CWP-19040-2026 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 110 CWP-19040-2026 Date of Decision: 08.07.2026 RAJ KUMAR ......Petitioner Versus PRINCIPAL DISTRICT INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION & TRAINING, MADINA AND OTHERS ......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Sandeep Yadav, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) (1) The challenge in the present writ petition, filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is to the award dated 26.08.2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”), in Reference No. 59 of 2017, titled “Raj Kumar versus Principal, DIET, Madina, Rohtak and another”, whereby the claim of the petitioner seeking reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages has been dismissed. (2) It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was engaged as Chowkidar in the office of respondent No.1- institute in December, 2010 and continuously worked till June, 2014. It is submitted that in June, 2014, the services of the petitioner were terminated on the false allegations of theft, without issuance of any show cause notice or SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19040-2026 -2- charge sheet; and without holding any domestic enquiry. Learned counsel contends that the petitioner was working under the direct supervision and control of respondent No.1, and his attendance used to be marked at the office of the said respondent, clearly showcasing the relationship of employer and employee between the two. However, even if the plea of respondent No.1 that the petitioner was engaged through an outsourcing agency is arguendo considered though not admitted, the principal employer cannot escape statutory liability where the workman performs duties under its direct supervision and control. It is further submitted that the termination was effected without compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, despite the petitioner having completed more than 240 days of continuous service, and is thus illegal and void. Therefore, the impugned award, being based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence, deserves to be set aside. Reliance in support of the submissions has been placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh passed in Registrar, Maharishi Markandeshwar Medical College and Hospital (MMU) versus Padam Kumar, LPA No. 601 of 2025, decided on 26.05.2026. (3) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record with his able assistance. (4) The Tribunal, upon the appreciation of the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, recorded the finding that the workman had failed to place on record any appointment letter or other document to establish that he had been directly engaged by the respondents. On the contrary, documentary evidence placed on record by the respondents, namely Ex.R-2 SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19040-2026 -3- (letter dated 31.03.2013 issued by the outsourcing agency, "The Chhochhi Co- operative L/C Society Ltd., Jhajjar") and Ex.R-3 (monthly bills raised by the said outsourcing agency), established that the petitioner, along with his wife, had been deputed to work as Class-IV/sweeper with effect from 01.04.2013 to 30.09.2013 through the said outsourcing agency, with which the respondents had a contractual arrangement that remained operative till 31.03.2014. The Tribunal further noted that thereafter, upon the petitioner's own request and having regard to his financial position, he was permitted to work in the said institution from 01.04.2014 to 04.06.2014, purely on "contribution basis salary" collected by the staff members themselves, and not paid by the respondents. The Tribunal also took note of the admissions made by the petitioner himself, in his cross-examination as WW-1, that he did not possess any appointment letter, and that he had been engaged on "contribution salary basis". It was on this basis that the learned Tribunal concluded the existence of employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondents could not be proved, and thus the consequent claim for retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was thus not maintainable. (5) At this juncture, a gainful reference can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in General Manager (OSD), Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Rajnandgaon v. Bharat Lal and another, 2011(1) SCC 635, wherein under similar circumstances, the appeal of the principal employer was allowed and the liability fastened upon him was set aside. The relevant portion of the same reads thus:- “8. In this case, the Industrial adjudicator has granted SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19040-2026 -4- relief to the first respondent in view of its finding that he should be deemed to be a direct employee of the appellant. The question for consideration is whether the said finding was justified. It is now well-settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds that contract between the principal employer and contractor to be sham, nominal or merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there was in fact a direct employment, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the direct employee of the principal employer. Two of the well-recognized tests to find out whether the contract labour are the direct employees of the principal employer are (i) whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of the contractor; and (ii) whether the principal employer controls and supervises the work of the employee. In this case, the Industrial Court answered both questions in the affirmative and as a consequence held that first respondent is a direct employee of the appellant. 9. On a careful consideration, we are of the view that the Industrial Court committed a serious error in arriving at those findings. In regard to the first test as to who pays the salary, it placed the onus wrongly upon the appellant. It is for the employee to aver and prove that he was paid salary directly by the principal employer and not the contractor. The first respondent did not discharge this onus. Even in regard to second test, the employee did not establish that he was working under the direct control and supervision of the principal employer. The Industrial Court misconstrued the meaning of the terms `control and supervision' and held that as the officers of appellant were giving some instructions to the first respondent working as a guard, he was deemed to be working under the control and supervision of the appellant. The expression `control and supervision' in the context of contract labour was explained by this court in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers Union, 2010(1) S.C.T. 172:2009 (13) SCC 374 thus: "If the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by contractor, if the right to regulate employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19040-2026 -5- the contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor." Therefore we are of the view that the Industrial Court ought to have held that first respondent was not a direct employee of the appellant, and rejected the application of the first respondent.” (6) Reference can also be made to the explanation of the relevant provisions, as made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, 2005(8) SCC 750, which reads thus:- “xxxx To attract the provisions of Section 25F, one of the condition required is that the workman is employed in any industry for a continuous period which would not be not less than one year. Section 25B of the Act defines continuous service for the purposes of Chapter V-A "Lay-off and Retrenchment". The purport of this Section is that if a workman has put in an uninterrupted service of the establishment, including the service which may be interrupted on account of sickness, authorized leave, an accident, a strike which is not illegal, a lock-out or cessation of work, that is not due to any fault on the part of the workman, shall be said to be a continuous service, for that period. Thus the workmen shall be said to be in continuous service for one year i.e., 12 months irrespective of the number of days he has actually worked with interrupted service, permissible under Section 25B. However, the workmen must have been in service during the period, i.e., not only on the date when he actually worked but also on the days he could not work under the circumstances set out in Sub-Section (1). The workmen must be in the employment of the employer concerned on the days he has actually worked but also on the days on which he has not worked. The import of Sub Section(1) of Section 25B is that the workmen should be in the employment of the employer for the continuous, uninterrupted period for one year except the period the absence is permissible as mentioned hereinabove. Sub-section (2) of Section 25B introduces the fiction to the effect that even if the workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Clause (i) of Section 25-B for the period of one year or six months he shall be deemed to be in continuous service for that period under an employer if he has actually worked for the days specified in clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2). By the legal fiction of Sub-section 2(a) (i), the workmen shall be deemed to be in continuous service for one year if he is employed underground in a mine for 190 days or 240 days in any other case. Provisions of the Section postulate that if the workmen has put in at least 240 days with his employer, immediately prior to the date of retrenchment, he shall be deemed to have SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19040-2026 -6- served with the employer for a period of one year to get the benefit of Section 25F.” (7) Reverting to the case in hand, the facts of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are also clearly distinguishable from that in the present case. Moreover, there is no material on record in the present case to show that the petitioner had completed 240 days of continuous service directly under the respondents in the twelve calendar months preceding his alleged termination, preliminary onus of which lied on the petitioner and which he failed to discharge. (8) Learned counsel for the petitioner has otherwise also not been able to point out any perversity in the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal, nor has it been shown that the said findings are contrary to the pleadings and evidence brought on record. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. This Court exercises only supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised for interfering with an award suffering from illegality or any error apparent on the face of the record, which has not been pointed out in the present case. (9) In view of the above, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. (10) Civil miscellaneous application(s) pending, if any, are also disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 08, 2026 SwarnjitS Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document