1 CGHC010316572026 2026:CGHC:36141-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2141 of 2026 1 - Radheshyam Patel S/o Santosh Patel Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Ghanaghat, Tahsil Lormi, District Mungeli (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Superintendent of Police Bilaspur District Bilaspur (C.G.). 2 - Station House Officer Police Station Sarkanda Bilaspur District Bilaspur (C.G.) 3 - XXX ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Shri Nikhil Waghwani, Advocate. For State : Shri S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 14.08.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 The petitioner has filed this petition seeking following reliefs/prayer: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and quash the F.I.R. and Chargesheet of Crime No. 886/2025 registered At Police Station Sarkanda Bilaspur (C.G.) Against The Petitioner for an offence under section 363, 366, 376(3), 376(2)(n) of IPC and 4 & 6 of the POCSO act and also quash the cognizance taken by the learned Additional Session Judge Second Fast Track Special Court INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.08.17 11:02:23 +0530 2 Bilaspur District Bilaspur (C.G.) vide order dated 25.08.2025 in Special Criminal Case (POCSO Act) no. 124/2025 and also quash the framing of charges by the learned Additional Session Judge Second Fast Track Special Court Bilaspur District Bilaspur (C.G.) vide order dated 01.09.2025 and also quash the further proceedings of Special Criminal Case (POCSO Act)No.124/2025 for an offence U/S section 363, 366, 376(3), 376(2)(n) of IPC and 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act pending before the learned Additional Session Judge Second Fast Track Special Court Bilaspur District Bilaspur.” 2 The prosecution case is that on 26.06.2025, the father of the prosecutrix lodged a report alleging that the the present petitioner had sexually exploited his daughter from 16.04.2022 till 2025 on the pretext of marriage and thereafter refused to marry her. On the basis of the report, FIR No.886/2025 was registered at Police Station Sarkanda, District Bilaspur, for offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376(3) of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act. The petitioner was arrested on 02.07.2025. Charge-sheet was filed on 14.08.2025 and cognizance was taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Second Fast Track Special Court, Bilaspur, vide order dated 25.08.2025. Charges were framed against the petitioner vide order dated 01.09.2025. 3 Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner and prosecutrix was having love affair and she made consensual physical relation with the petitioner. The petitioner never promised to marry her. From FIR and charge-sheet it appears that the prosecutrix was 18 years of age at the time of lodging FIR. Out of 27 prosecution witnesses, 6 witnesses have already been examined. The matter is presently at the stage of prosecution evidence. Further, during pendency of the proceedings, the petitioner and the prosecutrix entered into a written mutual compromise in which she has stated that 3 she does not wish to marry the petitioner and intends to live separately and independently on her own will and does not wish to pursue the allegations against the petitioner. Thus, since the prosecutrix has voluntarily entered into the compromise and has expressed her intention to live separately and independently. Therefore, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prays for quashing of criminal proceeding. 4 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the allegations involve serious offences, including offences under the POCSO Act and that such offences are subject to the statutory scheme governing prosecution and cannot ordinarily be terminated merely on the basis of a private compromise. It is further submitted that the effect of the compromise, the age of the prosecutrix at the relevant time and the evidence collected during investigation are matters to be considered in accordance with law before granting any relief to the petitioner. 5 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 6 At the outset, the contention of the petitioner that the prosecutrix was 18 years of age at the time of lodging of the FIR does not, by itself, conclude the question of her age at the time of the alleged occurrence. It is also not in dispute that the charge-sheet has already been filed, cognizance has been taken and charges have been framed against the petitioner. More importantly, the trial has commenced and 6 prosecution witnesses out of total 27 witnesses have already been 4 examined. The allegations are required to be tested on the basis of the evidence led before the Trial Court. 7 The main ground urged by the petitioner is the subsequent compromise between the petitioner and the prosecutrix. However, the alleged compromise cannot, by itself, dilute the allegations of commission of offences under the POCSO Act. The statutory protection afforded to a child under the POCSO Act cannot be defeated merely because subsequent to registration of the case, the prosecutrix has entered into a compromise or does not wish to pursue the prosecution. The submission that the relationship between the petitioner and the prosecutrix was consensual and that the petitioner never promised to marry her are matters essentially relating to the merits of the prosecution case. Such disputed questions require appreciation of the evidence and cannot appropriately be adjudicated upon in exercise of the jurisdiction sought by the petitioner, particularly when the trial has already commenced and prosecution witnesses have been examined. 8 In Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Apex Court has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.) is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash the FIR in suitable cases, the 5 Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), only has to consider whether or not the allegations of FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit. Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), final conclusions are as under:- “i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in 6 progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7 xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 9 Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), while reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, has once again emphasized that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised with great caution, circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances. 10 The Apex Court has held that while considering a prayer for quashing of an FIR, charge-sheet or criminal proceedings, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial or undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected during investigation. The scope of judicial scrutiny at such stage is confined to examining whether the allegations made in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and make out a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. 8 11 Thus, for all these reasons and also considering the fact that matter is still under investigation and the petitioner have already been granted regular bail in MCrC No.8810 of 2025 on 20.11.2025, interference at this stage would amount to stifling a legitimate prosecution and depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to establish its case in accordance with law. The defence put forth by the petitioner and the documents relied upon by him cannot be conclusively evaluated in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The issues raised by the petitioner are matters to be considered during the trial. Thus, the petitioner have failed to make out a case for interference of this court at this stage. 12 In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No order asto costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder