CGHC010218732026 2026:CGHC:31873-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 619 of 2026 Chief Executive Officer, District Co- Operative Central Bank Maryadi Ambikapur Tahsil And Police Station Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary Co- Operative Department Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Capital Complex New Raipur District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Registrar Raipur Division Co-Operative Societies Indrawati Bhawan Atal Nagar Raipur, District- Raipur, District Raipur, (C.G.) 3 - Deputy Registrar Co-Operative Societies, Ambikapur, District- Surguja, (C.G.) 4 - R. A. Tripathi S/o Late Ram Manohar Tripath Aged About 68 Years Retried Senior Branch Manager R/o D.C. Road Ambikapur Tahsil And Police Station Ambikapur District- Surguja Chhattisgarh District Surguja (Ambikapur ) (C.G.) ...Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ For Appellant : Shri Anurag Singh, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Prasun Bhaduri, Addl AG For Respondent-4 : Shri Bhupendra Singh, Advocate --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 27.07.2026 Heard Shri Anurag Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Shri Prasun Bhaduri, learned Addl AG appearing for the State, and Shri Bhupendra Singh, learned counsel for respondent-4. Digitally signed by V PADMAVATHI Date: 2026.08.03 16:08:36 +0530 Wa 619 of 2026 2 1. Present appeal has been filed with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant appeal and the order dated 05.12.2025 (Annexure A/1), passed in WPC No.1201 of 2021, passed by Hon’ble Single Judge, Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh may kindly be set-aside in the interest of justice.” 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties on IA-2 of 2026, which is an application for condonation of delay of 134 days in preferring the instant appeal. 3. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against an order dated 05.12.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 1201 of 2021 (RA Tripathi Vs State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. 4. On a pointed query being made to the learned counsel for the appellant as to why he has approached this Court against the impugned order dated 05.12.2025 after an inordinate delay of 134 days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent reason for delay in filing the writ appeal. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents submit that the writ appeal is barred by delay and laches and further there is no cogent reason or explanation has been given in the delay and laches application filed for condonation of delay. Hence, the appeal is not liable to be entertained. 6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant writ appeal. 7. The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the delay of about 134 days in preferring the present writ appeal deserves to be condoned or not. Wa 619 of 2026 3 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:- “5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate Wa 619 of 2026 4 delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has Wa 619 of 2026 5 been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical Wa 619 of 2026 6 considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this Wa 619 of 2026 7 case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States Wa 619 of 2026 8 scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” 9. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to condone the delay has to be Wa 619 of 2026 9 exercised with great caution and only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice. 10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of 134 days in filing the present appeal is grossly inordinate. The explanation offered by the appellant, i.e. financial constraints, lack of legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is now well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away. 11. The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which disabled him/her from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the record reveals that the appellant/ Bank remained inactive for a long period and sought to revive its claim only after consulting legal aid services. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a substantial period. Wa 619 of 2026 10 12. Even otherwise, when we examined the merits of the case, we found that the respondent was a permanent employee of the appellant-Bank and retired from service on 30.11.2011. Upon his retirement, the appellant failed to release all the retiral dues legally payable to him. Aggrieved thereby, the private respondent instituted proceedings under Section 64 of the Chhattisgarh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 before the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Ambikapur, claiming payment of the balance gratuity, leave encashment, arrears of enhanced dearness allowance and refund of the security amount along with interest. The Deputy Registrar, after framing the issues and affording adequate opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence, allowed the claim and directed the appellant-Bank to make payment of the adjudicated dues. The record further reveals that despite repeated opportunities, the appellant neither cross-examined the respondent nor led any evidence in support of its defence. Consequently, the appeal preferred by the appellant came to be dismissed and the order of the Deputy Registrar was affirmed. 13. So far as the claim of interest on delayed payment of gratuity is concerned, the entitlement of the private respondent cannot be denied. 14. Gratuity is a statutory retiral benefit and becomes payable immediately upon the retirement of an employee. Any unjustified delay in its disbursement deprives the employee of the beneficial use of the amount legally due to him/her. 15. In the present case, the private respondent retired on 30.11.2011, yet the appellant failed to release the admissible gratuity within the time prescribed by law and has not shown any justifiable reason for withholding the same. Therefore, the said respondent is legally entitled to interest on the delayed payment of gratuity from the date it became payable till the date of its actual payment. Such Wa 619 of 2026 11 entitlement is consistent with the mandate of Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which obligates the employer to pay interest where gratuity is not paid within the prescribed period, unless the delay is attributable to the employee and the employer has obtained the requisite permission from the Controlling Authority. 16. In the case of H. Gangahanume Gowda v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC 40, Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that interest on delayed payment of retiral benefits, particularly gratuity, is not a bounty but a statutory and equitable entitlement. 17. In view of the above, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant writ appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on merits. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice padma