1 CGHC010246422026 2026:CGHC:33048 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 776 of 2026 1 - Shuklaram S/o Late Thunu Ram Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Poksari, Police Station And Tahsil - Batauli, District Surguja Chhattisgarh 2 - Ramchandra S/o Bhauwa Ram Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Poksari, Police Station And Tahsil - Batauli, District Surguja Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus Kundanram S/o Late Thunuram Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Paksari Police Station And Tehsil Batauli, District- Surguja (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ghanshyam Kashyap, Dy.G.A. for the State (Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J.) Order on Board 30/07/2026 1. Heard. SUMIT KUMAR Digitally signed by SUMIT KUMAR Date: 2026.08.01 11:12:36 +0530 2 2. Present is a writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 20.05.2026 passed by the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur in Revision Case No. R.N./16/R/A-6/230/2024 whereby the revision filed by the petitioners have been dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the respondent No.1 had made an application before the Tehsildar, Batauli for mutation of his name in the revenue records of the land bearing Khasra No. 1269 area 0.5830 Hectare situated at Village – Poksari, Tehsil – Batauli, District – Surguja (C.G.) on the basis of a will allegedly executed by Budhiyaro Bai on 12.05.2004. The petitioner No.1 and respondent are real brother and the petitioner No.2 is the son of their another brother Bhauwaram. The property belongs to their mother Budhiyaro Bai and after her death, the respondent claims to be the owner of the property based on alleged will executed by their mother Budhiyaro Bai. In the mutation proceeding before the Tehsildar, the petitioner raised objection despite that the Tehsildar, Batauli passed an order for mutation on 21.06.2011 in the name of the respondent. The said order passed by the Tehsildar, Batauli was challenged by the petitioners before the SDO (Revenue), Sitapur which was allowed and the order dated 21.06.2011 passed by the Tehsildar, Batauli was set aside and the said order dated 10.12.2012 passed by the SDO (Revenue), Sitapur was further challenged by the respondent before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur which was also allowed and the order passed by the SDO (Revenue), Sitapur has been set aside. Against the order passed by the Commissioner, Surguja 3 Division, Ambikapur, the petitioners filed a revision petition before the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, Bilaspur which has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 20.05.2026. He would further submit that the subject property is coparcenary property belonging to the parties, and that their mother, Budhiyaro Bai was not competent to execute a will bequeathing the entire property exclusively in favour of the respondent alone. He would also submit that the evidence produced by the petitioners before the Tehsildar has not been considered in its true perspective and despite suspicious circumstances in alleged will, the genuineness of the will has been accepted by the Tehsildar. There is absolutely non compliance of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. There are material discrepancies in the evidence of its attesting witnesses, therefore, the revenue authorities have exceeded there jurisdiction in passing the order of mutation in favour of the respondent, yet the Commissioner, Surguja Division as well as the Board of Revenue have not considered the such discrepancies and dismissed the appeal and revision filed by the petitioners, therefore, the impugned order may be set aside and the order passed by the SDO (Revenue), Sitapur may be restored. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material annexed with the writ petition. 5. The petitioners’ claim is based on the evidences lead by the parties before the Tehsildar in the mutation proceeding which was initiated by the respondent claiming that he is the owner of the subject property by virtue of the will allegedly executed by their mother Budhiyaro Bai. The 4 petitioners' claim is that they are challenging the execution of the will allegedly executed by their mother in favour of the respondent. The petitioners contend that there are material discrepancies in the evidence of the attesting witnesses regarding the execution and attestation of the will by Budhiyaro Bai and that their testimony is unreliable in light of the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The said contention raises a dispute relating to the due execution and attestation of the will as well as the surrounding circumstances attending its execution. Such issues involve disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence. In case of “Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil” 2010 (8) SCC 329, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :- “40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this `limited extent' the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149-150). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the 5 Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh (supra) and Nagendra Nath (supra) discussed above. 41. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576. In paragraph 9, page 579 of the report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. 42. Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222-234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898. 43. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a 6 reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views. 44. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out: "38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." 45. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below: "38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) xxx xxx (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the 7 judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character." 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. 8 (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction 9 which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. 10 (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 6. Considering the dispute involved in the present case and also in view 11 of the aforesaid judgment of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (Supra), I do not find any jurisdictional error in the order passed by the revenue authorities including the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur. 7. With the aforesaid observation, the present writ petition is dismissed. 8. However, the petitioners are at liberty to avail themselves of such remedy as may be available before the competent Civil Court for redressal of their grievance. If the petitioners institute such proceedings, the competent Civil Court shall decide the suit independently, in accordance with law and on its own merits, without being influenced in any manner by the orders passed by the revenue authorities. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE Sumit