Form No. J(2) In the High Court at Calcutta Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Appellate Side Present: The Hon’be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya And The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya F.A. 101 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 CAN 2 of 2026 IFCI Infrastructure Development Ltd. Vs. Tangra Enclave Private Limited and others For the appellant : Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Sr. Adv. Mr. Rahul Karmakar Mr. Raj Dev Singh Mr. Sabyasachi Bhattacharjee Ms. Snigdha Bhattacharjee Mr. Parikshit Lakhotia For the respondent nos.1 to 5 : Mr. Jaydip Kar, Sr. Adv. Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee Mr. Sayak Ranjan Ganguly Ms. Srijani Ghosh Ms. Simran Hussain Mr. Pujal Musahib For the respondent no.6 : Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, Sr. Adv. Mr. Ratul Das Mr. Sudip Roy Heard on : 23.07.2026 Judgment on : 23.07.2026 2 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:- 1. The present appeal has been preferred against a judgment on admission passed under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondent no.5 for the following reliefs: a) “Decree for declaration that the land occupied by the defendant no.1 by virtue of sale Deed of Conveyance 09.06.2015 is actually land comprised in Dag 676, 678 and 681. b) Decree of eviction and recovery of possession of the suit property by evicting defendants therefrom and/or their men, agents and all entitles whosoever acting, through, under or in trust for them. c) Order of Mandatory Injunction directing the defendant no.1 to hand over physical possession of the land encroached by them and transferred to them by the defendant no.2 in terms of aforesaid Sale Deed dated 09.06.2015 forthwith. d) Decree for mesne profit from defendant no.2 for illegally occupying the suit property being 30 cottahs of land and enjoying the same unlawfully for the period from 01.09.2014 to 08.06.2015 being the date of taking possession till transferring possession to defendant no.1. e) Decree of mesne profit from defendant no.1 from 09.06.2015 till actual recovery of possession of the suit property and handling over the same to the plaintiffs. 3 f) An order of permanent injunction so as to restrain the defendants and/or their men, agents and all entitles acting through under or in trust for them from in any manner dealing with and/or part with possession of the suit property or portion thereof to any entity, till disposal of the instant suit. g) Temporary and ad interim order of injunction in terms of prayer (f) above. h) Costs and incidentals of the instant suit; i) Such other or further reliefs to which the plaintiffs are entitled to in equity and under the law.” 2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant no.1/appellant argues that the learned Trial Judge erred in law and in fact in passing the impugned judgment on admission in view of there being no unequivocal and unambiguous admission on the part of the defendant no.1/appellant as to the averments made in the plaint and the reliefs sought therein. 3. Learned senior counsel submits that paragraph no.8 of the written statement, which was substantially relied on by the learned Trial Judge, merely mentions that pursuant to the auction sale deed executed in favour of the defendant no.1/appellant, the said defendant is in possession of the suit/mortgaged property. 4 4. Whereas the mortgaged property pertains to CS Dag Nos.682, 683, 684, 685, 728, 731 and 732, the suit property is confined to Dag Nos.676, 678 and 681. 5. Learned senior counsel contends that both the sets of plots are situated within the same larger plot and in the absence of any specific demarcation, the learned Trial Judge erred in law in passing the impugned judgment and decree without any specific identification of the said plots, which would be the subject matter of trial and could not be decided at the stage of considering a prayer under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Learned senior counsel next contends that there is no dispute raised by the defendant no.1/appellant as to the plaintiffs’ title and/or occupation in respect of Dag Nos. 676, 678 and 681. 7. However, the plaintiffs, in prayer (a) of the plaint, seek to mix up the two sets of plots by seeking a declaration that the land occupied by the defendant no.1/appellant by virtue of its deed of conveyance dated June 9, 2015 is actually the land comprised in Dag nos.676, 678 and 681. 8. Learned senior counsel further contends that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned Trial Judge failed to take into consideration the defence case, on a comprehensive reading of the pleadings in the entire written statement, and culled out the 5 statements made in paragraph no.8 of the written statement in isolation. 9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant no.2/respondent no.6, which is the vendor of the defendant no.1/appellant, apart from adopting the arguments of the appellant, contends that the learned Trial Judge took into consideration a Commissioner’s report, which is entirely beyond the ambit of a consideration under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, by its very nature, is restricted to the pleadings in the written statement and, at best, the documents filed therewith and/or relied on therein. 10. Learned senior counsel for both the appellant and the respondent no.6 place reliance on Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India and others, reported at (2000) 7 SCC 120, for the proposition that when a statement is made by a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, only then the Court has to pass a judgment on admission. 11. In the present case, however, on the very first occasion when adjournment was sought on behalf of the defendant 6 no.1/appellant, in order to get an opportunity to explain the so- called admission by filing a written objection to the petition under Order XII Rule 6, the same was refused by the learned Trial Judge. 12. Thus, it is argued that sufficient opportunity to explain away such purported admission was not afforded to the defendant no.1/appellant, thereby vitiating the impugned judgment. 13. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant places reliance on the language of Order XVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is contended that the said provision envisages that the court, if sufficient cause is shown, can grant time at any stage of the suit to the parties or to any of them and may also from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit, only subject to the rider that reason have to be recorded in writing. 15. The proviso to the said provision stipulates that no such adjournments shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the suit. 16. Thus, the refusal of adjournment at the very first instance by the learned Trial Judge, particularly read in the context of Uttam Singh Duggal (supra), was itself an error of law which is required to be looked into. 7 17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent nos.1 to 5 controverts the arguments of the appellant and the respondent no.6 and submits that the relief sought in prayer (a) of the plaint has been categorically admitted in paragraph no.8 of the written statement by the defendant no.1/appellant. 18. It is pointed out that within the four corners of the written statement, nowhere has the defendant no.1/appellant disputed the title of the plaintiff/respondent nos.1 to 5 in the suit property, comprised of Dag nos. 676, 678 and 681. 19. The sale certificate/sale deed annexed to the written statement also clearly goes on to show that the subject properties of such sale are CS Dag Nos. 682, 683, 684, 685, 728, 731 and 732, and not the suit property. 20. Despite the same, in paragraph no.8, it has been specifically admitted that the defendant no.1/appellant rightfully purchased the suit/mortgaged property from defendant no.2/respondent no.6 and hence rightfully and legally holds the titles, rights and interest of the suit/mortgaged property. 21. Learned senior counsel argues that in paragraph no.12 of Uttam Singh Duggal (supra) itself, the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the objects and reasons for amending Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it should not unduly narrow down the meaning 8 of the Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply, and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts, in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed. 22. Learned senior counsel further submits that it is well-settled that clear admissions cannot be withdrawn even by way of amendments. 23. While considering the arguments of the parties, we take up the issue of adjournments first. 24. Contrary to the arguments of learned senior counsel for the defendant no.1/appellant, Rule 1 of Order XVII of the Code does not mandate the Court to grant adjournment any number of times. 25. The said provision merely puts a fetter to grant of adjournment more than three times to a party, which is completely prohibited under the proviso to Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 26. Even if the Court is to grant adjournment on any occasion, two threshold tests are required to be satisfied, one being that sufficient cause is shown by the parties seeking adjournment and secondly, reasons in writing are to be recorded by the Court while granting such adjournment. 9 27. Thus, Rule 1 of Order XVII does not vest any party with a right to get an adjournment but rather, puts a restriction on the Court to grant adjournments as a matter of course. 28. Hence, the said provision cannot be turned on its head by construing it to give a right to a party to get an adjournment on any occasion, be it the first, second or third. 29. A meaningful reading of the said provision would clearly indicate that it merely restricts the Court from granting adjournments for the asking and, in no event beyond the third adjournment. 30. Seen from the said perspective, we do not find any error in the learned Trial Court having exercised its judicial discretion in refusing adjournment. 31. The other question which crops up in this connection is whether, if the Court refuses opportunity to a party to file an affidavit-in-opposition/written objection to an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code, the same would come within the mischief of paragraph no. 13 of Uttam Singh Duggal (supra), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that an opportunity to explain the admission is to be given to the party against whom the judgment on admission is to be passed. 32. However, we cannot subscribe to the argument that such right to explain away the admission necessarily envisages a right to file a written objection to the petition under Order XII Rule 6 of 10 the Code, in view of the specific language of Order XII Rule 6. The said provision is quoted hereinbelow: “6. Judgment on admissions – (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.” 33. On a plain reading of the said provision, it is crystal clear that the Court is empowered under the said provision, even at a preliminary stage of the suit, to pass a judgment on admission if there is a clear admission on the part of either party to the pleadings of the other. 34. Such judgment can be passed not only at any stage of the suit but either on an application of a party or of the own motion of the Court and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties. 35. Since the provision empowers the Court also to suo motu pass a judgment on admission if it finds an admission in the pleadings, the mandatory right to the party making such admission to have 11 an opportunity to file a written objection or affidavit-in- opposition to an application under the said provision cannot be read into the said provision as a matter of course. 36. An application under the said provision merely sets in motion the power of the Court to pass a judgment on admission and is not a prerequisite of passing such judgment as per the provision itself. 37. Even otherwise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Uttam Singh Duggal (supra), did not read a right of filing a written objection to an application under Order XII Rule 6 into the said provision but merely observed that an opportunity to explain the admission, if any, is to be given to the party against whom the judgment on admission is contemplated. 38. From the impugned judgment in the instant case, we find that both sides were heard at length and the judgment was passed only upon a contested hearing, thus furnishing ample opportunity to the defendant no.1/appellant to canvass its case while explaining the admission made in the written statement. 39. As to the merits of the matter, paragraph no. 8 of the written statement filed by the defendant no.1/appellant is quoted hereinbelow: “8. That the plaint shall be rejected as it does not disclose any cause of action against IIDL i.e., Defendant No.1: The present suit is barred by 12 law and shall be rejected as the Plaintiff failed to show any cause of action against the Answering Defendant. It is pertinent to submit herein that IIDL signed a sale deed with IFCI Ltd. on 9th June, 2015 after the Answering Defendant came out to the „Highest Bidder‟ offering Rupees Fifteen Crores Sixteen Lakhs and One Thousand Only in the public auction held on 8th May, 2015 for the suit/mortgaged property, details of which are provided below in the “Schedule”. The Answering Defendant rightfully purchased the suit/mortgaged property from Defendant No. 2 by entirely paying the consideration amount and hence rightfully and legally holds the title, rights, and interest of the suit/mortgaged property. Therefore, no cause of action arises against the Answering Defendant.” 40. From the said paragraph, it is clear that the answering defendant, that is, the defendant no.1/appellant, states that it rightfully purchased the suit/mortgaged property from defendant no.2 by entirely paying the consideration amount. 41. More particularly, it avers that hence, it “rightfully and legally held the title, rights and interest of the suit/mortgaged property”. 42. Paragraph no.8 is not the only paragraph which is to be considered in the present context, in consonance with the submission made by the appellant itself that there has to be a meaningful reading of the entire written statement while considering a prayer under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code. 13 43. Throughout the written statement, the defendant no.1/appellant has stated that it is in possession of the schedule property. 44. The appellant does not stop there, by referring merely to the plaint schedule, but independently reproduces the schedule given in the plaint as a schedule to the written statement itself. 45. Thus, there cannot any manner of doubt that the appellant clearly admitted that pursuant to the sale deed executed in its favour, it is in possession of the suit schedule property. 46. The Court was fully within its jurisdiction to consider the annexures to the written statement and documents filed therewith, including the sale deed executed in favour of the appellant. 47. It is crystal clear therefrom that the property which was sold to the appellant was not the suit schedule property, comprised of Dag Nos. 676, 678 and 681, but different plots. 48. If we look at relief (a) sought in the plaint from the said viewpoint, which seeks a decree for declaration that the land occupied by the defendant no.1 by virtue of its deed of conveyance is actually the suit property, being land comprised in Dag Nos. 676, 678 and 681, it is precisely such relief which has been admitted by the defendant no.1/appellant throughout its written statement. 14 49. Since relief (a) stands admitted by the defendant no.1/appellant, coupled with the fact that the defendant no.1/appellant never denied the title of the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 5, either in the written statement or even during arguments in the Trial Court or before this Court, the essential corollary flowing therefrom would be to grant a decree of eviction in the teeth of the admission of the defendant no.1/appellant that it is in occupation of the suit property, which is not the subject-matter of its sale certificate/sale deed, which is evident also from the annexures and documents filed with the written statement. 50. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has also sought to portray before us that in the impugned decree drawn up by the learned Trial Judge, relief (a) was not specifically granted. 51. As such, it is contended that without granting such relief, the other relief of eviction could not follow. 52. However, a perusal of the impugned judgment and decree shows that the suit was decreed on admission against defendant no.1 in respect of the prayer for eviction as per the prayer of the plaint without any order as to costs. 53. In view of the above discussions, the admission on relief (a) is a given, being clear from paragraph no.8 and the other paragraphs of the written statement. 15 54. Hence, the effective decree which remain to be granted was the decree of eviction sought in prayer (b) of the plaint, which was precisely what was done by the learned Trial Judge. 55. Thus, we do not find any palpable error of law or fact in that regard, vitiating the impugned judgment and decree as a whole. 56. The other contention of the appellant, that such issue could not be decided without a trial or without a commission being taken, also cannot be accepted, in view of the pleadings in the written statement clearly containing unequivocal admission insofar as relief (a) is concerned, which automatically gives rise to entitlement of the plaintiffs to get relief (b), that is, the eviction decree and the consequential reliefs. 57. In Uttam Singh Duggal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe as follows: “12. As to the object of the Order XII Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled”. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other 16 party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed. 13. The next contention canvassed is that the resolutions or minutes of meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise. When a statement is made to a party and such statement is brought before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 and the other side has sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we do not think the trial court is helpless in refusing to pass a decree. We have adverted to the basis of the claim and the manner in which the trial court has dealt with the same. When the trial judge states that the statement made in the proceedings of the Board of Directors meeting and the letter sent as well as the pleadings when read together, leads to unambiguous and clear admission with only the extent to which the admission is made is in dispute, and the court had a duty to decide the same and grant a decree, we think this approach is unexceptionable.” 58. From the plain reading of Order XII Rule as well as the aforesaid judgment, we find that a clear admission entitling the plaintiffs to a judgment on admission was made by the defendant 17 no.1/appellant in its written statement, within the contemplation of the said provision and the ratio laid down in the said judgment. 59. Even otherwise, since sufficient opportunity to explain the admission was given by granting hearing to the appellant by the learned Trial Judge, we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment sufficient to interfere therewith. 60. In such view of the matter, FA 101 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned judgment and decree dated May 02, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ninth Court at Alipore, District: South 24 Parganas in Title Suit No. 1481 of 2022. 61. CAN 1 of 2026 and CAN 2 of 2026 are consequentially dismissed as well. 62. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. 63. There will be no order as to costs. 64. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) AD-03 AK