1 CGHC010280982026 2026:CGHC:31848-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1918 of 2026 1 - Nitin Nigam S/o Late Kailash Prasad Nigam, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Village Parsada, Kewatpara Police Station Chakrabhatha, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station Torwa, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Shakil Qureshi S/o Late Jameel Qureshi, R/o Hemu Nagar Torwa, Bilaspur, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate For State : Mr. Saumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Amit Verma and Mr. Afroj Khan, Advocates. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 27 -07-2026 1. Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.07.30 19:44:11 +0530 2 Also heard Mr. Saumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/State and Mr. Amit Verma and Mr. Afroj Khan, learned counsels for respondent No.2. 2. The petitioner has filed the present petition with the following prayer:- “1. Quash the First Information Report bearing Crime No. 375/2026, registered at Police Station Torwa, District Bilaspur (C.G.), for the offence punishable under Sections 420/34 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, against the present petitioner. 2. Quash all consequential proceedings arising out of the aforesaid FIR, including the investigation, filing of charge-sheet, cognizance, and all further criminal proceedings, insofar as they relate to the present petitioner. 3. Pass any other appropriate order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. The facts as mentioned in the petition are that, the petitioner was engaged through Veema Hospitality Private Limited as a contractual Recovery Officer with Cent Bank Home Finance Limited. The contention of the petitioner is that he was not an employee of the Bank and his duties were confined to serving recovery notices and persuading defaulting borrowers to regularize their loan accounts. He had no authority to handle cash, receive deposits, maintain loan accounts, issue receipts, or make accounting entries. Respondent No. 2 had obtained a housing loan of Rs. 12,00,000/- from Cent Bank Home Finance Limited on 11.07.2012 by mortgaging his residential property. Owing to persistent defaults, the loan account was classified as a Non- Performing Asset (NPA), following which the Bank initiated 3 proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. After issuing notices under Sections 13(2) and 13(4), the District Magistrate, Bilaspur, by order dated 02.04.2018, directed taking possession of the secured asset. Although Respondent No. 2 furnished an undertaking during possession proceedings in 2019 to clear the overdue amount, he again defaulted, compelling the Bank to continue recovery proceedings, including communications in 2023, proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat, and a legal notice dated 23.08.2024. It is further case of the petitioner that the allegations in the impugned FIR are belied by the Bank's records. The loan account statement reflects payments made by Respondent No. 2, while the demand draft of Rs. 3,00,000/- was duly credited to the Bank. The reconciliation statement further establishes that the disputed entries were accounting adjustments and not instances of misappropriation. The petitioner neither handled the demand draft nor had any role in the accounting or maintenance of the loan account, which remained exclusively within the domain of the Bank officials. Despite recovery proceedings having remained pending since 2014, the impugned FIR was lodged only in 2025, clearly after sustained recovery action had been initiated, indicating that the criminal proceedings have been instituted to obstruct the lawful recovery process and unnecessarily implicate the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR, even if accepted at face value, does not disclose the commission 4 of any offence against the petitioner. The petitioner was merely a contractual Recovery Officer engaged through an outsourcing agency and had no authority to receive loan repayments, maintain accounts, issue receipts, or make accounting entries. The allegations of misappropriation and cheating are wholly unsupported, as the Bank's records, including the loan account statement and reconciliation statement, establish that the disputed amounts were duly credited. In the absence of any material showing entrustment of money or dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner, the essential ingredients of the alleged offences are conspicuously absent. It is further submitted that the complainant is a chronic defaulter against whom recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had been initiated long before registration of the impugned FIR. The complainant had acknowledged his liability during the recovery proceedings and even approached the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of the loan account. The FIR, lodged only after the Bank pursued statutory recovery measures, is a mala fide counterblast intended to obstruct lawful recovery proceedings. The dispute, if any, is purely civil in nature and has been given a criminal colour. Therefore, the continuation of the criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law and deserves to be quashed in exercise of this Hon'ble Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the petition and 5 submits that the FIR in question was registered on the basis of a written complaint made by the complainant. He further submits that the allegations levelled in the FIR disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 420, 34 of the IPC, which require appreciation of evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, and the same cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioner is matter of evidence which may be examined by the trial Court during trial and do not, by themselves, constitute a ground for quashment of either the FIR or the criminal proceedings at the threshold. Therefore, the petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that three other FIRs bearing Crime No.51/2020, 269/2021 and 230/2026 have been registered registered against the petitioner for the offence of similar nature and one of them has been registered after registration of the present FIR. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 8. In the matter of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Supreme Court in para 23 held as under :- “23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court 6 would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). 7 v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;” 9. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:- “20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 8 (i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. (iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted prosecution/complainant; and/or the material that justifiably refuted it cannot be by is by the such, the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]” 10. The law is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and reaffirmed 9 in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, with great caution and circumspection, only in exceptional cases where the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose any offence or where the proceedings manifestly amount to an abuse of the process of law. 11. 11. In the present case, the petitioner seeks quashment of the impugned FIR primarily on the ground that he was merely a contractual Recovery Officer engaged through an outsourcing agency and had no authority to receive loan repayments, maintain loan accounts or make accounting entries. The petitioner further relies upon the Bank's records to contend that the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated were duly credited and that the FIR is a counterblast to the recovery proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. However, these submissions pertain to the petitioner's defence and involve disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of evidence, which cannot be examined while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) and reiterated in the case of Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra), the High Court, at the stage of considering a petition for quashing, is not expected to conduct a mini trial or evaluate the correctness or reliability of the defence material. The scope of interference is confined to 10 examining whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. 12. In view of the foregoing discussion and in view of the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases cited hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for quashing the impugned FIR and subsequent proceedings, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. Consequently, the petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil