1 / 7 CGHC010277882026 2026:CGHC:34728-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 170 of 2026 Ashok Kumar Agrawal S/o Nand Kishor Agrawal Aged About 59 Years R/o Sawandiya Building 2nd Floor, Gopi Talkies Road Raigarh Thana City Kotwali Raigarh Tahsil And District- Raigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus The New India Assurance Co. Ltd Through Regional Manager, Regional Office Pandari, Distt- Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Amit Sharma, Advocate D.B : Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, CJ & Ho n'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 07/08/2026 Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1. This appeal, preferred under Section 96 read with Order 21 Rule 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is directed against the order dated 19.06.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by learned Third District Judge, Raipur Digitally signed by PRAVEEN KUMAR SINHA Date: 2026.08.10 18:14:05 +0530 2 / 7 in Execution Case No.141 of 2024 arising out of the award dated 30.06.2017 passed by the learned Sixth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Raipur in Claim Case No.55 of 2014. 2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the claimants instituted a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation of Rs.1,22,20,688/- on account of the death of Anurag Jaiswal. The present appellant was arrayed as non- applicant No.3 before the Claims Tribunal being owner of the offending vehicle. By award dated 30.06.2017, learned Claims Tribunal, recording a finding that the offending vehicle bearing registration No.CG-13/L/3806 was being driven without a valid and effective driving licence on the date of the accident, awarded compensation of Rs.23,32,000/- Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation, the claimants preferred MAC No.1337 of 2024 before this Court seeking enhancement. By judgment dated 16.04.2024, this Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.23,32,000/- to Rs.62,99,840/- and directed respondents Nos.2, 3 (the present appellant) and 4 to deposit the enhanced amount within sixty days. Pursuant thereto, respondent No.4/Insurance Company initiated Execution Case No.141 of 2024. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the appellant filed an application under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Rule 99 and 101 CPC contending that no executable decree existed against him and further asserting that the offending vehicle was, in fact, being driven by a person holding a valid and effective driving licence. On these grounds, the appellant prayed that the execution proceedings be rejected. The learned Executing Court, by the impugned order dated 19.06.2026, dismissed the said application. Hence, the present appeal. 3 / 7 3. Assailing legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 19.06.2026, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Executing Court failed to appreciate that once an application under Order XXI Rules 97 read with Rule 99 and 101 CPC was filed raising a substantial dispute regarding the appellant's liability, it was incumbent upon the Court to frame appropriate issues and record evidence before deciding the application. It is further contended that neither the award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal nor the judgment rendered by this Court contains any direction for "pay and recover". It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the appellant's application under Order XXI Rule 97 read with Rule 99 and 101 CPC be allowed. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record of the case. 5. Before examining the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, it would be apposite to notice the scope and ambit of Order XXI Rules 97, 99 and 101 of the CPC, which read as under: “Order XXI -Execution of Decrees and Orders x x x x x x 97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property- (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an 4 / 7 application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 99. Dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser- (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 101. Question to be determined- All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions.” 6. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it abundantly clear that Rules 97, 99 and 101 of Order XXI constitute a complete code for adjudication of disputes arising out of resistance, obstruction or 5 / 7 dispossession in the course of execution of decrees for possession of immovable property. Rule 97 enables the decree-holder or auction purchaser to complain of resistance in obtaining possession, whereas Rule 99 confers a remedy upon a person other than the judgment-debtor who alleges dispossession in execution. Rule 101 merely provides for adjudication of all questions arising in proceedings validly instituted under Rule 97 or Rule 99. After reading aforesaid provisions, it is clear that this provisions are not intended to provide a general remedy to a judgment- debtor against execution of a money decree. 7. Admittedly, the present case does not arise out of execution of a decree for possession of immovable property but concerns execution of a money award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The appellant is admittedly a judgment-debtor and was a party to the original claim proceedings. Consequently, the provisions of Order XXI Rules 97, 99 and 101 CPC are ex facie inapplicable. Therefore, the application itself was not maintainable. 8. Once the application itself was not maintainable under the aforesaid provisions, the contention that the learned Executing Court ought to have framed issues and recorded evidence is wholly misconceived. 9. Even otherwise, the objections raised by the appellant strike at the very merits of the award. The plea that no executable decree exists against the appellant and the assertion that the offending vehicle was being driven by a person holding a valid and effective driving licence are issues which stood conclusively adjudicated by the learned Claims Tribunal. The award, as modified by the judgment of this Court in appeal, has attained finality. It 6 / 7 is trite law that an executing court cannot travel beyond the decree or award under execution, nor can it reopen findings which have attained finality between the parties. 10. Equally devoid of substance is the contention that the award does not contain a direction permitting the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner after satisfying the award. Paragraph 27 of the award specifically provides as follows: "अदक क. 4 क प अत सथ आदकग तथ अदक क. 1 ए 5 क !गत कग औ ह क $ स अतष स&ल क क( )स ह हकद हग क प क प* + अक , fMdzh क( गई ह)।" 11. The aforesaid direction unequivocally mandates that non-applicant No.4/Insurance Company (respondent herein) shall first satisfy the award in favour of the claimants and shall thereafter be entitled to recover the amount from the owner of the offending vehicle as if a decree had been passed in its favour against the owner. The direction is, in substance and effect, a clear "pay and recover" direction. 12. Admittedly, the appellant never challenged the aforesaid direction before any competent forum and, consequently, the award, including the direction authorising the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner after satisfying the award, has attained finality. It is well settled that an executing court is bound to execute the decree or award as it stands and cannot travel beyond its terms by altering, varying, modifying or enlarging its scope. If the appellant was aggrieved by any finding 7 / 7 recorded in the award or by any direction contained therein, the proper remedy was to assail the award before the competent appellate forum in accordance with law. Having failed to do so, the appellant cannot now be permitted to circumvent or nullify the binding directions contained in the award by invoking the provisions of Order XXI Rules 97, 99 and 101 CPC, which are wholly inapplicable to the present proceedings, or by seeking to re-agitate issues that have already attained finality in collateral execution proceedings. 13. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Executing Court committed no jurisdictional error, illegality or material irregularity in rejecting the appellant's application. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 14. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. The order dated 19.06.2026 passed by the learned Third District Judge, Raipur in Execution Case No.141 of 2024 is affirmed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Praveen