143 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Execution Second Appeal No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 06.07.2026 Naval Kamboj .......... Appellant Versus Sunita and others .......... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJA Present: Mr. Mandeep Singh Sachdev, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. Lakhwinder Singh Mann, Advocate for the appellant-Third Party Objector. Mr. Puneet Jindal, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rahul Bansal, Advocate for contesting respondent No. 1/Decree Holder-Sunita. **** HARKESH MANUJA, J. (ORAL) CM-2837-C-2026 Exemption application is allowed as prayed for subject to all just exceptions. CM-4657-C-2026 Application for placing on record some documents moved on behalf of the applicant-respondent No. 1 is allowed subject to all just exceptions. The same are taken on record as Annexures R-1 to R-6. Registry to do the needful. MAIN CASE By way of present Execution Second Appeal, challenge has been laid to the orders dated 27.05.2025 and 05.02.2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division)-cum-Executing Court, Jalandhar and the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar respectively, whereby the DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [2] objections preferred at the instance of appellant-Naval Kamboj, while claiming himself to be Third Party, stands declined. FACTS [2] Few facts necessary for adjudication of the matter in hand are that a firm-M/s. Supreme Engineering Corporation having two partners, namely, Sunita wife of Gopal Krishan and Piare Lal owned 15 marlas of land situated near Gazi Gulla, Railway Crossing, Jalandhar. On 10.10.2008, Sunita filed a suit bearing Civil Suit No. 144/13 (titled "Sunita Versus Piare Lal") for partition and permanent injunction qua the aforesaid property while impleading Piare Lal as defendant. Pertinently, during pendency of the said suit, Piare Lal died on 24.01.2012 and based on Will executed in favour of Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore, grandsons of Piare Lal, they were impleaded as his legal representatives to pursue the suit. The said suit was dismissed qua the claim for separate possession by way of partition; however, the claim for permanent injunction was partly decreed vide judgment and decree dated 07.02.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jalandhar. Aggrieved thereof, two separate appeals were preferred at the instance of Sunita and the legal representatives of Piare Lal, viz. (i) Case No. 172 of 2014 and (ii) Case No. 159 of 2014 respectively. Both the appeals came to be decided by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar vide decision dated 28.07.2015 whereby the appeal filed by the plaintiff-Sunita was accepted and she was found entitled to separate possession of half share in the suit property by way of partition through metes and bounds; whereas the appeal preferred by LRs of Piare Lal was dismissed. Based on the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015, the plaintiff- DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [3] Sunita (respondent No. 1 herein) preferred the execution application. [2.1] Further Naval Kamboj, father of Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore, filed a separate suit bearing CS No. 951 of 2018 (titled “Naval Kamboj Versus Sunita and others”) for permanent injunction on 19.04.2018 qua the subject property while impleading Sunita, Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore being the defendants. The plea set up in the suit for permanent injunction by Naval Kamboj was that he being a tenant over the subject property was entitled to the relief claimed. The said plea was denied by respondent No. 1-Sunita. The learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar, vide its judgment and decree dated 20.05.2024 dismissed the suit for injunction filed by Naval Kamboj while recording that his plea of tenancy over the subject property was not proved on record, however, recorded that the possession of the plaintiff-Naval Kamboj utmost was to be termed as permissible possession during life-time of his father-Piare Lal. Relevant observations made by the learned trial Court in para-14 of the judgment dated 20.05.2024 are extracted hereunder:- “14. ................The possession of the plaintiff utmost can be termed as permissible possession that too when his father Piare Lal was in possession of the property during his lifetime. ............” [2.2] Aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 20.05.2024, Naval Kamboj preferred first appeal bearing CA No. 335 of 2024, titled “Naval Kishore Versus Ms. Sunita and others”, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 29.07.2025 passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar. [2.3] As informed by the learned counsel for appellant, a Regular Second Appeal bearing RSA No. 3321 of 2025, titled “Naval Kishore alias DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [4] Naval Kamboj Versus Sunita and others” was preferred by the appellant- Naval Kamboj, wherein the Co-ordinate Bench passed the following order on 23.09.2025:- “ Notice of motion for 21.01.2026. In the meanwhile, appellant shall not be dispossessed forcibly. However, there shall be no stay applicable in the execution proceedings preferred by the respondents against the appellants. The execution proceedings may continue in accordance with law.” [2.4] In a separate but related development, the appellant-Naval Kamboj also filed objections to the execution application preferred at the instance of Decree Holder-plaintiff / Sunita (respondent No. 1 herein), i.e. EXE-166-2020, titled “Sunita Versus Varun Kishore”. The case set up in the objection petition was that during the life-time of Piare Lal, the subject property was rented out to the objector-appellant for running a business in the name and style of M/s. Amar Valves, therefore, the execution of the decree passed in favour of respondent No. 1-plaintiff was unsustainable in the absence of objector-appellant been impleaded as party to the partition suit. The objections were opposed at the instance of respondent No. 1- plaintiff. The learned Executing Court vide order dated 27.05.2025 dismissed the objections preferred at the instance of appellant-objector. [2.5] Aggrieved thereof, the appellant-objector filed first appeal bearing CA No. 447 of 2025, titled “Naval Kamboj Versus Sunita and others”, however, the same also came to be dismissed by the learned Court of learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar vide order dated 05.02.2026. Hence the present Execution Second Appeal. CONTENTION(S): ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-OBJECTOR DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [5] [3] Learned Senior Counsel representing the appellant submits that though the factum of appellant being in possession of the subject property was within the knowledge of respondent No. 1-plaintiff (Sunita), but he was never impleaded as party to the Civil Suit for partition filed at her instance and as such, having not been afforded any opportunity to lead evidence about his tenancy and possession, the appellant was not to be dispossessed in the present execution proceedings. [3.1] Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the objector- appellant being in possession of the subject property as third party, respondent No. 1 was required to invoke Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of seeking possession thereof. To substantiate the argument, reliance has been placed upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Brahmdeo Choudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal 1997 (3) SCC 694 and Babulal v. Raj Kumar 1996 (3) SCC 154. The relevant extract of Brahmdeo’s case (supra) and Babulal’s case (supra) is reproduced hereunder:- BRAHMDEO’S CASE “11. A conjoint reading of Order 21 Rules 97, 98, 99 and 101 projects the following picture: (1) If a decree-holder is resisted of obstructed in execution of the decree for possession with the result that the decree for possession could not be executed in the normal manner by obtaining warrant for possession under Order 21 Rule 35 then the decree-holder has to move an application under Order 21 Rule 97 for removal of such obstruction and after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist the Court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by Order 21 Rule 97 sub-rule (2) read with Order 21 Rule 98. It is obvious that after such adjudication if it is found that the resistance obstruction was occasioned without just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order 21 Rule 98 sub- rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the order passed would be treated as a decree under Order 21 Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer an appeal DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [6] before the appropriate appellate court against such deemed decree. (2) If for any reason a stranger to the decree is already dispossessed of the suit property relating to which he claims any right, title or interest before his getting any opportunity to resist or offer obstruction on spot on account of his absence from the place or for any other valid reason then his remedy would lie in filling an applicant under Order 21 Rule 99, CPC claiming that his dispossession was illegal and that possession deserves to be restored to him. If such an application is allowed after adjudication then as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 98 sub-rule (1), CPC the Executing Court can direct the stranger applicant under Order 21 Rule 99 to be put in possession of the property or if his application is found to be substanceless it has to be dismissed. Such an order passed by the Executing Court disposing of the application one way or the other under Order 21 Rule 98 sub-rule (1) would be deemed to be a decree as laid down by Order 21 Rule 103 and would be appealable before appropriate appellate forum. But no separate suit would lie against such orders as clearly enjoined by Order 21 Rule 101. 12. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the Executing Court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-holder against such an obstructionist is only under Order 21 Rule 97 sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on re-issuance of warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order 21 Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the Executing Court it is difficult to appreciate how the Executing Court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order 21 Rule 99, CPC and pray for restoration of possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order 21 Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order 21 Rule 99. Order 21 Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order 21 Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest de hors the interest of the judgment- debtor. Both these types of inquires in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [7] aforesaid scheme of Order 21 and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing the possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him. With respect the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21 Rule 97 in this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21 Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this connection also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the Executing court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of non-complinace with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order 21 Rule 97, CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the Executing Court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21 Rules 97 to 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the concerned parties to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves. 13. In this connection we may also profitably refer to a judgment of a Bench of three learned judges of this Court in the case of Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain and another, JT 1994(6) SC 626 : (1995) 1 SCC 6. In that case the Bench consisting of K. Ramaswamy, S.C. Agrawal, and N. Venkatachala, JJ., had to consider a parallel fact situation. One Satyanarain had obstructed to the delivery of possession of the suit immovable property which was sought to be obtained in execution by the appellant decree-holder. After such an obstruction was offered by Satyanarain the decree-holder moved an application under Order 21 Rule 35 for police assistance to remove obstruction caused by Satyanarain. The Executing Court directed the decree-holder to make an application under Order 21 Rule 97. This Court took the view that the very application under Order 21 Rule 35 Sub-rule (3) for police assistance for removal of obstruction caused by Satyanarain had to be treated to be an application under Order 21 Rule 97 and such an application was maintainable and could not be said to be beyond limitation. In this connection the following pertinent observations were made by this Court: "The crux of the question is whether the application filed on 25.5.1979 by the appellant, though purported to be under Order 21, Rule 35(3) against Satyanarain, is convertible to one under Order 21, Rule 97. Order 21, DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [8] Rule 35(3) provides that: '35. (3) Where possession of any building or enclosure is to be delivered and the person in possession, being bound by the decree, does not afford free access, the Court, through its officers, may, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in pubic according to the customs of the country to withdraw, remove or open any lock or bolt or break open any door or do any other act necessary for putting the decree-holder in possession.' A reading of Order 21, Rule 35(3) postulates that the person in possession of the immovable property to be delivered under the decree must be per force bound by the decree. Admittedly, Satyanarain was not a judgment- debtor and that therefore, he is not bound by the decree unless he claim right, title or interest through the judgment-debtor, Ram Kishan. The person resisting delivery of possession must be bound by the decree for possession. In other words the resistor must claim derivate title from the judgment-debtor. The court gets power under Order 21, Rule 97 to remove such obstruction or resistance and direct its officer to put the decree- holder in possession of the immovable property after conducting enquiry under Rule 97. Order 21, Rule 97 provides thus: '97. Resistance of obstruction to possession of immovable prroperty. - (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possessin of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.' The procedure has been provided in Rules 98 to 103. We are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under Order 21, Rules 98 to 102. A reading of Order 21, Rule 97 CPC clearly evisages that "any person" even including the judgment-debtor irrespective whether he claims derivative title from the judgment- debtor or set up his own right, title or interest de hors the judgment-debtor and he resists execution of a decree then the court in addition to the power under Rule 35(3) has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possessin of immovable property was legal or not. The decree-holder gets a right under Rule 97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction removed and an enquiry thereon could be done. Each occasion of obstruction or resistance furnishes a cause of action to the decree-holder to make an application for removal of the obstruction or resistance by such person. When the appellant had made the application on 25.2.1979 against Satyanarain, in law it must be only the application made under Order 21, Rule 97(1) of CPC. The executing court, obviously, was in error in directing to make a fresh application. It is the duty of the executing court to consider the averments in the petition and consider the scope of the applicability of the relevant rule. On DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [9] technical ground the executing court dismissed the second application on limitation and also the third application, on the ground of res judicata which the High Court has in the revisions now upheld. The procedure is the handmaid of substantive justice but in this case it has ruled the roost."” BABULAL’S CASE “6. The controversy is no longer res integrea. This court in Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain & Anr. 1995(2) RRR 398 (SC) : [JT 1994(6) SC 626 : (1995) 1 SCC 6] considered the controversy and had held that even an application filed under Order 21 Rule 35(3) or one filed under Section 47 would be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 97 and an adjudication is required to be conducted under Rule 98. Dispossession of the applicant from the property in execution is not a condition for declining to entertain the application. The reasons are obvious. The specific provisions contained in Order 21 Rules 98, 101,102 enjoy conduct of a regular adjudication, finding recorded thereon would be a decree and bind the parties. In Para 7 thereof it was held thus: "In the above view we have taken, the High court has committed grave error of jurisdiction and also patent illegality in treating the application filed by the appellant as barred by limitation and the third one on res judicata. Once the application, dated 25.5.1979 was made, the Court should have treated it to be one filed under Order 21, Rule 97 (1) Civil Procedure Code. The question of res judicata for filing the second and third applications does not arise. Under these circumstances, the appellate court, though for different reasons, was justified in directing an enquiry to be conducted for removal of the obstruction or resistance caused by Satyanarain under Order 21 Rule 35(3) and Order 21 Rule 101 and 102 of Civil Procedure Code." 7. It would, therefore, be clear that an adjudication is required to be conducted under Order 21, Rule 98 before removal of the obstruction caused by the object or the appellant and a finding is required to be recorded in that behalf. The order is treated as a decree under Order 21, Rule 103 and it shall be subject to an appeal. Prior to 1976, the order was subject to suit under 1976 Amendment to Civil Procedure Code that may be pending on the date of the commencement of the amended provisions of Civil Procedure Code was secured. Thereafter, under the amended Code, right of suit under Order 21, Rule 63 of old Code has taken away. The determination of the question of the right, title or interest of the objector in the immovable property under execution needs to be adjudicated under Order 21, Rule 98 which is an order and is a decree under Order 21, Rule 103 for the purpose of appeal subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Thus, the procedure prescribed is a complete code in itself. Therefore, the executing Court is required to determine the question, when the appellants had objected to the execution of the decree as against the appellants who were not parties to the decree for specific performance.” [3.2] Moreover, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [10] that since the judgment and decree dated 29.07.2025 passed in CA No. 335 of 2024, affirming the finding that the appellant failed to prove his tenancy over the subject property, has itself been assailed by way of Regular Second Appeal bearing RSA No. 3321 of 2025 (supra) and remains pending adjudication, the said finding has not attained finality and, therefore, ought not to be relied upon against the appellant at this stage. Learned Senior Counsel further places reliance on Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand, 1995(1) SCC 242, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an executing Court must independently adjudicate the claim of a person resisting execution on his own right, and cannot decline to do so merely because some allied litigation has resulted in a decree, so long as no adverse finding stands recorded against him. It is submitted that, thus, the learned Executing Court ought to have adjudicated the appellant's tenancy claim on its own merits. The relevant portion of Noorduddin’s case (supra) is extracted hereunder:- “10. The question is whether the executing Court was right in dismissing the application on the ground that the dispute was adjudicated in RFA No. 305/86 or as held by the High Court that the dispute was decided in the writ proceedings referred to earlier. The execution Court is enjoined to adjudicate the claim or the objection or the claim to resistance. As seen, Rule 97 enables such a person to make an application which must be independent of the judgment-debtor or a person having derivate right from the judgment-debtor. The applicant in his own right must be in possession of the property. Admittedly, neither the appellant nor his father was a party to the suit or appeal. Therefore, the decree per force does not bind him. In the writ proceedings, though Nanu was impleaded as 5th respondent, no relief was claimed against him nor a finding adverse to him has been recorded. Thereby, there is no adverse finding recorded either in the suit or in the writ proceedings against the appellant or his father. Under these circumstances, when the appellant has been claiming right, title and interest in Khasra No. 179 from which he is now sought to be dispossessed in execution of the decree by the respondent in respect of Khasra Sakni Nos. 13 and 14, the executing Court necessarily has to go DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [11] into the question whether the property in Khasra No. 179 is part of Khasra Sakni Nos. 13 and 14 and if so, whether the respondent while executing the decree trenched into his property and sought to dispossess him. The appellant's possession, pending adjudication, needs to be protected by interim orders. Unfortunately, the Courts below had not adverted to these crucial aspects of the matter. When the appellant claimed independent right, title and interest and resisted the execution, the decree-holder or the appellant should made an application under Rule 97 (1) and the Court, in that event, is enjoined to adjudicate the claim and record a finding allowing or rejecting the claim. It should remembered that the Parliament intended to shorten the litigation and to give effect to it, simplified procedure was devised for adjudication. On the basis of fact-situation and the nature of the controversy, the claim has to be adjudicated expeditiously in a period not exceeding six months and preferably on day to day basis by putting an end to the tendentious conduct of prolonging the proceedings by suitable orders.” No other argument has been raised. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1-PLAINTIFF [4] Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 1- plaintiff submits that the objections preferred at the instance of appellant were baseless and frivolous with a motive to delay the execution proceedings in terms of decree for separate possession by way of partition passed in favour of respondent No. 1-Decree Holder. He further submits that the suit for partition with respect to the subject property was filed against Piare Lal in the year 2008 and after the death of Piare Lal on 24.01.2012, both sons of appellant, namely, Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore got themselves impleaded as successors to Piare Lal having contested the claim set up by respondent No. 1-plaintiff, however, the appellant herein having notice and knowledge about the partition suit never ever got himself impleaded therein to set up his claim of independent DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [12] possession over the subject property. Learned Senior Counsel also points out that a similar plea of the appellant being tenant over the same property was raised by his two sons as defendants in the partition suit preferred at the instance of respondent No. 1-Sunita which was never accepted. In such circumstances, the impugned orders passed by the Courts below based on proper appreciation of evidence and pleading available on record, call for no interference. No other argument has been addressed. DISCUSSION AND REASONING [5] Having heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper-book, I am unable to find substance in the submission(s) made on behalf of the appellant-Third Party Objector. [6] In the present case, there is no dispute that a suit for separate possession by way of partition with respect to the subject property, preferred at the instance of respondent No. 1-plaintiff, was decreed by the learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015. In the said suit, two sons of the present appellant, namely, Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore also contested the claim now set up by respondent No. 1-plaintiff (Sunita), while pleading and asserting the possession of their father-Naval Kamboj. However, the said plea was never established on record. [6.1] Moreover, the suit for partition was filed in October 2008 by respondent No. 1-Sunita, who happened to be the wife of Gopal Krishan, i.e. the real brother of appellant-Naval Kamboj. The suit was filed against Piare Lal, father-in-law of Sunita being defendant. After the death of Piare Lal on 24.01.2012, Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore being sons of Naval Kamboj got themselves impleaded as successors of Piare Lal based on a Will and DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [13] contested the suit for partition. During all these years, Naval Kamboj never got himself impleaded as a party to claim possession over the subject property being tenant under the partnership firm-M/s Supreme Engineering Corporation though being the father of Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore he was definitely having knowledge about the pendency of the partition suit. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418, mandated that Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or Order 21 CPC must not entertain a third-party application raising an issue that could have been raised and determined during adjudication of the suit itself, had due diligence been exercised by the applicant. Thus, having the knowledge of the partition suit, the appellant ought to have sought impleadment and set up his claim of tenancy at that very stage. The relevant portion of Rahul’s case (supra) is extracted hereunder:- “42. All Courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below-mentioned directions: XXXX 10. The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order 21 of CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third- party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the Court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the Court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant…….” [7] Furthermore, neither Varun Kishore and Rubal Kishore were able to prove that the appellant-Naval Kamboj was a tenant over the subject property while contesting the suit for separate possession by way of partition preferred at the instance of respondent No. 1-Sunita nor even the appellant himself was able to prove his tenancy over the subject property even in his DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [14] suit for permanent injunction filed against respondent No. 1-plaintiff. Thus in the humble opinion of this Court, the Objections preferred at the instance of appellant herein, being vague, were rightly not accepted by the Courts below. In the entire objection petition, no date, month or year has been mentioned by the appellant regarding the inception of his tenancy over the subject property. Nor has it been pleaded that the subject property was rented out to him, either by the firm M/s. Supreme Engineering Corporation or by one of its partners, Sh. Piare Lal, or whether Sh. Piare Lal was ever authorised by the owner-firm to rent out the same to the appellant. [8] Therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the appellant with respect to his tenancy over the subject property was totally vague and baseless; not supported even by adequate pleadings in his objection petition. In such circumstances, at best, the appellant was to be treated in permissible possession through his father-Piare Lal as recorded by the learned Courts below in the suit for permanent injunction filed at his instance and as such, was liable to part with possession of the subject property qua the half share of his father-Piare Lal in terms of judgment and decree dated 28.07.2015 passed in Case No. 172 of 2014 (supra), vide which a decree for separate possession by way of partition qua the half share of subject property was passed in favour of respondent No. 1-plaintiff and the same had attained finality. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal, 2026 INSC 426, where an objection claiming co-ownership of the property, raised by a mother of the judgment-debtor; after earlier attempts by the judgment-debtor and his assignees to resist execution had already failed and the claim was unsupported by any material to prima facie substantiate it; the High Court DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [15] had taken the view that the Executing Court erred in not framing issues and permitting the objector to lead evidence to prove that the property was joint family property. The Hon'ble Apex Court reversed this view, holding that an objection to execution claiming co-ownership can be rejected outrightly where the claim lacks prima facie substantiation and is, in substance, a deliberate attempt to stall recovery. [8.1] It is significant to note that the appellant was never able to prove possession in his own right as a tenant. At best, he was found to be in possession through his father-Piare Lal, which can be treated, at highest, as that of a licensee. Such possession, being derived from and traceable to the judgment-debtor, does not make the appellant a "third party" or "stranger to the decree" under Order 21 Rule 97/99 CPC. The judgments relied upon by the appellant apply only where a stranger to the decree sets up an independent right, title or interest, unconnected with the judgment-debtor. Since the appellant's claim is, at best, of possession derived through the judgment-debtor (his father) and not an independent claim, these judgments have no application to the present case. [9] Also, assuming arguendo that the learned Executing Court ought to have adjudicated the appellant's tenancy claim on its own merits, without relying upon the findings rendered in the other litigation between the parties, however, the overall conduct of the appellant does not inspire confidence in the bona fides of his claim. The close relationship between the appellant and the judgment-debtors, being father and sons; the multiplicity of litigation already generated by the family to resist the decree, and the timing of the present objection, raised only in August 2022, more than seven years after the decree for separate possession by way of partition, dated DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [16] 28.07.2015, having been passed in favour of respondent No. 1-plaintiff, all point towards a collusive design between the appellant and the judgment- debtors to obstruct and delay execution, rather than a genuine assertion of independent right. In such circumstances, the appellant, having chosen not to put forth his claim in the partition suit and having remained a fence-sitter, cannot now be permitted to delay the fruits of the decree passed in favour of respondent No. 1-plaintiff, who has been litigating for almost eighteen years especially when the Hon’ble Apex Court in Marshall Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. & Anr., [(1999)2 SCC 325] acknowledged that oftentimes, undue advantage is derived out of delaying the execution on account of procedural complications. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:- “ ..it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in favour of the appellant is not being executed for some reason or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct the respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant since the suit filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the other and on occasion, become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications. It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for possession of immovable property, its execution takes long time.. ” [10] Furthermore, although the judgment(s) and decree(s) dated 20.05.2024 & 29.07.2025 passed by the Courts below for suit for permanent injunction have been assailed at the instance of appellant by way of RSA No. 3321 of 2025 (supra), however, a perusal of the interim order dated 23.09.2025 passed therein shows that the only protection granted is that the appellant shall not be dispossessed forcibly, while it has been categorically recorded that no stay shall operate on the execution proceedings, which may DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document E.S.A No. 20 of 2026 (O&M) [17] continue in accordance with law. Be that as it may, the said Regular Second Appeal has no bearing on the present proceedings, as the suit therefrom was simpliciter for permanent injunction and not the one seeking any declaration qua the status of appellant as a tenant over the subject property. The finding on tenancy was, at best, incidental to that adjudication and cannot be treated as a substantive declaratory finding of tenancy rights inter-se the parties. Consequently, mere pendency of a challenge to such an incidental finding cannot revive or lend credence to a claim of tenancy which the appellant has, in any event, failed to substantiate by adequate pleadings before the Executing Court. [11] Accordingly, finding no illegality, irregularity or perversity is in the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Executing Court and the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, dismissing the objections of the appellant-objector, the present appeal, being devoid of merits, is hereby dismissed. [12] Since the main appeal has been decided / dismissed, no orders are required to be passed in the pending miscellaneous application(s), the same shall stand disposed off. July 06, 2026 ( HARKESH MANUJA ) 'dk kamra' JUDGE Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes Whether Reportable Yes DINESH KUMAR 2026.07.17 14:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document