1 2026:CGHC:1110 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 5 of 2026 Devkumar Sahu S/o Shri Kanhaiya Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Ramnagar Kawardha, Thana And Tahsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Shri Khelawan Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 75 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 2. Shri Silau Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 3. Shri Jethram Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 4. Shri Baisakhu Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 5. Shri Rajaram Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 6. Shri Laxman Yadav S/o Late Roopnath Yadav Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil - Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 7. Smt. Bhukhin Bai Yadav (Died) D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Nil 7.A Bhagwan Singh S/o Shivprayash Yadav Aged About 72 Years R/o Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 7.B Siyaram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 50 Years R/o Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.01.09 16:25:00 +0530 2 7.C Santram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 49 Years R/o Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 7.D Maniram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 47 Years R/o Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 7.E Dhaniram S/o Shivprasad Yadav Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Jungle Khamhi, Thana And Tahsil- Pandariya, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 8. Baisakhin Bai D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Aged About 65 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tahsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 9. Rajni Bai D/o Late Rupnath Yadav Aged About 60 Years R/o Village- Bhagutola, Thana And Tehsil- Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) 10. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Kawardha, District- Kabirdham (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Alok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate For State/ : Mr. Ritesh Giri, P.L. Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 08/01/2026 Heard. 1. I.A.No.1 of 2025 2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. 3. By the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the CPC the appellant is challenging the order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the Learned District Judge, Kabirdham C.G. in Civil Suit No. 01-A/2024 whereby and where-under the learned Trial Court 3 rejected the application filed by the plaintiff/ appellant under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC. 4. The appellant/plaintiff filed the present suit alleging that the respondents/defendants are joint owners of agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 383/2 and 383/4, admeasuring 1.08 acres, situated at Kawardha. According to the appellant, owing to urgent family needs, the respondents agreed to sell 0.27 acres of land out of the said holding. After negotiations in the presence of witnesses, a sale agreement was entered into on 02.04.2023, and the land agreed to be sold was described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint. Pursuant to the agreement, the respondents received a total sum of 20,00,000/- as earnest money, 12,00,000/- through ₹ ₹ cheques on 02.04.2023 and 8,00,000/- in cash on 08.04.2023. ₹ The agreement was executed before a Notary at Kawardha, and possession of the disputed land was allegedly handed over to the appellant, who thereafter raised fencing and boundary demarcation. As per the terms of the agreement, the registered sale deed was to be executed on or before 08.02.2024. The appellant asserted that despite repeated requests and issuance of a legal notice, the respondents avoided execution of the sale deed and threatened to alienate the land to third parties. The appellant claimed readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and alleged that he remained present before the Sub- Registrar on the scheduled date with the balance consideration, but the respondents failed to appear. 4 5. Consequently, the appellant instituted the suit seeking appropriate reliefs and also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction. 6. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 and 9, in their reply, denied the averments made in the application and contended that the suit land bearing Khasra Nos. 383/2 and 383/4 at Village Bhagutola is recorded in their names and in the names of the legal heirs of deceased defendant No. 7. It was asserted that they own only 0.54 acres of land and not 1.08 acres as alleged, and that no agreement was ever executed for sale of 0.27 acres of the said land. The respondents further denied receipt of 20,00,000/- as ₹ earnest money and alleged that the purported agreement dated 08.04.2023 does not bear the signatures or thumb impressions of all recorded land owners, that the respondents are illiterate persons, and that the document has been tampered with and forged. It was contended that the contractual terms were violated and that restraining transfer of the land on the basis of such a document would amount to infringement of their rights, and accordingly dismissal of the application with costs was prayed for. 7. The learned Trial Court after hearing the parties and on due consideration of the material available on record, by order dated 09.07.2025, rejected the application for temporary injunction. Aggrieved by rejection of the injunction application, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 5 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial court erred in rejecting the application for temporary injunction, having failed to consider the strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss in favour of the appellant. It was contended that the impugned order was passed mechanically, without proper judicial reasoning, contrary to settled principles under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, and is arbitrary, perverse, and liable to be set aside. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the the parties and perused the documents. 10. After considering the matter in its entirety and upon appreciation of the material on record, the learned Trial Court rejected the application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC by the impugned order. The Court observed that even assuming the agreement dated 08.04.2023 to be valid, the plaintiff still owes the defendants a sum of 5,20,00,000/- out of the total ₹ consideration of approximately 5,40,00,000/- for the disputed ₹ land. The defendants are agriculturists, and agriculture constitutes their sole source of livelihood. Granting a temporary injunction in such circumstances would prevent the defendants, who are rural, uneducated, and economically weaker, from using and enjoying their own land and deprive them of the sale proceeds. This would cause them economic and mental hardship, which cannot be adequately compensated financially. In view of the above, the learned Trial Court rightly concluded that the balance of 6 convenience and the element of irreparable harm are not in favour of the plaintiff, and the impugned order is therefore justified. 11. Even otherwise the present appeal is barred by time. The appellant filled the application for condonation of delay by assigning the reason that due to medical emergency in family the appellant could not file the appeal in time. The said reason assigned by the appellant orally that too without any supporting document. 12. In the absence of any sufficient cause, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be entertained as a matter of routine, particularly, when the delay in filing of the instant appeal is for a period of 60 days. 13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and anothers. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, has, in very categorical terms, after considering a series of judgements of Supreme Court on Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts 7 to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application of condonation of delav. Para’s 12 & 15 of the said decision read as under :- 12. It is a settled legal position that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be show period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the Court has no power to ignore the provision to relieve flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 8 15. …..In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be justified ground to condone the delay….." 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy Collector {2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} had held as under:- 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same 9 cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vi) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. 15. 15. In view of the above, since sufficient cause has not been explained by the appellant/ plaintiff, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning the delay in filing of the instant appeal and further as there is no illegality in the order of the 10 learned trial court, the instant appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself on the ground of delay and laches as also on merits. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE Jyoti