1 CGHC010332642021 2026:CGHC:32469- NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 979 of 2021 State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Applicant versus Chetan Ram Sahu S/o Derharam Sahu Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Mouhabhata, Police Station Saja, Tahsil- Saja, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent For the Applicant/State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar,, Govt. Advocate For the non-applicant : None present Division Bench Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal (Order on Board) (29.07.2026) Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, J 1. The matter has been listed for orders on office note dated 25.07.2026 regarding non-compliance of court orders. The objection raised by the office is over ruled. ALLENA ANNAJEE RAO Digitally signed by ALLENA ANNAJEE RAO Date: 2026.07.30 11:39:28 +0530 2 Heard finally. 2. This revision is directed against the judgment dated 28.08.2021 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 21/2020 by the learned IV Addl. Sessions Judge, Durg (C.G) whereby the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of acquittal dated 18.07.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg in Criminal Case No. 15297/2009 by which the accused/respondent herein was acquitted of the charges under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Facts of the case, in short, are that in the year 2005-06 accused Chetan Ram Sahu being Branch Manager of Seva Sahkari Samiti, Nardha, dealt with the purchase of paddy on support price. The said Samiti purchased total 34,455.60 quintal paddy, but from total purchased paddy only 34,106.3 quintals of paddy was given to Marketing Federation. During the audit, the Deputy Auditor submitted report regarding embezzlement of total 348.8 quintals of paddy amounting to Rs.2,02,940.40 by the accused. Thereafter, complaint was lodged in Police Station Jamul, which was registered as Crime No.110/2009 for the offence punishable u/s 490 of IPC. After investigation, the charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that both the Courts below were absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused/ respondents for the aforesaid offences by recording findings which are perverse and contrary to the record and, therefore, the same are liable to be set aside. Thus, this revision be allowed. 3 5. We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant State and have also gone through the records. 6. At the very outset, it would be profitable to notice relevant decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1 whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the scope of interference in an order of acquittal is very limited and observed as under: "11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: "38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 "29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) '42. From the above decisions, in considered view, the following general principles regarding 1 2025 INSC 114 4 powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 5 "8. 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible." 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence a on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record." 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two 6 reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 7. In the case at hand, a careful perusal of the record reveals that the learned trial Court recorded the fact that the prosecution was granted ample opportunities to produce the documents regarding misappropriation of 348.8 quintals of paddy valued at 2,02,940.40 ₹ over a period of approximately six years (from 2013 to 2019), yet it failed to do so. Even during pendency of appeal which was filed before the Appellate Court on 10.12.2019, no documents were submitted there also. The appellate Court after analyzing the evidence observed that the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution lack clear evidence to prove that the accused committed criminal misappropriation. The Auditor's report (Exhibit P-6) raises mere suspicion against the accused but that suspicion cannot take the place of proof. Therefore, in light of the available evidence, the offense under Section 409 of the IPC cannot be said to have been proven against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 8. A perusal of records would further reveal that the accused had been facing trial since 21.12.2019 and had previously remained in judicial custody from 07.12.2009 to 17.05.2010. Keeping him under prosecution merely in anticipation of the production of documents would amount to an abuse of the judicial process. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent which has been affirmed by the appellate Court. 7 9. It is settled law that the appellate/revisional Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record, even if the view of the appellate/revisional Court may be the more probable one, unless the view taken by the trial Court is perverse, illegal or otherwise unsustainable. The concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below are neither perverse nor contrary to the record. As such, we do not find any merit in this revision and the same is liable to be dismissed. 10. In view of aforesaid discussion, we do not find any good ground to invoke our revisional jurisdiction against the impugned orders. Accordingly, this revision is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) Judge Judge Rao