1 CGHC010280282026 2026:CGHC:36164-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 742 of 2026 Jyotirmaya Pradhan S/o- Narendra Kumar Pradhan Aged About 50 Years Posted As System Administrator-Cum-Infra-Consultant, R/o- Quarter No. 200, Block No. 9, Housing Board Colony Khamhardeeh, Police Station- Khamhardeeh, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Electronics And Information Technology, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Secretary State Of Chhattisgarh, Mineral Resources Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Chhattisgarh Infortech Promotion Society Through Chief Executive Officer, Office At State Data Centre, Building, Civil Line, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha,, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2/State : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Kesharwani and Mr. Shrijita Kesharwani, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.08.17 10:28:16 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 14.08.2026 1. Heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.1 & 2 and Mr. R.K. Kesharwani and Ms. Shrijita Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 16.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No.5727/2024 (Jyotirmaya Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Brief facts of the case, as projected before the learned Single Judge, are that the appellant/writ petitioner was appointed by respondent No.3 on 26.03.2021 on contract basis for a period of five years from the date of joining or till completion of the Khanij Online 2.0 Project, whichever was earlier, on a consolidated remuneration. The order of appointment also stipulated that the appellant/writ petitioner would remain on probation for a period of six months from the date of commencement of duties, extendable at the discretion of respondent No.3, and that unsatisfactory performance during the probationary period could result in 3 termination of his services. The appellant/writ petitioner accepted the terms and conditions of appointment and joined his duties. 4. It was further the case of the appellant/writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge that his services were subsequently terminated vide order/notice dated 30.08.2024, on the ground that his work performance had not been found satisfactory. The appellant/writ petitioner challenged the said termination principally on the ground that his services had been terminated without conducting a regular departmental enquiry and without affording him an adequate opportunity of hearing. It was also contended that the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract Appointment) Rules, 2012 were applicable to his appointment and that the respondents were required to follow the procedure contemplated therein, including recording of a Confidential Report/Performance Appraisal Report. 5. The appellant/writ petitioner further contended that, prior to termination, a show-cause notice had been issued to him and, therefore, the termination order was founded upon allegations against his conduct and performance and could not have been passed without following the principles of natural justice. On the aforesaid grounds, he sought quashing of the termination order and consequential reliefs. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the true nature of 4 the appellant’s appointment and the circumstances in which his services came to be terminated. It is submitted that the appointment order itself contemplated a tenure of five years and, therefore, the appellant had a legitimate expectation of continuing in service during the said period, subject to the terms of appointment. It is further contended that the issuance of a show- cause notice prior to termination demonstrates that the termination was not a simpliciter discharge on the ground of unsuitability, but was founded upon allegations relating to the appellant’s conduct and performance. According to learned counsel, once such allegations constituted the foundation of the order of termination, the appellant was entitled to a proper opportunity of hearing and a regular enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the Rules of 2012 had no application to the appellant’s appointment and in treating the termination as a simple discharge during probation. He accordingly prays for setting aside the impugned order as well as the order of termination. 7. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No.1 and 2, on the other hand, submits that the appointment of the appellant was purely contractual and was specifically made for the Khanij Online 2.0 Project, subject to the terms and conditions contained in the appointment order. It is submitted that the appointment order expressly stipulated a 5 probationary period and also reserved the right of the competent authority to terminate the services if the performance of the appellant was found unsatisfactory. It is further submitted that the Rules of 2012 have no application to the appellant’s project- specific appointment, as the post against which he was appointed was not a contract appointment post contemplated under Rule 4 of the said Rules. Learned counsel submits that the termination order merely records unsatisfactory performance and does not contain any stigma or finding of misconduct. Therefore, no regular departmental enquiry was required. He supports the reasoning and conclusion of the learned Single Judge and prays for dismissal of the appeal. 8. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 submits that the appellant was appointed specifically for the project and subject to the terms and conditions contained in the appointment order, which were duly accepted by him. It is submitted that the appellant was on probation and his performance was assessed during the relevant period. The termination was based upon the assessment that his work performance was not satisfactory and was not founded upon any misconduct or punitive finding. It is further submitted that the appellant did not execute the standard agreement with respondent No.3 as contemplated by the appointment order. Learned counsel supports the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge and submits that no interference is warranted in the present appeal. 6 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and have carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also perused the record of the case and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 10. It is not in dispute that the appellant was appointed pursuant to the order dated 26.03.2021 on contract basis for a period of five years or till completion of the Khanij Online 2.0 Project, whichever was earlier. The appointment order also specifically provided for a probationary period of six months and stipulated that unsatisfactory performance during the said period could result in termination of services. The appellant accepted the appointment along with its terms and conditions. 11. The primary question which arises for consideration in the present intra-Court appeal is as to whether the termination of the appellant’s contractual services on the ground of unsatisfactory performance was punitive in nature and, consequently, whether it was incumbent upon respondent No.3 to conduct a regular departmental enquiry before bringing the contractual engagement to an end. The ancillary question is whether the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract Appointment) Rules, 2012 were applicable to the appellant’s project-specific appointment and whether non- recording of a Confidential Report/Performance Appraisal Report rendered the termination order unsustainable. 12. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the 7 parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order in the following terms:- “23. In the scheme of the Rules of 2012 post on which contract appointment can be made is specified. Petitioner is not appointed on the post as mentioned under Rule 4 of Rules of 2012, but the appointment is project specific only. Further the maximum period at first instance is clearly critical provided under Rule 11 to be of 03 years, with renewal clause for post under Rule 4(1) of Rules of 2012. Under Rules of 2012 there is no provision for appointment on probation. The appointment of petitioner is on probation and the period of appointment is for 05 years or till completion of project. Upon reading of the conditions and terms of appointment it is apparent that appointment of petitioner is not under Rules of 2012 and therefore, submission of the petitioner that the order Annexure P-1 is issued in contravention of the provisions under Rules of 2012 is not sustainable. *** 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ajit Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another reported in 1983 Volume 2 SCC 217 observed that period of probation gives time and opportunity to employer to watch the work, ability, efficiency, sincerity and competence of servant and if he is found not 8 suitable for the post the master reserves a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period, which is styled as period for probation. Mere holding of a preliminary inquiry where explanation is called from an employee would not make an otherwise innocuous order of discharge or termination of service punitive in nature. *** 27. In the aforementioned facts of the case the order of termination of the service of petitioner cannot be said to be punitive in nature. In case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Sukhbeer in 2005 Volume 5 SCC 569, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that High Court has gone completely wrong in drawing the inference that order of discharge dated 16.03.1990 was, in fact, based upon misconduct and was therefore, punitive in nature, which should have been preceded by a regular departmental enquiry. *** 29. In the case at hand as also the order only mentions that the order of termination/notice of termination is issued because the work performance of petitioner was found to be not satisfactory, which cannot be said to be the order to be punitive in nature, casting any stigma and therefore, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the 9 order Annexure P-1 is in violation of principles of natural justice, in the opinion of this Court and in view of decision’s of Hon’ble Supreme Court is not sustainable. 30. For the foregoing discussions, I do not find any merit in this writ petition, its liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.” 13. Upon a careful consideration of the matter, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The appointment of the appellant was not against a regular sanctioned post in the establishment of respondent No.3, but was specifically made for the Khanij Online 2.0 Project. The appointment order itself clearly stipulated the nature and duration of the engagement and further provided for probation. Thus, the appellant’s right to continue in service was necessarily governed by the terms and conditions of the contractual appointment accepted by him. 14. The contention of the appellant that the appointment was for a period of five years and, therefore, he acquired a right to continue for the entire period, cannot be accepted. The expression “for a period of five years or till completion of the project, whichever is earlier” cannot be read in isolation from the other conditions of appointment, particularly the condition relating to probation and satisfactory performance. The tenure mentioned in the appointment order did not confer an indefeasible right upon the 10 appellant to continue in service irrespective of his suitability or performance. 15. We also find no merit in the submission that the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract Appointment) Rules, 2012 governed the appellant’s appointment. Rule 3 of the said Rules makes the Rules applicable to persons appointed against posts declared as contract appointment posts under Rule 4. Rule 4 specifies the categories of posts which may be filled up by contract appointment. As noticed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant was not appointed against any such post in the regular departmental establishment. His engagement was project-specific and was governed by the terms of the appointment order. Therefore, the provisions of Rule 15(3), relating to recording of Confidential Report/Performance Appraisal Report for consideration for further contractual appointment, could not be invoked to invalidate the termination of the appellant’s existing contractual engagement. 16. The distinction between non-renewal/continuation of a contract and termination on account of unsatisfactory performance during probation is also material. Rule 15(3), even otherwise, contemplates recording of the Confidential Report/P.A.R. where a person appointed on contract is to be considered for appointment on contract for the next year. The present case is not one of refusal to extend or renew the contract for a further period. The 11 appellant’s services were brought to an end on the assessment that his performance was not satisfactory. Consequently, Rule 15(3) cannot be pressed into service in the manner suggested by the appellant. The further contention that issuance of a show- cause notice necessarily rendered the subsequent order punitive is equally without substance. The nature of an order has to be determined primarily from its substance, foundation and effect, and not merely from the fact that an explanation was called for before the order was passed. In the present case, the termination order does not record any finding of misconduct, moral turpitude, indiscipline or any other blameworthy conduct on the part of the appellant. It merely records that his work performance was not found satisfactory. 17. The law relating to termination of a probationer on the ground of unsuitability is well settled. The purpose of probation is to afford the employer an opportunity to assess the employee’s suitability, ability, efficiency and overall performance. If, during such period, the employer forms the opinion that the employee is not suitable for the assignment, the contractual engagement can ordinarily be brought to an end in terms of the conditions of appointment, provided the order is not founded upon a finding of misconduct or other punitive consideration. 18. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, (1983) 2 SCC 217, relied 12 upon by the learned Single Judge, supports the aforesaid proposition. Likewise, in State of Punjab and others v. Sukhbeer Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 569, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that an order of discharge of a probationer, which is founded upon unsuitability and does not cast any stigma, does not become punitive merely because the employer had undertaken some preliminary assessment or had called for an explanation. 19. The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520, is also apposite. The mere use of an expression such as “unsuitable” or “unsatisfactory performance”, by itself, does not render an order stigmatic. For an order to become stigmatic, it must contain something which imputes misconduct, blameworthy conduct or other disqualification beyond the ordinary assessment of suitability. 20. In the present case, the termination order merely records that the work performance of the appellant was not found satisfactory. It does not refer to any misconduct, nor does it record any finding of guilt against the appellant. The order, therefore, remains an order of discharge on the ground of unsuitability and cannot be characterised as punitive merely because a show-cause notice had earlier been issued. 21. We are also unable to accept the contention that the preliminary opportunity afforded to the appellant before termination 13 necessarily converted the contractual discharge into a punitive action. Affording an opportunity to explain the circumstances or to improve performance cannot, by itself, alter the basic character of the order where the ultimate decision is based upon an assessment of suitability and performance and no misconduct is made the foundation of the termination. 22. The appellant having accepted the terms and conditions of his appointment, including the stipulation regarding probation and satisfactory performance, cannot now seek to read into the contract a protection which is neither contained in the appointment order nor attracted under the Rules of 2012. A contractual appointment does not carry the same protection as a regular civil service appointment, particularly where the contract itself contains a clear stipulation regarding probation and termination on the ground of unsatisfactory performance. 23. We also find no perversity in the factual conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has considered the appointment order, the nature of project-specific engagement, the applicability of the Rules of 2012, the contents of the termination order and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the distinction between a punitive termination and a simpliciter discharge of a probationer. The conclusion reached is based upon the material available on record and does not suffer from any error of law warranting interference in intra-Court appeal. 14 24. It is trite that the jurisdiction of the Division Bench in an intra-Court appeal is not to substitute its own view merely because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where the order under appeal suffers from manifest error, perversity, misapplication of law or failure to consider material facts. No such infirmity has been demonstrated before us. 25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the termination of the appellant’s contractual engagement on the ground of unsatisfactory performance was neither punitive nor stigmatic. The requirement of a regular departmental enquiry, therefore, did not arise. The Rules of 2012, particularly Rule 15(3), were also rightly held to be inapplicable to the appellant’s project-specific appointment. Consequently, the learned Single Judge was justified in declining to interfere with the termination order. 26. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the present intra- Court appeal. The order dated 16.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.5727/2024 is hereby affirmed. 27. Accordingly, the present writ appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu