1 CGHC010237182026 2026:CGHC:32805-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 632 of 2026 Smt. Basanti Bai Jain W/o Shri Shubash Chand Jain Aged About 65 Years Navkar Parishar, Azad Ward No. 37 Ganjpara Chowk, Tahsil- Durg District- Durg (C.G.), Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Central Bank Of India Through Its Power Of Attorney Holder, Rajiv Singh, Posted As Chief Manager, Central Bank Of India Branch Civil Lines Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Branch Manager Central Bank Of India, Radhika Nagar, District- Durg (C.G.) 3 - R.S. Enterprises Through Its Proprietor Subhash Chand Jain Navakar Parishar Ganjpura District- Durg (C.G.) 4 - Subhash Chand Jain S/o Shri Heeralal Jain Navakar Parishar Ganjpura District- Durg (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Gyan Prakash Shukla, Advocate appeared through video conferencing For Respondent(s) : None. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.07.30 18:17:05 +0530 2 Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 30.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Gyan Prakash Shukla, learned counsel for the appellant appeared through video conferencing. 2. This writ appeal is presented against the order dated 21.05.2026 (Smt. Basanti Bai Jain vs. Central Bank of India & Others) passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No. 2651 of 2026, whereby, the writ petition filed by appellant herein was dismissed as not maintainable by the learned Single Judge. 3. The facts of the case according the appellant is that the appellant is a woman and the absolute owner of the immovable property in question, which she acquired by way of a duly registered Gift Deed and which constitutes her Streedhan. The said property is her independent personal property and has no nexus with the commercial borrowings of the principal borrower. The Appellant had executed only a limited guarantee in favour of the Respondent Bank, her liability being expressly restricted to Rs.13,30,000/- as per the Bank's sanction/confirmation letter dated 12.09.2017. Subsequently, the Respondent Bank, without obtaining the Appellant's consent or concurrence, enhanced the loan exposure from Rs.45,00,000/- to Rs.49,75,000/-, thereby materially varying the terms of the contract and discharging the Appellant from liability under Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Despite the contractual limitation and such discharge, 3 the Respondent Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and issued a Demand Notice dated 23.01.2026 seeking enforcement against the Appellant's independent property. The Appellant submitted detailed objections under Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act, inter alia, challenging the enforceability of the guarantee beyond the capped liability, the material alteration of the contract, the legality of proceeding against her property, and the incorrect classification of the loan account as a Non- Performing Asset (NPA). She also pointed out that the Bank had ignored the borrower's One-Time Settlement proposals and that its own Core Banking System records reflected renewal and continuation of the account till 2022. Aggrieved by the arbitrary and jurisdictionally defective action of the Respondent Bank, the Appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Before the learned Single Judge, the Appellant specifically contended that no efficacious alternative remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal was available to her since her contractual liability was limited to Rs.13,30,000/-, which is below the statutory threshold prescribed under Section 1(4) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. However, without adjudicating the said jurisdictional objection or examining the effect of the contractual limitation of liability, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition solely on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy before the DRT. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed WPC 4 No.2651 of 2026, whereby, the petition filed by the appellant herein / writ petitioner was dismissed as not maintainable vide order dated 21.05.2026. Hence, this writ appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) without first deciding the appellant's specific jurisdictional objection. The appellant had categorically contended that the proceedings against her were inherently without jurisdiction since her contractual liability as guarantor was expressly limited to Rs.13,30,000/-, which is below the statutory threshold of Rs.20,00,000/- prescribed under Section 1(4) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. It is well settled that where the jurisdiction of the statutory forum itself is under challenge, the rule of alternate remedy does not operate as a bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction. He further submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the liability of the appellant, being a limited guarantor, is governed strictly by the terms of the contract of guarantee and cannot be enlarged beyond the agreed cap. The respondent Bank cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the DRT against the appellant by relying upon the borrower's total outstanding liability when the appellant's independent contractual liability stands restricted to Rs.13,30,000/-. Consequently, the proceedings initiated against the Appellant are without jurisdiction and contrary to the express 5 terms of the contract of guarantee. He also submits that the impugned judgment mechanically applies the doctrine of alternative remedy without considering the settled exceptions recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, particularly where the action is without jurisdiction and raises pure questions of law. The learned Single Judge failed to adjudicate the principal issue regarding the maintainability of proceedings against a guarantor whose contractual liability is below the statutory threshold under Section 1(4) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, thereby rendering the impugned order non-speaking and unsustainable in law. If desired, these can be further refined into High Court appellate drafting style with stronger legal language and supporting case-law references. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be allowed. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 6. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable holding that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of the availability of an efficacious alternative statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act. While relying upon the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding the doctrine of alternative remedy, the learned Single 6 Judge concluded that, as proceedings before the DRT had already commenced, the appellant ought to avail the statutory remedy and, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable. 7. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, perusing the documents appended with writ petition as also with writ appeal and also considering the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court. 8. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- /- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu