1 CGHC010165492026 2026:CGHC:33072-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 589 of 2026 Smt. Tirbeni Devi Pandoliya W/o Late Shri Ramprakash Pandoliya Aged About 37 Years R/o Ward No. 15 Village Umri District Bhind M.P. .Appellant(s) Versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Agriculture Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar District Raipur C.G. 2 - Joint Director Treasury Account And Pension Bilaspur District Bilapsur C.G. 3 - Collector Korba District Korba C.G. 4 - Sub Divisional Office Agriculture Katghora District Korba C.G. Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. B.L. Sahu, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. P.K. Bhaduri, Dy. AG Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Bibhu Datta Guru, J. 31/07/2026 1. The present intra-Court appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 is directed against the RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.07.31 16:32:30 +0530 2 order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.8911 of 2025 whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant seeking grant of family pension was dismissed. 2. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that the present appeal has been preferred with a delay of 172 days. I.A. No.1 of 2026 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation thereof. 3. The explanation offered in the application is that the appellant is a resident of the State of Madhya Pradesh, was not conversant with the legal procedure governing the filing of an intra-Court appeal and, therefore, could not contact her counsel for some time. It is further averred that after obtaining legal advice, she applied for the certified copy of the impugned order and thereafter instituted the present appeal. Beyond these bald averments, the application is conspicuously silent as to the material particulars explaining the delay. It neither discloses the date on which the appellant acquired knowledge of the impugned order nor the circumstances which prevented her from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. In absence of any cogent or satisfactory explanation, the delay of 172 days remains wholly unexplained. 4. The Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar v. State of Maharastra1 has held that : “Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there 1 JT 2009 (3) SC 487 3 is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.” 5. It is trite law that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. (See: Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others v T.T. Murali Babu2). 6. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, we are of the considered opinion that the explanation offered by the appellant is vague, bald and bereft of material particulars so as to constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Mere ignorance of law or inability to contact the counsel, unsupported by any acceptable explanation, cannot furnish a valid ground for condoning a substantial delay of 172 days. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the appellant has made out any sufficient cause warranting condonation of delay. 7. Consequently, I.A. No.1 of 2026 seeking condonation of delay deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the present writ appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 8. Nevertheless, since learned counsel for the appellant has addressed submissions on the merits of the matter and the record is available before us, we have nevertheless examined the correctness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Even on merits, we do not find any ground 2 (2014) 4 SCC 108 4 warranting interference. 9. The claim of the appellant rests upon her assertion that she is the second wife of the deceased employee and is, therefore, entitled to family pension. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the pleadings and the documents placed on record, noticed that from the document Annexure-P/1, the date of marriage is reflected as 01.01.2022, whereas the marriage registration certificate (Page 13 of the Writ Petition) the date of marriage reflects as 01.01.2006. The learned Single Judge further noticed that the appellant herself claimed to be the second wife of the deceased employee, thereby giving rise to serious disputed questions regarding her legal status and consequential entitlement to family pension. 10. The right to receive family pension is a statutory right governed by the applicable Pension Rules. Entitlement thereto necessarily depends upon the legal status of the claimant under the governing statutory framework. Merely because the deceased employee is stated to have sought nomination of the appellant in the pension records would not, by itself, confer any substantive right upon her to claim family pension, as nomination neither creates nor enlarges the legal entitlement of a nominee contrary to the statutory provisions. Equally well settled is the principle that where determination of the rights of the parties involves seriously disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence, the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would ordinarily not be invoked for adjudication of such disputes. 11. In the present case, the validity of the alleged marriage, the legal status 5 of the appellant and her consequential entitlement to family pension involve disputed questions of fact which cannot be satisfactorily adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that such issues cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction and that the appellant has failed to establish an enforceable legal right to claim family pension. 12. Upon anxious consideration of the submissions advanced and an independent examination of the material available on record, we are satisfied that the order passed by the learned Single Judge neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor from any patent illegality or perversity warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006. 13. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 of 2026 stands dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal also stands dismissed as barred by limitation. Even assuming that the delay were to be condoned, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to make out any case for interference with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. The writ appeal is, accordingly, dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Rahul