1 / 6 CGHC010297382026 2026:CGHC:34173 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5926 of 2026 Vinod Das Vaishnav S/o Shri Lakheshwar Das Vaishnav Aged About 56 Years Presently Working As Panchayat Secretary, Gram Pachayat Kulipara (Holding Additional Charge of Gram Panchayat Hathband), Janpad Panchayat Simga, District Balodabazar -Bhanatapara, (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Mahandi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Collector, District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) 3 - C E O Zila Panchayat, District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) 4 - C E O Janpad Panchayat Simga , District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) 5 - Ramesh Kumar Banjare, Presently Working As Panchayat Secretary, Geam Panchayat Hirmi, Janpad Panchayat Simga, District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) 6 - Gram Panchayat Hathband, Through Its Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Simga, District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) 7 - Shri Dilip Kumar Yadav (Complainnant /panch Ward No. 08 ), Gram Panchyat Hathband, Janpad Panchayat Simga, District Balodabazar - Bhantapara, (C.G.) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Ujjawal Choubey, Advocate For State : Ms. Anuja Sharma, Dy. GA ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2026.08.06 10:39:44 +0530 2 / 6 (Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru) Order on Board 05/08/2026 1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed against the relieving order dated 22.07.2026 (Annexure- P/1); the consequential handing over memorandum dated 22.07.2026 (Annexure-P/2); the order constituting an enquiry committee dated 22.07.2026 (Annexure-P/3) and the memorandum dated 24.07.2026 (Annexure-P/4). 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been functioning as Panchayat Secretary of Gram Panchayat Hathbandh and has been frequently subjected to transfers and changes of additional charge. He would next submit that on the basis of a private complaint made by respondent No.7 due to personal vendatta, the respondent authorities simultaneously relieved the petitioner from the additional charge, constituted an enquiry committee and thereafter issued a coercive memorandum containing stigmatic allegations. He would next submit that the sequence of events clearly demonstrates that the respondents had already formed an opinion regarding the guilt of the petitioner even before conducting any enquiry. It is further submitted that the impugned relieving order is, in substance, a punitive order camouflaged as an administrative order and, therefore, could not have been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submits that the action is contrary to clause 8 of 3 / 6 the Panchayat Karmi Service Guidelines, 2008 and deserves to be quashed. 3. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that no legal or vested right of the petitioner has been infringed by the impugned action. She would next submit that the petitioner has merely been relieved from holding an additional charge and continues to remain in service as Panchayat Secretary. The relieving order neither visits the petitioner with any civil consequence nor records any finding of misconduct. It is further submitted that the constitution of an enquiry committee is only a fact- finding exercise to verify the allegations received against the petitioner and does not amount to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. She would next submit that the memorandum dated 24.07.2026 is only a preliminary communication requiring the petitioner to explain certain allegations and no punishment has either been imposed or proposed. It is therefore submitted that the writ petition is premature and devoid of merit. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 5. From perusal of the documents, it is evident that the relieving order dated 22.07.2026 merely withdraws the additional charge of Gram Panchayat Hathbandh from the petitioner. It neither terminates the services of the petitioner nor alters his substantive appointment as Panchayat Secretary. The submission of the petitioner that the impugned relieving order is punitive is also not borne out from the record. The 4 / 6 order itself does not record any finding regarding misconduct, guilt or culpability of the petitioner. Merely because certain complaints were received and an enquiry committee was constituted on the same date, it cannot automatically be inferred that the relieving order is punitive. The administrative decision to withdraw an additional charge during the pendency of verification of complaints cannot be equated with imposition of punishment. 6. The impugned order merely directs an enquiry into the allegations received against the petitioner. Constitution of a fact-finding committee is only a preliminary administrative step intended to ascertain the correctness of the allegations. Such a preliminary enquiry does not determine any right of the petitioner nor does it culminate in any finding of guilt. Consequently, no prior notice or hearing was required before constituting such an enquiry committee. 7. It is well settled that holding an additional charge does not confer any indefeasible or vested right upon an employee to continue on such additional assignment. The competent authority is always empowered to withdraw or reassign additional charge in the interest of administration. Such an administrative arrangement, by itself, does not attract the principles of natural justice unless it results in adverse civil consequences or is itself punitive in character. 8. Further, the memorandum dated 24.07.2026 also cannot be construed as a punishment. It merely calls upon the petitioner to furnish his explanation regarding the allegations. Far from violating the principles 5 / 6 of natural justice, the issuance of such memorandum affords an opportunity to the petitioner to place his version before the competent authority. At this stage, no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner and the disciplinary process, if any, has not culminated into any final decision. 9. The allegations of mala fides and the alleged personal vendetta have also been pleaded in a bald and general manner. Except making assertions against respondent No.7, the petitioner has not placed any cogent material demonstrating that the competent authority exercised its statutory powers for an extraneous purpose or under the dictate of a private individual. It is settled law that allegations of mala fides are required to be pleaded with full particulars and proved by convincing material. In the absence of any such material, this Court cannot invalidate an administrative order on mere conjectures. 10. No provision of the Guidelines has been shown which curtails the authority of the competent administrative authority to withdraw an additional charge or to order a preliminary enquiry upon receipt of complaints. On the contrary, the impugned action appears to have been taken only to ensure a fair verification of the allegations while making appropriate administrative arrangements. 11. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the administrative wisdom of the competent authority. Since the impugned orders do not suffer from lack of jurisdiction, violation of any statutory provision, procedural 6 / 6 impropriety, arbitrariness or mala fides, no interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed at the motion stage itself. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE ashu