1 CGHC010256092026 2026:CGHC:35776-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 704 of 2026 Kamalnarayan Madhariya S/o Tekanlal Madharia Aged About 60 Years Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat - Kandarka, Janpad Pachayat Dhamda, R/o Village Chetuwa, Post -Nardha, Tahsil -Ahiwara, District Durg (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Chhattisgarh Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District -Raipur, Chhattisgarh.(Respondent No. 1) 2 - Director, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya,mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Respondent No.2) 3 - Deputy Director, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Respondent No.3) 4 - Deputy Director Panchayat Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh. (Respondent No. 4) 5 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Durg District Durg, (C.G.) . (Respondent No. 5 ) 6 - Committee For Deciding The Grievance Of Panchayat Sachiv Through Its Chairman, Panchayat And Rural Development Department, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Respondent No.6 ) BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.08.13 17:29:01 +0530 2 ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr.Pankaj Singh, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 4/State : Mr.Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 13.08.2026 1. Heard Mr.Pankaj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr.Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents No.1 to 4/State on I.A.No.01/2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 03 days in filing the present appeal. 2. On due consideration, I.A.No.01/2026 is allowed. Delay is condoned. 3. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ appeal is heard finally. 4. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 14.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.4173/2026 by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein. 5. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the impugned order is unsustainable in law and on facts, as the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the erroneous premise that the 3 relief sought therein was substantially identical to the relief claimed in the earlier W.P.(S.) No. 2986 of 2025. The said finding proceeds without appreciating the material distinction between the two proceedings. It is submitted that the earlier writ petition and the present writ petition arose from entirely different causes of action. In the earlier writ petition, the Appellant had merely sought consideration of his representation by the competent authority. The said proceedings ultimately culminated in a direction to the Deputy Director to consider the Appellant's representation. The present writ petition, however, was necessitated by a subsequent and independent development, namely, the constitution of the State- Level Committee vide order dated 24.03.2025 for considering the issue of regularization of Panchayat Secretaries and the prolonged inaction of the said Committee thereafter. 6. Learned counsel submits that the learned Single Judge has misread the pleadings and the reliefs sought in the present writ petition. After disposal of the earlier writ petition and during the subsequent contempt proceedings, the Respondent authorities themselves disclosed before the Contempt Court that the Appellant's claim could not be decided as the matter had been placed before the State-Level Committee. Thus, the Appellant did not seek reconsideration of the relief already granted in the earlier writ petition. He sought only a limited and reasonable direction requiring the competent authority/Committee to conclude the pending exercise expeditiously. 4 7. It is further submitted that the constitution of the State-Level Committee was a subsequent event, which had occurred after the earlier proceedings. Likewise, the stand taken by the Respondents before the Contempt Court and the continued failure of the Committee to take a decision were subsequent developments. These facts were neither in existence nor could they have been adjudicated upon in the earlier writ petition. The learned counsel submits that the present case therefore involves a fresh and continuing cause of action. Once the Respondents themselves admitted that the matter was pending before the State-Level Committee, the continued failure of the Committee to take any decision gave rise to a recurring cause of action. Every continued day of unexplained administrative inaction caused further prejudice to the Appellant. The principle of finality of litigation cannot be invoked to defeat a cause of action which arose from subsequent events. 8. It is respectfully submitted that the authorities involved and the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are also different. The earlier proceedings were directed towards consideration of the Appellant's representation by the Deputy Director, whereas the present proceedings concerned the inaction of the State-Level Committee constituted by the Government itself to consider the larger issue of regularization. Therefore, there was no identity either of cause of action, relief, or authority. 5 9. Learned counsel further submits that the finding that the present writ petition sought “substantially similar relief” is conclusory and unsupported by any comparative examination of the pleadings, prayers or subsequent events. The impugned order does not identify which reliefs were allegedly identical, nor does it explain how the subsequent constitution and inaction of the State-Level Committee could be treated as part of the cause of action in the earlier proceedings. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principal grievance before the learned Single Judge was whether the prolonged and unexplained inaction of a Committee constituted by the State Government itself was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the Appellant's constitutional rights, particularly under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. 10.Learned counsel submits that once the State Government itself initiated a decision-making process by constituting the State-Level Committee, such process could not have been permitted to remain pending indefinitely. Administrative authorities are required to act within a reasonable period, particularly where the delay has direct consequences for the rights and legitimate interests of an affected employee. The Appellant's grievance assumes even greater significance because he is on the verge of superannuation. Any indefinite postponement of the decision concerning his regularization would have serious consequential effects upon his 6 service, retiral and pensionary benefits. The learned Single Judge ought therefore to have considered the urgency and substance of the grievance instead of dismissing the petition on a technical objection regarding maintainability. It is respectfully submitted that the impugned order suffers from non-consideration of material pleadings. The Appellant specifically pleaded that the Respondents had admitted before the Contempt Court that the issue of regularization was pending before the State-Level Committee and that no definite timeline had been prescribed for conclusion of the exercise. These pleadings constituted the very foundation of the subsequent writ petition, yet they have not been properly considered. 11.Learned counsel further submits that the doctrine of finality of litigation cannot be stretched to defeat a subsequent cause of action. The Appellant neither sought review of the earlier order nor attempted to reopen the earlier proceedings. He approached this Hon'ble Court on account of a new administrative inaction arising from events subsequent to the disposal of the earlier writ petition. Most importantly, learned counsel draws the attention of this Hon'ble Court to the order passed by the very same learned Single Judge in W.P.(S.) No. 4211 of 2026, Suresh Kumar Sahu & Others v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, decided on 15.05.2026. In the said case, the learned Single Judge entertained a writ petition concerning the very same State-Level Committee constituted for considering the grievance of Panchayat Secretaries and issued a 7 time-bound direction requiring the competent authorities to decide the grievance within forty-five days. The Appellant respectfully submits that the present case is materially similar inasmuch as the Appellant also sought judicial intervention only for expeditious conclusion of the proceedings pending before the same Committee. A copy of the order passed in W.P.(S.) No. 4211 of 2026 has been annexed as Annexure A/2. The impugned order, however, does not disclose any distinguishing feature as to why the Appellant was denied similar judicial protection. The absence of any reason distinguishing the two matters demonstrates an inconsistent and unequal exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is submitted that once the learned Single Judge was satisfied from the record that the Respondents themselves had admitted the pendency of the matter before the State-Level Committee, the appropriate course was to examine whether the Committee ought to be directed to conclude the proceedings within a reasonable, time-bound period. Instead, the writ petition was dismissed without adjudicating the substantive grievance. Learned counsel therefore submits that the impugned order suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record, non-consideration of material facts, failure to consider subsequent events, erroneous application of the principle of finality, and failure to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, it is respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Division Bench may be pleased to set aside the impugned order. 8 12.On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, in which no interference is called for. 13.We have learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 14.From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned Single Judge has observed that the petitioner had earlier approached this Court by filing WPS No.2986/2025 seeking consideration of his representation. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 30/04/2025 with a direction to the Dy. Director to consider and decide the representation of the petitioner within the stipulated period. Learned Single Judge further observed that the petitioner thereafter, filed Contempt Case No.1324/2025, which has also been decided on 17.02.2026 on the basis of submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. Thus, the grievance raised by the petitioner already stood considered by this Court in the earlier round of litigation. Learned Single Judge has also observed that once the earlier writ petition had already been disposed of with a direction to the competent authority, and the petitioner had also instituted contempt proceedings before this Court, the present writ petition seeking substantially similar relief is not maintainable and dismissed the writ petition. 9 15.Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perusing the documents appended in writ petition as also in writ appeal and also considering the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court. 16.Accordingly, the writ appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu