1 CGHC010016842022 2026:CGHC:36008 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 409 of 2022 1 - Shanti W/o Banchha Pradhan, Aged About 76 Years R/o Village Tala, Post Pathalla, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 2 - Mathamani S/o Bhagirathi, Aged About 61 Years R/o Village Arangi, Post Arangi, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 3 - Rajkishore S/o Bhagirath, Aged About 57 Years R/o Village Arangi, Post Arangi, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 4 - Hirakishore D/o Bhagirathi, Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Arangi, Post Arangi, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 5 - Indra W/o Rajendra Kumar, Aged About 54 Years R/o Village Tala, Post Pathalla, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 6 - Kamla W/o Prafull Kumar, Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Rasoda, Tahsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 7 - Bhumisuta W/o Bharat, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Paraswani, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 8 - Parvati W/o Kailash Aged About 76 Years R/o Village Rasoda, Tahsil Basna, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 9 - Ramakant S/o Rupdhar, Aged About 59 Years R/o Talpuri, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh 10 - Parikshit S/o Basudev, Aged About 68 Years R/o Village Baitari, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 11 - Pramod S/o Basudev, Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Rasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 12 - Damyanti W/o Narsingh, Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Bagaijor, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 13 - Tikeshwar S/o Basudev, Aged About 59 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 14 - Bhagyawanti W/o Mandani, Aged About 53 Years R/o Village Lohrakot, District Bargarh (Odisha), District : Bargarh *, Orissa 15 - Anjali W/o Late Prasanna, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : 3 Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 16 - Vinay S/o Late Prasanna, Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 17 - Manish S/o Late Prasanna, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 18 - Rajkumar S/o Late Banshidhar, Aged About 72 Years R/o Village Baitari, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 19 - Ahliya W/o Ugrasen, Aged About 68 Years R/o Village Jharmuda, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 20 - Tilotama W/o Kailash, Aged About 64 Years R/o Village Baitari, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 21 - Suresh S/o Late Banshidhar, Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Baitari, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 22 - Mahendra S/o Late Banshidhar Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Baitari, Tahsil Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 23 - Jayshankar S/o Late Panchanan, Aged About 54 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 4 24 - Laykanti D/o Late Panchanan, Aged About 51 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 25 - Geetanjali W/o Murlidhar, Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Kasalwa, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 26 - Manju W/o Late Anang, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Kisdi, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh..............(Note- Now Nila Bai And Chandrakanti Have And The Petitioners No. 2 To 26 Are The Legal Representatives Of Nila Bai And Chandrakanti), District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Revenue And Disaster Management Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Collector, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Mahasamund, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 4 - The Tahsiildar, Pithora, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh 5 - Devendra Bahadur S/o Virendra Bahadur, R/o Mahalpara, Saraipali, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh. 5 ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Raghvendra Pradhan, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Amit Nayak, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Harshwardhan, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 13/08/2026 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the records of the case. 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate setting-writ/order, thereby aside/quashing the impugned order dated 16.06.1989 (Annexure P/1) with all consequential proceedings and further be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to record the subject lands in the name of petitioners. 10.3 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to declare that the provisions of 170-B of Chhattisgarh land Revenue Code, 1959 are not applicable to the transaction made prior to 02.10.1959 the day the Code, 1959 came into force in the interest of justice. 10.4 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to hold/declare that any order passed under Section 170-B of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 by the competent 6 authority /revenue court with regard to reverting back the land to the tribal has no force of law and is nullity in the interest of justice. 10.5 That any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the cost of the petition may be given.” 2. At the outset, learned counsel for the parties submit that the issue involved in the present writ petition stands squarely covered by the judgment rendered by this Court in WPC No. 1493/2022 (Rajendra and others vs. Vimal and others) decided on 3.8.2026. It is prayed by the learned counsel for the parties that the present writ petition may also be disposed of in terms of the observations and findings recorded therein. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced below:– “34. Upon thoughtful consideration of the rival submissions and on a careful examination of the material available on record, the principal question which falls for determination is whether the authorities below were justified in invoking the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in reversing the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Sub- Divisional Officer dated 10.12.2014. The ancillary issue which also arises for consideration is whether the petitioners have been able to establish that the disputed 7 land had vested in or was settled in favour of their predecessors during the Surguja State Settlement of the year 1954-55, prior to the enforcement of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and, if so, whether such settlement falls outside the ambit of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 35. Before adverting to the rival contentions on merits, it would be apposite to examine the statutory scheme governing Section 170- B of the Code, 1959, together with the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction exercisable thereunder, in the light of the principles laid down by the Division Bench and the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court as well as the precedents of the erstwhile High Court of Madhya Pradesh relied upon by the parties. 36. Undisputedly, the facts of the present case reveal that the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 05, admeasuring 3.96 acres, situated at Village Batauli, District Surguja, originally stood recorded in the name of Pandra Oraon, son of Mahato Oraon, in the Surguja State Settlement dated 05.04.1939. It is also not in dispute that during the subsequent settlement operations of the year 1954-55, the names of the petitioners' predecessors, namely, Shivlal Sao, son of Brijmohan Sao Roniyar, and Nanka, son of Manbodh 8 Roniyar, came to be recorded in the Record of Rights/Adhikar Abhilekh pursuant to the settlement proceedings and the consequential order dated 08.04.1956 passed by the competent Settlement Officer. The respondents invoked the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 only in the year 2012- 13 by filing an application before the learned Sub- Divisional Officer seeking restoration of the disputed land, i.e., after nearly six decades from the preparation of the settlement records and more than fifty years after the enforcement of the Code, 1959. The provisions under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 reads as under:- “170-B. Reversion of land of members of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud. - (1) Every person who on the date of commencement of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code (Amendment), 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of the commencement of Amendment Act, 1980 shall, within two years of such commencement, notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in 9 such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land. (2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by sub-section (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs. (2-A) If a Gram Sabha in the Scheduled area referred to in clause (1) of Article 244 of the Constitution finds that any person, other than a member of an aboriginal tribe, is in possession of any land of a bhumiswami belonging to an aboriginal tribe, without any lawful authority, it shall restore the possession of such land to that person to whom it originally belonged and if that person is dead to his legal heirs : Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the possession of such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who shall restore the possession of such land within three months from the date of receipt of the reference. 10 (3) On receipt of the information under sub- section (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be deemed necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void and pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferor and, if he is dead, in his legal heirs. (3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (1) the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be necessary about all such transactions , of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void and- (a) Where no building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferer and if he be dead, in his legal heirs, (b) Where any building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding, he shall fix the price of such land in accordance with the principles laid down for fixation of price of land in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894) and order the person referred to in sub-section (1) to pay to the 11 transferor the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferer : Provided that where the building or structure has been erected after the 1st day of January, 1984, the provisions of clause (b) above shall not apply : Provided further that fixation of price under clause (b) shall be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case before the Sub-Divisional Officer.” 37. A bare reading of the provisions contained in Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 would reveal that the legislative intent behind the said provision is to provide a special mechanism for restoration of agricultural land belonging to members of the Scheduled Tribe which had been transferred to a non-tribal by way of a transaction falling within the statutory period commencing from 02.10.1959 and ending with the commencement of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980. The jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 can be invoked only where there exists a transfer of agricultural land by a tribal in favour of a non-tribal and the authority, upon due enquiry, arrives at a finding that the tribal had been deprived of his legitimate rights 12 by reason of such transfer. Thus, the existence of a transfer or transaction attracting the statutory provision is the foundational requirement for assumption of jurisdiction under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 38. A careful perusal of the order dated 10.12.2014 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Sitapur, Surguja, would indicate that the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, after considering the Surguja State Settlement records of the year 1939, the Adhikar Abhilekh and the Record of Rights pertaining to the settlement of the year 1954-55, recorded a categorical finding that the names of the petitioners' predecessors had already been entered in the revenue records during the settlement proceedings of the year 1954-55 and, therefore, the change in the revenue entries had taken place much prior to 02.10.1959. Proceeding on the said factual finding and relying upon the settled legal position that transfers effected prior to 02.10.1959 are outside the ambit of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer dismissed the respondents' application by holding that the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 were not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13 39. Further, a bare reading of the impugned order dated 03.03.2022 passed by the Board of Revenue would demonstrate that the Board proceeded on an altogether different premise. Instead of examining whether the case fulfilled the essential jurisdictional requirements of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, the Board primarily focused on the absence of a registered sale deed, gift deed, relinquishment deed or any other document evidencing lawful transfer of title in favour of the petitioners' predecessors and concluded that mere possession or mutation entries could not confer ownership. Proceeding on such reasoning, the Board affirmed the orders passed by the Collector and the Commissioner by holding that the petitioners had failed to establish a lawful source of title and, consequently, set aside the order passed by the learned Sub- Divisional Officer. The correctness and legality of the aforesaid approach adopted by the Board of Revenue is the principal issue which now falls for consideration before this Court. 40. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions and upon a meticulous examination of the original records, this Court is of the considered opinion that the entire controversy revolves around the true scope and ambit of the enquiry contemplated under 14 Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. A plain reading of the provision unmistakably demonstrates that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Sub-Divisional Officer is not merely to ascertain the date on which the name of a non-tribal came to be recorded in the revenue records. Rather, the statute obligates the prescribed authority to undertake a comprehensive enquiry into the manner in which a non-tribal came into possession of agricultural land which originally belonged to a member of a Scheduled Tribe. The enquiry contemplated under Section 170-B is therefore not confined to examination of revenue entries but extends to determination of the legality of possession, the existence or otherwise of a lawful transfer, the circumstances under which the tribal was allegedly divested of possession and whether such divestment was brought about by fraud, misrepresentation or any other device defeating the protective object of the legislation. The provision being a beneficial and remedial legislation enacted for protecting members of the Scheduled Tribes from unlawful deprivation of their agricultural lands, the prescribed authority is under a statutory obligation to conduct an effective and meaningful enquiry before arriving at any conclusion. Consequently, mere reliance upon the date of mutation or the date of recording of 15 names in the revenue records, without examining the surrounding circumstances leading to such entries, cannot satisfy the mandatory requirement of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 41. The legislative object behind incorporation of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is to restore lands unlawfully alienated from members of the Scheduled Tribes and not merely to verify the chronological sequence of revenue entries. The enquiry envisaged by the statute necessarily requires the prescribed authority to ascertain whether the tribal owner had voluntarily transferred the property by any legally recognised mode, whether the transfer had obtained the requisite statutory permission wherever necessary, whether possession was delivered pursuant to any lawful transaction, or whether the tribal was fraudulently deprived of his land without his knowledge. Such determination can be arrived at only after affording adequate opportunity to all concerned parties to produce oral and documentary evidence, examining the relevant settlement records, calling for reports from the concerned Revenue Inspector, Patwari and other field revenue officials, inspecting the original revenue records wherever necessary and appreciating the entire material in accordance with settled principles governing 16 quasi-judicial proceedings. The statute thus contemplates a full-fledged fact-finding exercise and not a summary disposal based merely upon historical revenue entries. 42. In the present case, this Court finds from the order dated 10.12.2014 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer that the authority substantially proceeded on the premise that since the names of the predecessors of the present petitioners had come to be recorded during the settlement proceedings of the year 1954- 55, which was prior to 02.10.1959, provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 stood excluded. Beyond recording such conclusion, the order does not disclose any detailed enquiry regarding the manner in which possession of the disputed land changed hands, the circumstances under which the entries in favour of the petitioners' predecessors came to be recorded, whether any enquiry was undertaken with respect to the alleged abandonment pleaded by the petitioners, or whether the respondents had knowledge of the alleged settlement proceedings. Likewise, there is no discussion indicating that the prescribed authority examined whether the respondents or their predecessors had been dispossessed by any fraudulent means or whether the statutory presumption arising 17 under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 stood effectively rebutted. Thus, the enquiry undertaken by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer appears to have remained confined to the existence of pre-1959 revenue entries without addressing the wider statutory issues which necessarily arise for consideration under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. 43. Equally significant is the fact that the record does not reveal that any comprehensive enquiry regarding actual possession of the disputed land was undertaken by the prescribed authority. No detailed report appears to have been called from the concerned revenue officials regarding continuous possession, cultivation, enjoyment of the land or the historical status of the property. There is also no indication that the parties were afforded adequate opportunity to substantiate their respective claims by producing independent evidence relating to possession, title or the nature of the alleged settlement proceedings. The proceedings under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 undoubtedly possess summary characteristics; nevertheless, the summary nature of the proceedings does not dispense with the statutory requirement of conducting a fair and meaningful enquiry. Compliance with the principles of natural justice constitutes the very foundation of such 18 enquiry. Unless both the tribal claimants and the non- tribal occupants are afforded full opportunity to establish their respective cases through legally admissible evidence, any conclusion regarding lawful or unlawful possession would remain incomplete. 44. At the same time, this Court is equally unable to approve the approach subsequently adopted by the Collector, Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. The appellate and revisional authorities, instead of examining whether the enquiry conducted by the Sub- Divisional Officer satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, proceeded to determine the controversy principally on the basis that the petitioners had failed to produce any registered sale deed or other conventional document of transfer. Such an approach, in the opinion of this Court, also does not fully address the controversy involved. The petitioners have consistently pleaded that their predecessors derived rights not through any private transfer executed by the tribal landholders but through statutory settlement proceedings undertaken by the competent Settlement Authority during the year 1954-55. If such plea was raised, the authorities were required to examine the legal effect, validity and evidentiary value of the alleged settlement proceedings, the original 19 settlement records and the statutory consequences flowing therefrom instead of treating the absence of a registered sale deed as determinative of the entire controversy. The authorities below were therefore required to examine the entire chain of events leading to the recording of the petitioners' predecessors' names rather than confining the enquiry to the existence or non-existence of a registered conveyance. 45. It is well settled that entries in revenue records, including mutation entries, are primarily maintained for fiscal purposes and neither create nor extinguish title. Mutation merely recognises possession or facilitates collection of land revenue and by itself cannot constitute conclusive proof of ownership. Equally, however, where the entries are shown to have originated from statutory settlement proceedings conducted under the provisions of the applicable land revenue enactments, such entries cannot be brushed aside without examining the legality of the settlement proceedings from which they emanated. The real enquiry, therefore, is not whether a mutation entry exists, but whether the foundation of such entry is traceable to a lawful source recognised by law. It is this aspect which required a detailed examination by the prescribed authority under Section 170-B of the Code, 20 1959 before any conclusion could legitimately be recorded. The principles governing such enquiry have consistently been explained by the Courts. In Dhirendra Nath Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 1985 MPLJ 786, it was emphasised that the authority exercising jurisdiction under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is required to undertake an effective enquiry into the circumstances under which possession has been obtained. 47. Likewise, in case of Atmaram Rohulla (supra), the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has considered the scope of enquiry under Section 170-B of Code and held as under:- 9. As explained in Dhirendra Nath Sharma's case even in a case governed by sub-section (2) of Section 170-B of the Code, there must be show cause notice and enquiry. In reply to show case notice, it is open to the vendee in possession to aver that his possession is by lawful authority. It must be open to him to adduce evidence in support of his contention that his possession is by lawful authority. If the Sub-Divisional Officer is satisfied on the materials before him either produced by the vendee or received from other sources 21 that the vendee's possession is based authority, the presumption is rebutted. That is lawful the end of the operation of sub-section (2). It is important to know that the presumption has nothing to do with the aspect whether the document is obtained by fraud or other unfair means or whether the document is substantially unfair and constitutes fraudulent transaction affecting legitimate rights of the tribals. The presumption is confined only to one aspect in a narrow compass, namely, whether the possession is without lawful authority.” 48. In a decision reported in case of Keshabo and another v. State of M.P. and others, (1996) 7 SCC 765, the Supreme Court has held that M.P. Land Revenue Code is a welfare legislation enacted to protect the ownership rights in the land of Scheduled Tribe and inter-alia observed as under:- “4………....It is a welfare legislation made to protect the ownership right in the land of a Scheduled Tribe to effectuate the constitutional obligation of Articles 39 (b) and 46 of the Constitution read with the Preamble. Economic empowerment of a tribal to provide economic democracy is the goal. Prevention of their exploitation due to ignorance or indigency is a constitutional duty 22 under Article 46. Agricultural land gives economic status to the tiller. Therefore, any alienation of land in contravention of the above objectives is void. It is contended that the application under Section 170 (1) should have been filed within two years from the date of sale. Since the application was not so filed, the authorities were not right in directing entertainment of the application. It is not in dispute that the authority has jurisdiction suo motu to go into the violation of the statutory provisions. Even otherwise, since it is a beneficial legislation, the authorities are bound to give effect tor constitutional policy; they are not devoid of jurisdiction, even if it is filed beyond limitation to entertain the application. It is a matter of public policy and of discretion.” 49. While considering this question, the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Gopichand v. State of M.P., 1998 RN 103 held as under:- “6. At this stage Shri Deoras submits that the Sub- Divisional Officer being subordinate to the Collector would not be in a position to look into the correctness, validity and propriety of the order passed by the Collector under Section 165(6), therefore, in a case where the lands have been transferred with the 23 permission of the Collector, such proceedings cannot be initiated or continued. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 170-B provides that if proper action is not taken by the transferee, then there would be presumption of fraud in favour of the a aboriginal tribe. Even in a case where a party proves that the land was purchased with the permission, the seller can still prove that the permission, the seller can still prove that the permission was obtained by playing fraud on the Collector. It is not that the correctness, validity or propriety of the permission is in question or challenge. The Sub-Divisional Officer only has to convine himself to the fact of exercise of fraud. Fraud may be exercised in a number of ways. A party may be defauded even before the application permission is moved. Permission itself may be the result of fraud or the permission may become ineffective, if certain assurances given by the transferee are not fulfilled by him after obtaining permission. In any case, it would be for the Sub- Divisional Officer to look into the matter.” 50. Similar principles were reiterated in Dhanna v. Nanudi, 2001 Revenue Nirnay 16, wherein it was observed that the enquiry contemplated under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 cannot be reduced to a mere mechanical exercise and the authority is duty- bound to 24 examine all relevant factual and legal aspects after granting adequate opportunity to the parties. These decisions uniformly underline that a meaningful enquiry constitutes the heart of proceedings under Section 170- B of the Code, 1959 and that the rights of either side cannot be adjudicated merely on presumptions or isolated revenue entries. 51. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid legal principles, this Court is of the considered opinion that neither the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer nor the orders subsequently passed by the Collector, Commissioner and the Board of Revenue comprehensively address every jurisdictional requirement contemplated under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. While the learned Sub-Divisional Officer confined himself substantially to the existence of pre-1959 revenue entries, the appellate authorities confined themselves largely to the absence of a registered transfer document. Neither approach fully satisfies the statutory mandate requiring an enquiry into the manner in which possession was acquired, the legal source of such possession, the effect of the statutory settlement proceedings relied upon by the petitioners, the allegation of abandonment put forward by them, and the claim of the respondents that the tribal land 25 was unlawfully recorded in the names of non-tribals. These issues are foundational in nature and require adjudication upon appreciation of complete evidence in accordance with law. 52. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the controversy cannot be satisfactorily resolved without a comprehensive enquiry strictly in accordance with Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. Such enquiry shall necessarily include examination of the original settlement proceedings of the year 1954-55, the alleged settlement order dated 08.04.1956, the statutory character and evidentiary value of the Adhikar Abhilekh, the circumstances leading to recording of the petitioners' predecessors' names, the legality of their possession, the allegations regarding abandonment of the land by the tribal ancestors, the plea of fraudulent deprivation advanced by the respondents and all other relevant factual and legal issues arising between the parties. Needless to observe, the prescribed authority shall afford full opportunity to both sides to adduce oral as well as documentary evidence, permit cross-examination wherever permissible in law, call for all relevant original revenue records and thereafter pass a reasoned and speaking order uninfluenced by any observation made herein on the merits of the rival claims. 26 53. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the impugned order dated 03.03.2022 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, the order dated 09.07.2018 passed by the Commissioner, Surguja Division, and the order dated 08.03.2018 passed by the Collector, Surguja, as well as the order dated 10.12.2014 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sitapur, District Surguja, cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Sub- Divisional Officer, Sitapur, District Surguja, for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. The Sub- Divisional Officer shall conduct a comprehensive enquiry strictly in terms of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, after issuing notice to all concerned parties and affording them full and effective opportunity to adduce oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective claims. The prescribed authority shall call for and examine the original settlement records, Record of Rights, Adhikar Abhilekh and all other relevant revenue records, ascertain the manner in which the petitioners' predecessors came into possession of the disputed land, determine the legal effect of the alleged settlement proceedings of the year 1954-55 and the order dated 08.04.1956, if proved, examine whether there existed any lawful transfer or other legally 27 recognised source of title, and thereafter decide whether the jurisdictional requirements of Section 170- B of the Code, 1959 are attracted to the facts of the present case. The authority shall also consider all contentions advanced by the parties uninfluenced by any observations made by the Collector, the Commissioner, the Board of Revenue or this Court on the merits of the rival claims, except to the extent of legal principles governing the scope of enquiry under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. Since the proceedings have remained pending for a considerable period, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make every endeavour to conclude the enquiry and pass a reasoned and speaking order, strictly in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Sub-Divisional Officer on the date to be fixed by the said authority, and they shall extend full cooperation for expeditious disposal of the proceedings. 54. In view of the above, while disposing of the writ petition, the parties are directed to appear before the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Sitapur, District Surguja, C.G. on 19.08.2026 without awaiting any further notice. Upon their appearance, the learned Sub-Divisional Officer shall initiate fresh proceedings and conduct a comprehensive enquiry strictly in accordance with the 28 provisions of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The prescribed authority shall afford full and adequate opportunity to all concerned parties to adduce oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective claims, permit them to raise all contentions available in law, and consider the entire material on record objectively. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer shall thereafter pass a reasoned and speaking order, uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned orders or in the present judgment on the merits of the rival claims, except to the extent of the legal principles governing the scope of enquiry under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. It is expected that the proceedings shall be concluded expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of first appearance of the parties. 55. There shall be no order as to costs. 3. When the present case is examined in the light of the aforesaid order/judgment, it is found that the concerned SDO (R) cum Prescribed Authority has not conducted an enquiry as envisaged under Section 170-B of the CGLRC, 1959. The enquiry was not conducted merely on the ground that the non-tribal had not furnished the requisite information before the authority and that his possession was not in accordance with law, and, therefore, 29 was held to be illegal. Such an approach does not meet the standard of enquiry required under Section 170-B of the CGLRC, 1959. 4. As indicated in the aforesaid order/judgment cited above, the enquiry is required to be conducted in a proper manner by affording due opportunity to the parties to lead oral as well as documentary evidence, particularly to rebut the plea of unauthorized occupation and to establish bona fide possession in accordance with law. All these aspects are lacking in the initial order dated 16.06.1989 passed by the concerned SDO (R) cum Prescribed Authority. Unless and until a proper enquiry is conducted, no effective order can be passed under Section 170-B of the CGLRC, 1959. 5. Since the grievance raised by the petitioner is identical to the grievance considered by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1493/2022 (Rajendra and Others v. Vimal and Others), decided on 03.08.2026, and the petitioners in the present case are also seeking substantially the same relief, the present writ petition is accordingly disposed of. It is noticed that no enquiry, as contemplated under Section 170-B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, has been conducted by the concerned SDO; therefore, the matter is required to be remanded to the competent authority for consideration and appropriate action in accordance with law. Having regard to the fact that the matter pertains to the 30 year 1989 and that a decree has already been passed in the civil suit in favour of the tribal party, the concerned SDO is directed to conduct and conclude the proceedings, after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioners as well as the respondents shall be under an obligation to appear before the concerned SDO ( R) cum Prescribed Authority and furnish a copy of this order to the concerned authority and shall extend full cooperation for expeditious conclusion of the proceedings within the aforesaid period. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat