1 CGHC010025772022 2026:CGHC:35544-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 191 of 2022 Ramnarayan Yadav S/o Late Ramsunder Yadav Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Khada Khod, Tahsil Bharatpur, Police Station Janakpur, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Kelhari, District Koriya, Chhattisgarh., District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 12/08/2026 1. The present appeal has been listed for consideration on I.A. No. 03/2026, which is repeat application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail. Since the appellant is in jail since 30.08.2019, and with ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.08.18 16:03:14 +0530 2 the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is heard finally. Accordingly, I.A. No. 03 of 2026 is disposed of. 2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 14.12.2021 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC (POCSO), Manendragarh, District Koriya, in Special Criminal Case No. 02 of 2019, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as below:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment of 02 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine separate Rigorous imprisonment of 01 month. Under Section 366 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment of 05 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine separate Rigorous imprisonment of 01 month. 4(2) of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. Rigorous imprisonment of 20 years and fine of Rs. 500/- in default of payment of fine separate rigorous imprisonment of 01 years. Under Section 376(1) of IPC No separate sentence has been awarded. All sentence shall run concurrently. 3. Brief facts of the case are that, on 28.08.2019, the victim PW-1, lodged a written complaint Ex.P/1 to the Police with the allegation that on 26.08.2019, when she was going to school, on the way the appellant asked to accompany her and leave her at village Kolhari. When she accompany the appellant and his friend, they took her to Biharpur in 3 the relative’s house of the appellant and made forceful physical relation with her two three times. On 27.08.2019 at about 04:30 PM, he left her near the village and then she informed the incident to her mother and other family members and then lodged the report. The FIR Ex.P/2 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 363, 366, 376DA of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’). The victim was sent for her medical examination to Community Health Centre, Manendragarh, where she was medically examined by Dr Vandan Gupta, PW-4, who gave her report Ex.P/8. While medically examining the victim, the doctor noticed that her hymen was old and ruptured, however, no other external injuries were found on her body. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the Police for chemical examination. Spot Map Ex.P/5, was prepared by the Police, and EX.P/6 was prepared by the Patwari. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim, the police seized her middle school mark-sheet vide seizure memo Ex.P/4. The school record of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo ExP/16 and after retaining an attested true copy of the school register Ex.P/11-C, the original register was returned to the school. A certificate Ex.P/12 has also been obtained from the Headmaster of the school. According to the school record, the date of birth of the victim was 17.05.2005. The appellant was arrested on 30.08.2019, and he too was sent for medical examination to Primary Health Centre, Kelhari, where PW-14 Dr Mahesh Singh medically examined him and found no external injuries on his body and also found him capable of performing sexual intercourse and gave his report Ex.P/26. The 4 motorcycle of the appellant has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/13. The vaginal slides of the victim and her underwear have also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/14.The vaginal slides of the victim, her underwear, the semen slides of the appellant, and his underwear were sent for chemical examination to Regional FSL, Ambikapur, District Surguja, from where FSL report Ex.P/24 was received, and semen and sperm were found on the sent articles. 4. Statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. and statement of other witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. have been recorded, and after completion of usual investigation, the charge-sheet has been filed against the appellant and co-accused Anil Kumar Yadav, showing him absconding, for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376DA of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act, before the learned trial Court. 5. The learned trial court has framed the charge against the appellant Ram Narayan Yadav for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2) (n) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act vide order dated 04.11.2019. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 6. During pendency of the trial, the absconded accused Anil Kumar Yadav was arrested on 22.05.2020 pursuant to the permanent arrest warrant issued against him, and he was also produced before the learned trial Court. The charge against Anil Kumar Yadav has been framed vide order dated 10.02.2021, for the offence under Section 363/34 of IPC. and Section 17 of POCSO Act. The accused Anil Kumar Yadav denied the charge and claimed trial. 7. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses. The statement under Section 313 of CrPC of the accused persons were also recorded in which they denied the 5 material appears against them, pleaded innocence and has submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. 8. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial court has acquitted the co- accused Anil Kumar Yadav from all the offences by giving him the benefit of doubt, whereas the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as mentioned in the earlier para of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would argue that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the offence. No offence is made out against the appellant as alleged. The prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim, that she was a minor on the date of the incident by leading cogent oral as well as documentary evidence. The victim was in a love affair with the appellant and, of her own free will, accompanied the appellant and had made consensual physical relations without raising any objection or protest. No external injuries were found on the body of the victim while she was medically examined by the doctor, and no signs of any struggle were noticed on her body. Even while going with the appellant up to village Biharpur, she has not raise any alarm and has not tried to flee from the clutches of the appellant. Therefore, no offence against the appellant is made out and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State opposes the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and submitted that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident and 6 was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant against her will and without consent. Since the victim was a minor, her consent is immaterial even if she was found to have consented to making physical relations with the appellant. Further, had she consented to making physical relations with the appellant, she would not have lodged a report against him. The age of the victim has been proved by the school record and evidence of the teacher of the school. There are sufficient evidence produced by the prosecution that the victim was minor on the date of the incident. He would further submit that the even no injuries have been found on the body of the victim, that itself is not sufficient to hold that the victim was a consenting party. The FSL report proves the presence of semen and sperm on the vaginal slides of the victim, which corroborates the allegation that she was subjected to rape by the appellant. But for minor omission and contradictions, the prosecution evidence are reliable and sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and has convicted and sentenced the appellant, which needs no interference. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court carefully. 12. The first and foremost question that arises for consideration is the age of the victim, as to whether she was a minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of the incident or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register Ex.P/11-C and certificate Ex.P/12 which are sought to be proved by PW-7, Headmaster of the school. PW-7 has stated in his evidence that he is the Headmaster of the school. The police have seized the school register with respect to the age and date 7 of birth of the victim and, after retaining its attested true copy Ex.P/11- C, the original register Ex.P/11 return back to the school. He also issued a certificate Ex.P/12 and, according to the school register, the date of birth of the victim is 17.05.2005. In cross-examination, though he admitted that he is not the author of the school register and he did not know as to who has recorded the date of birth of the victim in the school register but he admitted that he issued the certificate Ex.P/12 and he made his signature in the school register on 01.04.2016, which was the date of issuing the transfer certificate to the victim. There is no suggestion given by the defence that in the school register Ex.P/11-C and Ex.P/12, a wrong date of birth of the victim has been mentioned. 13. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register have been considered by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana” 2013 (7) SCC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para 22 to 24 held that:- “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007 Rules). The afore stated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under : “12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.? (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date of making of the application for that purpose. 8 (2) The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail. (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining – (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a) (i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. (4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of 9 offence, on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and declaring the status of juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these rules and a copy of the order shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned. (5) Save and except where, further inquiry or otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the certificate or any other documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule. (6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also apply to those disposed off cases, where the status of juvenility has not been determined in accordance with the provisions contained in sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law.” 23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW- PW6. The manner of determining age conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option 10 expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical opinion. 24. Following the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it is apparent that the age of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 could not be determined on the basis of the matriculation (or equivalent) certificate as she had herself deposed, that she had studied upto class 3 only, and thereafter, had left her school and had started to do household work. The prosecution in the facts and circumstances of this case, had endeavoured to establish the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6, on the next available basis, in the sequence of options expressed in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. The prosecution produced Satpal (PW4), to prove the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. Satpal (PW4) was the Head Master of the Government High School, Jathlana, where the prosecutrix VW - PW6 had studied upto class 3. Satpal (PW4) had proved the certificate Exhibit-PG, as having been made on the basis of the school records indicating, that the prosecutrix VW - PW6, was born on 15.5.1977. In the scheme contemplated 11 under Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules, it is not permissible to determine age in any other manner, and certainly not on the basis of an option mentioned in a subsequent clause. We are therefore of the view, that the High Court was fully justified in relying on the aforesaid basis for establishing the age of the prosecutrix VW – PW6. It would also be relevant to mention, that under the scheme of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, it would have been improper for the High Court to rely on any other material including the ossification test, for determining the age of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The deposition of Satpal-PW4 has not been contested. Therefore, the date of birth of the prosecutrix VW - PW6 (indicated in Exhibit P.G., as 15.7.1977) assumes finality. Accordingly it is clear, that the prosecutrix VW-PW6, was less than 15 years old on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 25.3.1993. In the said view of the matter, there is no room for any doubt that the prosecutrix VW - PW6 was a minor on the date of occurrence. Accordingly, we hereby endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court, that even if the prosecutrix VW-PW6 had accompanied the accused-appellant Jarnail Singh of her own free will, and had had consensual sex with him, the same would have been clearly inconsequential, as she was a minor.” 14. PW-1, the victim have stated in her evidence that she is aged about 14 years. In cross-examination, she denied that she did not know her age. She admitted the suggestion given by the defence that she disclosed her age on the basis of information given by her parents. 15. PW-2 is the uncle of the victim. He too has stated that on the date of incident the victim was 14 years of age. In cross-examination, he admitted that the mother of the victim had gone to school for her admission and therefore, he did not know the date of birth of the victim. Though he admitted that the age of the victim may be more or less than 14 years but he voluntarily stated that her age is 14 years. 12 16. PW-3, is the mother of the victim, has also stated that she is aged about 14 years. In cross-examination, she stated that at the time when the victim was aged about 3-4 years, her father had died and therefore, at the time of her admission in the school, her elder father accompanied her to the school. She denied that the age of the victim is 19 years. From these evidences and also the evidence of the school record, the prosecution is duly proved the age of the victim that she was less than 18 years of age and she was child as defined under Section 2D of the POCSO Act in which there is infirmity or perversity. 17. So far as the kidnapping and rape are concerned, we again examine the evidence of the victim PW-1. She stated in her evidence that on the date of incident at about 09:00 AM, she was going to school, on the way the appellant met her and asked her to accompany him, and he would drop her at her destination. On his insist, she accompanied him and he took her to Biharpur to his relative’s house by his motorcycle. He kept her in the house there and, on the pretext of marriage, committed sexual intercourse with her on the next day, he left her at about 04:30 PM, near the village, and then she informed it to her mother and lodged the report. In cross-examination, she denied that she had frequent telephonic conversations with the appellant; she also denied that she on her own will, had gone with the appellant. She admitted that on the instance of the appellant she accompanied him. At the time when the appellant took her, the shops of the nearby place were not open. Though she admitted that if she refused to go with the appellant and raised alarm, the appellant could not have taken her with him. She further admitted that in the house where the appellant took her, 5 - 6 other male and female persons were residing, and she 13 stayed there for the whole of the night. She denied that she liked the appellant. She also admitted that there was a dispute between her elder father and brother of the appellant. She further denied that the appellant had not given the allurement of marriage. She already knew that the appellant was already married. From the evidence of this witness it transpires that the defence has taken the plea that the victim was having love affair with the appellant and she on her own will and voluntarily, accompanied him; they stayed together at night in the relative’s house of the appellant, and they made consensual physical relations. However, the appellant was admittedly a married person and therefore developing further physical relations with the victim on the pretext of marriage itself is sufficient to hold that he committed the offence of rape upon the victim after alleged consent, though the victim cannot consent due to her minority. From the evidence of the victim, PW-1, the defence could not be able to extract any material that makes her evidence doubtful, rather, the suggestion given by the defence clearly indicates that he took the minor victim with him, kept her away from her lawful guardianship and committed rape upon her. 18. Further in the matter of Appabhai and Another vs. State of Gujarat 1998 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 241, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in Para-13 that: “13. The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue impor-tance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given im- portance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exagge-rated version given by any witness. 14 When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses may go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are other-(Para 13) wise trustworthy.” 19. In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sanjay Kumar alias Sunny, (2017) 2 SCC 51 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 30 and 31 that:- “30. …...We have already discussed above the manner in which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases. … 31. ….By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the 15 lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance {See Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh[(2003) 8 SCC 551 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 31]}. Notwithstanding this legal position, in the instant case, we even find enough corroborative material as well, which is discussed hereinabove.” 20. PW-2, father of the victim, has stated that on 27.08.2019, when the victim returned to her house, she informed that the appellant kidnapped her and committed rape upon her. Thereafter, they lodged the report. In cross-examination, he stated that the appellant Ram Narayan is the son of his relative and he knew him. He admitted that the victim also knew the appellant. He stated whatever the victim disclosed to him. 21. PW-3, is the mother of the victim, has also stated that when the victim came back to her house. She disclosed that the appellant kidnapped her and committed rape upon her. In cross-examination, she too has stated that she deposed on the basis of the incident narrated by the victim to her. 22. PW-4, Dr Vandan Gupta, who medically examined the victim, has not noticed any external injuries on her body and found that her hymen was old and ruptured. She proved the MLC report Ex.P/8 and found signs of sexual intercourse with the victim. She prepared two vaginal slides of the victim and handed them over to the police for its chemical 16 examination. In cross-examination, she admitted that there was no sign of forceful sexual intercourse. 23. PW-6 is the relative of the appellant in whose house the victim was being taken by the appellant and kept her throughout the night. From the evidence of this witness, the fact that the victim was being taken by the appellant and kept her away from her lawful guardianship has been found proved. 24. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim’s evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is no material contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, in which the prosecution has succeeded in the instant case. 25. After having considered the entire evidence available on record and rival submissions of the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and has convicted and sentenced the appellant for the alleged offences. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the 17 learned trial Court does not suffer from any perversity and illegality, and we do not find any reason for interference in the same. 26. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant fails and is hereby dismissed. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 30.08.2019. He shall serve the entire sentence awarded by the learned trial Court. 27. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 28. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Alok