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2026 DAILYLAW 30776 (CAL)

MRITYUNJOY JANA v. LAKSHMI RANI JANA AND ORS.

FMA/601/2026 · 2026-07-28

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Supratim Bhattacharya

body2026

Judgment text

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Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya FMA No. 601 of 2026 + CAN 1 of 2026 Mrityunjoy Jana Vs. Lakshmi Rani Jana and others For the defendant no. 1/appellant : Mr. Amit Baran Dash, Mr. Pradip Paul, Ms. Ankana Sarkar, Ms. Renesa Dey, Advs. For the plaintiffs/ respondents : Mr. Aswini Kr. Bera, Mr. Arijit Bera, Advs. Heard on : 28.07.2026. Judgment on : 28.07.2026. Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. The affidavit-of-service filed in Court today be kept on record. 2. On consent of the parties, the appeal, along with the application, is taken up for hearing. 3. The present challenge has been preferred against an order whereby in a partition suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 3, status quo has been directed to be maintained by the plaintiffs and the defendant 2 no. 1 in respect of possession and nature and character of the schedule property. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant no. 1/appellant argues that in the written objection filed to the temporary injunction application before the learned Trial Court, it was specifically pointed out in paragraph no. 20 that upon obtaining sanction plan from the local Panchayat, the appellant is making construction of his dwelling house over an area of 626.63 square feet. 5. Learned counsel further contends that from the chain title deeds produced in the trial court, it is seen that at one point of time, the father of the parties, namely Gourhari, had purchased the entire suit property in the name of the appellant, who was then a minor. 6. However, by subsequent transfer deeds, the same was sold back to the vendor and repurchased by Gourhari in his own name. 7. Learned counsel contends that such transfer by Gourhari was against the interest of the appellant, who was a minor at that point of time and no consent was obtained from the minor, nor was it in the interest of the minor/appellant. 8. Furthermore, it is submitted that the appellant, at present, is residing in the partially completed ground floor of the new construction under tarpaulin covers, in view of there being no alternative accommodation for the appellant, as it is the dwelling house of the appellant which is being built on the suit property. 9. It is pointed out that the area of the construction comes within the admitted share of the appellant in the partition suit as well. 3 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 3 opposes the contentions of the appellant and submits that there was an exchange in the line of transfers leading to the present ownership, whereby commensurate property was also given to the appellant by way of exchange. 11. Learned counsel further submits that the appellant is trying to make construction over the best portion of the property to the detriment of the interest of the other parties. 12. That apart, learned counsel points out that the learned Trial Judge took into consideration the certified copies of two sale deeds of 1971 and 1973, which were disputed by the appellant in the Trial Court. 13. Being satisfied of the veracity of the said two deeds, the learned Trial Judge granted injunction in the form of status quo. Thus, it is submitted that the learned Trial Judge rightly passed the order of status quo. 14. Upon considering the respective cases of the parties, we find that there is some doubt as to whether a strong prima facie objection has been raised by the appellant to the case made out by the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 3 that the suit property is a joint one. 15. Transfer deeds executed as long back as in the year 1970, 1971 and 1973 were never challenged by the appellant after the stipulated moratorium statutorily provided for such challenge, from the date of the appellant attaining majority. 16. Moreover, no counter claim, nor any independent suit, has been filed by the appellant challenging the deeds-in-question. 4 17. Be that as it may, at this stage it would be premature to decide such questions conclusively. 18. Fact remains that the appellant has already partially constructed up to the roof level of the ground floor on 626.63 square feet of the suit property for the purpose of building a dwelling house, by demolishing his earlier residential accommodation situated on the suit property. 19. Thus, we are of the opinion that unless the appellant is permitted to complete at least the ground floor, which in any event is unusable at present by the other parties due to partial construction being raised thereon, the appellant might be left in the lurch, without a dwelling house. 20. Hence, the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of the appellant being permitted to raise at least the ground floor of the new construction to meet his bare residential requirements. 21. However, so far as construction of further floors is concerned, we are not inclined to grant such permission to the appellant at this stage. 22. Accordingly, FMA No. 601 of 2026 is partially allowed, thereby modifying the impugned order, bearing Order no. 21 dated March 24, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Third Court, Paschim Medinipur in Title Suit No. 107 of 2024, to the effect that the appellant shall be entitled to complete the construction only of the ground floor of the structure being raised by the appellant over 626.63 square feet of the suit property, subject to there being a valid sanction plan to that effect, and adhering to such sanction plan. 5 23. Such construction shall be completed by the appellant at the appellant’s own costs without claiming any special equity for such construction and the construction shall be subject to the outcome of the partition suit. 24. In the event any such order is passed or the final decree incorporates such a direction, the appellant undertakes to demolish the said construction at his own costs. 25. We make it abundantly clear that for the time being, the appellant shall not be entitled to raise any further construction above the ground floor, irrespective of whether any sanction plan is available to the appellant in that regard or not. 26. We further clarify that apart from the above modification, the status quo granted by the learned Trial Judge in respect of the possession and nature and character of the suit property shall be maintained by the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 3 and the defendant no. 1/appellant herein. 27. CAN 1 of 2026 is also disposed of consequentially. 28. There will be no order as to costs. 29. Urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)