JUDGMENT : Basant Balaji, J. The 1st petitioner is an MSME enterprise engaged in the manufacture of food products which availed loan facilities from Respondent Banks 2,5 and 8. Due to the default in repayment, respondent banks initiated recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act . The 3 rd respondent issued Ext P6 demand notice dated 25.06.2025 under section 13(2) of the Act demanding payment of the amounts due, pursuant to which symbolic possession of the secured assets was taken through Ext.Nos.P7 and P8 possession notices dated 12.09.2025 and 19.09.2025 respectively. Ext.P9 demand notice dated 05.05.2025 was issued by the 6 th respondent to the petitioners under section 13(2), followed by the issuance of Ext.P10 recall notice dated 28.10.2025 by the 9 th respondent. Aggrieved by the commencement of these coercive recovery proceedings, petitioners approached this Court. 2. The counsel for the petitioners submits that they do not wish to press the prayer (b) and accordingly, the permission sought for is granted. The counsel also seeks permission to delete the Attorney General from the party array, which is also permitted by this Court. 3. According to the counsels for the petitioners, the respondent Bank had acted in violation of the notification dated 29.05.2015, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.9 of the MSMED Act, 2006 , by the Central Government and had initiated recovery proceedings against the petitioners without even referring them before the Committee constituted under the framework for rehabilitation for availing benefits as contemplated in the said notification, which is a nullity in the eyes of law and hence, the entire proceedings done pursuant thereto is liable to be quashed. 4. The counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent had filed a preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , as there is an efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner under section 17 to challenge SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the Bank. 4. The counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent had filed a preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , as there is an efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner under section 17 to challenge SARFAESI proceedings initiated by the Bank. The counsel has relied on the decisions laid down by the hon’ble Supreme court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 , Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C (2018) 3 SCC 85 and in Phoenix ARC Pvt Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir (2022) 5 SCC 345 wherein, it was categorically held that High Courts, in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, should refrain from entertaining writ petitions challenging SARFAESI actions, save for exceptional circumstances involving a total lack of jurisdiction or violation of fundamental rights. 5. The counsel submits further that the petitioner relies on an MSME certificate of the year 2020, whereas the loan in question was availed in the year 2022. It is not discernible as to whether the MSME certificate produced before this Court was valid or subsisting as on the date of sanction of the said loan. No documents substantiating this point has been made available by the petitioners in this Court. 6. Heard counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the respondents. 7. As far as obtaining the protection conferred under the revival framework of MSMED Act is concerned, the petitioners herein failed to adhere to the guidelines as held by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank reported in (2024) 10 SCC 292 ]. Relevant paragraphs of the above dictum read as follows: - "16. We may hasten to add that under the "Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs", the banks or creditors are required to identify the incipient stress in the account of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, before their accounts turn into non-performing assets, by creating three sub-categories under the "Special Mention Account" Category. However, while creating such sub-categories, the Banks must have some authenticated and verifiable material with them as produced by the concerned MSME to show that loan account is of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, classified and registered as such under the MSMED Act. However, while creating such sub-categories, the Banks must have some authenticated and verifiable material with them as produced by the concerned MSME to show that loan account is of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, classified and registered as such under the MSMED Act. The said Framework also enables the Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise to voluntarily initiate the proceedings under the said Framework, by filing an application along with the affidavit of an authorized person. Therefore, the stage of identification of incipient stress in the loan account of MSMEs and categorization under the Special Mention Account category, before the loan account of MSME turns into NPA is a very crucial stage, and therefore it would be incumbent on the part of the concerned MSME also to produce authenticated and verifiable documents/material for substantiating its claim of being MSME, before its account is classified as NPA. If that is not done, and once the account is classified as NPA, the banks i.e., secured creditors would be entitled to take the recourse to Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act for enforcement of security interest. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. However, if at the stage of classification of the loan account of the borrower as NPA, the borrower does not bring to the notice of the concerned bank/creditor that it is a Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act and if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the concerned bank/creditor in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage. Suffice it to say, when it is mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Banks to follow the Instructions/Directions issued by the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India with regard to the Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs, it would be equally incumbent on the part of the concerned MSMEs to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the concerned Banks, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework." 8. A division Bench of this Court in P.K. Krishnakumar v. IndusInd Bank , [ 2024 (6) KLT 606 ] had also stated that MSMEs cannot later assert benefits, if they did not notify the banks before classification as NPA thereby stressing the obligation incumbent upon the concerned MSMEs for notifying the Banks regarding the MSME status in order to obtain the benefits attached thereto, before the NPA classification is effected. Relevant extract from the above dictum is as follows: - "19. xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx In cases where a borrower who qualifies as MSME does not initially raise its status to challenge a bank's recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act but instead participates fully in the process without objection, cannot later use their MSME status to argue that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary based on the principles of fairness and justice, which include examining the conduct of the parties involved. When the Appellants, by their actions, accepted the Bank's authority without objection, the High Court will refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction to assist such Appellants, even if there are questions about the jurisdiction of the Bank. This is because the Appellants' own conduct disqualifies them from claiming such relief. When the High Court declines to interfere in such circumstances, it does not mean that the Appellants' waiver vested the Bank with jurisdiction, assuming it is inherently lacking; it means that the borrower is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction irrespective of whether the Bank's actions are without jurisdiction or not. These two concepts are distinct, and the distinction is emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pro Knit." 9. These two concepts are distinct, and the distinction is emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pro Knit." 9. In a recent judgment of the hon'ble Supreme court in Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Ors. v. The Board of Directors of NKGSB Co- op. Bank Ltd. and Ors. (2025 SCC Online SC 1566), the dictum was as follows: - "6. xxxx xxxx We would read and interpret the seemingly confusing terms of the Framework harmoniously to ensure that a right under the MSME Act is not destroyed by the SARFAESI Act or vice versa. In our reading, the terms of the Framework do not prohibit the lending bank / secured creditor (assuming that it has no conscious knowledge that the defaulting borrower is an MSME) to classify the account of the defaulting MSME as NPA and to even issue the demand notice under S.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act without such identification of incipient stress in the account of the defaulting borrower (MSME); however, upon receipt of the demand notice, if such borrower in its response under S.13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act asserts that it an MSME and claims the benefit of the Framework citing reasons supported by an affidavit, the lending bank/secured creditor would then be mandatorily bound to look into such claim keeping further action under the SARFAESI Act in abeyance; and, should the claim be found to be worthy of acceptance within the framework of the Framework, to act in terms thereof for securing revival and rehabilitation of the defaulting borrower. 7. As has been noted above, the petitioning enterprise does not seem to have ever claimed the benefit of the terms of the Framework after the demand notice under s.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued. It is at the stage of compliance with an order passed by the relevant Magistrate under s.14 of the SARFAESI Act that this writ petition has been presented before this Court claiming benefits of the Framework to restrain the respondent no.2 and its officers from proceeding further under the SARFAESI Act and other enactments except in the manner contemplated under the said Notification. We find the bona fides of the petitioning enterprise to be suspect. 8. Pro Knits is a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court holding inter alia, that the Notification is binding on the lending banks / secured creditors. We find the bona fides of the petitioning enterprise to be suspect. 8. Pro Knits is a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court holding inter alia, that the Notification is binding on the lending banks / secured creditors. Finding to the contrary by the High Court of Bombay in the judgment and order under challenge in the appeal was, thus, quashed. Though while stressing that the terms of the Framework need to be followed by the lending banks / secured creditors before the account of an MSME is classified as NPA, this decision also lays stress on the obligation of the MSMEs by holding that "it would be equally incumbent on the part of the MSMEs concerned to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the Banks concerned, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework". It was cautioned that "if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the bank / creditor concerned in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage". This decision, however, left unsaid something which we have explained hereinabove while construing the terms consistently to prevent undermining the rights that one central enactment confers on by another. 9. Although counsel for the petitioners chose not to press the prayer seeking a declaration that the dicta in Pro Knits and Shri Shri Swami Samarth are per incuriam, this Court is bound to adhere to those decisions. In Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Rambha Devu [2025) 3 SCC 95], the hon’ble apex Court had emphasized that a decision can be disregarded only when it demonstrably fails to consider a binding statutory provision or authoritative precedent that would have necessarily led to a different outcome. This principle is confined to the ratio decidendi and does not apply to obiter dicta. This principle is confined to the ratio decidendi and does not apply to obiter dicta. Therefore, if a precedent correctness is questioned, the proper procedure is to refer the matter to a larger bench instead of disregarding it, as any departure therefrom must be rare and based on sound legal principles. 10. A perusal of Article 141 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: - “Article 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” 11. Under the Doctrine of Precedent enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution of India , the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the country, including the High Courts and subordinate judiciary. This constitutional mandate ensures that the law of the land remains uniform and certain, requiring lower courts to strictly follow the ratio decidendi established by the Apex Court. While the Supreme Court is not bound by its own previous rulings and may overrule them to correct errors or adapt to societal changes, all other judicial bodies are duty- bound to apply its precedents. Even the obiter dicta, or incidental observations made by the Supreme Court, carry significant persuasive authority. Thus, in view of the significant binding authority carried by these decisions in Pro Knits (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, they constitute settled law that governs all Courts and Tribunals within the territory of India. Consequently, this Court is mandated to follow the said precedents as far as the realm of the present challenge is concerned. 12. In view of the law laid down by the hon’ble Apex Court in Pro Knits (supra) and that laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in P.K. Krishnakumar(supra) , if, at the stage prior to the classification of the loan accounts as NPA, the borrowers do not bring to the notice of the Bank that it is an MSME and allow the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to go through, then they will be precluded from raising it at a belated stage. A combined reading of these judgments along with that of Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) , made the position more clarified that MSME Framework provisions must be read harmoniously wherein both Banks and MSMEs have complementary obligations regarding obtaining the benefits associated with the said Framework. 13. As far as this writ petition is concerned, the petitioners have neither previously raised their status of MSME nor had they provided any authenticated or substantive materials to prove the same. Even if going by the dictum laid down by the hon’ble apex court in Shri Shri Swami (supra) , at the minimum, the petitioners had to respond to section 13(2) notice issued under the SARFAESI Act by the bank concerned. In the instant case, it is of no dispute that no such claim was raised by the petitioners even at the stage of issuance of section 13(2) notice or at any stage prior to the initiation of proceedings under section 14 of the Act, thereby negating the petitioners’ locus to claim the protection offered under the revival framework under the MSMED Act. 14. The dictum laid down by the hon’ble apex Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra) is extracted hereunder: 24. xxxx xxxx xxxx In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 25. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 25. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self - imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Art.226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. xxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx.” 15. In South Indian Bank Ltd. and Others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and Another , reported in (2023) 17 SCC 311 , the apex court has reiterated the same position and held that: - “13. A writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. So also, the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel.” 16. When a tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. So also, the issue governing waiver, acquiescence, and estoppel.” 16. It is a settled principle that the wide powers under Article 226 are to be exercised with extreme caution, especially when a statute provides a specific machinery for grievance redressal. Therefore, except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, parties must be relegated to the designated alternate remedy rather than seeking the discretionary intervention of this Court. See also South Indian Bank v. M/s. PDMC Industries (2025 KHC 1307), Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu (2022 KHC 7208). 17. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners neither previously raised their MSME status nor provided authenticated documents to substantiate their claim, as held in Pro Knits (supra) , P.K. Krishnakumar(supra), M.D. Esthappan (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth(supra) , it is appropriate to hold that they stand estopped from seeking protection and associated benefits under the relevant notification at this late stage, particularly after allowing the SARFAESI proceedings to commence without objection. Also, taking note of the dicta laid down by the hon’ble apex court regarding the non-amenability of writ petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is of the view that all the contentions raised herein by the petitioners challenging sec.13(2), 13(4) as well as other coercive proceedings squarely fall within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, and therefore, the current writ petition is devoid of any merits. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed leaving open the right of the petitioners to approach the DRT under section 17 of the Act.