1 CGHC010247682026 2026:CGHC:35475-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 699 of 2026 1 - Fatte Lal Sahu S/o Tika Ram Sahu Aged About 41 Years R/o Karma Vihar Moti Nagar, Behind Ram Mandir Old Dhamtari Road Raipur Chhattisgarh Posted As Assistant Engineer Under The Office Of Municipal Corporation Raipur District- Raipur Chhattisgarh (As Per Writ Petition). At Present Posted As Assistant Engineer Under The Office Of Municipal Corporation Bhilai District - Durg Chhattisgarh (Petitioner In Writ Petition) ... Appellant Versus 1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary Department of Urban Administration And Development Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar Nava Raipur District - Raipur (Respondent No 1 In Writ Petition) 2 - The Director Directorate Of Urban Administration And Development Indrawati Bhawan Atal Nagar Nava Raipur District-Raipur (C.G.) (Respondent No 2 In Writ Petition) 3 - The Joint Director Regional Officer Raipur Division District Raipur (C.G.) (Respondent No 3 In Writ Petition) 4 - The Municipal Corporation Raipur Through- Its Commissioner Office Of Municipal Corporation Raipur District Raipur (C.G.) (Respondent No.4 Writ Petition ) ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Shri Sandeep Dubey, Advocate. For State : Shri Saumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate. For Respondent No.4 : Ms. Swati Agrawal, on behalf of Shri Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.08.13 14:32:56 +0530 2 12.08.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1. The present writ appeal has been filed by the writ appellant against the order dated 13.04.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.3477 of 2025 whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner/appellant herein has been dismissed. Review Petition No.157 of 2026 filed against the said order dated 13.04.2026 also stood dismissed. 2. The appellant being employee of Respondent-Municipal Corporation while posted as Assistant Engineer was placed under suspension vide order dated 11.11.2024 alleging certain allegation. He was served with a charge memo on 23.01.2025 by the State Government. Issuance of charge-memo was challenged before the Single Judge on the ground that State Government is neither appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority of the appellant, therefore the State Government has no jurisdiction to issue charge-memo and to conduct necessary proceedings. He would further submit that Section 58 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short "Act of 1956") provides for Appointment and Conditions of Service of Corporation Officers and servants, under sub-section 1 of Section 58 State Government has formulated rules governing the services of the officers/ employees of the Municipal Corporation as Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Appointment Condition of Service of Officers and Servants) Rules 2018 (for short, the Rules of 2018) (for short "Rules of 2018"). As per Rule 2(ख) of the Rules of 2018 the appointing authority has been specified as Mayor-in-Council or the Municipal Commissioner. Under Section 60 of the Act of 1956 it specifically 3 provides for Discharge and Infliction of penalties and for imposing punishment on the officers and the servants of the Municipal Corporation, it is mentioned that no authority subordinate to the authority who makes the appointment. Thus, the Commissioner and Mayor-in-Council would be the competent authority to impose punishment in the present case. Therefore, the charge-memo ought to have been by the authority who has been mentioned to be an authority to impose penalty. As per sub-section 6 of Section 60 of the Act of 1956, for inflicting major penalty of reduction in rank, removal from service and dismissal from service, it is the Mayor-in-Council to impose such penalty in consultation with the State Government/Divisional Commissioner. Under the provisions of the Act of 1956 and the Rules of 2018, the State Government has not been mentioned as appointing or disciplinary authority. Therefore, issuance of charge-memo by the State is not sustainable. However, all these aspects have not been properly dealt with by the Single Judge. Therefore, the writ appeal may be allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents opposed the submissions made by the counsel for appellant and would submit that the appellant was appointed by the order of State/Respondent No.1 and therefore Respondent No.1 would be an authority for issuance of charge-memo and to act as a disciplinary authority. Rule 9 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1966 provides for the appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor can issue order of suspension as also the charge-memo and therefore there is no error on the part of 4 respondent in issuing charge memo. Thus, the order passed by learned Single Judge needs no interference. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. The principal question which arises for consideration in the present writ appeal is as to whether the State Government was competent to issue the charge memo dated 23.01.2025 to the appellant, who is an employee of the Municipal Corporation, notwithstanding the fact that under Rule 2(kha) of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation (Appointment and Conditions of Service of Officers and Servants) Rules, 2018, the Mayor-in-Council or the Municipal Commissioner has been specified as the appointing authority. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant proceeds on the premise that the authority competent to issue a charge memo must necessarily be the authority competent to impose the ultimate penalty. Such proposition, in our considered opinion, is too broad and cannot be accepted in the facts of the present case. The initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the ultimate imposition of penalty are two distinct stages of disciplinary jurisdiction. Merely because the Rules prescribe a particular authority for imposing a major penalty, it does not follow that no other authority, if otherwise empowered under the governing statutory framework or the applicable service rules, can initiate disciplinary proceedings. 6. Section 58 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 empowers the State Government to frame rules governing the appointment and conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Corporation. In exercise of such statutory power, the Rules of 2018 have been framed. Rule 15 thereof is of considerable 5 significance. The said provision makes applicable, inter alia, the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 to the employees of the Corporation in respect of matters not otherwise specifically provided for. Thus, the disciplinary mechanism contained in the CCA Rules cannot be ignored while determining the authority competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against an employee of the Corporation. 7. It is true that Rule 2(kha) of the Rules of 2018 identifies the Mayor-in- Council or the Municipal Commissioner as the appointing authority. It is equally true that Section 60 of the Act of 1956 prescribes the authority competent to impose penalties, including the major penalties contemplated therein. However, these provisions have to be read harmoniously with the other provisions of the Act and the Rules. They do not expressly prohibit the State Government from exercising a power of supervision or initiating disciplinary proceedings where such power is otherwise conferred upon it under the statutory scheme. The contention of the appellant that Section 60 completely excludes the jurisdiction of the State Government cannot be accepted. Section 60 primarily deals with discharge and infliction of penalties and places restrictions upon the authority competent to impose punishment. It does not, by itself, create an absolute embargo against the State Government initiating disciplinary proceedings or issuing a charge memo when such power is available under the applicable service rules. The distinction between initiation of proceedings and imposition of penalty assumes significance in the present case. Further, Rule 15 of the Rules of 2018 incorporates the provisions of the CCA Rules, 1966, as applicable to Government servants, in respect of the 6 conditions of service of Corporation employees. The disciplinary provisions contained in the CCA Rules contemplate exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the authorities specified therein, including the authority empowered in that behalf by the competent Government authority. Consequently, the appellant cannot rely upon Rule 2(ख) in isolation and contend that every stage of disciplinary action must be undertaken only by the appointing authority named therein. 8. The fact that the appellant's appointment was made pursuant to approval of the State Government on the proposal forwarded by the Corporation is also a relevant circumstance. The statutory scheme does not contemplate complete exclusion of the State Government from matters relating to the service of Corporation employees. The power of the State Government under the Act, read with the statutory rules framed thereunder, has to be given meaningful effect. The Rules of 2018 cannot be interpreted as impliedly taking away a statutory power of the State Government unless the language of the Act or the Rules clearly mandates such exclusion. 9. Thus, we find that the State Government cannot be said to have acted wholly without jurisdiction. The applicability of the CCA Rules through Rule 15 of the Rules of 2018, coupled with the statutory powers available to the State Government under the Act of 1956, provides sufficient legal foundation for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The appellant's argument, if accepted, would result in reading Rule 2(ख) as an absolute prohibition against any disciplinary proceeding being initiated by an authority other than the appointing authority, which is not the necessary consequence of the provision. 7 10. We may also observe that the question as to which authority would ultimately be competent to impose a particular penalty, particularly a major penalty contemplated under Section 60 of the Act of 1956, is a matter distinct from the validity of the charge memo. If, upon conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, any penalty is proposed or imposed by an authority lacking jurisdiction, the appellant would be entitled to assail such action in accordance with law. That issue, however, does not render the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings itself invalid. 11. The learned Single Judge has considered the statutory provisions and the applicable service rules and has declined to interfere at the stage of issuance of the charge memo. We do not find that the learned Single Judge committed any error of law or jurisdiction warranting interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction. 12. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order asto costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder