1 CGHC010235172022 2026:CGHC:32828-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1244 of 2022 State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station- Podi, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus Sriram Pando S/o Shivchand Pando Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Meel Sajapahad, Police Station- Podi, District- Korea, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For State/Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sumit Singh, Dy. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 30/07/2026 1. This is an application under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 filed by the appellant/State for grant of leave to appeal. The present application has been preferred against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 31.03.2022, passed by the learned Special Judge (Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korea at Baikunthpur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 15/2020, arising out of ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.08.03 11:12:27 +0530 2 Crime No. 95/2020 registered at Police Station Podi, District Korea (C.G.), whereby the respondent/accused has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376(3) and 506-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the prosecutrix lodged a report at Police Station Podi, District Korea, alleging that about one and a half years prior to the lodging of the report, as she was not in a proper mental condition, her parents used to call the respondent/accused for performing exorcism. It was alleged that during the month of Phalgun, in the absence of her parents, the respondent/accused repeatedly subjected her to sexual intercourse without her consent and against her will by threatening her with dire consequences in the event of disclosure. It was further alleged that on the third day of the last Phalgun festival, the respondent/accused forcibly entered her house and again committed rape upon her. Subsequently, when she developed abdominal pain and was taken to the hospital, she came to know that she was pregnant, whereafter she disclosed the incident to her parents and Phoolmati. On the basis of the said report, Crime No. 95/2020 was registered at Police Station Podi, District Korea, for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376(3) and 506-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. During the course of investigation, the prosecutrix and the respondent/accused were medically examined, the spot map was prepared, statements of witnesses were recorded, necessary seizures were effected and, after completion of 3 investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the respondent/accused before the competent Court, which, after trial, culminated in the impugned judgment of acquittal. 3. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge (Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korea at Baikunthpur (C.G.). The case was taken up for trial by the learned Special Judge. The charges for the offences punishable under Sections 450, 376(3) and 506-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 were framed against the respondent/accused, which were denied by him and he claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses in support of its case. 4. After recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and hearing the parties, the learned trial Court has acquitted the respondent/accused of the charges punishable under Sections 450, 376(3) and 506-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the evidence on record is insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Hence, the present acquittal appeal along with the application for grant of leave to appeal has been filed by the State. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner/State would submit that there is sufficient evidence available on record which establishes the 4 involvement of the respondent/accused in the offences in question. It is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the testimony of the prosecutrix, which, being trustworthy and reliable, was sufficient to bring home the guilt of the respondent/accused. It is further submitted that the evidence of the prosecutrix stands corroborated by the statements of her mother and Phoolmati as well as the medical evidence establishing that the prosecutrix was pregnant. It is also contended that the learned trial Court has erred in discarding the evidence of the prosecutrix on the basis of minor contradictions and inconsistencies and has further failed to appreciate the statutory presumptions available under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. According to the learned counsel, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are contrary to the evidence available on record and suffer from misappreciation of evidence. Hence, the impugned judgment of acquittal is perverse, illegal and liable to be set aside, and therefore, the present application for grant of leave to appeal has been filed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the application for grant of leave to file the acquittal appeal. 7. From perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it transpires that the learned trial Court has taken into consideration that the prosecution has failed to establish that the prosecutrix was a child within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, as her age has 5 not been proved by cogent and reliable evidence. The learned trial Court has observed that the Aadhaar Card produced by the prosecution has no probative value in the absence of examination of the person who prepared the document or on whose information the date of birth was recorded, and no ossification test or any other age determination process was undertaken during investigation. It has further been considered that the testimony of the prosecutrix suffers from material inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to the time, place and manner of the alleged incident and, therefore, does not inspire confidence to form the sole basis of conviction. The learned trial Court has also taken into account that, despite the prosecutrix having become pregnant and delivered a child, no DNA profiling was conducted to scientifically establish the involvement of the respondent/accused, which constituted the best available evidence in the facts and circumstances of the case. It has also been observed that the evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix and Phoolmati is only hearsay in nature, as their source of information was the prosecutrix herself. Further, the learned trial Court has held that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the respondent/accused has been given the benefit of doubt. 8. We have again gone through the record produced by the petitioner/State in the present case. It reveals that the prosecution case primarily rests on the testimony of the prosecutrix. It further appears from the record that the prosecution has failed to establish by cogent and reliable evidence that the prosecutrix was a child within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual 6 Offences Act, 2012, as neither any reliable documentary evidence regarding her date of birth was adduced nor any ossification test or other age determination procedure was undertaken during investigation. It is also evident from the record that the testimony of the prosecutrix is not consistent on material particulars relating to the time, place and manner of the alleged incident, as the version narrated in the First Information Report materially differs from her deposition before the Court. Further, despite the prosecutrix having become pregnant and delivered a child, no DNA profiling was conducted to establish the paternity of the child or to connect the respondent/accused with the alleged offence. The evidence of the mother of the prosecutrix and Phoolmati is only based on what was allegedly disclosed to them by the prosecutrix and does not furnish independent corroboration to the prosecution case. In such a factual backdrop, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution cannot be said to conclusively establish the guilt of the respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt, thereby reinforcing the view taken by the learned trial Court. 9. From perusal of the medical examination report of the prosecutrix (Exhibit P/8A), it appears that the prosecutrix was found to be carrying a pregnancy of about 28 weeks, however, the said medical evidence does not conclusively establish that the respondent/accused had committed the alleged offence. The document (Exhibit P/8A) is proved by PW-7/Dr. Ayushri Roy, who has stated that the prosecutrix was pregnant at the time of her examination. It is further evident that no DNA profiling of the prosecutrix, the child born to her and the respondent/accused was conducted during the course of investigation 7 to establish the paternity of the child or to scientifically connect the respondent/accused with the alleged offence. In absence of such scientific corroboration, the medical evidence merely establishes the fact of pregnancy and not the identity of the person responsible for it. Thus, though the medical evidence establishes that the prosecutrix was pregnant, it does not conclusively establish the involvement of the respondent/accused, and the same creates a doubt in the prosecution case regarding the authorship of the alleged offence. 10. The learned trial Court has also considered the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW-2), her mother (PW-3), Phoolmati (PW-4), Dr. Ayushri Roy (PW-7) and other prosecution witnesses and has taken note of the discrepancies and inconsistencies in their statements. The learned trial Court has observed that the testimony of the prosecutrix suffers from material contradictions with regard to the time, place and manner of the alleged incident and, therefore, does not inspire confidence. It has further been considered that the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 is not independent in nature, as their knowledge of the alleged incident is solely based upon the disclosure made by the prosecutrix. The learned trial Court has also taken note of the fact that, despite the prosecutrix having become pregnant, no DNA examination was conducted during the course of investigation to scientifically establish the involvement of the respondent/accused. Accordingly, the learned trial Court has held that the evidence led by the prosecution is not wholly reliable to base a conviction against the respondent/accused. 8 11. Learned trial Court in acquitting the respondent/accused, we do not find any perversity, illegality or material infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court. The learned trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the failure of the prosecution to establish the age of the prosecutrix by cogent evidence, the material inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix with regard to the time, place and manner of the alleged incident, and the absence of scientific evidence in the form of DNA profiling despite the prosecutrix having become pregnant. The view taken by the learned trial Court is a plausible and reasonable view based on proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. Accordingly, no case is made out for grant of leave to appeal and the impugned judgment is not liable to be set aside. 12. Recently, applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows: "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not 9 possible at all." 13. Further, in case of Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala, 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgment at para 25, which reads as under :- “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters." 14. Considering the evidence available on record as well as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, particularly with regard to the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, the requirement of proving the age of the victim in prosecutions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the limited scope of interference in an appeal against 10 acquittal, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish any perversity, illegality or manifest error in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix by cogent evidence, that her testimony suffered from material inconsistencies and lacked sufficient corroboration, and that the omission to conduct DNA profiling constituted a serious lacuna in the investigation, are based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and cannot be said to be unreasonable or improbable so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 15. Consequently, no case for grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 31.03.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge (Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012)/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Korea at Baikunthpur (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 15/2020 is made out. The application for grant of leave to appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 16. Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed. As a consequence thereof, the accompanying acquittal appeal also stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- S Sdd (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Alok