1 CGHC010223932026 2026:CGHC:36170-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 709 of 2026 Dr. Puranjan Singh Armo S/o Late Shri Chandan Singh Armo Aged About 45 Years R/o Sarakanda VIP Colony House No. A/303, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh, Presently Working As Lecturer, Panchakarm Government Ayurvedic, College Raipur 492010, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Address Ayurved Chikistsaa Kendra M.A. No. 479, Jailer Chaal Khairagarh Road, Chikhali, Jila Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh, 491441, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Public Service Commission Through Secretary, North Block, Sector-19, New Raipur Atal Nagar Chhattisgarh, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - The Director Directorate of Ayurvedic Yoga And Prakriti Chikitsa, Unani Siddha And Homeopathy (Ayush) Purana Mantralaya Parisa, Raipur Chhattisgarh, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Dr. Gourav Mishra S/o Late Shri Mahesh Mishra Address Ayurved Chikistsaa Kendra M.A. No. 479, Jailer Chaal Khairagarh Road, Chikhali, Jila Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh, 491441 ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Shri Ishan Verma, Advocate. For Respondent No. 1 & 3 Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Anand Mohan Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Rajesh Tiwari, Advocate. 2 Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13/08/2026 1 Heard Mr. Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for the State/respondent No. 1 and 3, Mr. Anand Mohan Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 as well as Mr. Rajesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. 2 Challenge in this appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 is to the order dated 17.04.2026 passed in WPS No. 1569/2023 by the learned Single Judge by which the challenge made to the legality, propriety and correctness of the advertisement dated 08.02.2023 issued by the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission (for short, the CGPSC) for direct recruitment to the post of Reader in Medical Education (Ayush) Department, has been rejected. 3 There is a delay of 7 days in Aling the present appeal for which the appellant/writ petitioner has Aled IA No. 1/2026 seeking condonation of delay in preferring the present appeal. For the reasons stated in the application, the delay is condoned and we proceed to decide the matter on merits. 4 In the present appeal, the appellant/writ petitioner has prayed for the following relief(s): “(1) Allow the present Writ Appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 17.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1569 of 2023; 3 (2) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire record pertaining to the case of the petitioner; (3) Set aside / quash the impugned advertisement published on 08.02.2023 by CGPSC with respect to the post of Reader Panchkarm being contrary to the rules; (4) Direct the respondents to consider the case of petitioner for grant of promotion to the post of Reader Panchkarm duly in accordance with law at the earliest and to take a decision of the same in time bound manner, in the interest of justice. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to grant the petitioner all the Consequential bene8t including the pay-band, seniority etc. from the date where the petitioner was entitled for the promotion; (5) Issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem 8t and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 5 The facts, as projected by the appellant/writ petitioner, in brief, are that he belongs to Gond Tribe, which is recognized as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of Chhattisgarh. He was born on 18.10.1980 in Korba District and completed his Master's Degree in Ayurveda (M.D. Kaya Chikitsa) in the year 2011 from Government Ayurvedic College, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, also known as Narayan Prasad Awasthi Government Ayurvedic College. The present matter arises out of advertisement dated 08.02.2023 issued by the respondent-CGPSC for direct recruitment to the post of Reader (Panchkarm), Medical Education (Ayush). The appellant was initially appointed as an Ayurveda Medical OEcer through the CGPSC on 01.03.2011 and served on the said post till the year 2016 with utmost sincerity and diligence. Upon obtaining No Objection CertiAcate from the Joint Director, Ayurved Yog Evam Prakritik Chikitsa, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy (Ayush), the appellant was appointed through direct recruitment as Lecturer (Panchkarm) by the respondent 4 CGPSC on 17.02.2016 in District Raipur. Earlier, the determination of posts for direct recruitment and promotion was governed by the Government guidelines/orders dated 03.08.2007 and 06.10.2007. Subsequently, the State Government issued amended guidelines on 09.11.2011 bearing No. Circular/Order dated AP/247/2011/NAU/55, whereby the earlier policy stood modiAed. As per the amended guidelines, where decimal "0.5" arose in both direct recruitment and promotion quota, the promotional quota was to be rounded oH upward and the decimal in direct recruitment was to be ignored/deleted. In the cadre of Reader (Panchkarm), only two sanctioned posts existed and, in view of the amended guidelines dated 09.11.2011, both the said posts became promotional posts with no post remaining available for direct recruitment. One of the two posts of Reader (Panchkarm) came to be Alled through promotion vide promotion order dated 21.10.2022, whereas the second post remained vacant since 16.09.2021. The said fact was evident from the gradation list showing promotion of Dr. Ranjeep Kumar Das from Reader to Professor (Panchkarm) on 16.09.2021. 6 As per the appellant/writ petitioner, he is fully qualiAed for consideration against the promotional post of Reader (Panchkarm), possessing M.D. (Kaya Chikitsa Ayurveda) qualiAcation and more than Ave years of teaching experience. Despite availability of vacant promotional post, the respondents failed to consider the appellant for promotion and instead proceeded to issue advertisement dated 08.02.2023 for direct recruitment in violation of the amended guidelines dated 09.11.2011. Upon learning that the respondents intended to All the post of Reader (Panchkarm) through direct recruitment by relying upon the earlier guidelines dated 06.10.2007 instead of the amended guidelines dated 09.11.2011, the appellant submitted several complaints and 5 representations before the competent authorities. The appellant initially approached the Secretary, Department of Scheduled Tribe, State of Chhattisgarh, who by communication dated 09.09.2021 sought clariAcation from the Director, Ayurved Yog Evam Prakritik Chikitsa, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy (Ayush) regarding the issue raised by the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant submitted representations dated 10.01.2022, 28.01.2022, 17.02.2022 and 19.09.2022 before the Director, Principal Secretary, Chairman of the CGPSC and other authorities requesting that the vacant post of Reader (Panchkarm) be treated as a promotional post in accordance with the amended guidelines dated 09.11.02011. The Joint Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, State of Chhattisgarh, by reply dated 22.07.2022, denied the claim of the appellant and further denied that both the posts of Reader (Panchkarm) were promotional posts. Despite repeated representations and despite the amended guidelines dated 09.11.2011 holding the Aeld, the respondent CGPSC issued advertisement dated 08.02.2023 for direct recruitment to the post of Reader (Panchkarm), in complete violation of the amended policy decision. The status of the posts of Reader (Panchkarm) as on 01.04.2021 was clearly reJected in the gradation list dated 13.07.2021. The appellant challenged the aforesaid advertisement dated 08.02.2023 by Aling WPS No. 1569/2023 before the learned Single Judge primarily on the ground that under the amended guidelines dated 09.11.2011, no post of Reader (Panchkarm) could legally be Alled through direct recruitment as both sanctioned posts were required to be Alled through promotion. However, the said writ petition stood dismissed vide order dated 17.04.2026 which is sought to be challenged herein. 7 Mr. Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the 6 learned Single Judge erred in resorting to purposive interpretation when the applicable Recruitment Rules and the circular dated 09.11.2011 were clear, unambiguous and self-executing. In the absence of any ambiguity in the statutory language, there was no occasion to depart from its plain meaning or to rely upon rules subsequently notiAed on 19.06.2023. The respondents’ own reply acknowledges that the Recruitment Rules of 2022–2023 operate prospectively from the date of their notiAcation. It is well settled that interpretation of a statutory provision is warranted only where the language is ambiguous, obscure, or a literal construction leads to an absurd or self-defeating result. Where the statutory text is plain, the Court must give eHect to it as enacted. In support, reliance is placed on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in R.S. Nayak and Ors. vs. A.R. Antulay and Ors. {MANU/SC/0102/1984}, Grasim Industries Ltd. υ. Collector of Customs, Bombay, {MANU/SC/0256/2002}, B. Premanand & Ors. v. Mohan Koikal {MANU/SC/0249/2011}. 8 Mr. Verma further submits that the recruitment rules prescribed a ratio of 75:25 between promotion and direct recruitment. This is a clear numerical mandate. The circular dated 09.11.2011 prescribed a clear methodology for dealing with fractional posts. There is no obscurity in either text. The application of a 75:25 ratio to 2 posts yields 1.5 (promotion) and 0.5 (direct recruitment). The circular prescribes the rounding- oH treatment of fractions. The result is arithmetically certain and legally unambiguous. The learned Single Judge was not faced with a was silent, contradictory, or provision that susceptible to multiple reasonable readings. The Court was faced with a clear rule applied to a speciAc fact situation. The result inconvenient the to Respondents however was unambiguous. In such a situation, the Court had no jurisdiction to substitute its own policy preference for the clear statutory 7 mandate by invoking the doctrines of purposive interpretation or "evolving policy framework." As the maxim states verbis legis non est recedendum from the words of the law there shall be no departure. The learned Single Judge's departure from this principle produced not interpretation but legislation from the Bench, which is constitutionally impermissible. The learned Single Judge erred in holding that the circular dated 09.11.2011 is a 'general executive instruction' subordinate to the policy decision dated 06.10.2007 both are executive orders and neither can override statutory rules; the analysis is internally contradictory. Executive instructions whether styled as circulars, oEce memoranda, government orders or policy decisions cannot override statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge, after correctly holding that the recruitment rules are 'statutory in nature', went on to prefer the executive policy decision of 06.10.2007 over the circular dated 09.11.2011, treating the latter as a 'general executive instruction.' This approach is Jawed. The learned Single Judge erred by relying on the 06.10.2007 document, which is a mere internal note sheet rather than a binding circular. Any guidance oHered by that note sheet was overruled by the formal circular dated 09.11.2011. This 2011 circular was essential to All the vacuum regarding how recruitment rules and fractional quotas apply to cases where such fractional quotas would be applicable to direct recruitment/promotion to the total sanctioned strength. A formal circular must take precedence over an internal note sheet. When two executive instruments operate on the same subject matter and are in conJict, the later instrument must prevail over the earlier one. This is the eHect of the time-honoured legal maxim leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant - later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has applied this principle 8 consistently in the context of conJicting government orders, circulars, and oEce memoranda dealing with the same subject matter. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised as basic principle of statutory interpretation that later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws; an earlier Act must give place to a later if the two cannot be reconciled. The learned Single Judge inverted this principle by giving precedence to the earlier instrument the 2007 note-sheet over the later Circular of 2011. The circular dated 09.11.2011 is a speciAc, categorical, and later executive instruction prescribing the precise methodology for rounding oH fractional vacancies in quota-based recruitment. The 2007 note-sheet, being an earlier and more general policy note, must yield to the later, more speciAc, and operationally precise circular of 2011. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant further reinforces this conclusion. Even if the 2007 note-sheet is treated as a general policy, the 2011 circular as a speciAc operative instruction for fraction computation prevails over it. In support of his contentions, he places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Harshad S. Mehta and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra {MANU/SC/0540/2001}. 9 Mr. Verma further submits that the proper approach was to interpret the recruitment rules themselves. The recruitment rules expressly accord primacy to promotion over direct recruitment in a 3:1 ratio the learned Single Judge erred in treating both modes as equal and coordinate sources of recruitment warranting equal protection. The learned Single Judge, throughout the impugned order, proceeds on the assumption that direct recruitment and promotion are two co-equal and coordinate sources of recruitment that must be simultaneously preserved in all circumstances. This foundational assumption is legally incorrect and contrary to the express mandate of the recruitment rules applicable as on 9 the date of the advertisement dated 08.02.2023. The recruitment rules prescribe a ratio of 75% promotion to 25% direct recruitment. This is not a neutral or equal distribution. It is a deliberate legislative and rule- making choice to accord three times the weight to promotion over direct recruitment. The rule-making authority, in the exercise of its power under Article 309 of the Constitution, made a conscious policy determination that the said posts should, to the extent of three-fourths, be Alled from within the existing service through promotion, and only to the extent of one-fourth from outside through direct recruitment. This scheme of primacy is signiAcant in two respects. First, it reJects a considered view that the experience and domain knowledge of existing service members is the predominant qualiAcation for these posts, and that fresh induction from outside is only a supplementary and secondary mode. Second, it means that when the total strength of the cadre is small and the mathematical application of the ratio produces a fraction, the fraction that is shed must, in conformity with the spirit and hierarchy of the rules, be shed from the lesser and subordinate mode namely, direct recruitment and not from the dominant and primary mode of promotion. The learned Single Judge at paragraph 16 of the order impugned has held that any interpretation which "completely eliminates one source would defeat the very scheme and intent of the rules." This reasoning treats the two sources as symmetrically valued. But the rules do not value them symmetrically. A rule that prescribes 75:25 is structurally incompatible with the proposition that both sources enjoy equal protection against elimination. The dominant source promotion enjoys superior statutory recognition. When rounding is necessitated by a small cadre, it is not a "defeat" of the rules to round in favour of the dominant source; it is, on the contrary, the most faithful implementation of the rules' own hierarchy. 10 Furthermore, the recruitment rules as they stood on 08.02.2023 i.e., the rules actually applicable on the date of the advertisement did not contemplate any minimum Joor of one direct recruitment post irrespective of cadre strength. No such protective clause, no such saving provision, and no such non-obstante clause existed in the rules to override the mathematical consequence of applying a 75:25 ratio to a 2 post cadre. The subsequently proposed 50:50 rules (approved on 04.01.2023 but not yet notiAed) and the rules eventually notiAed on 19.06.2023 are irrelevant, but it is notable that even the legislative evolution from 75:25 to a more equal 50:50 conArms that the original rules decidedly did not treat the two modes as equals. Importing the equality principle from rules not yet in force into the interpretation of rules that expressly rejected that equality is impermissible. The learned Single Judge, having correctly held that the recruitment rules are statutory in character and therefore superior to both executive instruments, ought to have stopped at that Anding and interpreted the rules directly. Instead, the Court descended into a comparison between two executive instruments and then compounded the error by preferring the earlier one. In service jurisprudence, the service rules are liable to prevail; there can be government resolutions being in consonance with or expounding the rules, but not in conJict with the same. This principle applies with equal force as between two executive instruments on the same subject, where the later must prevail, and both must ultimately be tested against the statute. In support of his argument, he places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Ashok Ram Parhad & Ors v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. {Civil Appeal No. 822 Of 2023}. The learned Single Judge erred in relying upon proposed/amended rules of 2022-2023 to validate the advertisement of 08.02.2023, the applicable law is the law in 11 force on the date of advertisement, not subsequently notiAed rules. The impugned order, relies upon 'proposed 50:50 Rules approved on 04.01.2023' and 'Anal 2022 Rules notiAed on 19.06.2023' to hold that the Advertisement dated 08.02.2023 was consistent with the 'evolving policy framework. This is a serious error of law. The legality of an advertisement must be tested against the rules in force on the date of its issuance not against rules proposed or notiAed subsequently. Proposed rules, being unapproved, ha ve no legal force. The rules notiAed on 19.06.2023 (i.e., four months after the impugned advertisement of 08.02.2023) cannot retroactively validate an advertisement that, on the date of issue, was governed by a diHerent and subsisting set of recruitment rules. He places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India & others v. Krishna Kumar and others {(2019) 4 SCC 319} and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court {2024 INSC 847}. The Rules notiAed on 19.06.2023 are explicitly prospective as mentioned in the rules themselves as they have been annexed to the Respondents' own reply before the Learned Single Judge which implies that they cannot be used even as an aid to interpretation of the Rules in force on 08.02.2023. Hence borrowing legitimacy from subsequently enacted rules is constitutionally impermissible and oHends Articles 14 and 16. 10 Mr. Verma further submits that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the challenge to the selection process without impleading selected candidates was liable to be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties, is perverse and contrary to the record, inasmuch as the private respondents including selected candidates were duly impleaded in both petitions as is evident from the cause title of the impugned order itself. This Anding is factually perverse and contrary to the record. A bare perusal of the cause title of the which is a part impugned common order 12 itself of the judicial record discloses that the private respondents, i.e., the selected candidates, were duly arrayed as parties-respondent in WPS No. 1839/2023. In these circumstances, the Anding that selected candidates were not impleaded is directly contradicted by the record of the case itself and constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. A Anding recorded in ignorance of, or contrary to, the material on record cannot be sustained in law and must be set aside in appeal. He places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Amit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand and ors. {2025 INSC 176 }. The learned Single Judge failed to consider that the appellant had a legitimate expectation of being considered for promotion to the available posts based on the application of the rounding-oH principle as enunciated in circular dated 09.11.2011 in their favour the advertisement dated 08.02.2023 issued in departure from that practice without notice or justiAcation violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation and is arbitrary under Article 14. The appellant, as members of the service eligible for promotion to the posts of and Reader (Kayachikitsa), had a legitimate expectation founded not merely on hope or aspiration but on State's own executive instrument the circular dated 09.11.2011 that when the mathematical application of the 75:25 ratio to the available posts yielded a fraction incapable of constituting a whole direct recruitment vacancy, the rounding-oH principle embodied in the circular would be applied, the fractional direct recruitment component would be excluded, and the available posts would be Alled by promotion. This expectation was not a unilateral assumption. It was grounded in the State's own executive instrument 09.11.2011 the circular dated which the State had issued precisely to govern such situations. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, operates in two modes. First, it may entitle the holder of the expectation to the substantive beneAt they were led to 13 expect. Second, and at the very minimum, it that is, entitles the holder to procedural fairness to notice of the proposed departure from the established practice and an opportunity to make representations before the departure is acted upon. In the present case, neither mode was satisAed. The advertisement dated 08.02.2023 was issued without any prior notice to the promotee - eligible employees that the State intended to depart from the circular of 2011. No reasons were communicated for the departure. No opportunity was aHorded to the appellant to represent against the decision to advertise a direct recruitment vacancy. The advertisement was simply issued, confronting the appellant with a fait accompli. It is further submitted that where the State departs from a settled practice or its own executive instruction without rational justiAcation, such departure is not merely a violation of legitimate expectation but is independently arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution. The State cannot blow hot and cold applying the rounding- oH Circular when it suits it and ignoring the same circular when it does not. Selective application of an executive instruction, without any intelligible diHerentia, is the very antithesis of the equality guarantee. The impugned order does not contain any Anding that the circular of 2011 was inapplicable to the present cadre or that any distinguishing feature justiAed its non-application here. The mere invocation of the 2007 note sheet the lesser character itself an executive instrument of cannot constitute a rational justiAcation for discriminatory treatment. It is also relevant to note that the legitimate expectation of the appellant crystallised well before the issuance of the advertisement. The appellant had built his service career, acquired the requisite qualiAcations, and positioned themselves in the zone of consideration for promotion on the reasonable and well-founded understanding that the State would act in 14 accordance with its own rules and instructions. Upsetting this expectation at the stage of the advertisement by taking a contrary position with no forewarning and no rational basis inJicted a direct injury on the appellant's constitutional right to equal opportunity in public employment under Article 16. In support of his contentions, he places reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) and Sivanandan CT & Ors. v. High Court of Kerala & Ors., {2023 INSC 709} and Navjyoti Coo-Group Housing Society etc. v. Union of India and Ors. {MANU/SC/0029/1993}. The learned Single Judge erred in holding that petitioner failed to challenge requisition, seniority lists and promotion order, these are separate administrative actions and cannot be made a precondition for challenging the legality of an advertisement. The impugned judgment and order dated 17.04.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge is otherwise contrary to the settled principles governing public employment, statutory interpretation and judicial review under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the controversy in the present case did not pertain to a mere service grievance simpliciter but involved the legality of the very decision to divert a promotional vacancy towards direct recruitment in the teeth of the governing recruitment rules and the circular dated 09.11.2011. The entire reasoning adopted in the impugned order proceeds on assumptions dehors the applicable statutory framework and imports considerations arising from subsequent policy developments and proposed rules which were admittedly not in force on the date of issuance of the advertisement dated 08.02.2023. The learned Single Judge further failed to appreciate that where the State itself has framed a statutory quota heavily favouring promotion and has thereafter issued a clariAcatory circular to operationalise such quota 15 in cases involving fractional vacancies, the authorities were bound to act consistently and uniformly in accordance therewith. The impugned advertisement dated 08.02.2023 was therefore ex facie arbitrary, contrary to the applicable rules and violative of the appellant's valuable right of consideration for promotion guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the same deserves to be set aside and the appellant be granted relief(s) as aforesaid. 11 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents, placing reliance on the returns Aled, support the order passed by the learned Single Judge and submit that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality or irregularity in dismissing the writ petition Aled by the appellant/writ petitioner. The State Government had already considered the issue and, by decision dated 06.10.2007, duly approved by the General Administration Department, clariAed that rounding oH 1.5 posts to 2 would eliminate the direct recruitment quota and was impermissible. Accordingly, a balanced approach was adopted to preserve both promotional and direct recruitment avenues. and there is no substance in this appeal and as such, the same may also be dismissed. Learned counsel further submit that the select list has not been challenged by the appellant before the learned Single Judge and as such, on this ground also, the writ petition has rightly been dismissed and this appeal also deserves to be dismissed. 12 We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, perused the pleadings and materials available on record. 13 At the outset, it may be noted that before the learned Single Judge, the appellant/writ petitioner had merely challenged the advertisement dated 08.02.2023 and sought consideration of his candidature for promotion 16 and further, to hold him entitled for promotion to the post of Reader Panchkarm from the date when his contemporaries were promoted i.e. w.e.f. 16.09.2021. Initially, when the writ petition was Aled, the selected candidate i.e. Dr. Gourav Mishra was not arrayed as a party but later on, through amendment, he was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the writ petition which was allowed vide order dated 02.07.2024. On 28.02.2023, the learned Single Judge had observed that any appointment made pursuant to the advertisement dated 08.02.2023 shall be subject to the outcome of the writ petition and the writ petition Anally stood dismissed vide order dated 17.04.2026. 14 The learned Single Judge has observed in its order that the principal question that arose for determination was whether the advertisement dated 08.02.2023 issued by the CGPSC providing for direct recruitment to the posts of Reader (Panchkarm) was contrary to the applicable recruitment rules and Government circulars, and whether the appellant could have claimed that the said posts were required to be Alled exclusively by promotion and not through direct recruitment. 15 There is no dispute that recruitment to the posts in question is governed by the Chhattisgarh Public Health (Indian System of Medicine and Homeopathy) (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 1987, as amended. Schedule-II of the said Rules prescribes that 75% of the posts shall be Alled by promotion and 25% by direct recruitment. It is also undisputed that there are only two sanctioned posts of Reader in each of the concerned disciplines. Accordingly, applying the prescribed ratio to two posts results in 1.5 posts for promotion and 0.5 post for direct recruitment. The principal contention of the appellant is that in view of the Government circular dated 09.11.2011, the fraction of 0.5 attributable to 17 direct recruitment ought to be disregarded and the promotional quota of 1.5 posts rounded oH to 2, thereby making both posts available exclusively for promotion. On this basis, the appellant contends that the impugned advertisement providing for direct recruitment is illegal. This contention, however, cannot be accepted. 16 The recruitment rules are statutory in character and expressly prescribe the proportion of posts to be Alled through promotion and direct recruitment. The purpose of such prescription is to maintain an appropriate balance between the two sources of recruitment. An interpretation which eHectively eliminates one of the prescribed sources would defeat the scheme and object of the rules. The Government circular dated 09.11.2011, relied upon by the appellant is a general executive instruction and cannot be construed in isolation so as to override or nullify the statutory recruitment rules. More importantly, the State Government had already considered the issue of allocation of fractional posts and, by its decision dated 06.10.2007, clariAed that rounding oH 1.5 posts to 2 and reducing 0.5 post to zero would eHectively eliminate the avenue of direct recruitment, which was impermissible. The said decision, having been duly approved by the competent authority, reJects a conscious policy decision to preserve both prescribed modes of recruitment. There is no dispute that the statutory provisions must be interpreted in a manner that advances the object and purpose of the legislation, rather than rendering any part thereof redundant or otiose. Accepting the interpretation advanced by the appellant would eHectively exclude candidates seeking appointment through direct recruitment, thereby defeating the quota expressly prescribed for that mode of recruitment. Such an interpretation cannot be countenanced. 18 17 It is further relevant that the process for framing the new recruitment rules had already been initiated, and the proposal providing for an equal 50:50 ratio between promotion and direct recruitment was duly approved on 04.01.2023. The advertisement dated 08.02.2023 was issued pursuant to and in conformity with the said approved framework. Subsequently, the new Recruitment Rules were notiAed on 19.06.2023, reaErming the equal distribution between promotion and direct recruitment. Under these circumstances, the action of the respondents was consistent with the applicable policy and the recruitment framework approved by the competent authority. The same cannot, therefore, be characterised as arbitrary, illegal, or contrary to the governing Recruitment Rules. 18 Furthermore, it is trite law that a challenge to a selection process, without impleading the selected candidates whose rights are likely to be aHected, is liable to fail for non-joinder of necessary parties. In the present case, the appellant initially did not challenge the foundational actions culminating in the issuance of the advertisement, including the requisition submitted by the State Government, the relevant seniority lists, and the earlier orders concerning promotion. In the absence of any challenge to these underlying actions, the writ petition, which sought to indirectly assail the recruitment process, could not have been sustained. The contention that the appellant that he has been deprived of his right to consideration for promotion also cannot be accepted. Although the right to be considered for promotion is undoubtedly a valuable right, it does not confer an entitlement to enlargement of the promotional quota by eliminating the quota prescribed for direct recruitment under the recruitment Rules. 19 19 The interpretation advanced by the appellant is contrary to the statutory scheme and, if accepted, would lead to anomalous and inequitable consequences. The respondents have acted in accordance with the applicable recruitment rules, the policy decision of the State Government, and the requisition duly approved by the competent authority. No arbitrariness, illegality, or violation of any constitutional or statutory provision is, therefore, made out. 20 We do not And any illegality or irregularity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge and as such, this appeal being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Amit AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2026.08.14 19:44:23 +0530