q Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya F.M.A. 220 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 Abhijit Barui Vs. Dipak Kumar Mukherjee and others For the appellant : Mr. Arijit Bardhan Mr. Jayanta Samanta Mrs. Karunamoyee Samanta Mrs. Satabdi Bhattacharya Ms. Riddhi Naskar For the respondent Nos.1 to 3 & 5 : Mr. Pinaki Ranjan Mitra Heard on : 27.07.2026 Judgment on : 27.07.2026 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. Leave is granted to the learned Advocate-on-record for the appellant to file affidavit-of-service during the course of the day. 2. In view of the short questions involved, we take up the appeal for hearing along with the application. 2 3. The present appeal has been preferred against the refusal to grant ad interim injunction in a suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff/appellant. 4. By the impugned order, learned counsel for the appellant argues, the learned Trial Judge refused to grant ad interim injunction, inter alia, by observing that prima facie the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s order. However, it is pointed out that the plaint was registered on the very same date and by the previous portion of the self-same order it was recorded that requisites and process fees have been filed and paid respectively, which were found to be correct, leaving no “direction” of the court to be complied with by the plaintiff. 5. Thus, the said finding, which was also a ground of the refusal, was perverse. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant next contends that the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Judge at the ad interim stage was confined to a consideration of the averments made in the plaint and the injunction application as sacrosanct. 7. The learned Trial Judge, however, proceeded to observe that from the copies of the Advocate’s letter and reply filed by the plaintiff, it was apparent that the plaintiff had failed to comply the terms and conditions of that agreement. 3 8. It was also observed that the plaintiff did not file the earlier agreement for the year 2006 but a “xerox” copy of an unregistered agreement dated March 28, 2019 was only filed. 9. It is argued that on the strength of the averments made in the plaint, it would be evident that time was never the essence of the contract and the agreement-in-question was never terminated by the defendant/respondent. 10. For the first time, only in the reply dated August 12, 2025 to the legal notice issued by the plaintiff/appellant on August 1, 2025 asserting his willingness to perform his part of the agreement, that the defendants alleged breach and termination of the agreement. 11. Thus, on the basis of the plaint and the injunction application, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge ought to have granted ad interim injunction. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants/respondents argues that even as per the plaint pleadings, the plaintiff/appellant was not entitled to any injunction whatsoever. 13. In paragraph nos. 7 and 8 of the plaint and the injunction application, it is admitted that due to the Covid-19 pandemic and severe financial hardship, the plaintiff himself could not 4 strictly adhere to the payment schedule. It is also stated that the plaintiff suffered from serious fire-related injuries, further delaying payment. 14. Thus, in the absence of even any foundational pleading as to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff at all points of time to perform his part of the agreement by making the required payments, as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, it is argued that the injunction was rightly refused even at the ad interim stage by the learned Trial Judge. 15. Upon a perusal of the plaint and the injunction application, we find that although it has been admitted by the plaintiff/appellant that the timelines and payment schedules in terms of the agreement could not be strictly adhered to, the plaintiff has cited prima facie justifiable reasons therefor, being the Covid-19 pandemic, severe financial hardship and fire- related injuries subject, of course, to such averments being tested at the subsequent stages of the injunction application and the suit. 16. In paragraph no. 9 of the plaint, it has been alleged that the defendants were fully aware of the aforesaid facts and never rescinded the agreement at the relevant time. 5 17. In paragraph no. 10, the plaintiff pleads his readiness and willingness to pay the balance consideration and discloses about a legal notice dated August 1, 2025 whereby such readiness and willingness was asserted. 18. As per the plaint case, we also find that the defendants did not terminate the contract during the interregnum, despite non- performance of the plaintiff’s part of the contract, and only in reply to the legal notice indicated above, on August 12, 2025, was the agreement sought to be terminated by alleging breach thereof by the plaintiff. 19. Even from a plain reading of the clauses of the agreement-in- question, we do not find any stipulation of a particular time- schedule for compliance of the same. 20. Thus, at the ad interim stage, it would be premature to hold that time was the essence of the contract and/or that the plaintiff/appellant was not ready and willing in the true sense of the term to perform his part of the contract. 21. We hasten to add that the above observations are tentative in nature and shall not be binding on the learned Trial Judge at any further stage of the injunction application or the suit. 22. However, on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the injunction application and the documents filed therewith, we 6 find a sufficient prima facie case for grant of injunction having been made out. 23. Hence, FMA 220 of 2026 is allowed, thereby setting aside the impugned order dated January 22, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), First Court at Howrah in Title Suit No. 32 of 2026 and granting injunction restraining both parties from selling, transferring, alienating and/or creating any third party interest in respect of the subject property and/or changing the nature and character of the property which is the subject matter of the agreement-in-question, during pendency of the temporary injunction application in the trial court. 24. The defendants shall file their written objection to the temporary injunction application within three weeks from date in the trial court. 25. It is expected that the temporary injunction application shall be disposed of by the trial court as expeditiously as possible, preferably within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order to the trial court. 26. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 is also disposed of. 27. There will be no order as to costs. 7 28. Urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) AD-25 AK