1 2026:CGHC:7446 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 2858 of 2022 1 - Manoj Kumar Sahu S/o Shri Bhuwan Lal Sahu Aged About 38 Years Resident Of Village Achhola, P.S. Tumgaon, District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Bank Of India Madama Cama Road, Naviman Point, Mumbai, Maharashtra 400021 Through Its Chairman 2 - Zonal Manager State Bank Of India Regional Office, Zonal Office Premises Byron Bazar, Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Chief Manager (H.R.) State Bank Of India Administrative Office, Vyapar Vihar Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 4 - Regional Manager State Bank Of India Rbo Iii Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh 5 - Branch Manager State Bank Of India, Kharsiya Dabra Road, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Purnendra Khichariya with Mr. C. R. Sahu, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. P. R. Patankar, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput Order On Board 10.02.2026 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking for the following relief(s); “(i) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to set-aside the impugned termination order dated 09.02.2022 (Annexure P-1), in the interest of justice. (ii) That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to issue the appropriate writ order or direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner on his service within the stipulated period as given by per the facts and the Hon'ble Court as circumantaces of the case, in the interest of justice. iii) Any other relief which may be suitable in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be granted.” HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2026.03.18 17:59:16 +0530 2 2. The facts in this case in a nutshell is that the petitioner is an ex-serviceman who retired from the Army on 30.11.2019. An advertisement was issued by the respondent bank on 12.03.2020 inviting applications from ex-servicemen for the post of Bank Guard. The petitioner was found successful and issued a selection order on 11.06.2021. While submitting the application for appointment, the petitioner was required to submit a declaration regarding his previous antecedents, specifically whether he had ever been arrested, tried, or convicted by a criminal court. The petitioner, in his application, failed to provide this information. The petitioner was convicted and fined an amount of Rs. 900/- for an offence under Section 279 of the IPC, 1860 and Section 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short MV Act) in criminal case no. 119/2013, as per the impugned termination order dated 09.02.2022 (Annexure P/1). The alleged conviction and fine imposed upon the petitioner related to trivial offences i.e. rash and negligent driving and driving an uninsured vehicle. These cannot be classified as offences of moral turpitude. Furthermore, the petitioner being an ex-serviceman has no other criminal cases registered against him nor has he been convicted in any other criminal matters. The petitioner has been deprived of his regular service. The impugned order while reflecting that certain material facts were suppressed fails to disclose how this suppression has affected the petitioner’s service. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner, an ex- serviceman who retired from the Army on 30.11.2019, applied successfully under the respondent bank's advertisement dated 12.03.2020 for the post of Bank Guard and got selected. While submitting the application, he failed to disclose his prior conviction and fine of Rs. 900/- . He further submtis that these were trivial offences related to the rash/negligent driving of the MV Act. 3 He further submits that the act alleged against the petitioner does not involve the moral turpitudee. He placed relaince a judgment of this Court in case of Swami Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh (WP No. 6555/10, dt. 11.02.2013) and the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 471. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the submissions and asserts that the relationship between an employee and employer is based on trust and faith. The employee, while submitting the application must disclose all previous antecedents. The petitioner failed to disclose his conviction for the aforementioned offences and the imposition of a fine. Consequently, the petitioner did not submit the application form with clean hands. It is contended that the petitioner’s action was not honest and therefore, his services were lawfully terminated by the impugned order. He submits that Clause 9 & 10 of the letter of offer issued by Assistant General Manager (HR) specifically provides that the appointment shall be subject to satisfactory police verification report within specified period and it further provided that if any declaration/information / certificate / document is found false, forged or fabricated the offer for appointment shall be deemed to have been cancelled. Clause 9 & 10 of the offer of appointment is quoted below for the ready reference of this Hon'ble Court. 9. Please note that this is not an appointment letter and will itself not entitle you to an appointment in the Bank. The appointment letter will be issued to you by the competent authority after completion of other formalities like verification of original certificates/testimonials, satisfactory medical report and completion of your induction training etc. your appointment in the Bank will be subject to verification of character from the two referees/last employer and satisfactory police verification report within a specified period. Please note that you will not be paid any travelling allowance, 4 conveyance, medical examination charges, for journey for reporting at Administrative Office Bilaspur. 10. Please note that in the event of any of the information/declaration/certificate or document being found false, forged or fabricated at a later date, this offer of appointment shall be deemed to have been cancelled and in the event of your having joined the service, you will render yourself liable for appropriate action including disciplinary removal/termination of service. action or removal/termination of service. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent relies on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited v. Anil Kanwariya (2021) 10 SCC 136. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The fact of non-disclosure of criminal case pending/decided against the employee fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Avtar Singh (supra). Paragraph 38 is relevant for adjudication of the case and quoted as under: “38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus: 38.1 Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information. 38.2 While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. 38.3 The employer shall take into consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision. 38.4 In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted: - 38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty 5 offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion. ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse. 38.4.2. Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee. 38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude of offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. 38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case. the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. 38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case. 38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order canceling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper. 38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime. 38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form. 38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for. 38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.” 6 8. As would be clear from Avtar Singh (Supra), it has been clearly laid down that of course a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment, but still he or she has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily. The exercise of power has to be in a reasonable manner with objectivity and having due regard to the facts. In short, the ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria after due consideration of all relevant aspects. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Pawan Kumar vs. Union of India and Another, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 532, involving appointment to the post of Constable in Railway Protection Force and setting aside the order of discharge due to alleged suppression in the verification form, after noting Avtar Singh (Supra) held as under:- “11. This cannot be disputed that the candidate who intends to participate in the selection process is always required to furnish correct information relating to his character and antecedents in the verification/attestation form before and after induction into service. It is also equally true that the person who has suppressed the material information or has made false declaration indeed has no unfettered right of seeking appointment or continuity in service, but at least has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and power has to be judiciously exercised by the competent authority in a reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to the facts of the case on hand. It goes without saying that the yardstick/standard which has to be applied with regard to adjudging suitability of the incumbent always depends upon the nature of post, nature of duties, effect of suppression over suitability to be considered by the authority on due diligence of various aspects but no hard and fast rule of thumb can be laid down in this regard. 13. What emerges from the exposition as laid down by this Court is that by mere suppression of material/false information regardless of the fact whether there is a conviction or acquittal has been recorded, the employee/recruit is not to be discharged/terminated axiomatically from service just by a stroke of pen. At the same time, the effect of suppression of material/false information involving in a criminal case, if any, is left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances available as 7 to antecedents and keeping in view the objective criteria and the relevant service rules into consideration, while taking appropriate decision regarding continuance/suitability of the employee into service. What being noticed by this Court is that mere suppression of material/false information involving in a criminal case, if any, is left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances available as to antecedents and keeping in view the objective criteria and the relevant service rules into consideration, while taking appropriate decision regarding continuance/suitability of the employee into service. What has been noticed by this Court is that mere suppression of material/false information in a given case does not mean that the employer can arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employee from service. 20. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 17th November, 2015 and the order of discharge dated 24thApril, 2015 and dated 23 rd December, 2021 are hereby quashed and set aside. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant in service on the post of Constable on which he was selected pursuant to his participation in reference to employment notice no. 1/2011 dated 27th February, 2011. We make it clear that the appellant will not be entitled for the arrears of salary for the period during which he has not served the force and at the same time he will be entitled for all notional benefits, including pay, seniority and other consequential benefits, etc. Necessary orders shall be passed within a period of one month from today. No costs.” 10. Avtar Singh (Supra) also took note of the judgment in Commissioner of Police and Others Vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011) 4 SCC 644. In Sandeep Kumar (supra) taking cue from the classic judgment of Lord Denning in Morris v. Crown Office, (1970) 2 QB 114 setting out the story of the character “Jean Valjean” in Victor Hugo’s novel Les Miserables where the character was branded as a thief for stealing a loaf of bread for his hungry family, Hon’ble Supreme Court has summed up as under:- “10… … In our opinion, we should display the same wisdom as displayed by Lord Denning. 11. As already observed above, youth often commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Sections 8 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.” 11. Further in yet another case where a disclosure of registration of a criminal case was made by the candidate while applying for a job, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Mohammed Imran vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (2019) 17 SCC 696 has made a lucidly worded observation that making the past conduct an albatross around the neck of the candidate keeping at bay all other considerations may not always be a call for justice and the much should however be left to depend on the fact situation of that particular case. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:- “5. Employment opportunities are a scarce commodity in our country. Every advertisement invites a large number of aspirants for limited number of vacancies. But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials of the candidate may raise serious questions regarding suitability, irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life by self-improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact situation of a case.” 12. Further in the case of Ram Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Others (2011) 14 SCC 709 involving near identical facts with regard to disclosure of desirable 9 information at the time of applying for an employment, referring to Avtar Singh (Supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- “9. We have carefully read the Government Order dated 28-4- 1958 on the subject “Verification of the character and antecedents of government servants before their first appointment” and it is stated in the government order that the Governor has been pleased to lay down the following instructions in supersession of all the previous orders: “The rule regarding character of candidate for appointment under the State Government shall continue to be as follows: The character of a candidate for direct appointment must be such as to render him suitable in all respects for employment in the service or post to which he is to be appointed. It would be the duty of the appointing authority to satisfy itself on this point. xxx xxx 12. On a reading of the order dated 18-7-2002 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate it would show that the sole witness examined before the court, PW 1, Mr Akhilesh Kumar, had deposed before the court that on 2-12-2000 at 4.00 p.m. children were quarrelling and at that time the appellant, Shailendra and Ajay Kumar amongst other neighbours had reached there and someone from the crowd hurled abuses and in the scuffle Akhilesh Kumar got injured when he fell and his head hit a brick platform and that he was not beaten by the accused persons by any sharp weapon. In the absence of any other witness against the appellant, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 323/34/504 IPC. On these facts, it was not at all possible for the appointing authority to take a view that the appellant was not suitable for appointment to the post of a police constable. 13. The order dated 18-7-2002 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had been sent along with the report dated 15-1-2007 of Jaswant Nagar Police Station to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, but it appears from the order dated 8-8-2007 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, that he has not gone into the question as to whether the appellant was suitable for 10 appointment to service or to the post of constable in which he was appointed and he has only held that the selection of the appellant was illegal and irregular because he did not furnish in his affidavit in the pro forma of verification roll that a criminal case has been registered against him. 14. As has been stated in the instructions in the Government Order dated 28-4-1958, it was the duty of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, as the appointing authority, to satisfy himself on the point as to whether the appellant was suitable for appointment to the post of a constable, with reference to the nature of suppression and nature of the criminal case. Instead of considering whether the appellant was suitable for appointment to the post of male constable, the appointing authority has mechanically held that his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit stating the facts incorrectly at the time of recruitment. xxx xxx 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and the impugned order of the Division Bench and allow the writ petition of the appellant and quash the order dated 8-8-2007 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad. The appellant will be taken back in service within a period of two months from today but he will not be entitled to any back wages for the period he has remained out of service. There shall be no order as to costs.” Ram Kumar (supra) was also a case of cancellation of selection to the post of Constable. 13. Thus now in the light of afore-stated principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case are required to be carefully examined. In this case, while applying for the post of Bank Guard pursuant to an advertisement, the case under the MV Act was registered against the petitioner in which only a fine amounting to Rs. 900/- was imposed on him without any imprisonment. Apart from the case registered under the MV Act, 11 the offence under Section 279 of IPC also embraces triviality in its fold being connected to the incident taking place in respect of driving of the motor vehicle. However, neither of these have even the longest trace of the moral turpitude or any other offence of the similar gravity. The act alleged against the petitioner need not necessarily be intentional, sometimes such motor vehicle related incidents do happens even unknowingly without being noticed beforehand. The law in this regard as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court makes it abundantly clear that suppression or non-disclosure of criminal antecedents in an application or verification form cannot automatically result in cancellation of appointment or termination of service. The employer is required to undertake a holistic examination of the relevant circumstances, including the nature of the offence, the gravity of the allegations, the stage and outcome of the criminal proceedings, the nature of duties attached to the post and the overall suitability of the candidate for public employment. It is only after considering these relevant factors that a reasoned decision can be taken as to whether such suppression materially affects the fitness of the candidate for appointment. 14. Examining the facts of the present case in the aforesaid legal backdrop, it is not in dispute that the petitioner is an ex-serviceman. The record placed before this Court indicates that the conviction attributed to the petitioner relates only to an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC and Section 146/196 of the MV Act. It is also not disputed that the petitioner was not awarded any sentence of imprisonment and was merely directed to pay a fine of Rs. 900/-. The materials available on record further do not disclose that the petitioner has any other criminal antecedents or involvement in any other criminal case. 12 Thus, the offence in question appears to be an isolated instance arising out of a traffic violation for which a nominal fine was imposed. 15. The application form of the petitioner Annexure R/1 forming part of the record filed by the respondent No. 1 in which petitioner was required to furnish information relating to any prosecution, detention, conviction, sentence or fine imposed by a court of law. In the said column the petitioner appears to have indicated “Not Applicable”. While the respondents have proceeded on the assumption that such declaration amounts to suppression of material facts, it is equally possible that the said entry may have been made due to an inadvertent mistake, misunderstanding or lack of clarity regarding the scope of disclosure required in the form. Significantly, the impugned order does not disclose that the competent authority had examined whether the alleged suppression was deliberate and intentional or whether the same occurred on account of a bona fide error on the part of the petitioner. 16. More importantly, the impugned order proceeds on the premise that once suppression of information is established, the employer is justified in cancelling the appointment. Such an approach is clearly inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, which mandate that the employer must evaluate whether the fact suppressed is a material fact having a direct bearing on the suitability of the candidate for the post in question. In the present case, the impugned order does not indicate any consideration as to why the non-disclosure of a minor traffic offence, resulting only in imposition of a small fine and not involving any element of moral turpitude, would render the petitioner unsuitable for appointment. The order also does not reflect any evaluation of the nature of duties attached to the post or the overall antecedents of the petitioner. 13 17. This Court also finds support from the earlier decision of this Court in Churendra Kumar Dhruv Vs. State of CG & Others reported in 2012 (4) CGLJ 381 this Court has taken this view that on the day of Diwali festival, most of the people indulge into gambling, as there is a belief that if you succeed in the gambling on the day of Diwali, in future there would not be a dearth of money. After observing thus this Court allowed the writ petition because in the said also the person was imposed fine of Rs. 100/- on account of conviction under Public Gambling Act and the said fact was not disclosed at the time of seeking appointment. 18. If the aforesaid legal position is cast in the present fact situation, it gets crystallized that the petitioner was involved in a trivial nature of case punishable under the provisions of MV Act and even the IPC. It is relevant to note here that no sentence of imprisonment was slapped on the petitioner and merely a scanty amount of Rs. 900/- was imposed on him. If the entirety of the allegation are taken into consideration, there is nothing which can malign the status of the petitioner in the society or cast a stigma of any kind on him rendering him to be totally unsuitable for the job he was recruited. Since prima facie the allegations do not demonstrate the criminal propensity, probably the petitioner might not have thought it necessary to specify the act attributed to him while applying for the job. It is not even the case of the respondents that there was any allegation against the petitioner involving any serious offence including the act of moral turpitude against him affecting the society at large. As has already been enunciated by the Supreme Court in series of decisions referred to above, no one should be ousted from service merely for the reason of non disclosure of the information desired to be disclosed by the employer, rather in such an exigency, it must be given a thoughtful consideration as to whether the magnitude of the offence imputed 14 against the petitioner was having the roots deeper and ramifications wider to affect the public system in which the petitioner was inducted by the respondents. Unfortunately, none of these requirements appear to have received the rational approach by the respondents before abruptly resorting to cancellation of the appointment order of the petitioner. No doubt that the suppression of desired information should be viewed by the employer with a greater degree of caution but at the same time, the ingredient as have been time and again propounded by the Supreme Court must be coherently taken care of before taking any caustic and drastic pathway because otherwise the possibility of great injustice being caused to the people like petitioner for none of their faults can be ruled out. This Court has gone through the judicial pronouncement taken recourse to by the counsel for the respondents pertaining to the consequence of non-disclosure of the information by an employee, but as already stated, on account of an altogether factual background in the present case, the respondents can hardly derive any benefit of the same. 19. In aforesaid view of the factual and legal discussion, this Court has no hesitation to say that the action of the respondents in canceling the appointment of the petitioner by the impugned order is not in accordance with the settled legal position, and being so it is not sustainable in law. Petition is accordingly allowed and the order impugned is hereby set aside. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge H.Ansari