1 CGHC010205792024 2026:CGHC:37080-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3191 of 2024 1 - Khedu Ram Sahu S/o Late Bhawsingh Sahu Aged About 57 Years R/o Village Kolihamar, P.O. Gurur, District - Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Public Works Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - The Sub-Divisional Officer (P.W.D.) B And R, Sub Dn. No.1, Balod, District Balod, Chhattisgarh 3 - Executive Engineer, Pwd, Balod Division, Balod, District - Balod, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. B. P. Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Praveen Das, Addl. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 19/08/2026 1. Heard Mr. B. P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Praveen Das, learned Addl. Advocate General for the Respondent/ State. SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.08.20 10:46:16 +0530 2 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities revert back the excess amount that has been deducted under the head of royalty. 10.2 That any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also be granted in favor of the petitioner safeguarding their interest.” 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, a registered Class-B contractor with the Public Works Department, participated in a tender invited by the respondents on 27.08.2020 for procurement and supply of Muroom/raw material for road construction. The petitioner was declared successful and was called upon to execute the contract, pursuant to which the respondent No.3 issued the work order dated 28.10.2020 directing the petitioner to commence the work of supply and stacking of road material under Sub-Division No.2, Balod. The petitioner duly completed the work, whereafter the competent authority issued the work completion certificate and bill. However, at the time of making payment, the respondents deducted an amount of Rs.13,78,205/- towards royalty from the petitioner's bill. Aggrieved by the said deduction, which according to the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the applicable norms, the petitioner submitted a representation before the Collector on 14.05.2024. As the grievance remained unredressed, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking appropriate relief against the said deduction. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the action of the respondent authorities in deducting an exorbitant amount of 3 Rs.13,78,205/- towards royalty from the petitioner's total bill of Rs.17,53,886/- is wholly illegal, arbitrary and violative of the petitioner's constitutional right to equality. It is submitted that similarly placed contractors, who were allotted the same nature of work in the same district, have been subjected to substantially lesser deductions towards royalty, as evident from the pay orders placed on record. Learned counsel further submits that the royalty prescribed by the Department is only Rs.50/- per square meter and, therefore, the deduction of Rs.13,78,205/- is wholly disproportionate and contrary to the applicable norms. It is contended that the petitioner is a petty Class-B contractor and, after such deduction, hardly any amount would remain towards labour charges and other expenses incurred in execution of the work. It is further submitted that similarly situated contractors, namely Moti Lal Goyal and Jas Construction, have also not furnished royalty clearance certificates, yet no similar deduction has been made from their bills, demonstrating discriminatory and arbitrary treatment. On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the impugned deduction deserves to be set aside and the respondents be directed to release the amount illegally deducted from the petitioner's bill. 5. Learned State counsel, opposing the petition, submits that the writ petition is not maintainable as the agreement dated 28.10.2020 contains a specific arbitration clause under Clause 28, providing an efficacious alternative remedy to the petitioner, which has admittedly not been availed. It is further submitted that the deduction of Rs.13,78,205/- towards royalty is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, but has been made strictly in accordance with Clause 35 of the agreement, which specifically provides that in the absence of a royalty 4 clearance certificate, the Executive Engineer is entitled to deduct the applicable royalty charges from the contractor's bill. Learned State counsel submits that pursuant to the instructions issued by the Collector, Balod on 21.01.2021, royalty was payable at the prescribed rates, and the amount deducted from the petitioner's bill has been duly calculated on the basis of the quantity of Metal and Muroom used, i.e. Rs.4,80,701/- towards Metal and Rs.8,97,504/- towards Muroom, totalling Rs.13,78,205/-. It is further submitted that similarly situated contractors have also been subjected to royalty deductions in accordance with the same instructions, and therefore the allegation of discriminatory treatment is wholly misconceived. Since the petitioner has failed to produce the requisite royalty clearance certificate and the deduction has been made strictly in terms of the contractual conditions and applicable departmental instructions, no arbitrariness, illegality or violation of the petitioner's rights is made out. Accordingly, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner has failed to establish any ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy as well as on merits. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the pleadings and documents placed on record, this Court finds that the dispute in the present case squarely arises out of a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondent authorities and pertains to deduction of royalty from the petitioner's final bill in respect of the work executed pursuant to the work order dated 28.10.2020. The 5 agreement executed between the parties admittedly contains a specific dispute resolution mechanism under Clause 28 of the agreement dated 28.10.2020, providing for arbitration in respect of disputes arising between the parties under the contract. Clause 28 of the agreement is reads as under:- “Clause 28: Except as otherwise provided in this contract all question and dispute relating to the meaning of the specification, designs, drawings and instruction herein before mentioned as to thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract designs, drawings, specification, estimate, concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work. or a after the abandonment there of shall be referred to the Superintending Engineer for his decision, within a period of 30 (thirty) days of such an occurrence (s). There upon the Superintending Engineer shall give his written instructions and/or decisions, after hearing the contractor and Executive Engineer within a period of 15 (fifteen) days of such request. This period can be extended by mutual consent of parties. Upon receipt of written instructions or decisions, of Superintending Engineer the parties shall promptly proceed without delay to comply such instructions or decisions. If the Superintending Engineer fails to give his instruction or decisions in writing within a perion of 15 (fifteen) days or mutually agreed time after being requested and/or, if the party (es) is/are aggrieved against the decision of the Superintending Engineer, the aggrieved party may within 30 days prefer an appeal to the Chief Engineer, who shall afford an opportunity to the parties of being heard and to offer evidence in support of his appeal The, Chief Engineer will give his decision within 30 (thirty) days, or such, mutually agreed period. 6 If any party is not satisfied with the decision of the Chief Engineer he can file the petition for resolving the dispute through arbitration in the arbitration tribunal. A reference to Arbitration Tribunal shall be no ground for not continuing the work on-the part of the Contractor. Payment as per original terms and condition of the agreement shall be continued by the Executive Engineer in accordance with clause 8 above." 8. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Clause 28 demonstrates that a complete and efficacious dispute resolution mechanism has been contractually agreed between the parties, providing for reference of the dispute initially to the Superintending Engineer, followed by an appeal to the Chief Engineer and, thereafter, reference of the dispute to the Arbitration Tribunal in case either party remains aggrieved by the decision of the Chief Engineer. The said clause further prescribes specific timelines and provides an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. In such circumstances, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be invoked in contractual disputes, particularly when the agreement itself provides an efficacious alternative remedy for resolution of the dispute and the determination of the petitioner's claim would require examination of the contractual terms, applicable royalty rates and factual aspects relating to the quantity of material supplied. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 has categorically held: “10. We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr. Raval. Learned Counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of 7 a clause in a contract cannot be the subject matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature. 11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not of itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount 8 is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have been relegated to other remedies.” 9. In the present case, the issues raised by the petitioner, including the alleged excess deduction of royalty, applicability of the prescribed royalty rates, correctness of the quantity of Metal and Muroom assessed for the purpose of royalty, and the alleged discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis similarly situated contractors, are all matters requiring examination of the contractual terms, departmental instructions, relevant documents and factual aspects, which cannot appropriately be undertaken in summary proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. In view of the aforesaid legal position and considering that (i) the dispute is purely contractual in nature, (ii) disputed questions of fact relating to the applicable royalty rates, quantity of Metal and Muroom used and the alleged discriminatory deduction are involved, and (iii) an efficacious and comprehensive alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Clause 28 of the agreement dated 28.10.2020, culminating in reference of the dispute to the Arbitration Tribunal, this Court is not inclined to entertain the present writ petition. The law is well settled that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not intended to supplant the agreed contractual dispute resolution mechanism, particularly where the parties have consciously agreed to a specific remedy for adjudication of disputes arising out of the contract. 9 11. Accordingly, the writ petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika