-1- CR-5375-2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH *** 125 CR-5375-2026 Date of Decision: 16.07.2026 BIKRAM SINGH AND ANOTHER …Petitioners Versus UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS …Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL Present:- Mr. Rohan Moudgil, Advocate and Ms. Maninee, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate for petitioners *** JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL) 1. The petitioners through instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are seeking setting aside of order dated 11.03.2026 whereby learned Additional District Judge, Gurugram has dismissed their petition on the ground of delay and accepted objections filed by respondent. 2. The petitioners were owners in possession of land measuring 6 Kanals 15 Marlas situated in revenue estate of Village Mevka, Tehsil & District Gurgaon. The respondent vide notification dated 15.09.2008 issued under Section 3 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962 (for short ‘1962 Act’) expressed its intention to acquire petitioners’ land. The land was to be acquired for laying down the Chhainsa-Gurgaon-Jhajjar-Hisar gas pipeline. The competent SUDEEPAK KUMAR 2026.07.17 10:27 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document -2- CR-5375-2026 authority vide award dated 25.08.2009 in terms of 1962 Act determined amount of compensation. The petitioners received compensation on 28.01.2010. They filed objections before competent authority on 07.10.2013 claiming compensation to the tune of ₹ 50 crore per acre. The competent authority vide order dated 14.03.2018 dismissed their application on the ground that competent authority has no power to review its orders. The landowners were supposed to file application before the District Judge. The authority further observed that applicants have filed application after 49 months from the date of award. The petitioners after adjudication of their application by competent authority filed a petition before the District Judge seeking enhancement of compensation. The petition was filed in terms of Section 10 of 1962 Act read with 1963 Rules made thereunder. The respondent filed reply raising preliminary objection of limitation. The respondent pleaded that award was passed in 2009 and petition before the District Judge could be filed within 90 days whereas petitioners have approached after 9 years, thus, petition may be dismissed on the ground of limitation. 3. Learned Additional District Judge, Gurugram (for short ‘ADJ, Gurugram’) vide impugned order dated 11.03.2026 has dismissed petitioners’ application on the ground of limitation. The Court has held that application could be filed within 90 days whereas petitioners have approached after 9 years. The petition has been filed way after the prescribed period, thus, cannot be entertained. 4. Mr. Rohan Moudgil, Advocate for the petitioners submit that ADJ, Gurugram has wrongly dismissed petitioners’ petition on the ground SUDEEPAK KUMAR 2026.07.17 10:27 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document -3- CR-5375-2026 of limitation. Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 has been totally ignored. The petitioners bonafidely were pursuing their matter before competent authority. They were unaware that their application before competent authority is not maintainable. They under bona fide belief approached competent authority which intentionally kept said application pending for 5 years. The said 5 years’ period should be excluded for computing limitation. Rule 5 of 1963 Rules does not provide that delay beyond 90 days cannot be condoned. It simply prescribes period to file petition under Section 10 of 1962 Act. No limitation period has been prescribed under Section 10 of 1962 Act. Limitation period has been prescribed by rules and power of the Court is not circumscribed while adjudicating application seeking condonation of delay. The Court has power to condone delay of any period if applicant is able to show sufficient cause. Section 5 of Limitation Act is also applicable. If Sections 5 and 14 of Limitation Act are applied, there would be no delay. The petitioners approached the District Judge in 2018 because respondent mischievously kept their application pending for 5 years. 5. Heard the arguments and perused the record. 6. From the perusal of record, it is evident that petitioners were awarded compensation vide award dated 25.08.2009. The compensation was disbursed on 28.01.2010. They filed an application dated 07.10.2013 before competent authority seeking enhancement of compensation. The competent authority vide order dated 14.03.2018 rejected their application on the ground of limitation as well as on the ground that it has no power to review its orders. The authority further held that the petitioners had remedy to approach District Judge but they wrongly approached competent authority. SUDEEPAK KUMAR 2026.07.17 10:27 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document -4- CR-5375-2026 The application dated 07.10.2013 before authority is an afterthought to make a claim. 7. The petitioners are justified while claiming that period spent before authority must be excluded while computing limitation period. Benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act may be extended. Hon’ble Supreme Court in “M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise”, 2015(7) SCC 58 has clearly held that Section 5 will not be applicable to authorities, however, benefit of Section 14 should be extended. The petitioners have filed petition before the Court, thus, Sections 5 and 14 of Limitation Act were applicable. The period spent before authority could be excluded. There was no finding disclosing that petitioners intentionally availed remedy which was not actually available, thus, they could be given benefit of Section 14 and 5 years’ period spent before the competent authority could be excluded. 8. The petitioners are further correct while claiming that Rule 5 of 1963 Rules does not provide that delay cannot be condoned. The Rule does not prescribe outer period to condone delay like provided under different statutes like Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Customs Act, 1962; Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 etc. In the absence of restriction on the Court to condone delay, Court was competent to condone delay while invoking provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 9. Now the question arises, whether delay was required to be condoned in the obtained facts and circumstances. The impugned award was passed on 25.08.2009 and petitioners filed application before competent authority on 07.10.2013 i.e. after more than 4 years from the date of award. SUDEEPAK KUMAR 2026.07.17 10:27 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document -5- CR-5375-2026 There is no plausible explanation for exclusion of said period. It appears that petitioners to make out their case filed an application before the authority and thereafter approached ADJ, Gurugram. In the absence of plausible and convincing explanation for 49 months’ delay, the petitioners’ petition could not be entertained by ADJ, Gurugram. It was liable to be dismissed and was rightly dismissed. 10. In the backdrop, this Court is of the considered opinion that petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. 11. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. (JAGMOHAN BANSAL) JUDGE 16.07.2026 SDK Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No Whether reportable Yes/No SUDEEPAK KUMAR 2026.07.17 10:27 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document