1 CGHC010182852024 2026:CGHC:32851 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1090 of 2024 Gambhir Singh S/o Late Karman Singh Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Majhartola, Police Station Sonhat, District : Manendragarh- Chirmiri-Bharatpur, Chhattisgarh --- Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Station Kadganwa, District : Manendragarh-Chirmiri-Bharatpur, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Neelam Singh Yadav, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, G.A. CRA No. 1210 of 2024 Mahesh Singh S/o Jaikaran Singh Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Dubhapani, P.S. Baikunthpur, District Korea (C.G.) ---Appellant(s) Versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Khadganwa, Distt. Korea (C.G.) --- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Baghel, G.A. MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.07.31 10:51:27 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J . 30.07.2026 1. These criminal appeals under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the judgment dated 09.05.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO) Chirmiri, District- Korea (C.G.) in in Special Case POCSO No.60/2023, whereby the appellants have been convicted as under:- Particulars of the Convict(s) Particulars of the Offence(s) Sentence Imposed Gambhir Singh Section 363 of the IPC R.I. for 3 years & Fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for 01 month. Mahesh Singh Section 366(A) of the IPC Section 3/4(2) of the POCSO Act R.I. for 5 years & fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 01 month. R.I. for 20 years & fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 02 months. All sentences have been directed to run concurrently for Mahesh Singh. 3 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that the victim, a resident of Village Ganeshpur, Police Station Khadgawan, District Korea, was residing with her parents and pursuing her studies. According to the prosecution, on the night of 24.04.2020 at about 8:00 p.m., after she had retired to sleep, both the accused persons came to her house and knocked at the door. When she opened it, they allegedly caught hold of her and attempted to force her onto a motorcycle. It is alleged that when she raised an alarm, accused Mahesh Singh gagged her by stuffing a cloth into her mouth, whereafter both the accused took her to Village Dubhapani. The prosecution further alleges that accused Gambhir Singh thereafter left the place, while accused Mahesh Singh wrongfully confined the victim in his house for about ten days and repeatedly subjected her to penetrative sexual assault against her will. It is further alleged that whenever the victim insisted on returning home, she was assaulted and threatened with dire consequences. Upon her report, FIR was registered against both the accused for offences punishable under Sections 344, 366-A, 376, 323, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court. 3. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 4 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant- Gambhir Singh submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.05.2024 is wholly illegal, perverse, contrary to the evidence available on record and unsustainable in law. It is contended that the appellant has been implicated solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, whose version is inconsistent, unreliable and suffers from material contradictions. It is submitted that even according to the prosecution case, the alleged love affair, if any, was between the victim and co-accused Mahesh Singh and no allegation of sexual assault has been attributed to the present appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has failed to establish that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. The evidence relating to her age is highly doubtful, inasmuch as PW-4 Hansraj Singh, Assistant Teacher, admitted in his cross-examination that the date of birth of the victim recorded in the school admission register was entered on the basis of the estimate furnished by her father. It is also pointed out that the father of the victim, while deposing before the Trial Court, admitted that he had not maintained any record of the dates of birth of his children and that their ages were merely estimated. It is argued that, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Yuva Prakash v. State (AIR Online 2023 SC 558), such school records cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution withheld the testimony of the victim's 5 mother, who was a material witness, and that the sister of the victim also did not support the prosecution case. No independent witness has been examined despite their availability, thereby inviting an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act. It is further argued that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case, as no external or internal injuries were found on the person of the victim during her medical examination. According to the appellant, the investigation was perfunctory and unfair, as the police failed to examine material and independent witnesses, failed to comply with the mandatory procedural safeguards, and implicated the appellant solely on the basis of an uncorroborated and unreliable statement of the victim. It is submitted that neither the actus reus nor the requisite mens rea to constitute the alleged offences has been established against the appellant, and even the essential ingredients of the offences alleged are absent. Learned counsel further contends that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the conviction is based on conjectures and surmises rather than legally admissible evidence. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Yuva Prakash v. State (AIR Online 2023 SC 558), Sham Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2018 SC 3976), and Abbas Ahmed Choudhary v. State of Assam (2010 AIR SCW 1917), as well as the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 2023 Criminal Law 6 Journal 1545, to contend that where the testimony of the victim is unreliable, material witnesses are withheld, age is not satisfactorily proved, and the prosecution case suffers from serious infirmities, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant- Mahesh Singh submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.05.2024 is contrary to the facts, evidence on record and settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, deserves to be set aside. It is contended that the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence in its correct perspective and has erroneously convicted the appellant despite the prosecution having failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. It is submitted that the finding regarding the age of the victim is unsustainable, as the Trial Court has relied solely upon the school mark-sheet of Class V showing her date of birth as 18.09.2004, without there being any reliable foundational evidence regarding the source of such entry. Learned counsel further submits that the victim was more than 17 years of age at the relevant time and the evidence on record indicates that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant. According to the prosecution evidence itself, the victim left her parental home after receiving a phone call from the appellant, travelled with him of her own volition, remained with him for about ten days and thereafter contacted her father over the telephone, 7 following which she returned home. These circumstances, according to the appellant, clearly indicate that she was a consenting party and belie the prosecution allegation of forcible kidnapping or wrongful confinement. It is further argued that the medical evidence also does not support the prosecution case. Referring to the testimony of PW-9 Dr. Geeta Pradhan, learned counsel submits that no external injuries were found on the body of the victim during her medical examination and the doctor specifically noted that the hymen was old ruptured, thereby rendering the prosecution version doubtful. It is further submitted that the remaining prosecution witnesses are merely hearsay witnesses, none of whom had witnessed the alleged occurrence, and, therefore, their testimony does not provide any independent corroboration to the allegations made by the victim. Learned counsel accordingly submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that the conviction is based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence. It is also submitted that the appellant has remained in custody since 05.06.2020 and has undergone a substantial period of incarceration. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of all the charges. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of both the appellants beyond all reasonable 8 doubt by leading cogent, reliable and consistent oral as well as documentary evidence. It is contended that the testimony of the victim is natural, trustworthy and inspires confidence, and the same stands duly corroborated by the medical and other prosecution evidence. It is further submitted that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved that the victim was a child within the meaning of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and, therefore, her alleged consent, if any, is of no legal consequence. Learned State counsel argues that the Trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire evidence on record and has rightly convicted the appellants after recording well-reasoned findings. It is submitted that no material contradiction or infirmity has been brought on record so as to discredit the prosecution case or warrant interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is prayed that both the criminal appeals, being devoid of merit, deserve to be dismissed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be affirmed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. The foremost question which falls for consideration is whether the prosecution has satisfactorily established that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident, as the entire conviction under the provisions of the POCSO Act 9 as well as the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court substantially rest upon such conclusion. 9. In this regard, the Trial Court has accepted the date of birth of the victim as 18.09.2004 primarily on the basis of the school admission register, the Class-V mark-sheet and the certificate issued by the school authorities. On that basis, it held that the victim was about 15 years and 8 months old on the date of occurrence. 10. However, a closer scrutiny of the evidence on record reveals that the very foundation of the entry relating to the date of birth is doubtful. Hansraj Singh (PW-4), Assistant Teacher, who produced the school records, candidly admitted in his cross-examination that the date of birth of the victim was recorded in the school register on the basis of the age disclosed by her father and that no birth certificate or any contemporaneous document was produced before the school at the time of admission. The father of the victim also admitted during his cross-examination that he had not maintained any record regarding the dates of birth of his children and that the ages of his children were merely estimated. He further admitted that all his children were born at intervals of about two to three years and that he had nowhere recorded their dates of birth. These admissions assume considerable significance, as they cast a serious doubt upon the authenticity of the source from which the date of birth came to be entered in the school records. 10 11. The prosecution has also not produced any birth certificate issued by the competent statutory authority, hospital record or any other contemporaneous public document evidencing the date of birth of the victim. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the school records, whose entries admittedly originated from an estimated declaration made by the father, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age. The Trial Court, in our considered opinion, accepted the school documents without examining the reliability of the source from which the date of birth had been derived. Such an approach is not in consonance with the settled principles governing proof of age. 12. We shall, therefore, examine the evidentiary value of the school records and the legal effect of the admissions made by the prosecution witnesses while considering whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving the minority of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Upon careful examination of the evidence available on record, this Court finds that the finding recorded by the learned Trial Court with regard to the age of the victim cannot be sustained for more than one reason. 14. The learned Trial Court has primarily relied upon the admission register (Ex.P-12), its certified copy (Ex.P-12(C)), the certificate issued by the school (Ex.P-13) and the Class-V mark-sheet of the prosecutrix to hold that her date of birth was 18.09.2004. 11 However, the evidentiary value of these documents has to be tested not merely on the basis of their existence but also on the basis of the source from which the entry regarding the date of birth was made. 15. Hansraj Singh (PW-4), Assistant Teacher, who proved the school records, admitted during his cross-examination that the date of birth of the victim was entered in the admission register on the basis of the information furnished by her father. He further admitted that no birth certificate or any other contemporaneous document was produced before the school at the time of admission. Thus, the entry in the school register was not based upon any independent or verified public record but merely upon the statement of the guardian. 16. The evidence of the father of the victim further weakens the prosecution case. In his cross-examination, he categorically admitted that his own marriage had taken place when he was about 25 years of age, the victim was born about two years after his marriage, that he had never maintained any record of the dates of birth of his children and that all his children were born at intervals of two to three years. These admissions unmistakably demonstrate that even the father was not certain about the exact date of birth of the victim and that the information supplied by him to the school was only an estimate. Once the very source of the school entry is found to be uncertain, the entry itself loses much of its evidentiary value. 12 17. It is also significant that the prosecution did not produce the mother of the victim, who was undoubtedly the most competent witness to depose regarding the birth and age of her daughter. No explanation has been offered for withholding such an important witness. The non-examination of the mother assumes considerable importance particularly when the father himself expressed uncertainty regarding the dates of birth of his children. In these circumstances, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the prosecution. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Yuva Prakash v. State (AIR Online 2023 SC 558) has held that an entry in the school admission register, by itself, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age unless the person who supplied the information regarding the date of birth or the source of such entry is satisfactorily established. Where the foundational facts regarding the entry remain doubtful, such documents cannot be accepted as unimpeachable proof of age. 19. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational basis of the school record. No birth certificate, hospital record, municipal register or other contemporaneous public document has been brought on record. Even the prosecution witnesses have admitted that the date of birth recorded in the school register was based only upon the estimate furnished by the father. Therefore, the finding of the learned Trial 13 Court that the victim was below eighteen years of age merely on the strength of the school records cannot be sustained. 20. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the victim was a minor on the date of the alleged incident. The benefit of such uncertainty must necessarily enure to the appellants. 21. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of UP, (2006) 5 SCC 584, relying upon its earlier judgment in case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 supp. SCC 604, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “26. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." 22. In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by 14 government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. It was observed as under:- “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to 15 the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 23. Reverting to the facts of the present case and due consideration of the prosecution evidence, we find that no any clinching and legally admissible evidence have been brought by the prosecution to prove the fact that the victim was minor on the date of incident, yet the trial Court in the impugned judgment has held her minor, hence, we set aside the finding given by the trail Court that on the date of incident the victim was minor. 24. Having held that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged occurrence, the next question which arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has nevertheless succeeded in proving the charge of rape against appellant- Mahesh Singh under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Since the conviction under the POCSO Act cannot survive in the absence of satisfactory proof regarding the age of the victim, the evidence is now required to be examined independently to ascertain whether the ingredients of the offence 16 punishable under Section 376 of the IPC have been established beyond reasonable doubt. 25. The prosecution principally rests upon the testimony of the victim. A careful reading of her deposition shows that although she was declared hostile by the prosecution on certain aspects relating to her previous acquaintance with the accused and the alleged love affair, she did not resile from the core prosecution case regarding the alleged sexual assault. It is well settled that the evidence of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in its entirety and the Court may rely upon such part of the testimony as is found to be trustworthy and inspires confidence. 26. In her examination-in-chief, the victim stated that on the relevant evening accused Mahesh Singh called her on her mobile phone asking her to come outside. According to her, after she came out, both the accused persons stuffed a cloth into her mouth and forcibly took her on a motorcycle to village Dubhapani. She further stated that appellant Mahesh Singh assaulted her, confined her in his house and committed rape upon her on several occasions. She also stated that whenever she expressed her desire to return to her parental house, the appellant threatened to kill her. She identified the First Information Report as well as her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. 27. Even during her cross-examination, the victim denied the defence suggestion that she had voluntarily accompanied appellant 17 Mahesh Singh or that she was in a love affair with him. She specifically denied the suggestion that no rape had been committed upon her and consistently maintained that appellant Mahesh Singh had forcibly taken her and committed sexual intercourse against her will. Her assertion regarding the commission of rape thus remained substantially intact despite an elaborate cross-examination. 28. At the same time, certain aspects emerging from her evidence assume significance while appreciating its overall reliability. In her examination-in-chief she stated that she had remained in the house of appellant Mahesh Singh for about ten days. However, during cross-examination she admitted that she remained there only for one day and further admitted that during that period the mother of the accused was also residing in the same house. She also admitted that she neither informed the mother of the accused that she had been brought forcibly nor made any complaint to any neighbour, although several houses were situated nearby. These admissions constitute material improvements and inconsistencies which require careful scrutiny while evaluating the prosecution version. 29. Another significant circumstance is that although the victim alleged that she had been forcibly abducted, confined and repeatedly subjected to sexual intercourse against her will, the medical evidence does not indicate the presence of any external 18 injury upon her body. The doctor has also not noticed any injury over the genital organs and has found the hymen to be old ruptured. Though it is well settled that absence of injuries by itself is not decisive and does not necessarily falsify the allegation of rape, such circumstance assumes relevance while appreciating the overall evidence particularly where other material inconsistencies are also available on record. 30. It is no doubt well settled that conviction for the offence of rape can be based solely upon the testimony of the victim if the same is found to be wholly reliable and inspires confidence. Equally well settled is the principle that where the testimony of the victim suffers from material contradictions, improvements and inherent improbabilities affecting its credibility, the Court would be justified in seeking corroboration from other reliable evidence. In criminal jurisprudence, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof. 31. In the present case, the testimony of the victim does not inspire such confidence as would justify recording a conviction without independent corroboration. The victim has made materially inconsistent statements regarding the duration of her stay with appellant Mahesh Singh. While in her examination-in-chief she alleged that she remained confined in the house of the appellant for about ten days, during cross-examination she categorically admitted that she remained there only for one day. This 19 contradiction goes to the root of the prosecution story, particularly when the allegation is of repeated forcible sexual intercourse during the alleged period of confinement. 32. The conduct of the victim during the alleged period of confinement also creates serious doubt about the prosecution version. She admitted that the mother of appellant Mahesh Singh was residing in the same house throughout. She further admitted that several neighbouring houses were situated nearby. Despite having opportunities to seek assistance, she admittedly neither informed the mother of the accused nor disclosed the alleged incident to any neighbour. The prosecution has not offered any satisfactory explanation for such conduct. 33. It has further come on record that the victim returned to her parental house on the very next day. According to her own deposition, appellant Mahesh Singh himself took her to Khandohra, from where she reached her house. This circumstance also appears inconsistent with the prosecution allegation that she had been illegally confined for several days under constant threat and subjected to repeated forcible sexual intercourse. 34. The medical evidence also does not materially advance the prosecution case. The doctor who medically examined the victim did not notice any external injury on her person nor any injury over her private parts. Though the absence of injuries is not by 20 itself decisive, in the facts of the present case, where the ocular testimony itself suffers from material inconsistencies, the medical evidence fails to furnish the assurance necessary to sustain the conviction. 35. The prosecution has also not examined any independent witness to corroborate the material aspects of its case. The mother of the victim, who was a natural and material witness, has not been examined without any explanation. Likewise, no neighbour or other independent witness has been produced though, according to the prosecution itself, the alleged confinement took place in a residential locality. The non-examination of such material witnesses assumes significance in the peculiar facts of the present case. 36. On an overall appreciation of the entire evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of appellant-Mahesh Singh beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim is not of such sterling quality as would justify sustaining the conviction in the absence of reliable corroboration. The material contradictions, improvements, absence of convincing medical support, failure to prove the age of the victim and the omission to examine material witnesses together create a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution story. Such doubt must necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused. 21 37. So far as appellant-Gambhir Singh is concerned, the evidence against him stands on an even weaker footing. According to the prosecution itself, his role was confined to accompanying appellant-Mahesh Singh at the time when the victim was allegedly taken from her house. The consistent prosecution case is that after reaching village Dubhapani, appellant-Gambhir Singh left the place and thereafter no allegation of sexual assault, wrongful confinement or any overt act has been attributed to him. 38. The conviction of appellant-Gambhir Singh under Section 363 of the IPC has been recorded primarily on the basis of the statement of the victim. However, once this Court has found that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor and the testimony of the victim suffers from material inconsistencies on the core aspects of the prosecution story, it would not be safe to sustain the conviction of appellant-Gambhir Singh solely on such uncorroborated evidence. 39. Apart from the testimony of the victim, there is no independent evidence establishing that appellant-Gambhir Singh actively participated in the alleged kidnapping or shared any common intention with appellant-Mahesh Singh to commit the alleged offences. No independent eyewitness has been examined. The prosecution has also failed to produce any circumstance 22 connecting appellant-Gambhir Singh with the subsequent alleged acts committed by appellant-Mahesh Singh. 40. It is a settled principle of criminal law that every accused is entitled to have his individual role independently evaluated. Mere presence at the place of occurrence or mere association with a co-accused cannot by itself constitute sufficient proof of guilt unless the prosecution establishes the necessary ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the standard required for recording a conviction against appellant-Gambhir Singh. 41. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of appellant-Gambhir Singh beyond reasonable doubt. He is also entitled to the benefit of doubt. 42. The medical evidence also does not lend sufficient assurance to the prosecution case. Dr. Geeta Pradhan (PW-9), who medically examined the victim and proved the medical examination report (Ex.P-16), has deposed that no external injury was found on any part of the body of the victim. The doctor has further stated that no fresh injury was noticed over the genital region and the hymen was found to be old ruptured. The opinion of the doctor does not indicate any definite sign of recent forcible sexual intercourse. 23 43. In her cross-examination, Dr. Geeta Pradhan (PW-9) admitted that no external injury was present on the person of the victim and no injury was found over the private parts. Thus, the medical evidence does not corroborate the allegation that the victim was subjected to repeated forcible sexual intercourse during the alleged period of confinement. 44. The prosecution has also relied upon the Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P-37). However, a perusal of the said report reveals that no incriminating forensic material has been detected so as to conclusively connect appellant Mahesh Singh with the commission of the alleged offence. The FSL report, therefore, does not furnish any substantive corroboration to the ocular version of the victim. 45. It is true that medical evidence is corroborative in nature and conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of the victim if it is of sterling quality. However, in the present case, where the testimony of the victim suffers from material inconsistencies and the prosecution has failed to establish her age beyond reasonable doubt, the medical evidence (Ex.P-16) and the FSL report (Ex.P-37) do not provide the assurance necessary to sustain the conviction of the appellants. 46. Upon an overall appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the 24 appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to satisfactorily prove that the victim was a minor on the date of the incident. The testimony of the victim, though not liable to be discarded in toto merely because she was declared hostile on certain aspects, suffers from material inconsistencies and improvements on the core prosecution case. The medical and forensic evidence also do not furnish the necessary corroboration so as to dispel the reasonable doubt arising from the prosecution evidence. In a criminal trial, the burden always rests upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and where two views are reasonably possible, the one favourable to the accused must necessarily be adopted. 47. Consequently, the criminal appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.05.2024 is set aside. The appellants stand acquitted from all the charges. 48. Appellant- Gambhir Singh is stated to be on bail. He need not surrender, however, keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), his bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and shall remain effective for a period of six months from today along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 25 49. Appellant- Mahesh Singh is stated to be in jail. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (now Section 481 of BNSS), the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 50. 50. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice 51. MManpreet