APHC010136852026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] TUESDAY,THE SEVENTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 2177/2026 Between: 1. SUNKARA SIVA SATYA REVANTH,ALIAS REVANTH,, S/O. JAGADESWAR RAO, AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS, OCC. JCB OPERATOR, R/O. D. NO. 1-71, KONDAKARLA VILLAGE, ATCHUTAPURAM MANDAL, ANAKAPALLI DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, PARAWADA SUB-DIVISION REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF AP AT AMARAVATI. 2. VICTIM/PW1, RESPONDENT NO.2 CAUSE TITLE IS AMENDED AS PER THE COURT ORDER DATED 24.03.2026 IN I.A.NO.2 OF 2026 IN CRL.P.NO.2177 OF 2026. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. KOTI REDDY IDAMAKANTI Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 2 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 The Court made the following: ORDER: Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity the „BNSS‟) by the Petitioner/Accused, seeking to quash the order dated 06.03.2026 passed against him in Crl.M.P.No.41 of 2026 in S.C.No.29 of 2023 on the file of the learned special Judge for Trial of Offences under the POCSO Act, Visakhapatnam. 2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, learned legal aid counsel for the 2nd respondent and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri I. Koti Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of the Court below is contrary to law and the weight of evidence on record, and is therefore liable to be set aside.The Court below erred in dismissing the petition filed for recalling PW1 for further cross-examination on important aspects relating to her age and educational qualification certificates.The dismissal was based on the ground that the child witness should not be repeatedly called as per the mandate under Section 33(5) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity „the POCSO Act‟). However, PW1 was not repeatedly examined, as she was examined in chief and cross-examined only once. The petitioner sought recall only for limited and essential clarification on crucial points. The learned Trial Court failed to consider this aspect. The Court below failed to appreciate that 3 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 the recall petition was filed only after closure of PW1‟s evidence, and no such application had been filed earlier.The petitioner had bona fide reasons for seeking recall, and it is not always possible to set out every detail in the recall application. The Court below ought to have afforded an opportunity to the petitioner to further examine PW1 to elicit certain material and relevant facts necessary for proper adjudication of the case. 4. On the other hand, Mr. A. Sai Rohit, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, along with Ms.B. Alekhya, the learned counsel for respondent No.2, submits that the order passed by the Court below is in accordance with law and the evidence on record, and does not warrant any interference. The learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the petition filed for recalling PW1, keeping in view the mandate under Section 33(5) of „the POCSOAct.,‟ which clearly intends to protect a child witness from being subjected to repeated examination and unnecessary harassment. 5. It is further submitted that PW1 has already been examined in chief and duly cross-examined by the petitioner, and sufficient opportunity was afforded at that stage. The present petition for recall is nothing but an attempt to fill up lacunae in the defence and to protract the proceedings. The reasons now sought to be urged, relating to age and educational certificates, were very much within the knowledge of the petitioner at the time of earlier cross- examination, and no valid justification has been shown for recalling the witness. It is also contended that the petition for recall was filed only after 4 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 closure of evidence, without any bona fide or compelling grounds. The learned Trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion in rejecting the said application. Granting such recall would defeat the object of speedy trial, particularly in cases involving child witnesses, and would cause unnecessary inconvenience and prejudice to PW1. Therefore, the impugned order calls for no interference and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 7. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the order dated 06.03.2026 in Crl.M.P.No.41 of 2026 in S.C.No.29 of 2023 passed by the file of the learned special Judge for Trial of Offences under POCSO Act, Visakhapatnamis liable to be interfered and set aside in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟/Section 528 of „the BNSS‟?" 8. In thisregard, it is apposite to refer to the judgmentsof the Hon‟ble Apex Court. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Madhab Chandra Pradhan v. State of Odisha1,at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9held as under: “7…Let us now examine whether in the given facts and circumstances, plea of the petitioners for recalling the victim as witness for re-examination ought to have been allowed by the Special Court. The victim here is a girl who at the time of the incident was around 15 years of age allegedly. It is an admitted fact here that even before the application under Section 311 of the Cr. P.C. was filed by the petitioners, the defence counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine the victim twice already. On 22.07.2023, the examination-in-chief of the victim was conducted and on the same day, she was cross-examined by the counsel engaged by the petitioners before the Special Court. Thereafter, further cross- examination of the victim was deferred to 14.08.2023 on the request of the counsel engaged by the petitioners. On 14.08.2023, she was cross-examined at length and yet again, a request for adjournment was made by the counsel engaged by the petitioners, which was then turned down by the Special Court. It 12024 SCC OnLine SC 6131 5 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 is then that the application under Section 311 of Cr. P.C. came to be filed by the petitioners seeking recall of the victim which was rightly rejected vide Order dated 10.10.2023 of the Special Court. 8. What weighed with the Special Court, while dismissing their application was the fact that the after having availed their first opportunity to cross-examine the victim on 22.07.2023, the accused sought an adjournment which was granted and thus they were given a second opportunity to cross-examine the victim on 14.08.2023 and on this day, their advocate cross-examined her at length but again sought an adjournment which was disallowed as there was no justification for seeking an adjournment. Since the accused did not challenge this order of rejection, the Special Court observed that its findings in the said order that there was no justification to adjourn or defer cross-examination to a later date had attained a finality. The Special Court also placed its reliance on Section 33(5) of the Act and emphasised that it is mandated to ensure that the child is not repeatedly called to testify before it. 9. From a perusal of the record of the case, it is abundantly clear that ample opportunities were given to the defence counsel to cross-examine the victim. When the victim has been examined and then cross-examined at length twice already, mechanically allowing an application for recall of the victim, especially in trial of offences under the POCSO Act would defeat the very purpose of the statute. Hence, we find no error or illegality in the impugned order of the High Court or the Order dt. 10.10.2023 of the Special Court.” 9. Thus, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Madhab Chandra Pradhan supra,while enunciating the law at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9,the petitioners were given ample opportunities to cross-examine the minor victim, including two detailed cross-examinations on separate dates. Despite this, the defence sought repeated adjournments without sufficient justification, and only after exhausting these chancesdid they file an application under Section 311 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ to recall the witness. The Special Court rightly rejected this request, noting that the earlier refusal to grant further adjournment had attained finality.It was further observed that allowing recall in such circumstances, especially under „the POCSO Act.,‟ would defeat the objective of protecting child victims from repeated testimony, as mandated under Section 33(5) of „the POCSOAct‟. Therefore, the court found no illegality in the orders of the 6 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 Special Court and the High Court, upholding the rejection of the recall application. 10. The Hon‟ble Apex Court inEera v. State (NCT of Delhi)2, at paragraph No.20 held as under: “20... The purpose of referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble of the Pocso Act is to appreciate that the very purpose of bringing a legislation of the present nature is to protect the children from the sexual assault, harassment and exploitation, and to secure the best interest of the child. On an avid and diligent discernment of the Preamble, it is manifest that it recognises the necessity of the right to privacy and confidentiality of a child to be protected and respected by every person by all means and through all stages of a judicial process involving the child. Best interest and well-being are regarded as being of paramount importance at every stage to ensure the healthy physical, emotional, intellectual and social development of the child. There is also a stipulation that sexual exploitation and sexual abuse are heinous offences and need to be effectively addressed. The Statement of Objects and Reasons provides regard being had to the constitutional mandate, to direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children is not abused and their childhood is protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. There is also a mention which is quite significant that interest of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, needs to be protected. The stress is on providing child-friendly procedure. Dignity of the child has been laid immense emphasis in the scheme of legislation. Protection and interest occupy the seminal place in the text of the Pocso Act.” 11. Ergo, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Eerasupra, while expounding the law at paragraph No.20, underscored „the POCSO Act.,‟ aims to protect children from sexual offences while safeguarding their dignity, privacy, and overall well-being throughout the judicial process. It emphasizes child-friendly procedures and prioritizes the best interests of the child, ensuring their healthy development and protection both as victims and witnesses, in line with constitutional principles against exploitation. 2(2017) 15 SCC 133 7 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 12. The Hon‟ble Apex Court inChild K. v. State (NCT of Delhi) 3 ,at paragraph Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 held as under: “…The Court disposed of the petition with the following conclusions: 1. Child victims and victims of sexual offences are “vulnerable witnesses” requiring a sensitive and protective approach during investigation and trial. 2. The POCSO Act mandates adoption of child-friendly procedures so that child victims should not be repeatedly summoned and the trial process does not result in re-victimisation or further trauma. 3. Courts may use video-conferencing and other protective measures to minimise exposure with the accused and reduce the psychological stress associated with court proceedings. 4. During bail hearings, once the victim's views or objections are recorded, her repeated presence should not be insisted upon. 5. Existing statutory provisions, Supreme Court directions and High Court guidelines must be followed strictly by all trial courts. The Court directed that the judgment be circulated to all trial courts and Special Courts in Delhi for guidance and compliance. 13. Thus, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Child K supra, while elucidating the legal position at paragraph No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, emphatically held that the child victims of sexual offences are vulnerable witnesses who require a sensitive and protective approach throughout investigation and trial. It emphasized that „the POCSO Act.,‟ mandates child-friendly procedures to prevent repeated summoning and avoid re-victimisation, and that measures like video-conferencing should be used to reduce trauma and limit exposure to the accused. It further clarified that during bail hearings, the victim‟s presence should not be repeatedly required once her views are recorded, and directed all trial and Special Courts to strictly follow statutory provisions and judicial guidelines. The judgment was ordered to be circulated to ensure uniform compliance. 32026 SCC OnLine Del 1137 8 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 14. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 4, at paragraph Nos.102 and 103 held as under: “102... In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or 41992 Supp (1) SCC 335 9 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 15. Hence, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Bhajan Lalsupra, held that the principles laid down by the Bhajan Lal enumerate illustrative categories where the High Court may exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ to quash criminal proceedings. These include situations where the allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value, do not constitute any offence; where the materials do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying police investigation; where the uncontroverted allegations and evidence fail to establish any offence; where investigation is undertaken without the requisite Magistrate‟s order in non- cognizable cases; where the allegations are absurd or inherently improbable; where there is a legal bar to the proceedings; or where the proceedings are manifestly mala fide and instituted with an ulterior motive.However, the Court has cautioned that such extraordinary or inherent powers must be exercised sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases. The High Court should not undertake an enquiry into the truth or genuineness of the allegations at this stage, nor act arbitrarily or capriciously while invoking its jurisdiction to quash proceedings 10 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 16. The Hon‟ble Apex Court inSom Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka 5, at paragraph No.9 held as under: “9.... When the words “rarest of rare cases” are used after the words “sparingly and with circumspection” while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasise and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words “sparingly and with circumspection”. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection. Judgments are not to be construed as statutes. Nor words or phrases in judgments to be interpreted like provisions of a statute. Some words used in a judgment should be read and understood contextually and are not intended to be taken literally. Many a time a judge uses a phrase or expression with the intention of emphasising a point or accentuating a principle or even by way of a flourish of writing style. Ratio decidendi of a judgment is not to be discerned from a stray word or phrase read in isolation.” 17. Therefore, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Som Mittal supra, held that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal clarified that the expression “rarest of rare cases,” used in the context of Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ is only meant to emphasise that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly and with great caution, and not in the same sense as applied to capital punishment under Section 302 of „the IPC‟. It signifies that such power should not be invoked routinely or mechanically, but only when a clear case for quashing is made out to prevent miscarriage of justice. The Court further observed that judgments are not to be interpreted like statutes, and words or phrases used therein must be understood in their proper context, as they are often employed to stress or illustrate a principle. 5 (2008) 3 SCC 574 11 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 Therefore, the ratio decidendi cannot be deduced from isolated words or expressions, but must be gathered from the judgment as a whole. 18. Upon considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor along with the learned counsel for respondent No.2, and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not made out any valid or sufficient ground warranting interference with the order passed by the Court below. 19. It is evident that PW1 was already examined in chief and duly cross- examined and sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner at the relevant stage. The reason now urged for recalling the witness pertain to aspects which were within the knowledge of the petitioner during the earlier cross-examination does not appear to be convincing and reasonable. A fortiori, the petition for recall appears to be an attempt to fill up lacunae in the defence rather than for any bona fide purpose. 20. Further, the learned Trial Court has rightly taken into consideration the object underlying Section 33(5) of „the POCSO Act.,‟ which is to ensure that a child witness, is not subjected to repeated examination and unnecessary hardship. The discretion exercised by the Court below in rejecting the recall petition cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal. 21. Having bestowed thoughtful consideration upon the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the learned Assistant 12 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 Public Prosecutor, and the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2, and upon careful perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Petitioner has failed to make out any valid, sufficient, or compelling ground warranting interference with the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of „the BNSS‟. 22. It is manifest from the record that PW1 was duly examined-in-chief and subjected to cross-examination, thereby affording adequate and sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner at the relevant stage of trial, the grounds now urged for recalling the witness, pertaining to aspects of age and educational qualification certificates, were well within the knowledge of the Petitioner at the time of the earlier cross-examination, and no cogent or bona fide justification has been forthcoming to explain the omission to elicit such clarifications at that stage. The recall petition, therefore, bears the unmistakable hallmark of an attempt to fill up lacunae in the defence rather than being actuated by any genuine necessity. 23. Furthermore, the learned Trial Court has rightly given effect to the legislative mandate enshrined under Section 33(5) of „the POCSO Act‟, which is expressly designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of repeated examination and unnecessary hardship, in consonance with the child-friendly procedural framework envisaged by the statute and as reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhab Chandra Pradhan supra, Eera supra, and 13 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 Child K. supra. The discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court in rejecting the recall petition cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be characterized as arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law, and thus no case for interference under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court is made out. 24. In view of the above, this Court finds no merit in the petition, and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO,J Date :07.04.2026 KMS 14 Dr.YLR, J CrlP.No.2177 of 2026 Dated 07.04.2026 155 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO:2177 of 2026 Date: 07.04.2026 KMS 155