28.07.2026 Item no. DL41 Court No. 16 Asraf, A.R.(Ct.) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Case No. SAT 85 of 2026 with CAN 1 of 2026 In the matter of : SMT. SULEKHA BARAI & ORS. …Appellants VS. SRI BISWASWAR MONDAL & ORS. …Respondents For the Appellants : Mr. A. K. Gayen …Advocate For the Respondent nos.1 to 3 : Mr. Mukteswar Maity Ms. Manika Sarkar …Advocates 1. Insofar as the name of the respondent nos.4 to 7 in the certified copy of the appellate decree not finding place in the certified copy of the trial court decree is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant submits that such respondents were substituted as heirs and legal representatives of their mother, who had died during pendency of the appeal. 2. As such, their names do not find place in the certified copy of the Trial Court’s decree, although during pendency of the appeal they were substituted in the appeal and, as such, find place in the appellate Court’s decree. Page 2 3. Insofar as the name of respondent no.3 in the certified copy of the appellate decree not tallying with that of the trial court’s decree is concerned, the matter is to be resolved by sending the records down for correction. 4. Accordingly, the records be sent down for effecting necessary correction to the decree of the First Appellate Court or the Trial Court, as the case may be. 5. However, due to the urgency involved, prior to sending down the records, we take up the appeal for hearing under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 6. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment of affirmance, whereby both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court decreed a suit for eviction filed by the respondents against the appellants on the ground of reasonable requirement for the purpose of building and rebuilding under Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 7. Learned counsel for the tenants/appellants argues that although two transfer deeds were executed in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents in the year 1982 and 1985 respectively in respect of the suit property by the landlord of the present appellants, Page 3 who was the original owner, subsequently there was a litigation in respect of the said deed and much subsequent to the institution of the present suit in the year 1991, the issue was settled in favour of the present plaintiffs/respondents in an appeal before this court. 8. Learned counsel submits that since the character of the transactions in question by the original landlord of the appellants in favour of the present plaintiffs/respondents was finally settled post- filing of the suit, it cannot be construed that at the time of the filing of the suit the plaintiffs/respondents had title in the property. Thus, the suit was bad from the inception, in view of the plaintiffs/respondents lacking title in the suit property. Such defect cannot be cured subsequently. 9. Secondly, learned counsel for the appellants places reliance on Section 6(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and argues that in terms of the same, if a suit is filed by a subsequent transferee on the ground of building- rebuilding, the same cannot be instituted before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of acquisition of the title. In the present case, the title in the property was acquired by the Page 4 plaintiffs much prior to the filing of the suit. Thus, the suit is bad on such ground as well. 10. Thirdly, learned counsel argues that a concession was made on behalf of both parties before the First Appellate Court to the effect that the possession of the appellants would be retained in respect of 175 sq. ft. out of the total suit property and the building-rebuilding would be done by the plaintiffs/respondents in the rest of the property. 11. Thus, it is argued that the present appeal ought to be admitted on the above questions. 12. However, we are unable to accept any of the above contentions. 13. Insofar as the transfer of the suit property is concerned, the First Appellate Court elaborately discussed the same. As per the said observations, by two deeds respectively of the year 1982 and 1985, the original landlord of the present appellants transferred the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents, who are spouses of each other. 14. Subsequently, a suit was instituted by Ananta, the original landlord/transferor, for a declaration that the sale by him in favour of the present plaintiffs/ Page 5 respondents was a loan-in-substance and not an out-and-out sale. 15. However, the said suit ultimately culminated in dismissal up to the appellate stage, thereby affirming the character of the transfer as an outright sale. 16. Irrespective of the pendency of the litigation, it was ultimately held by the Court that the transfer deeds of 1982 and 1985 conveyed the suit property in favour of the present plaintiffs/respondents by way of a sale. Thus, as on the date of filing of the suit, i.e., in the year 1991, the plaintiffs already had title in the suit property by dint of the two transfer deeds dated 1982 and 1985. The ascertainment of the character of the transfer by subsequent disposal of an appeal in respect thereof does not mean that the transfer itself was postponed till the final adjudication of the appeal. What was decided in the litigation was only the character of the transfer, the same having already been effected by the transfer deeds themselves, i.e., in the year 1982 and 1985, which was much prior to the institution of the suit. 17. Thus, the first contention of the appellants, to the effect that the plaintiffs/respondents did not have Page 6 title at the relevant point of time, is not tenable in the eye of law. 18. Insofar as Section 6(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 is concerned, the same is not attracted in the present case, for the simple reason that the suit itself was instituted under the predecessor-statute of the said Act, that is, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 19. Section 45(1) of the 1997 Act repealed the 1956 Act. However, under sub-Section (2) of the said Section, all suits and proceedings under the 1956 Act pending at the commencement of the 1997 Act were saved from the purview of the 1997 Act. Thus, it is the provisions of the 1956 Act which are applicable in the present context. 20. Even as per Section 13(3A) of the 1956 Act, there is a moratorium of three years from acquisition of a property by a transferee-landlord for instituting a suit for eviction. 21. However, in the present case, the transfers in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents were effected in the years 1982 and 1985 respectively whereas the suit was instituted in the year 1991, that is, much beyond the moratorium period of three years from the transfers. Hence, the said Page 7 contention of the appellants also cannot be accepted. 22. Insofar as the supposed concession on the part of the respondents/landlords regarding the appellants retaining a portion of the property allegedly made before the First Appellate Court, we do not find any mention whatsoever in the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court to that effect. Learned counsel for the appellants also fails to produce any independent document evidencing any such concession being given by the plaintiffs/respondents. Thus, we are unable to accede to the said proposition as well. 23. In such view of the matter, we do not find any arguable question of law, let alone any substantial question of law, involved in the present appeal. 24. Accordingly, SAT 85 of 2026 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 25. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is also dismissed. 26. There shall be no order as to costs. 27. All parties shall act on the basis of server copy of this order, duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. Page 8 28. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all necessary formalities. ( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. ) ( Supratim Bhattacharya, J. )