1 CGHC010251552026 2026:CGHC:34055-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 657 of 2026 Manish Kumar Shrivastava S/o Shri M.N. Srivastava Aged About 53 Years Presently Posted As In-Charge Director, Industrial Health And Safety, R/o Flat No. 401, Raheja Earth, Jora, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Rajju Kumar Bhoi S/o Late Shri Sarju Prasad Aged About 58 Years R/o House No. 6, Shristi Park, Avanti Vihar, Telibandha, Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Labour Department, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 3 - The Labour Commissioner Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 4 - Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission Through The Secretary, North Block Sector - 19, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 5 - K.K. Dwivedi, Director Industrial Health And Safety Department, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 6 - Toshan Kumar Sahu, Deputy Director Industrial Health And Safety Department, Labour Commissioner Office Floor No. 2, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 7 - Dinesh Prasad Marskole, Deputy Director Industrial Health And BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.08.06 10:16:51 +0530 2 Safety Department, 100 Wardhaman Nagar Rajnandgaon, District - Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr.Jitendra Pali, Advocate For Respondent No.1 For Respondents No.2 and 3 For Respondent No.4 For Respondents No.6 and 7 : : : : Mr.Prateek Sharma, Advocate Mr.Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General Dr.Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate Mr.Ravi Bhagat, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 5.8.2026 1. Heard Mr.Jitendra Pali, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr.Prateek Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, Mr.Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents No.2 & 3, Dr.Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 and Mr.Ravi Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.6 & 7. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 12.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.1686/2025, whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner was allowed by the learned Single Judge. 3 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in law in interfering with the order of promotion, as the findings recorded in the impugned order are contrary to the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003. It was contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the true scope and import of Rule 7(8) and Rule 7(9) of the said Rules. It was submitted that Rule 7(8) merely prescribes the benchmark for eligibility for promotion from a Class-I post to a higher Class-I post and provides that the benchmark grade shall be "Very Good". Once an officer secures the prescribed benchmark, he enters the zone of consideration for promotion. The said provision nowhere provides that an officer securing higher numerical marks in the assessment of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) would automatically be placed in the category of "Outstanding". According to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge proceeded on an erroneous assumption that higher marks necessarily result in superior grading, which is contrary to the statutory scheme. 4. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that Rule 7(9) of the Promotion Rules, 2003 requires the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) to undertake a relative and comparative assessment of the merit of the officers falling within the zone of consideration on the basis of their service records and thereafter assign appropriate grading. It was argued that the Rules do not require the DPC to reproduce in 4 its proceedings the individual ACR gradings, integrity assessments, confidential remarks, or other service particulars of each officer. The proceedings of the DPC are only intended to record the decision-making process and recommendations, and disclosure of confidential service records of eligible officers would be contrary to the nature of such records and may adversely affect the service interests and privacy of the officers concerned. It was further contended that the learned Single Judge committed an error in presuming that no comparative assessment of merit had been undertaken merely because the proceedings of the DPC did not contain a detailed discussion regarding the inter se assessment of the eligible officers. In the absence of any material demonstrating that the DPC had failed to consider the service records of the officers within the zone of consideration, a presumption ought to have been drawn that the expert body had duly discharged its statutory functions in accordance with Rule 7(9) of the Rules, 2003. It was submitted that, if any doubt was entertained by the learned Single Judge regarding the manner of assessment undertaken by the DPC, the original records, proceedings, and assessment sheets could have been called for and examined instead of recording a finding that no comparative assessment had been made. 5. Learned counsel further argued that Rule 7(9) contemplates a separate and independent exercise after determination of eligibility under Rule 7(8). The said provision mandates the DPC to make a 5 relative and comparative assessment of the merits of the public servants within the zone of consideration and thereafter categorize them as "Outstanding", "Very Good", "Good", "Average", and "Poor". It was submitted that the statutory scheme recognizes that an officer may be eligible for consideration by securing the benchmark of "Very Good" but may not necessarily be graded as "Outstanding". The learned Single Judge, according to the appellant, failed to appreciate this distinction. It was further submitted that the assessment under Rule 7(9) is not a mere mathematical exercise based on marks obtained in ACRs but requires a holistic evaluation of the entire service profile of an officer, including integrity, leadership qualities, administrative ability, consistency of performance, and overall suitability for the higher post. The Rules do not prescribe that an officer securing 17, 18, or 19 marks must invariably be placed in the category of "Outstanding". In the absence of any such statutory prescription, the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the writ petitioner possessed superior merit merely on the basis of higher numerical marks. 6. Learned counsel submitted that Rule 7(9) specifically provides that officers graded as "Outstanding" shall be placed above officers graded as "Very Good", and only amongst officers having the same grading would their inter se seniority in the feeder cadre be maintained. Therefore, unless an officer is assessed and categorized as "Outstanding", mere higher marks secured in ACR 6 assessment would not confer any right upon such officer to claim precedence over senior officers. It was argued that the writ petitioner did not have consistent "Outstanding" gradings during the relevant period and had a combination of "Outstanding" and "Very Good" gradings. Hence, he could not claim automatic placement in the category of "Outstanding". It was further submitted that Rule 7(6) requires the DPC to assess the suitability of public servants on the basis of their service records, with particular reference to ACRs. However, the Rule does not provide that promotion is to be made solely on the basis of marks assigned to ACR gradings. The expression "service record" has a wider meaning and includes the overall service profile of an officer. The learned Single Judge, therefore, erred in restricting the concept of merit only to comparative ACR marks. Learned counsel also submitted that there is no statutory formula prescribed under the Promotion Rules for conversion of ACR gradings into the final categories of "Outstanding", "Very Good", "Good", "Average", and "Poor". In the absence of such a formula, the assessment of comparative merit falls within the domain of the DPC, which is an expert body. The Court, while exercising judicial review, could not substitute its own assessment of merit in place of the evaluation undertaken by the DPC. It was further argued that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in paragraphs 17 to 23 of the impugned order have virtually predetermined the issue of comparative merit, which was required to be considered afresh 7 by the Review DPC. It was submitted that, while directing reconsideration, the learned Single Judge ought to have left all questions relating to grading and comparative merit open for independent consideration by the Review DPC. The observations contained in the impugned order are likely to prejudice the fresh decision-making process and therefore deserve to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the governing principle for promotion from Class-I to a higher Class-I post is "merit-cum-seniority" and not "merit alone". Rule 7(9) itself recognizes the relevance of seniority by providing that officers having the same grading shall maintain their inter se seniority in the feeder cadre. Therefore, unless an officer is assessed in a superior grading category, seniority continues to operate. The impugned judgment, according to the appellant, virtually renders the latter part of Rule 7(9) redundant. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the appellant prayed for setting aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and for upholding the promotion granted by the competent authority in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/writ petitioner opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed 8 the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner, which warrants no interference by this Court. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 10.Upon consideration of the pleadings of the parties, the relevant statutory provisions, and the proceedings of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC), the learned Single Judge rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner by holding that the procedure adopted by the DPC for recommending promotion to the post of Director, Industrial Health and Safety, was contrary to the provisions of the Service Rules, 2013 and the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003. 11.The learned Single Judge rightly appreciated that, as per Schedule 4(B) of the Service Rules, 2013, the requisite qualifying service in the feeder cadre for promotion from the post of Deputy Director, Industrial Health and Safety, to the post of Director, Industrial Health and Safety, is 10 years. It was further rightly held that, in terms of Rule 7(6) of the CCS (Promotion) Rules, 2003, where the required qualifying service is more than five years, the Departmental Promotion Committee is required to consider the service record of the eligible employees with particular reference to the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the years equal to the required qualifying service. 9 12.The learned Single Judge, after examining the proceedings of the DPC, rightly found that the DPC had considered only the ACRs of the preceding five years and had failed to consider the ACRs for the entire qualifying period of 10 years prescribed under the Service Rules, 2013. Such an approach adopted by the DPC was rightly held to be contrary to the statutory provisions governing the promotion process, thereby vitiating the recommendation made by the DPC. The learned Single Judge further rightly held that the DPC had failed to undertake the mandatory exercise contemplated under Rule 7(9) of the CCS (Promotion) Rules, 2003. The said provision requires the DPC to make a relative and comparative assessment of the merits of all eligible officers falling within the zone of consideration on the basis of their service records and thereafter assign an overall grading such as "Outstanding", "Very Good", "Good", "Average", or "Poor". After such assessment, the eligible officers are required to be placed in the order of merit, with seniority being relevant only amongst officers having the same grading. 13.The learned Single Judge correctly observed that the assessment of merit under the principle of "merit-cum-seniority" cannot be reduced to a mere consideration of ACR marks or benchmark grading. The DPC was required to undertake a holistic and comparative evaluation of the service records of the eligible officers by considering all relevant factors reflected in their service profiles. Since no such comparative or relative assessment of merit 10 was undertaken by the DPC, the learned Single Judge rightly concluded that the promotion process was not conducted in accordance with the applicable rules. The learned Single Judge also rightly relied upon the settled principles governing promotion on the basis of "merit-cum-seniority". Under the said principle, merit has primacy over seniority, and a junior officer may supersede a senior officer if found more meritorious. However, such determination can only be made after a proper comparative assessment of merit amongst the eligible candidates. In the absence of such an assessment by the DPC, the recommendation of the DPC could not be sustained. 14. The learned Single Judge rightly held that merely recording that the candidates had secured the prescribed benchmark of "Very Good" and thereafter recommending the senior-most candidate for promotion did not satisfy the statutory requirement of comparative assessment under Rule 7(9) of the CCS (Promotion) Rules, 2003. The DPC was required to determine the relative merit of the candidates and place them in the appropriate grading category before preparing the order of merit. In view of the aforesaid deficiencies in the decision-making process, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the proceedings of the DPC were vitiated and consequently the order of promotion issued pursuant to such recommendation could not be sustained. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge rightly allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of promotion dated 24.02.2025, and directed the respondents- 11 authorities to convene a Review DPC for fresh consideration of the candidature of eligible employees in accordance with the Service Rules, 2013 and the CCS (Promotion) Rules, 2003. The direction issued by the learned Single Judge for conducting a Review DPC was therefore a proper exercise of jurisdiction, as it did not substitute the Court's opinion on the merits of the candidates but only required the competent authority to undertake the promotion exercise in accordance with the statutory procedure. 15.Considering the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, perusing the documents appended with writ petition as also with writ appeal and further considering the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality or irregularity warranting interference by this Court. 16.Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu