[2026:RJ-JP:17544] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Review Petition (Writ) No. 110/2026 Raj Bahadur Rajoria Son Of Shri Lal Chand Rajoria, Aged About 59 Years, Resident Of House No.c-1/239, Chitrakoot Yojna, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Plaintiff-Petitioner Versus 1. Shri Lal Chand Rajoria Son Of Late Shri Bhagwan Das, Resident Of S-18, Bhawani Singh Road, C-Scheme, Jaipur (Raj.). (Since Deceased) 2. Smt. Kamla Devi Wife Of Shri Lal Chand Rajoria, Aged About 83 Years, Resident Of S-18, Bhawani Singh Road, C-Scheme, Jaipur (Raj.). 3. Girish Kumar Son Of Shri Lal Chand Rajoria, Aged About 66 Years, Resident Of Plot No.34, Shakti Nagar, Triveni Chauraha, Gopalpura Bypass Road, Jaipur (Raj.). Presently Residing At Plot No.58, Bajrang Vihar, Near Durgapura Railway Station, Jaipur (Raj.). 4. Smt. Shakuntala Devi Wife Of Shri Girish Kumar, Aged About 64 Years, Resident Of Plot No.34, Shakti Nagar, Triveni Chauraha, Gopalpura Bypass Road, Jaipur (Raj.). Presently Residing At Plot No.58, Bajrang Vihar, Near Durgapura Railway Station, Jaipur (Raj.). 5. Shri Rambabu Son Of Shri Lal Chand Rajoria, Aged About 56 Years, Resident Of S-18, Bhawani Singh Road, C- Scheme, Jaipur (Raj.). 6. Sunil Kumar Badaya Son Of Shri Kastoor Chand Badaya, Aged About 58 Years, Resident Of Plot No.b-60, Laxmi Narainpuri, Surajpole, Jaipur (Raj.). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Raj Bahadur Rajoria (In person) For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA Judgment / Order Reportable 24/04/2026 1. The present review petition has been filing assailing the order dated 26.02.2026, passed by this Court, in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9435/2025, whereby the writ petition preferred by the [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (2 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] petitioner came to be dismissed. This Court, while dismissing the writ petition, held that the learned trial Court had correctly framed the issues and that no necessity arose for framing any additional issues under Order 14 Rule 5 read with Section 151 CPC. 2. Learned petitioner submits that initially six issues were framed by the learned trial Court. Thereafter, the learned trial Court re-framed the issues vide order dated 10.03.2025 pursuant to the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by this Court. However, alleging that certain material issues were still not framed, the petitioner again approached this Court by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9435/2025, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 26.02.2026. Learned petitioner contends that the order dated 26.02.2026 suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, warrants interference in exercise of review jurisdiction. 3. Heard and perused the material available on record. 4. While examining the validity of the impugned order in the context of review jurisdiction, it is necessary for this Court to bear in mind certain settled and fundamental principles governing such jurisdiction. The power of review is not inherent in a Court; rather, it must be expressly conferred by statute. It is not a forum for rehearing the matter or re-agitating issues already decided on merits. In civil proceedings, the exercise of review jurisdiction is regulated by Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC, and the Court must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed therein are strictly fulfilled before invoking such power. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati; (2013) 8 SCC 320 has succinctly observed that: [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (3 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] “19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.” (emphasis Supplied) 4.1 In light of the aforesaid settled position, this Court considers it appropriate to reproduce Order 47 Rule 1 CPC hereinbelow for ready reference: “1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” 4.2 To put it plainly, Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC provides three grounds for review: 1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed, or order made; or [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (4 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] 2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or 3) for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to either of the aforesaid grounds. 4.3 It is a settled principle of law that rehearing of a matter is impermissible under the guise of review. The power of review constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it ought not to be altered. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India; AIR 2000 SC 1650, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power of review can be exercised only for correction of an apparent error and not for substituting a new view. Such power is to be exercised strictly within the confines of the statutory provisions governing it as has been held in Inderchand Jain v. Motilal; (2009) 4 SCC 665. 4.4 It is further well-settled that the provisions contained in Section 114 and Order 47 CPC, which govern the review of a decree or order, are mandatory in nature. A review petition that fails to satisfy the strict parameters and limitations prescribed therein cannot be entertained by a Court of law, even on considerations of ex debito justitiae, as the exercise of such jurisdiction is circumscribed by statute. 4.5 Upon a careful perusal of the grounds enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it becomes evident that the first two grounds, namely, discovery of new and important matter or evidence, and mistake or error apparent on the face of the record are explicit and self-evident in their application. In contrast, the third ground, articulated as “any other sufficient reason,” is not to be construed in an expansive or independent manner, but rather [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (5 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] requires a contextual and purposive interpretation. In this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.; 2024 INSC 454, has authoritatively clarified that the ambit of the third ground must be interpreted ejusdem generis with the preceding grounds. The Court emphasized that “any other sufficient reason” cannot be invoked to re-agitate issues already decided, nor can it serve as a residuary provision to circumvent the finality of judgments. Instead, it must be confined to reasons analogous to those specified in the first two grounds, thereby preserving the limited and exceptional nature of the review jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is clear that the invocation of the third ground must be exercised with circumspection and only in cases where the reason advanced bears a close nexus to the grounds expressly provided, and where failure to entertain the review would result in palpable injustice. 4.6 In the case of Rajendra Kumar Vs. Rambai; AIR 2003 SC 2095, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed about limited scope of judicial intervention at the time of review of the judgment and said: "The limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgement/order cannot be disturbed." 4.7 Recently, in the case of Malleeswari vs K. Suguna And Anr.; 2025 INSC 1080, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (6 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] review jurisdiction is a limited statutory power, distinct from appellate jurisdiction, and may be exercised only to correct apparent errors within the strict confines of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, not for rehearing or substituting a fresh view. It appropriate to reproduce relevant paragraph hereinbelow for ready reference: “15. It is axiomatic that the right of appeal cannot be assumed unless expressly conferred by the statute or the rules having the force of a statute. The review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of CPC deal with the power of review of the courts. The power of review is different from appellate power and is subject to the following limitations to maintain the finality of judicial decisions: 15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. 15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court. 15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. 15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power. [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (7 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] 15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors.” (Emphasis supplied) 5. This Court finds that the suit in question was instituted in the year 2014 and has been pending adjudication for a considerable period. It is also an admitted position that initially six issues were framed by the learned trial Court and, subsequently, vide order dated 10.03.2025, the issues were re-framed, culminating in a total of fourteen issues. The mere increase in the number of issues does not lead to the inference that the earlier issues were discarded; rather, it reflects a more comprehensive formulation and consolidation of the real matters in controversy between the parties. 5.1 The contention of the petitioner that certain material issues have been left out has been duly examined. However, it is a settled principle of civil jurisprudence that issues are not required to be framed on each and every allegation made in the pleadings or on every fact denied by the opposite party. Issues are to be framed only with respect to material propositions of fact and law which are necessary for the effective adjudication of the dispute. 5.2 This Court, in its earlier order (paragraph 9), has categorically observed that the purpose of framing issues is to identify the real questions in controversy between the parties and to guide the parties regarding the evidence required to be led. The exercise of [2026:RJ-JP:17544] (8 of 8) [WRW-110/2026] framing issues is not mechanical in nature but is a judicial function requiring due application of mind by the learned trial Court. 5.3 It is further well-settled that the trial Court enjoys a degree of discretion in framing issues, which is to be exercised on the basis of the pleadings and material available on record. A litigant cannot insist that every issue suggested by him must necessarily be framed, particularly when the essence of such suggested issues is already encompassed within the issues framed, or where such issues are not germane for the adjudication of the dispute. 5.4 In the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner is, in effect, seeking a rehearing of the matter under the guise of a review petition, which is impermissible in law. No error apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated, nor has any new material been brought on record to warrant interference. 5.5 In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in the present petition. The petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the matter in the garb of review. 5.6 Accordingly, the present Civil Review Petition is hereby dismissed. 5.7 Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (BIPIN GUPTA),J KRATIKA /79