( 2026:HHC:11554 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Civil Revision No. 47 of 2021 Decided on 10.04.2026 ____________________________________________________ Nikka Singh (deceased) through LRs ...Petitioners. Versus Lachhman & others …..Respondents. Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioners: Mr. Rajiv Jiwan, Senior Advocate with Mr. Hitender Verma, Mr. Prashant Sharma, Mr. Yug Singhal and Ms. Aditi Sharma, Advocates. For the respondents: Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, Advocate. __________________________________________________ Romesh Verma , Judge The present petition arises out of the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge on 07.01.2021, whereby an application under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC, filed by the Decree Holders (DHs), i.e., Bagga Ram, was dismissed. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners/Decree Holders filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants (JDs). It was averred in the plaint that the defendants, who are residents 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) of Village Behal, have no right, title, or interest in Khasra No. 1578, Khewat No. 106 Min, Khatauni No. 121, measuring 10-1 bighas, situated at Village Behl-Banda, Pargna Fatehpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants are very forcefull persons attempting to dispossess them of the suit land and were trying to remove valuable trees to prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs. Despite requests not to interfere with the suit land, the defendants allegedly continued their actions, leading the plaintiffs to file the suit. Consequently, a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, or alternatively, for possession of the suit land, was sought before the learned Trial Court. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants, who refuted all the averments as made in the plaint and contended that the suit was filed without any cause of action and based on false claims. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. The learned Trial Court framed issues on 21.09.2001 and, after hearing the parties, partly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs by restraining the defendants 3 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) from causing any interference over the suit land until it was partitioned by metes and bounds by the competent revenue authority. 5. Feeling dissatisfied, the defendants/ respondents preferred an appeal under Section 96 CPC on 16.12.2009. The learned District Judge, Bilaspur, vide its judgment and decree dated 28.02.2011, dismissed the appeal. Subsequently, on 11.01.2012, the decree holder/plaintiff filed an application under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC for execution of the judgment and decree dated 13.10.2009. It was averred in the execution petition that despite the decree of injunction, the defendants/respondents were interfering with the suit land in violation of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court. 6. In reply to the said application, the respondents denied the allegations, stating that no violation of any kind has been made over the suit land. The learned Executing Court framed issues in the following manner: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are joint owners in possession of the suit land, as alleged ? OPP 4 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) 2. Whether the defendants have been interfering in the suit land, as alleged ? If so whether the plaintiffs are entitiled to the relief of injunctio n, as prayed for ? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitiled to the relief of possession qua the suit land in the laternative ? If so to what extent and in what manner ? OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the presnet form ? OPD 5. Whether the suit land is owned and possessed by the defendants by way of sale, as alleged ? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit, as alleged ? OPD 7. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD 8. Relief.” 7. The executing Court directed both the parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Vide its order dated 07.01.2021, the Court dismissed the Execution Petition. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the DH/petitioner filed the present civil revision under Section of 115 of CPC. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the order passed by the learned Trial Court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside, as it failed to appreciate the point in controversy and the evidence on record. 5 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) 9. On the other hand, Mr. Sanket Sankhayan, Advocate for the defendants, defended the impugned order, submitting that no violation of any kind had occurred on the suit land, and the Executing Court had rightly rejected the petition after considering oral and documentary evidence placed on record. 10. A perusal of the case file reveals that the suit filed by the petitioners was partly decreed, and a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction with respect to the land comprised in Khasra No. 1578, Khewat No. 106 Min, Khatauni No. 121, measuring 10–1 bighas, situated at Village Behl-Banda, Pargna Fatehpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur, HP was passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants/respondents. These findings were affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court. 11. To prove the case, the petitioners/plaintiffs were required to show that, after the passing of the judgment and decree, there was a violation of the same by the respondents. 12. The decree holder/petitioner, Bagga Ram, appeared as PW-3. Although he reiterated the averments in 6 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) the application, his cross-examination demolished his own case. He admitted that there were four co-sharers and that his share was 6-1 bighas, while Lachhman Dass and others have 4 bighas. He did not know which Khasra numbers contained Lachhman Dass’s house. He admitted that Khasra Nos. 1581 and 1591 adjoin Khasra No. 1578 and that land had been partitioned. Khasra Nos. 1578/1 and 1578/2 were proposed to be allotted to him, and 1578/3 to Lachhman Dass. He accepted that he did not receive any land in the possession of Lachhman Dass and that the partition had been accepted by his deceased father. He also stated that he was unaware when the partition was affected and that the Kanungo had prepared the report. 13. Decree holder further admitted that Kishori Lal had sold his share to Lachhman Dass and Pyar Singh during the pendency of the case and that he had filed civil and criminal cases against Lachhman and others. He did not know on which land the toilet and bathroom were constructed, as it had been allotted to the respondents. The cross-examination of the applicant/petitioner thus shows that 7 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) he failed to prove any alleged violation or disobedience on the part of the respondents. 14. The respondent appeared as RW-1 and stated that he did not violate the judgment and decree, and no construction of any kind was raised by him. He admitted that his house was constructed over Khasra No. 1578 and that he visited the suit land but did not interfere with it. 15. The petitioner has failed to prove any interference in any manner by the respondents over the suit land. Therefore, the findings of the learned Executing Court do not suffer from any infirmity. 16. The exposition of law by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court clearly lays down that in order to held a person guilty of willful disobedience of the order there has to be not mere “disobedience” but it should be “willful disobedience”. 17. The allegations of willful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the disobedience was not a mere disobedience but a willful disobedience. 8 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) 18. This Court in Civil Revision No. 72 of 2025, titled Rajeev Bansal vs. Parkash Chand and others, decided on 09.04.2026 has reiterated the scope of interference while dealing with the case as filed under Section 115 of CPC, which reads as follows:- “14. The primary object of the revision powers conferred to the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revision powers given to the High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows: “5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise 9 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that the proceedings under reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this Clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan & others, held as under:- 14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit 10 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) property to any person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.” 17. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided on 18th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as under: “11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway [(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that the first 11 ( 2026:HHC:11554 ) appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code." 19. After considering the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, the Executing Court has rightly concluded that no interference was made by the respondents. The learned Executing Court has appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record in detail which does not call for any interference. 20. Consequently, the present revision petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. 21. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. (Romesh Verma) Judge April 10, 2026 (Nisha)