1 CGHC010039362020 2026:CGHC:35658 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MCC No. 163 of 2020 Officer-In Charge CSEB, Chirmiri, Tahsil Menendragarh, District Koriya Chhattisgarh ... Applicant versus 1 - Nidhir Singh S/o Shri Mangal Singh Gond Aged About 45 Years Representative Father Of Late Dharmapal Singh, Occupation Kastkari, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, Tahsil Manendragarh, District Koriya Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of M. P. Now Chhattisgarh Collector District Koriya Baikuntpur, Chhattisgarh State 3 - Chief General Manager SECL Chirmiri Area, District Koriya Chhattisgarh 4 - Anand Singh Gond S/o Manrup Singh Panda President, Ganesh Pooja Samiti, Piparbahra, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State 5 - Sukhen Gond S/o Harmangal Singh Secretary, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State 6 - Dilip Singh Jt. Secretary, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State 7 - Shivram Gond S/o Buddhu Singh Jt. Secretary, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State 8 - Devan Singh Gond S/o Ram Singh Member, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State 9 - Sammal Gond S/o Bondu Singh Jt. Treasurer, R/o Gram Piparbahra, P. O. Bardar, P. S. Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh State ... Respondents For Applicant : Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate For Respondent No.2/State : Ms. Vartika Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, Advocate BINI PRADEEP Digitally signed by BINI PRADEEP Date: 2026.08.13 16:35:03 +0530 2 (Hon’ble Shri Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 12.08.2026 1. Heard on IA No.01/2020, application for condonation of delay in filing restoration application. 2. Present MCC has been filed for restoration of First Appeal No.158/2004, which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 03.08.2018. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that First Appeal No.158/2004 (Officer Incharge, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Nidhir Singh & Ors.) was listed for hearing before this Court on 03.8.2018. However, when the case was called out for hearing, counsel appearing for the appellant was not present, and consequently, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. The applicant came to know about aforesaid dismissal when the proceedings were undertaken by the trial Court in execution proceedings. Thereafter, instant MCC along with application for condonation of delay was filed. Learned counsel further submits that delay of 511 days in filing the present MCC is bonafide, hence, it is prayed that the delay may be condoned and the first appeal may be restored to its original number. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that they are formal party. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The first appeal was dismissed on 08.03.2018 for want of prosecution. Thereafter, instant MCC has been filed on 29.01.2020 along with application dated 11.02.2020 to condone the delay in filing the MCC. No sufficient cause has been shown by the applicant to condone such huge delay of 511 days. 3 7. The lapse of time not only creates rights in favour of the opposite party, but, in some cases, the parties may also proceed on the basis of the status that has arisen as a consequence of the dismissal of the case or appeal. 8. In the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi, (2021) 18 SCC 384:AIR 2022 SC 332, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the alike issue has observed that the High Court erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal and thereby set-aside the order observing therein as under:- 7.1 In the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC Online SC 39, it is observed and held as under: In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light- heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, ILR (1890) 13 Mad. 269, "s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." 4 7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Anr. (1997) 7 SCC 556, while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as under: “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 7.4 In the case of Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the 5 party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature. 7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights.” 9. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513 has held in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20 & 21, as under:- “17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. 18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramla, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is 6 the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. 19. In Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351 wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 10. It is also settled proposition of law that, the doctrine of delay and laches or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, there must be a lifespan during which a person 7 must approach the Court for his remedy. Otherwise there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 11. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the applicant has failed to establish any sufficient cause warranting condonation of the extraordinary delay of 511 days. Entertaining such a highly belated application would defeat the very object of the law of limitation and unsettle rights that may have accrued to the opposite parties over the passage of time. 12. Accordingly, IA No.01/2020, application for condonation of delay, is rejected. Consequently, the present Miscellaneous Civil Case (MCC), being barred by limitation, is dismissed. No order as to costs. 13. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of. Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge Bini