1 CGHC010224182026 2026:CGHC:36150-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 653 of 2026 1. South Eastern Coal Field Ltd. Through Is Chairman Cum Managing Director, Seepat Road, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 2. Chief Manager (Karmik Evam Shram Shakti) Secl, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 3. The Regional Personnel Manager Secl, Korba Area, District- Korba Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus Smt. Vijay Laxmi Sahu W/o Late Anup Sahu Aged About 53 Years R/o 1-B/89 Pump House Secl Colony District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 14 .08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Pankaj Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, as well as Mr. Paraj Kotecha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on I.A. No. 1 of 2026, an application seeking condonation of delay. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2026.08.14 18:54:11 +0530 2 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon considering the reasons assigned in the application, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown for the delay. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 is allowed, and the delay of 08 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. 3. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellants/respondents against the order dated 10.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 2363 of 2021, titled Smt. Vijay Laxmi Sahu vs. South Eastern Coalfields Limited & Others, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondent herein came to be allowed. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the present appeal arises out of the judgment dated 10.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 2363 of 2021, whereby the writ petition preferred by the Respondent was allowed and the Appellants were directed to pay monetary compensation to the Respondent under Clause 9.4.0(iv) of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA-IX) from the date of her application, i.e. 08.10.2018. He further submits that the impugned judgment proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of the governing provisions of the NCWA. The appellants and their employees are governed by the terms and conditions contained in the NCWA, which is the result of collective bargaining between the management and the recognised workmen’s unions. The benefits relating to dependent employment and monetary compensation are therefore 3 required to be determined strictly in accordance with the scheme and cannot be extended to a person who does not fall within the definition of “dependent” prescribed therein. 5. Learned counsel submits that the husband of the respondent, Late Mr. Anup Sahu, was an employee of SECL and died in harness on 04.11.2015. Upon his death, the respondent herself gave consent for dependent employment in favour of her elder daughter, Ku. Manisha Sahu. In accordance with the applicable scheme, Ku. Manisha Sahu was granted dependent employment. Subsequently, Ku. Manisha Sahu unfortunately died in harness on 27.12.2017. He further contended that thereafter the younger daughter of the respondent, Mrs. Preeti Sahu, claimed dependent employment on account of the death of her sister. The said claim was rejected as she was already married and was not dependent upon either Ku. Manisha Sahu or the original employee, Late Mr. Anup Sahu. The said rejection was challenged by Mrs. Preeti Sahu in WPS No. 6159 of 2018, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 19.09.2018. However, while disposing of the said petition, the learned Single Judge permitted the respondent, being the mother of deceased employee Ku. Manisha Sahu and widow of Late Mr. Anup Sahu, to make a representation regarding monetary compensation in accordance with the NCWA. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that pursuant to the said liberty, the respondent submitted her representation dated 08.10.2018 claiming monetary compensation. The said representation 4 was duly considered by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable provisions of NCWA-VI and NCWA-IX and was rejected by order dated 27.11.2018. A subsequent representation seeking the same benefit was also duly considered and rejected on 28.06.2019. Thus, there was no failure on the part of the appellants to consider the respondent’s claim, nor was there any arbitrary or mechanical rejection of her representation. 7. It is also contended by the learned counsel, appearing for the appellants that at the relevant point of time, the provisions contained in Clause 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI continued to operate under NCWA-IX until formulation of a revised scheme. The said provisions specifically regulate dependent employment and monetary compensation. Clause 9.4.0 defines the expression “dependent” for the purpose of the scheme and includes the wife/husband, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son and, in the absence of such direct dependants, certain specified categories such as brother, widowed daughter, widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the employee and substantially dependent upon the employee’s earnings. Significantly, the mother of the deceased employee is not included within the prescribed categories. He further stated that the respondent was admittedly the mother of deceased employee Ku. Manisha Sahu. She therefore did not fall within the definition of “dependent” under the applicable provisions of the NCWA. The benefit of monetary compensation under Clause 9.4.0(iv) cannot be considered in isolation from the eligibility conditions and definition of dependent 5 contained in the scheme. The monetary compensation contemplated under the NCWA is a benefit available to the eligible female dependent and not a general monetary benefit payable to every surviving relative of a deceased employee. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the appellants had already extended the benefit of dependent employment upon the death of Late Mr. Anup Sahu by appointing Ku. Manisha Sahu on compassionate grounds. The subsequent unfortunate death of Ku. Manisha Sahu could not, by itself, create a fresh entitlement in favour of her mother contrary to the express definition of “dependent” contained in the governing agreement. The scheme does not provide for succession or inheritance of the benefit of dependent employment or monetary compensation from one dependent to another. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge, by directing payment of monetary compensation to the respondent, has effectively enlarged the class of beneficiaries contemplated by the NCWA by including the mother of a deceased employee, although such category is conspicuously absent from the agreed definition of dependent. Such an expansion amounts to supplying words to the agreement which the negotiating parties themselves have not incorporated. The NCWA is binding upon the parties and its provisions cannot be altered by judicially creating an additional category of beneficiaries. Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 recognises the binding nature of settlements between the employer and workmen. The NCWA, being a settlement arrived at through collective bargaining, binds the parties and 6 has to be given effect in accordance with its terms. While interpreting such a settlement, the Court may enforce the rights which flow from it, but cannot substitute its own policy for the policy mutually agreed upon by the employer and the workmen. 9. Learned counsel further submits that the rejection orders dated 27.11.2018 and 28.06.2019 were passed after consideration of the relevant provisions of NCWA-VI and NCWA-IX. The authorities did not deny consideration of the Respondent’s claim; rather, they examined the claim on the touchstone of the applicable scheme and found that the Respondent did not satisfy the prescribed eligibility condition. Consequently, there was no administrative perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdictional error warranting interference with the decision of the competent authority. He submits that Clause 9.4.0(iv) and Clause 9.5.0 of the NCWA, which provide for monetary compensation to eligible female dependants in specified circumstances, cannot be read as independent or unrestricted provisions. Their operation is necessarily confined to those persons who satisfy the definition and eligibility requirements of “dependent” under the scheme. The learned Single Judge, with respect, failed to appreciate this interrelationship between the eligibility provision and the provision granting monetary compensation. 10. Learned counsel further stated that compassionate appointment and monetary compensation are not matters of inheritance or vested successionary rights. They are exceptional benefits created under a 7 specific scheme to provide immediate assistance to eligible dependants of an employee who dies in harness or becomes medically unfit. The entitlement therefore depends entirely upon satisfaction of the conditions prescribed by the scheme in force at the relevant time. The respondent, being the mother of deceased employee Ku. Manisha Sahu, did not fall within the categories of dependants recognised under the applicable provisions of the NCWA and consequently had no entitlement to claim monetary compensation under Clause 9.4.0(iv). The appellants had acted strictly in accordance with the governing agreement while rejecting her representations. The impugned judgment, by directing payment of compensation to a person outside the prescribed category of dependants, has enlarged the scope of the NCWA and is therefore liable to be set aside. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the judgment dated 10.04.2026 passed in WPS No. 2363 of 2021 deserves to be set aside. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioner would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the writ petition after taking into consideration the provisions contained in Clause 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of the NCWA-IX. It is submitted that the respondent is the widow of Late Mr. Anup Sahu, the original employee of the appellants, and is also the mother of deceased employee Ku. Manisha Sahu, who had been appointed on compassionate grounds after the death of her father. According to learned counsel, after the death of Ku. Manisha Sahu in harness, the 8 respondent being a female dependent was entitled to monetary compensation under the applicable provisions of the NCWA. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent would further submit that Clause 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI continued to operate under NCWA-IX and Clause 9.4.0(iv) specifically provides for payment of monthly monetary compensation to a female dependent in case of death of an employee. It is contended that the respondent had submitted her application for monetary compensation on 08.10.2018, which was rejected by the appellants merely by referring to the definition of “dependent”. According to the respondent, the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the scheme and directed payment of compensation from the date of her application. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment does not call for any interference and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record, including the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the relevant provisions of the NCWA. 14. The short question which arises for consideration in the present intra-Court appeal is whether the respondent, being the mother of deceased employee Ku. Manisha Sahu, can claim monetary compensation under Clause 9.4.0(iv) of NCWA-IX, notwithstanding the fact that the definition of “dependent” contained in the applicable scheme does not include the mother of the deceased employee. 9 15. The undisputed facts are that Late Mr. Anup Sahu, husband of the respondent, was an employee of the appellants and died in harness on 04.11.2015. After his death, dependent employment was provided to his elder daughter, Ku. Manisha Sahu, on the basis of the consent furnished by the respondent. Ku. Manisha Sahu subsequently died in harness on 27.12.2017. Thereafter, the respondent claimed monetary compensation on the ground that she was a female dependent of the deceased employee. Her application dated 08.10.2018 was rejected by the competent authority on 27.11.2018 and her subsequent representation was also rejected on 28.06.2019. 16. It is also not in dispute that under NCWA-IX, Clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of NCWA-VI continued to operate until a revised scheme was jointly prepared. Thus, the entitlement of the respondent has to be examined with reference to the scheme which was applicable at the relevant point of time. 17. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, principally proceeded on the basis that Clause 9.4.0(iv) of NCWA-IX provides for monthly monetary compensation to a female dependent in the event of death of an employee and, therefore, the respondent was entitled to such compensation. With respect, the said provision cannot be read in isolation from the provision which defines the expression “dependent” for the purpose of the scheme. 18. The relevant provision specifically defines the expression “dependent” and enumerates the categories of persons who can claim 10 the benefit under the scheme. The direct dependants include the wife/husband, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. In the absence of such direct dependants, certain other specified relations, namely brother, widowed daughter, widowed daughter-in-law or son-in- law residing with the employee and substantially dependent upon the earnings of the employee, may be considered in accordance with the scheme. The mother of the deceased employee does not find place in the said definition. 19. The significance of the definition cannot be overlooked. Clause 9.4.0(iv), which provides for monthly monetary compensation to a female dependent, does not independently create an unrestricted right in favour of every female relative of a deceased employee. The expression “female dependent” occurring therein necessarily refers to a person who satisfies the definition and eligibility requirements of a dependent under the governing scheme. Unless a person first falls within the category of an eligible dependent, the subsequent provision prescribing the amount of monetary compensation cannot be invoked. 20. In the present case, the respondent was admittedly the mother of Ku. Manisha Sahu. She was not the wife, unmarried daughter, son or legally adopted son of the deceased employee. Nor has any material been placed on record to show that she fell within any of the other specifically enumerated categories under the definition of dependent. Her status as the mother of the deceased employee, by itself, therefore, does not make her an eligible dependent under the NCWA. 11 21. There is another aspect of the matter which also assumes significance. The benefit of dependent employment had already been extended upon the death of the original employee, Late Mr. Anup Sahu, in favour of his daughter Ku. Manisha Sahu. The subsequent death of Ku. Manisha Sahu could not, in the absence of any provision in the governing scheme, result in transmission or succession of the benefit to her mother. Compassionate appointment and monetary compensation under the NCWA are benefits arising out of a specific welfare scheme and are not hereditary or successionary benefits capable of passing from one family member to another. 22. We are conscious of the fact that the object underlying provisions relating to compassionate appointment and monetary compensation is to provide financial assistance to the family of an employee who dies in harness. However, the beneficial object of the scheme cannot justify enlargement of the category of beneficiaries expressly prescribed by the parties to the settlement. Once the parties have consciously defined the expression “dependent” and have specified the categories entitled to the benefit, the Court cannot add a category which has not been included in the agreement. 23. The NCWA is the outcome of collective bargaining between the management and the representatives of the workmen and its provisions are binding upon the parties. The Court, while exercising judicial review, can certainly examine whether the authorities have acted in accordance with the governing scheme, but it cannot rewrite the terms of such 12 settlement or create a substantive entitlement which does not flow from its provisions. Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also recognises the binding character of settlements between the employer and workmen. 24. In the present case, the appellants did not reject the respondent’s claim without consideration. The representation dated 08.10.2018 was considered and rejected by order dated 27.11.2018 by referring to the applicable provisions of the NCWA. The subsequent representation was also considered and rejected on 28.06.2019. Thus, the decision-making process cannot be said to suffer from non-consideration, arbitrariness or perversity. The dispute is essentially as to the interpretation and applicability of the governing scheme. 25. The learned Single Judge, however, while noticing the provisions of Clause 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of NCWA-IX, proceeded directly to Clause 9.4.0(iv) and concluded that the respondent was entitled to monetary compensation as a female dependent. In our considered view, the eligibility of the respondent to be treated as a “dependent” was required to be determined first. Only upon such determination could the question of entitlement to monetary compensation under the subsequent clause arise. The failure to examine the threshold requirement of eligibility has resulted in an erroneous application of the scheme. 26. The mere fact that the respondent is a female and is the mother of the deceased employee cannot, therefore, confer upon her the status of 13 a “female dependent” within the meaning of the NCWA. The words “female dependent” cannot be divorced from the definition of “dependent” contained in the same scheme. To hold otherwise would amount to enlarging the scope of the agreed scheme and introducing a category of beneficiary which the parties to the settlement have not contemplated. 27. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the order dated 27.11.2018 passed by the appellants rejecting the respondent’s claim was in accordance with the applicable provisions of the NCWA. The learned Single Judge, in directing payment of monetary compensation to the respondent from 08.10.2018, has failed to appreciate the eligibility requirement embodied in the definition of “dependent” and has consequently extended the benefit of the scheme to a person who does not fall within its prescribed categories. 28. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 10.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 2363 of 2021 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner is dismissed. 29. Accordingly, the present intra-Court appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan