು ಈಗ ನನ ೆ –ೕಸ 8ಾ Dೋ1ರು6ಾ3ೆ. ಸದ ಬ ೇdಂದ ಾನು 8ಾನ5ಕ@ಾ1 ಮತು3 ೈಕ@ಾ1 ೊಂರು6ೆ3ೕೆ. ಬ ೇd ನನ:ನು: ಮದು@ೆ 8ಾBೊಳ•ದ . Bಾರಣ ನನ ೆ ಅವರ ƒೊ6ೆ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ Dೊಂದಲು ಇಷT ಇಲ. ದOರೂ ನನ:ನು: Dೆದ5 ಮತು3 ನಂXBೆ ಬರುವಂ6ೆ 8ಾ ಪLDೆƒೆ£ಗೂ ಪL7ಾ ಮದು@ೆ ಆಗು6ೆ3ೕೆ, ಾನು ನ: ಗಂಡ ೕನು ನನ: Dೆಂಡ ಎಂದು Dೇ ನನ: ƒೊ6ೆ ೈಕ ಸಂಬಂಧ Dೊಂರು6ಾ3ೆ. (ಾ,_ಾಲಯದ ಒ•ಾಂಗಣದ-. =ಾJಯು DೇದOನು: 7ೆರಳ‘ಚು„ ಾರ ೆ ಉಕ30ೇಖನ ೕ- -7ೆರಳಚು„ 8ಾಸ0ಾaತು) =ಾJ ೆ ಓ DೇದOನು: 45 =ಾJ ಸ ಇೆ ಎ೦ದು ಒ&•ದರು. Sd /- ಎಂ.ಎಂ.'.5 6” The complainant does not stop at registration of the crime. But begins to communicate e-mail and messages to the employer of the petitioner and gets him arrested all for the offence punishable under Section 69 of the BNS. Therefore, the complainant being completely manipulative, shrouded with falsehood, contradictions and on consensual acts is now wanting to get the petitioner, who is third in line, be tried in a Sessions case for the aforesaid offences. If this would be permitted, it would be putting a premium on the acts of the complainant and permitting the process of law to be abused by the complainant apart from it resulting in grave miscarriage of justice. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to exercise my jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNS and take off the sword of Damocles hanging on the head of the petitioner. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: - O R D E R (i) Writ Petition is allowed. 46 (ii) Charge sheet and the proceedings in S.C.No.1727 of 2025 (arising out of Crime No.244 of 2025), pending before the LIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-54), qua the petitioner, stand quashed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE nvj CT:BR