21.07.2026 Court No.2 Item No.95 sudipta IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE CO 1047 of 2023 With CAN 1 of 2026 Mohul Debnath Vs. M/S. C.R.C. Exports Private Limited & Ors. Mr. Anup Kumar Mukhopadhyay Mr. Abhijit Sarkar …for the petitioner Mr. S. Dasgupta Mr. Samrat Mukherjee Mr. Rik Mukherjee …for the opposite parties 1. Present petition has been filed challenging the order no. 66 dated 2nd February, 2023 passed by the learned Judge, Commercial Court at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, in Money Suit No. 14 of 2019 whereby the application filed by the defendant / petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was dismissed. The defendant / petitioner aggrieved of this has filed this present petition challenging the correctness of the impugned order. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on several grounds. Learned counsel submits that the petition is barred by law under the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Learned counsel submits that the basis of the present suit filed by the petitioner is notice dated 26th 2 September, 2026 whereby the plaintiff / opposite party informed the defendant / petitioner that they had decided to terminate the services from the project with effect from July, 2016. Learned counsel submits that retrospective termination of contract is not permissible in law. Learned counsel submits that since the termination itself is bad in law, therefore, the basis of the cause of action is void ab initio and, therefore, the suit cannot proceed on the basis of the same. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that it is a clear case of clever drafting wherein opposite party / plaintiff by twisting the facts had filed the present suit which is liable to be nipped in the bud. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of T. Arivandandam Vs. T. V. Satyapal & Anr. reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2421. In respect of retrospective termination of the contract, learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision of Md. Shahnawaz Khan & Anr. Vs. Shaik Shajahan Hossain & Ors. reported in 2018 Supreme (Cal) 445. Reliance has also been placed upon the decision of Rail Land Development Authority Vs. Parsvnath Developers Limited & Anr. reported in 2019 Supreme (Del) 894. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited the attention of the Court to the fact that the damages 3 claimed in the present suit in the sum of Rs.20 lakhs are apparently barred by law of limitation as the damages claimed pertained to the year 2016 and prior to that, and by the time the suit was filed, it had become barred by law. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the plaintiff / opposite party has made the averments in the plaint which are contrary to the documents filed along with it. Learned counsel submits that as per the completion certificate dated 17th February, 2018 the petitioner / defendant has been shown as developer and, therefore, the very plea of the plaintiff / opposite party that the contract had been terminated is false and frivolous. Learned counsel for the petitioner, further, submits that the plaint is liable to be rejected and the impugned order passed by the learned Commercial Court is liable to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff / opposite party has submitted that while deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court merely has to look into the averments made in the plaint. Learned counsel submits that at this stage, the Court cannot look into the defence of the defendant. Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court has taken a comprehensive view after taking into 4 account the entire pleadings made by the plaintiff and there is no reason to interfere in the impugned order. 7. The Court has considered the submissions and perused the record carefully. Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC provides as under : “11. Rejection of plaint.—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; [(e) where it is not filed in duplicate]; [(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9]; [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp- papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]” 8. The bare perusal of the provisions makes it clear that the legislature has conferred a drastic power to the Court under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The Court while exercising the jurisdiction under this provision can reject a suit at the infancy stage if the conditions as made out in sub-Clause (a) to sub-Clause (b) exists therein. However, it is a settled proposition that at this stage the Court is required to examine only the 5 averment made in the plaint and the defence being taken by the defendant is beyond the scope of examination for deciding such application. 9. There cannot be any doubt to the proposition that if the averments made in the plaint are vexatious or are totally contrary to the documents filed along with it, it is the duty of the Court to nip the evil in the bud. However, the rule of caution is that the Court cannot meticulously examine the probative value of such document at this stage and has to wait till the appreciation of the evidence. If the pleading are such, that it has created an illusion of the cause of action, that is certainly liable to be rejected. However, the Court is the best arbiter to decide that whether the pleadings are creating illusions or are liable to be tested by way of evidence. 10. The power granted under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is drastic power and has to be exercised with grave circumspection. It is also pertinent to mention here that while deciding such application, the Court has to read the plaint as a whole and it cannot be read in a piecemeal. 11. Before proceeding further, it is also advantageous to refer to the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised by the Court while hearing and deciding the revision petition. The Apex Court has reiterated the scope of the 6 jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and Another Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and Others reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745. It was, inter alia, held as under: “31. The scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been the subject matter of consideration before this Court in several judgments, and the law governing the exercise of such power now stands well settled. In exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as an appellate court, nor can it sit in appeal over the correctness of the orders passed by courts and tribunals over which it exercises the power of superintendence under Article 227. 32. This court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, has held: “35. Nasirullah Beg J. of the Allahabad High Court in a very well-considered judgment rendered in the case of Jodhey v. State, 1952 SCC OnLine All 10 : AIR 1952 All 788, discussed the provisions of Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861, Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and Section 224 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and compared them with almost similar provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned judge considered the power of the High Court under Article 227 to be plenary and unfettered but at the same time, in paragraph 15 at page 792 of the report, the learned judge held that High Court should be cautious in its exercise. It was made clear, and rightly so, that the power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. The learned judge clarified if only there is a flagrant abuse of the elementary principles of justice or a manifest error of law patent on the face of the record or an outrageous miscarriage of justice, power of superintendence can be exercised. This is a discretionary power to be exercised by Court and cannot be claimed as a matter or right by a party. …….….. 7 40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. v. Phiroz N. Bhatena etc., (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this „limited extent‟ the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149-150). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh v. Amanath, (1954) 1 SCC 51 : AIR 1954 SC 215 and Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 45 : AIR 1958 SC 398 discussed above.” 33. This court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.14, has held that the power of the High Court in interfering with the order of the Court or Tribunal, would be restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. It has been further held: “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of 8 facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to.” 35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 12. Bare perusal of this judgment makes it clear that the Court at this stage cannot substitute its own view with the view of the learned Trial court. The order challenged can be set aside only if there is a patent illegality or infirmity in the order of the Court. The impugned order can also set aside if there is a violation of principle of natural justice or it smacks of mala fide or is being apparently barred by any law. 13. The plaintiff / opposite party has filed a suit for recovery of money, damages valued at Rs.1,08,30,783/- plus interest. Perusal of the pleading makes it clear 9 that the plaintiff is claiming himself to be the owner of the plot (The same has been disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner‟s case is that the plaintiff / opposite party is only a lessee). The plaintiff / opposite party entered in to a contract with the petitioner / defendant for construction. Paragraphs 9 to 17 of the plaint enumerate the various steps leading to the contract between the parties. Paragraphs 18 of the plaint then spells out where the problem started between the parties. In respect of cause of action, paragraphs 20 to 26 of the plaint are important which are being reproduced as follows:- “20.The plaintiff by a letter dated 25.08.2016 sought for clarification from the defendant no. 1 about such difference in total constructed area. The plaintiff also indicated therein that if such difference was correct in that event they were changed a sum of Rs.10,84,100/- extra and the defendant no 1 to 3 are liable to pay back the same. 21. In response of the plaintiff's letter dated 25.08.2016 the defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 by a letter dated September 03, 2016 denied the difference in measurement of constructed area and wrote that there were extra works that had to be done for structural safety of the building and in order to build G+IV on the said suit premises along with other works which was not mentioned on their previous quotation dated 18/11/2014. In the said letter the defendants allegedly made an area calculation for the construction on the said suit premises which was according to them 9,557 square foot as on date of sanction plan. They have further allegedly stated that as per revised plan submitted under Rule 26 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 2009 the total constructed area as on September 2016 was 9,899 square foot. 22. The plaintiff states and submits that the defendant no. 4 being sub-contractor have denied such statement of the defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 as in correct and informed to the plaintiff that there 10 could not be such difference in measurement as defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 stated in their letter or as alleged or at all. 23. In the mean time the plaintiff discussed this illegality and/or irregularity of defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 in their meeting of Board of Directors and decided not to carry out further construction work through them. Accordingly the Plaintiff resolved to terminate the contract with MGA Realtors and accordingly issued a termination notice dated 26'h September, 2016. The plaintiff thereafter contacted the defendant no. 4 directly and requested him to complete the construction work. The defendant no. 4 promptly agreed to complete the entire work @Rs. 1,450 per square foot and also requested to pay separately for extra work. 24. By a letter dated 26 September, 2016 the plaintiff terminated the said building contract with the defendant no. 1 2 and 3 and demanded return of excess money paid to them for irregularities of the construction work and for the other conditions as stated therein. 25. The plaintiff company thereafter paid to the defendant no. 4 a total sum of Rs.1,55,00,000/- in 29 installments for the balance construction work which was completed by the defendant no. 4. The defendant no. 4 furnished the final bill dated 8" May, 2017 to the plaintiff wherein they have admitted that they received a sum of Rs. 53,70,000/- only on account of construction work from defendant no 1 whereas plaintiff paid to the defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 a sum of Rs. 1,33,19,000/-in total. 26.The plaintiff as per letter of intent dated 18.11.2014 agreed to pay the defendant no. 1, 2 and 3 @ 1,850/- per square foot and plaintiff terminated the contract after a bare structure upto fourth floor of construction work and the balance construction work was completed by the defendant no. 4.” 14. The cause of action has been mentioned in paragraph 31 of the plaint which reads as under: “31.The cause of action of the suit arose for the first time on 28th June 2016 when the plaintiff had realized that the defendant had embezzled by way of falsely mentioning the area of construction and thereafter by issuing letters to the defendants have demanded to refund the said sum, thereafter on 26th September, 2016 when the contract was terminated, thereafter on 8th 11 May, 2017 when the building was completed and Surya Infrastructure issued it‟s final bill and lastly on 4th May, 2018 demand the said sum together with interest @ 18 % per annum which the defendant had refused to refund and the same is continuing day by day since the said payment has still remain unpaid till date.” 15. The question is whether the veracity of the averments made in the plaint can be decided at this state. The another moot question is that whether any finding could have been returned at this stage by scrutinizing the documents and the averments made in the plaint at this stage. The Court considers that the law in this regard is well settled that the rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is a drastic power, which can be exercised sparingly only if the conditions as set out from sub-Clause (a) to (d) of order 7 Rule 11 CPC is made out, or if the averments made in the plaint are totally vexatious, illusory and smacks of mala fide. The principles governing exercise of jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are summarized in the case of Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali reported in (2020) 7 SCC 366, wherein it was, inter alia, held as under: “…….. 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinising the averments in the plaint [Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512] , read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 12 ……. 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. [Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137]” 16. Similarly, in the case of Karam Singh Vs. Amarjit Singh & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 12703 of 2025 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held under: “15. Before we assess the correctness of the impugned orders, we must remind ourselves of the basic principles governing rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 117 of CPC. Here, the defendants seek rejection of plaint under clause (d) of Rule 11 (i.e., suit barred by law). Clause (d) makes it clear that while considering rejection of the plaint thereunder only the averments made in the plaint and nothing else is to be considered to find out whether the suit is barred by law. At this stage, the defense is not to be considered. Thus, whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint.” 17. The issue that whether the claim made by the plaintiff / opposite party falls within the law of limitation is again generally a mixed question fact and law, which has to be determined after the evidence is led. Similarly, whether the termination is good or bad in law can be determined only after the parties led their evidence. 18. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the Court considers that there is no infirmity in the order of 13 the learned Trial Court. The Court considers that no interference is required at this stage. 19. Hence, the present revision petition being CO 1047 of 2023 stands dismissed. Connected pending application to this revision petition, if any, stands dismissed. 20. The suit is stated to be 2019. The Court will expect that taking into account the intention of the legislature, the learned Trial Court may make all endeavour to expedite the trial of the suit. 21. Trial Court Record, if any, be returned immediately. 22. All parties shall act on the basis of the server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. (Dinesh Kumar Sharma, J.)