Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya F.M.A.T 202 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 Bhawrilal Sanei and others Vs. Ravi Sanei For the appellants : Mr. Sakya Sen, Snr. Adv. Mr. Sourojit Dasgupta Mr. Vishwarup Acharyya For the respondent : Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Snr. Adv. Mr. Rahul Karmakar Mr. Santosh Kr. Ray Mr. Sourath Dutta Ms. Antalina Guha Ms. Harshita Purohit Heard on : 27.07.2026 Judgment on : 27.07.2026 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. In view of the short questions involved, we take up the appeal for hearing along with the application. 2 2. The appellants assail an ad interim injunction order passed in a suit filed by the respondent challenging certain gift deeds executed by the defendant/appellant nos.1 and 2 in favour of the defendant/appellant no.3. 3. The relationship between the parties is that the appellant nos.1 and 2 are respectively the father and the mother of the plaintiff/respondent and the grandfather of the donee/defendant/appellant no.3 (appellant no.3 being the son of the other son of the appellant nos. 1 and 2 than the plaintiff/respondent). 4. As per the plaint case, there was a previous settlement deed entered between the parties, which was given the sanction of court by passing a compromise decree in terms thereof. 5. According to the same, the respective shares of the parties thereto, including the appellant nos.1 and 2, the respondent and the elder brother of the respondent, being the father of the appellant no.3, were agreed upon. 6. The plaintiff/respondent, alleging that certain portions of the property, which were the subject-matter of the said compromise decree, were transferred by way of the impugned gift deeds in favour of the appellant no.3, thereby transgressing the 3 provisions of the compromise decree and adversely affecting the rights of the plaintiff/respondent in the said properties as well as to run business in the said properties. 7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants argues that despite the appellants being on caveat and having filed a written objection, the learned Trial Judge, while passing the impugned order, did not advert to the contentions raised in such written objection. 8. Secondly, it is argued that although the learned Trial Judge paid lip-service to the parameters of law governing grant of injunction, there is practically no reason in the impugned order as to how the averments made in the plaint or the injunction application justify the grant of injunction. 9. Furthermore, it is argued that by virtue of the impugned order, the main relief asked for in the suit has been granted, by restraining the defendants/appellants from acting upon the impugned deeds of gift, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the suit itself. 10. Moreover, learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that at least in the year 2024, when an allegation was made that gift deeds were executed in contravention of an injunction order 4 passed in an earlier suit, the plaintiff/respondent had full knowledge of the gift deeds, but the present challenge has been filed only in the year 2026. 11. In view of the gap of two years between the filing of the present suit and the plaintiff acquiring such knowledge, it is argued that the very urgency pleaded in the temporary injunction application is denuded. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants lastly argues that by the impugned gift deeds, the donors/appellant nos.1 and 2 have transferred only their shares in the subject properties. 13. As such, the rights of the plaintiff/respondent, if any, in such properties could not have been disturbed in any manner. 14. Learned senior counsel accordingly argues that the impugned order ought to be set aside. 15. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent contends that the manner in which the schedules of the gift deeds have been couched and the subject- properties of the gifts have been described leaves serious doubt as to the intent of the donors. 16. It is sought to be impressed upon the court by the respondent that by execution of the gift deeds, the donors acted in violation 5 of the compromise decree and the terms of settlement leading thereto. 17. It is pointed out that in the third schedule of one of the assailed gift deeds, annexed to the present application, a particular semi- commercial unit/space having a specific carpet area was mentioned to have been transferred, with the subsequent rider “being the undivided 50% share and/or interest of all that unit/ space”. 18. It is argued that from the said description, there is scope of ambiguity as to whether the entire unit/space, where the plaintiff/respondent is running business, was intended to be donated to the appellant no.3, thereby frustrating the provisions of the compromise decree and the rights of the plaintiff/respondent therein. 19. Learned senior counsel further argues that it is not absolutely barred in law, if necessity so requires, even to grant relief akin to the main relief sought in the suit at the ad interim stage, in aid of such final reliefs. 20. Lastly, learned senior counsel argues that from the impugned order, it would be evident that the written objection filed by the 6 defendants/appellants was taken on record and the documents on record were also noted. 21. Moreover, the injunction application has been kept alive, to be heard on merits. 22. As such, in view of the appellants having appeared and contested even at the ad interim stage, the question of urgency does not acquire primacy, as sought to be made out by the appellants. 23. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the appellants have a point in submitting that the manner in which the ad interim injunction impugned before us has been couched, virtually tantamounts to the main relief sought in the suit being granted, whereas a lesser relief would have sufficed to serve the interests of the plaintiff/respondent. 24. At the ad interim stage, according to us, it was premature for the learned Trial Judge to injunct the defendants/appellants from acting in terms of the impugned gift deeds, leaving nothing to be decided in the suit. 25. In the same breath, we cannot but take note of the fact that from the language of the gift deeds, prima facie there is scope of ambiguous interpretation inasmuch as the subject-matter of the 7 transfers in some of the gift deeds has been described to the specific portions of the property, although immediately qualified by the rider “being the undivided 50% share and/or interest”. 26. Thus, there is some doubt as to whether what was transferred was the specific portion, being described as the 50% undivided share of the donors, or the undivided share of the donors in such specific portion. 27. Since there is such scope of doubt, at the prima facie stage, the learned Trial Jude was justified in holding that triable issues have been made out, justifying the grant of injunction. 28. Insofar as the shares of the parties are concerned, although both parties, in effect, rely on the terms of the compromise decree, there is a dispute as to how far the rights of the donors/appellant nos.1 and 2, flowing therefrom, extend insofar as transfer of such properties is concerned in favour of the appellant no.3, who is a third party to the said compromise decree. 29. With regard to urgency, since both parties were heard, the rigours of the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made applicable and the learned Trial Judge might not have categorically recorded the reason for 8 granting injunction on the ground of urgency as required under the said proviso in case of an ex parte order. 30. We find from the impugned order that the learned Trial Court has narrated the case of both the parties and has come to its own conclusions. 31. Thus, in the absence of any patent legal error, we do not intend to interfere with the substance of the impugned order at this premature stage but leave it open to the learned Trial Judge to decide the temporary injunction application independently without being influenced by any of the observations made herein or in the impugned order at any further stage of the injunction application or the suit. 32. Be that as it may, in view of our above observations, we intend to modify the impugned order as follows: 33. FMAT 202 of 2026 is partially allowed on contest, by modifying the impugned Order dated May 18, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, First Court at Alipore, District- South 24 Parganas in Title Suit No.680 of 2026 to the effect that both parties to the suit shall maintain status quo in respect of the suit property till disposal of the temporary injunction application pending in the trial court. 9 34. It is expected that the learned Trial Judge shall dispose of the temporary injunction application on merits in accordance with law, without being unnecessarily influenced in any manner by our above observations, as expeditiously as possible, positively within six weeks from the date of communication of this order to the learned Trial Judge. 35. CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of as well. 36. There will be no order as to costs. 37. Urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) AD-23 AK