1 CGHC010275762022 2026:CGHC:32848-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3727 of 2022 Shivalay Ispat And Power Pvt. Ltd. Having Its Registered Office At Guma - Urla Road, Village- Kara, Raipur- 493221, Chhattisgarh, Through Its Authoriced Signatory Shri Nitesh Agrawal. --- Petitioner Versus 1 - Union of India Through The Secretary, Ministry of Coal, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. 2 - Coal India Limited, A Maharatna Company, (Govt of India Undertaking), Through Its General Manager (Marketing And Sales), Coal Bhawan, Marketing Directorate, Premises No. 04 Mar, Plot – AF III, Action Area - 1a, New Town, Rajarhat Kolkata – 700156. 3 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited, (A Subsidiary of Coal India Limited/a Mini RATN PSU), Through Its General Manager, (Marketing And Sales), Regd. Office - Seepat Road, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. 495006. 4 - South East Central Railways, Through Its General Manager, South East Central Railway, New Zonal Building, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. Pin - 495004 --- Respondents WPC No. 3732 of 2022 API Ispat And Powertech Pvt. Ltd. Having Its Registered Office At Near Industrial Growth Center Phase - 2, Siltara, Raipur - 493111, Chhattisgarh, Through Its Authorised Signatory Shri Nitesh Agrawal. ---Petitioner Versus ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.07.31 10:22:55 +0530 2 1 - Union of India Through The Secretary, Ministry of Coal Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. 2 - Coal India Limited A Maharatna Company, (Govt. of India Undertaking) Through Its General Manager (Marketing And Sales), Coal Bhawan, Marketing Directorate, Premise No. 04 Mar, Plot No. – AF III, Action Area - 1a, New Town, Rajarhat Kolkata – 7000156 3 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited (A Subsidiary of Coal India Limited / A Mini RATNA PSU),through Its General Manager, (Marketing And Sales), Regd. Office - Seepat Road Bilaspur (C.G.) – 495006 4 - South East Central Railways Through Its General Manager, South East Central Railway, New Zonal Building, Bilaspur C.G. Pin, 495004. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Ashish Anand Bernard, Mr. Ankit Singhal and Mr. Ashish Mittal, Advocates For Respondent-UOI : Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, Central Government Counsel For Respondents No.2 & 3 : Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 30.07.2026 1. Though the matters were listed today for further orders, it is noticed that pleadings in both the petitions have been completed. Learned counsel appearing for the respective parties submitted that the matters are ripe for final adjudication and expressed their consent for final disposal. Accordingly, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, both the writ petitions are being decided finally. 3 2. Heard Mr. Ashish Anand Bernard, Mr. Ankit Singhal as well as Mr. Ashish Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the Union of India/respondents No.1 and 4 as well as Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 and 3. 3. Since both the petitions involve common questions of fact arising out of identical circumstances and the challenge in each petition pertains to the same set of actions on the part of the respondents, this Court considers it appropriate to hear them together. Accordingly, both the writ petitions were clubbed, taken up for analogous hearing, and are being disposed of by this common order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. 4. In W.P.(C) No.3727 of 2022, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1. Be Pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ holding and/or declaring that the instant action on the part of the Respondent No.3 in passing the the impugned order dated 13.4.2021 as bad in the eyes of law and as illegal, arbitrary and consequentially after setting it aside, direct the Respondents to issue/submit the Allotment/Allocation of Coal for the supplies of contracted capacity of coal for the period during which the coal supply was deferred in accordance with the various Notifications as well as the Fuel Supply Agreement; and 4 10.2. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case along with cost of the petition.” 5. In W.P.(C) No.3732 of 2022, the petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1. Be Pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ holding and/or declaring that the instant action on the part of the Respondent No.3 in passing the the impugned order dated 13.4.2022 as bad in the eyes of law and as illegal, arbitrary and consequentially after setting it aside, direct the Respondents to issue/submit the Allotment/Allocation of Coal for the supplies of contracted capacity of coal for the period during which the coal supply was deferred in accordance with the various Notifications as well as the Fuel Supply Agreement; and 10.2. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case along with cost of the petition.” 6. Brief facts of the cases, are that the petitioners are companies incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, engaged in the manufacture of Sponge Iron/Steel in the State of Chhattisgarh. For running their manufacturing units, the petitioners require regular supply of coal. Pursuant to the auction of coal linkages conducted by the Union of India under the Scheme Documents (‘RFP’) issued for the Sponge Iron Sub- Sector in the years 2016 and 2017, the petitioners emerged as 5 successful bidders and entered into separate Fuel Supply Agreements (‘FSAs’) with South Eastern Coalfields Limited (‘SECL’). Under the terms of the respective FSAs, SECL was obligated to allocate and supply the contracted quantity of coal, while the actual transportation of coal was to be undertaken by the Indian Railways in accordance with the Rail Programme. It is the common case of the petitioners that during the Covid-19 pandemic, SECL and Coal India Limited issued circulars permitting consumers to seek deferment of coal loading/rake movement. Availing the said facility, the petitioners requested deferment of their coal supplies by letters dated 16.07.2020. Subsequently, after improvement of the prevailing situation, the petitioners withdrew the deferment and, by representations dated 17.02.2021 and 13.03.2021, requested the respondents to revive the indents and resume allocation of coal in terms of the circulars governing revival of deferred indents. However, despite such requests, the respondents did not resume allocation of coal to the petitioners. 7. Aggrieved by the inaction of the respondents, the petitioners had earlier approached this Court by filing separate writ petitions, which were disposed of on 09.03.2022 with a direction to the competent authority to decide the petitioners' representations dated 17.02.2021 and 13.03.2021 within the stipulated period. Pursuant thereto, the respondent authority rejected the representations by separate orders. In W.P.(C) No. 3727 of 2022, 6 the representation came to be rejected by order dated 13.04.2021, whereas in W.P.(C) No. 3732 of 2022, the representation was rejected by order dated 13.04.2022. The respondents took the view that the deferment sought by the petitioners amounted to modification of the Rail Programme under the FSAs and that the non-acceptance of the Rail Programme by the Railways disentitled the petitioners from seeking further allocation of coal. 8. According to the petitioners, the impugned orders proceed on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable circulars issued by Coal India Limited and the Railways. It is contended that the circulars specifically contemplated revival of indents kept in abeyance upon a request made by the consumer and did not prohibit resumption of coal allocation after withdrawal of the deferment request. It is further pleaded that refusal to allocate the contracted quantity of coal is arbitrary, contrary to the terms of the Fuel Supply Agreements, and has adversely affected the petitioners' manufacturing operations. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions seeking quashment of the respective impugned orders and consequential directions for allocation and supply of coal in accordance with the Fuel Supply Agreements. 9. Mr. Ashish Anand Bernard, assisted by Mr. Ankit Singhal and Mr. Ashish Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in 7 both the writ petitions, submit that the impugned orders dated 13.04.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 3727 of 2022 and 13.04.2022 in W.P. (C) No. 3732 of 2022 are wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the terms of the respective Fuel Supply Agreements (FSAs) as well as the circulars issued by Coal India Limited, SECL and the Railway Board during the Covid-19 period. It is contended that the respondents themselves had introduced the facility of deferment of coal loading and, after the petitioners withdrew the deferment by communications dated 17.02.2021 and 13.03.2021, the respondents were under a corresponding obligation to revive the indents and resume allocation of coal. The refusal to do so, coupled with the rejection of the petitioners' representations, is stated to be contrary to the governing policy and the contractual obligations under the FSAs. 10. It is further submitted that the respondents have completely misconstrued the Railway Board Circular dated 08.07.2020 and the subsequent Coal India Limited Circular dated 16.07.2020. According to learned counsel, the said circulars merely prohibited placement of fresh indents during the period the earlier indents remained in abeyance and specifically contemplated revival of such indents upon a request by the consumer. Therefore, the petitioners' request was not for any fresh allocation but only for revival of the earlier indents in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the circulars. The respondents have thus acted on an erroneous interpretation of the policy, rendering the impugned 8 orders unsustainable. They further contend that the action of the respondents violates the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. 11. It is argued that having themselves extended the benefit of deferment during the pandemic and assured consumers that the indents would be revived upon request, the respondents cannot subsequently refuse to restore coal allocation by taking a contrary stand. In support of these submissions, reliance has been placed upon Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71; Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499; Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2005) 1 SCC 625; MRF Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Sales Tax, (2006) 8 SCC 702; Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 1 SCC 31; Pine Chemicals Ltd. v. Assessing Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 683; and Manjushree Extrusions Ltd. v. State of Assam, 2001 SCC OnLine Gau 125. 12. Lastly, it is submitted that under the scheme of the FSAs, allocation of coal by SECL is the first and indispensable step in the process of supply, whereafter the Railways undertake transportation in accordance with the Rail Programme. Unless allocation is first made by SECL, no question of transportation by the Railways arises. The respondents, therefore, cannot justify their refusal to allocate coal by placing reliance upon alleged non- 9 acceptance of the Rail Programme by the Railways. It is argued that the continued non-allocation of the contracted quantity of coal has seriously affected the petitioners' manufacturing operations and is in breach of the contractual obligations undertaken by the respondents. Accordingly, it is prayed that the impugned orders dated 13.04.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 3727 of 2022 and 13.04.2022 in W.P.(C) No. 3732 of 2022 be quashed and appropriate directions be issued to the respondents to allocate coal and initiate the process for its supply in accordance with the respective Fuel Supply Agreements. 13. On the other hand, Dr. Sudeep Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 and 3, opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the impugned orders dated 13.04.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 3727 of 2022 and 13.04.2022 in W.P.(C) No. 3732 of 2022 are well-reasoned and speaking orders passed strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions of the respective Fuel Supply Agreements (FSAs), the circulars issued by Coal India Limited (CIL) and the Railway Board, as well as the applicable railway procedures. It is contended that the petitioners, having voluntarily opted for deferment of coal supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic, were fully aware of the consequences thereof. Once the allotments remained un-booked during the period of deferment, such quantities automatically lapsed in terms of Clauses 5.8.1(b) and 8.1.2 of the FSA, and there exists no provision under the 10 agreement permitting revival of such lapsed quantities in subsequent months. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim, as a matter of right, revival of the earlier allotments. The respondent No. 3 merely forwarded the petitioners' requests to the Railways for activation or deactivation in the FOIS system and had no control over the functioning of the Railway system or the consequences flowing therefrom. 14. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have misread and misconstrued the circulars issued by CIL and the Railway Board. According to him, the respondents have scrupulously adhered to the contractual stipulations governing monthly rail programmes and allotment of coal. The impugned orders were passed pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in the earlier writ petitions after duly considering the petitioners' representations and the relevant provisions of the FSAs. It is, therefore, submitted that the action of the respondents is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and does not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381; Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499; and Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India, (1999) 4 SCC 727, to contend that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not confer an enforceable legal right and cannot override the express contractual terms or settled policy. 11 15. Lastly, it is submitted by learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 that the Fuel Supply Agreements executed between the parties contain a comprehensive arbitration clause providing for resolution of all disputes arising out of or in connection with the agreements. Since the controversy raised in the present writ petitions pertains to the interpretation and enforcement of the contractual terms of the FSAs, including the consequences of deferment of supplies and entitlement to revival of coal allocation, the dispute is purely contractual in nature. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy of arbitration under the terms of the agreements and, in the absence of any challenge to the validity of any statutory provision or allegation of violation of fundamental rights, the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be invoked. 16. Mr. Shalvik Tiwari, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the Union of India/respondents No. 1 and 4, submits that the Union of India is only a formal party to the present proceedings. He submits that the controversy involved in the writ petitions essentially pertains to the implementation of the Fuel Supply Agreements entered into between the petitioners and respondent No. 3, as well as the actions taken pursuant thereto. It is further submitted that no independent relief has been claimed against the Union of India, nor has any specific action of respondents No. 1 and 4 been challenged in the present writ 12 petitions. Therefore, the adjudication of the dispute primarily rests upon the interpretation of the contractual terms of the Fuel Supply Agreements and the circulars issued by the competent authorities, and the Union of India would abide by any order that may be passed by this Court. 17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the Bar. We have also carefully perused the pleadings, the documents brought on record, the respective Fuel Supply Agreements executed between the parties, the impugned orders, as well as the circulars issued by Coal India Limited, SECL and the Railway Board governing deferment and resumption of coal supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic. 18. Upon a careful consideration of the rival submissions, we find that the principal controversy involved in the present batch of writ petitions arises out of the interpretation of the terms and conditions of the respective Fuel Supply Agreements executed between the petitioners and respondent No.3. The grievance of the petitioners is founded upon their claim that after withdrawal of the deferment sought during the Covid-19 period, they were entitled to revival of the earlier allotments and consequential allocation of coal, whereas the stand of respondent No.3 is that the quantities which remained un-booked during the period of deferment stood lapsed in terms of the Fuel Supply Agreements 13 and could not thereafter be revived. Thus, the dispute essentially concerns the rights and obligations flowing from the contractual stipulations contained in the Fuel Supply Agreements, particularly the interpretation of Clauses 5.8.1(b), 8.1.2 and other related provisions, read with the circulars issued by Coal India Limited and the Railway Board. 19. It is now well settled that although the existence of an arbitration clause does not, by itself, operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would ordinarily decline to entertain a writ petition where the dispute is predominantly contractual in nature and the parties have consciously agreed upon a specific mechanism for resolution of their disputes. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 is essentially a public law remedy intended to ensure fairness in State action and to enforce constitutional and statutory obligations. It is not intended to supplant the contractual remedies voluntarily agreed upon by commercial parties. Where adjudication of the controversy necessarily involves interpretation of contractual clauses, determination of reciprocal rights and obligations, appreciation of contractual terms, and examination of disputed questions arising from the performance of the contract, such matters are more appropriately adjudicated by the forum chosen by the parties themselves. 14 20. The Supreme Court in Joshi Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728, after an exhaustive review of the earlier precedents, authoritatively summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction in contractual matters and held that though writ jurisdiction is not completely excluded merely because the dispute arises from a contract, the High Court must exercise considerable restraint where the dispute is essentially private law in character, particularly when an efficacious contractual remedy exists. The Court observed that the writ court should ordinarily refrain from adjudicating disputes involving enforcement of contractual obligations, interpretation of contractual terms or claims arising purely out of the contract unless the impugned action is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, violative of statutory provisions or actuated by public law considerations. 21. The aforesaid principle has consistently been reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22, wherein it was held that disputes relating to interpretation and implementation of contractual terms should ordinarily not be entertained in writ proceedings. 22. Similarly, in ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553, while recognising that the existence of a contractual relationship does not completely oust writ jurisdiction, the Supreme Court clarified that 15 such jurisdiction is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where the impugned action has a clear public law element or is patently arbitrary or unreasonable. 23. Again, in Unitech Ltd. v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation, (2021) 15 SCC 308, the Supreme Court reiterated that the mere presence of an arbitration clause is not an absolute bar; nevertheless, the High Court must examine whether the dispute is essentially contractual or whether it involves violation of constitutional or statutory duties. 24. More recently, in M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703, the Supreme Court emphasized that where sophisticated commercial parties have consciously agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration, the High Court should ordinarily respect such contractual bargain and refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction unless exceptional circumstances exist. The Court further observed that disputes involving interpretation of contractual stipulations, reciprocal obligations of the contracting parties and determination of contractual rights are matters best left to the arbitral forum agreed upon by the parties. 25. Reverting to the facts of the present cases in the light of above judicial precedents Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra), Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. (supra), ABL International Ltd. (supra), Unitech Ltd. (supra) and Sky Power 16 Southeast Solar India Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it is apparent that the Fuel Supply Agreements executed between the parties contain a comprehensive arbitration clause providing for adjudication of disputes arising out of or relating to the agreements. The questions sought to be raised before us, namely, whether the quantities stood lapsed during the period of deferment, whether the respondents were obliged to revive the allotments after withdrawal of deferment, whether the circulars issued during the Covid-19 period override or supplement the contractual provisions, and whether the impugned orders correctly interpret the relevant clauses of the Fuel Supply Agreements, are all matters squarely falling within the realm of contractual interpretation. Determination of these issues would necessarily require an adjudication upon the reciprocal contractual rights and obligations of the parties, which is more appropriately undertaken by the forum chosen by the parties themselves under the agreement. 26. We are also unable to accept the submission that the present case falls within any of the recognized exceptions warranting exercise of writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration clause. There is no challenge to the vires of any statutory provision, nor is there any allegation of violation of the principles of natural justice in the decision-making process. The impugned orders have been passed pursuant to the directions issued earlier by this Court after considering the representations 17 submitted by the petitioners. The petitioners have essentially questioned the correctness of the interpretation placed by respondent No.3 upon the Fuel Supply Agreements and the relevant circulars. Such questions, in our considered opinion, are contractual disputes simpliciter. 27. At this stage, we consciously refrain from expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions touching upon the interpretation of the Fuel Supply Agreements, the applicability of the circulars issued by Coal India Limited and the Railway Board or the legality of the conclusions recorded in the impugned orders, lest any observation made by us may prejudice either party in the arbitral proceedings. All such questions are left open to be urged before the appropriate forum in accordance with law. 28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the present writ petitions do not warrant interference in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The disputes raised by the petitioners are essentially contractual in nature and are required to be adjudicated in terms of the dispute resolution mechanism agreed upon by the parties under respective Fuel Supply Agreements. 29. Consequently, both the writ petitions being W.P.(C) No. 3727 of 2022 and W.P.(C) No. 3732 of 2022, are dismissed, reserving liberty in favour of the petitioners to invoke the arbitration clause or such other remedy as may be available to them in law. 18 30. It is clarified that dismissal of these writ petitions shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the rival claims and all questions of fact and law are left open for consideration by the competent forum. 31. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu