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2026 DAILYLAW 31201 (CHH)

SMT. RAJKUNWAR @ MOTI BAI SAHU @ YAGYA KUNWAR v. NATIONAL THERMAL POWER CORPORTION LIMITED

WA/757/2026 · 2026-08-13

Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

body2026

Judgment text

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1 CGHC010275902026 2026:CGHC:36133-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 757 of 2026 1 - Smt. Rajkunwar @ Moti Bai Sahu @ Yagya Kunwar W/o Ramfal Sahu, D/o Girdhari Sahu Aged About 65 Years R/o Village Bitkula, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Devendra Kumar Sahu S/o Ramfal Sahu Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Bitkula, Tahsil Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1 - National Thermal Power Corporation Limited Through- The Chief General Manager, Jamnipali, Korba, District Korba (C.G.) 2 - Assistant Director (CSR/Land Acquisition) National Thermal Power Corporation Limited, Jamnipali, Korba, District Korba (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr.Yogesh Chandra, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.Anuroop Panda, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 14.08.2026 1. Heard Mr.Yogesh Chandra, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr.Anuroop Panda, learned counsel appearing for the respondents on I.A.No.01/2026, which is an application for BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.08.17 10:19:17 +0530 2 condonation of delay of 38 days in filing the present appeal. 2. On due consideration, I.A.No.01/2026 is allowed. Delay of 38 days in filing the present appeal is hereby condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ appeal is heard finally. 4. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 20.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.1321/2022 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant herein. 5. The facts in brief are that the land bearing survey Nos. 335, 370, 385/2, 387, 388, 569, 570/1, 578, 585, 586, 587, 589/3, 640/2, total admeasuring 4.47 acres, were earlier recorded in the name of father of writ petitioner No. 1, i.e. Girdhari, who died in the year, 1976, thereafter, appellant No.1 inherited the aforesaid lands. Later on, the aforesaid land were acquired by the National Thermal Power Corporation in the years 1978–1979, and an award was passed on 28.03.1980. Compensation was also awarded to the landholder to the tune of Rs.35,950.15. Appellant No. 2 is the son of appellant No. 1. Appellant No.2 applied for employment in lieu of land acquired for construction of Railway Track on 02.04.2021. As the claim was not considered & decided, therefore, WPS No. 5044 of 2021 was filed, which was disposed of vide order dated 21.09.2021 with a direction to the respondents to decide the claim within a period of three months. The respondent 3 authorities rejected the claim of appellant No.2 vide order dated 19.01.2022. Against which the appellants have filed writ petition, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order. Hence, this writ appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the impugned order passed by the respondent authorities is contrary to the facts available on record as well as the applicable Rehabilitation/Employment Scheme. It is submitted that appellant No.1 was the owner of land bearing Khasra Nos. 335, 370, 385/2, 387, 388, 569, 570/1, 578, 585, 586, 587, 589/3 and 640/2, total admeasuring 4.47 acres. The aforesaid land originally belonged to her father, namely Girdhari Lal, who died in the year 1976. After his death, appellant No.1 succeeded to the property and her name came to be recorded in the revenue records on 17.01.1980. Learned counsel would further submit that appellant No.1 has specifically filed an affidavit explaining that her name in the revenue records is recorded as Yagya Kunwar D/o Girdhari Lal, whereas in her Aadhaar Card her name is recorded as Moti Bai Sahu and she is also known as Rajkunwar. All the aforesaid names pertain to one and the same person. The said fact was duly brought to the notice of the respondents along with the supporting affidavit and documents, but the same has not been properly considered. 7. It is submitted that the aforesaid land was acquired by the 4 respondent company in the year 1978-79 for the purposes of construction of the Railway Track. The land acquisition proceedings culminated in an award dated 28.03.1980, whereby compensation of Rs.35,950.15 was awarded to the affected persons. Learned counsel would submit that appellant No.2 submitted an application along with the relevant documents seeking employment in lieu of the land acquired for construction of the Railway Track. The application was submitted on 02.04.2021, immediately after the appellants came to know about the provision for employment under the applicable Rehabilitation Scheme. It is submitted that appellant No.2 is the son of appellant No.1, who was the recorded owner/co-owner of the acquired land. Therefore, the respondents have committed an error in holding that appellant No.2 does not fall within the definition of the eligible family member under the applicable Rehabilitation Scheme. 8. Learned counsel would further submit that the land acquisition proceedings took place in the year 1979-80, and the award was passed on 28.03.1980. At the relevant point of time, appellant No.1 was recorded in the revenue records in respect of the acquired land. Since appellant No.2 is the son of appellant No.1, he was entitled to consideration for employment under the Rehabilitation Scheme applicable to the land losers at the relevant time. The subsequent rejection of his claim by treating him as outside the purview of the eligible family is wholly erroneous. It is also submitted that at the time of acquisition, the appellants and 5 other beneficiaries were not informed by the authorities about the provision for employment in lieu of the acquired land. The appellants subsequently obtained information under the Right to Information Act, wherein they were informed on 08.03.2021 that a provision for employment existed. Immediately thereafter, appellant No.2 submitted his application dated 02.04.2021. Thus, there was no deliberate or unexplained delay on the part of the appellants. Learned counsel would submit that the respondents have rejected the claim without properly appreciating the revenue records, the succession of appellant No.1 to the property of Girdhari Lal, the land acquisition award, the relationship between appellant Nos.1 and 2, the affidavit regarding the different names of appellant No.1 and the information obtained under the RTI Act. The impugned order is therefore vitiated by non-application of mind. It is further submitted that the impugned order has been passed without affording any effective opportunity of hearing to the appellants. The appellants had relevant documents and material to establish their entitlement, but they were not given an opportunity to place and explain the same before the competent authority. Even in an administrative or quasi-judicial decision having civil consequences, the principles of natural justice require that the affected party be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing. 9. Learned counsel would submit that the respondents were required to examine the appellants' claim with reference to the Rehabilitation Scheme prevailing at the time of acquisition, rather 6 than rejecting the claim on a narrow and technical interpretation of the relationship of appellant No.2 with the original landowner. The status of appellant No.1 as the successor/co-owner and the relationship of appellant No.2 as her son were material facts which required proper consideration. It is therefore submitted that the rejection of the claim of appellant No.2 is arbitrary, suffers from non-application of mind and has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The respondents ought to have considered the claim on its merits after examining the original revenue records, acquisition proceedings, award, applicable Rehabilitation Scheme and the documents produced by the appellants. Accordingly, learned counsel for the appellants would pray that the impugned order be set aside and the matter be remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration of the appellants' claim for employment in accordance with the Rehabilitation Scheme applicable to the acquisition, after affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing and considering all relevant documents, including the revenue records and the award dated 28.03.1980. 10.On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, in which no interference is called for. 7 11.Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon consideration of the material available on record, we find no ground to interfere with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12.It is an admitted position that the land in question was acquired in the year 1978-79 and the award was thereafter passed. The present claim for employment has, however, been raised after an extraordinary lapse of about 42 years, as the writ petition came to be filed only in the year 2022. Though it is true that an earlier writ petition had been filed by the appellants, the said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the appellants and take an appropriate decision within a period of three months. Such an order, by itself, does not obliterate or condone the enormous delay in asserting the substantive claim for employment arising out of an acquisition which had taken place more than four decades earlier. 13.The claim of the appellants is therefore clearly hit by the principles of delay and laches. The appellants have failed to furnish any satisfactory or cogent explanation for approaching the Court after such an inordinate period. In the writ petition itself, the appellants have pleaded that there was no delay in filing the petition, which, in the facts of the present case, cannot be accepted. 14.In the present case, the appellants seek employment on the basis of a land acquisition which took place in 1978-79, whereas the 8 claim for such employment has been pursued after about 42 years. Such a claim cannot be permitted to remain alive indefinitely, particularly when the appellants have failed to satisfactorily explain the delay. Entertaining such a stale claim after several decades would result in unsettling matters which have long since attained finality and may also have consequences for third-party rights. 15.The earlier direction issued by the learned Single Judge to consider the representation of the appellants cannot be construed as a declaration that the appellants were entitled to employment or that the question of delay and laches stood condoned. The respondent authorities were only required to consider the claim in accordance with law, and the rejection of such claim, on the ground of delay and laches, cannot be said to suffer from any jurisdictional error. 16.We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge do not call for any interference in the present intra-court appeal. 17.Consequently, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu