1 CGHC010276482026 2026:CGHC:35865-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 711 of 2026 1 - Ganga Prasad Sharanagat S/o Shri Mohan Lal Shranagat, Aged About 43 Years, Occupation- Govt Service, Working As Incharge Senior Agriculture Development Officer, Posted at Bagbahara, District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - The State of Chhattisgarh Through the Secretary, Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Director of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare Department Block-2 Second Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The District Collector, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund (C.G.) 4 - Deputy Director, Office of the Deputy Director, Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Near Baronda Chowk, District Mahasamund (C.G.) 5 - Mr. Faguram Kashyap, Deputy Director (Agriculture), Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, Near Baronda Chowk, District Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Respondents Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.08.18 18:48:53 +0530 2 (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate. For State : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board 13.08.2026 1. The present writ appeal has been filed by the appellant, who was petitioner before the learned Single Judge, against the order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 4767/2026 (Ganga Prasad Sharanagat Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, arising out of the suspension order dated 20.05.2026 ANNEXURE A-2, passed by the respondent No.03) whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant /petitioner reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy before the competent forum, in accordance with law, if so advised. 2. The facts as mentioned the writ appeal are that, the appellant was appointed Agriculture Development Officer in the State Government, by the competent Agriculture Department authority and was serving as Senior Agriculture Development Officer at Bagbahara. His case was also under consideration for promotion. On 20.05.2026, however, the District Collector suspended him for allegedly failing to take action against M/s R.S. Traders and M/s Jai Ma Bhimeshwari for irregular distribution of urea during the alleged inactive crop period and for not complying with 3 departmental directions. The appellant contends that he had, in fact, complied with the directions of the competent Agriculture authority by approaching the police for registration of an FIR on several occasions. The police sought additional documents, which the appellant immediately requested from respondent No.4, but those documents were never supplied. Despite this, repeated reminders and a warning were issued to the appellant, culminating in his suspension. He further contends that there was no Government order declaring 16.03.2026 to 29.03.2026 as an inactive crop period and that the allegations in the suspension order are factually incorrect. The appellant challenges the suspension order primarily on the ground that the District Collector was neither his appointing, controlling, nor disciplinary authority and had no statutory authorization to suspend him under the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short ‘the Rules of 1966’). According to the appellant, Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966 permits suspension only by the competent authorities specified therein or by an authority specifically empowered by the Governor, and no such empowerment existed in the present case. He also alleges violation of natural justice, absence of a proper opportunity of hearing, non-application of mind, and mala fide conduct by the concerned authorities. The appellant challenged the suspension in WPS No. 4767/2026, but the petition has been dismissed at the motion stage on 25.06.2026 on the ground of availability of an 4 alternate statutory remedy and he has challenged the order dated 25.06.2026 in the present writ appeal. Although he subsequently filed a departmental appeal, it was withdrawn on 07.07.2026 to pursue the present writ appeal. He seeks interference by on the ground that the suspension order is without jurisdiction, arbitrary and legally unsustainable, and has caused serious civil consequences, stigma, financial hardship, and prejudice to his career and promotion prospects. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy without considering that the case involved a complete lack of jurisdiction and violation of natural justice. It has been further submitted that under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966, the power to suspend lies with the appointing/disciplinary authority or an authority specifically empowered by the Governor. Since the appellant's appointing authority is the Director of Agriculture, the District Collector had no authority to suspend him. The alleged reliance on the 1996 Circular was also disputed, as its applicability to the appellant's cadre was neither established nor properly placed before him. The learned Single Judge, therefore, ought to have decided the jurisdictional issue instead of relegating the appellant to a departmental appeal. It has been further argued that the suspension order was passed without proper application of mind and without affording the appellant any opportunity of hearing. The appellant had repeatedly approached the police for 5 registration of the FIR, but the police sought documents which respondent No.4 failed to provide despite repeated requests. Thus, the allegation of disobedience was contrary to the record, and the immediate issuance of the suspension order after the warning indicated predetermination and mala fide exercise of power. The appellant has contended that the departmental appeal was not an efficacious remedy for deciding the fundamental issue of the Collector's jurisdiction. The suspension has caused serious civil consequences, stigma, financial hardship and prejudice to the appellant's career; hence, the order of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside and the illegal suspension order may be quashed. 4. Per contra, Learned counsel for the State-respondents has supported the order of the learned Single Judge and has submitted that the writ petition has rightly been dismissed in view of the efficacious alternative statutory remedy available to the appellant. The appellant, being a Class-III employee, could be suspended by the Collector under the Circular dated 23.05.1996 and the Rules of 1966. It has been further contended that the impugned suspension order was passed by the competent authority in exercise of the powers conferred under the said Circular. Therefore, the suspension order was issued in accordance with the applicable service rules and administrative instructions on account of the appellant's alleged failure to comply with official directions and discharge his duties. 6 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available in the writ appeal as well as writ petition. 6. The learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 25.06.2026 passed in WPS No.4767 of 2026 has observed in para Nos. 5 to 7 that:- “5. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the principal grievance raised by the petitioner pertains to the competency of the authority issuing the suspension order dated 20.05.2026. The respondents have specifically relied upon the Circular dated 23.05.1996 issued by the General Administration Department, whereby the Collector has been empowered to exercise powers of suspension in respect of Class-III and Class-IV employees under the Rules of 1966. It is not in dispute that against the order of suspension, an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner before the competent authority under the provisions of the Rules of 1966. 6. It is well settled that when an efficacious alternative statutory remedy is available to an aggrieved employee before a competent forum, this Court would ordinarily refrain from exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of 7 India, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed at the motion stage itself as not maintainable. However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy before the competent forum, in accordance with law, if so advised.” 7. Upon considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and the material available on record, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The principal grievance of the appellant relates to the competency of the District Collector to pass the suspension order, whereas the State has relied upon the Circular dated 23.05.1996 empowering the Collector to exercise the power of suspension in respect of Class-III and Class-IV employees under the Rules of 1966. Such disputed questions, including the applicability and effect of the said Circular, can appropriately be examined by the competent appellate authority under the statutory remedy available to the appellant. Since an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal was admittedly available, and no exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was established, the learned Single Judge was justified in declining to entertain the writ petition at the motion stage while granting liberty to the appellant to avail the appropriate statutory remedy. Therefore, the order dated 25.06.2026 calls for no interference. 8 8. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no error or illegality in the order dated 25.06.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in the present appeal. The appellant has an efficacious statutory remedy available under the Rules of 1966, and the learned Single Judge has rightly granted liberty to avail such remedy in accordance with law. Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil