1 CGHC010272572026 2026:CGHC:32475-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1961 of 2026 Dinesh Mudliyar S/o G. K. Mundliyar Aged About 37 Years R/o Near Railway Pump House Torwa, Dist- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station - Torwa Bilaspur, District -Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Ritesh Pathak S/o Ashok Pathak, Aged About 40 Years R/o Kashyp Colony Gali No. 3 Old Bus Stand Dist- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Pratyaksh Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 29.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Pratyaksh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No.1. ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.07.30 10:33:24 +0530 2 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘B.N.S.S.’) with the following relief:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and kindly be pleased to quash the FIR/Charge-Sheet bearing Crime No. 465/2025 dated 18/10/2025 for the offence U/s 420 of IPC registered at police station- Torwa, Bilaspur (C.G.) against the applicant with charge sheet No- 56/2025 dated 28/02/2026 offence U/s 420 of IPC as well as the criminal proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (C.G) bearing Criminal Case No.3680/2026, in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR is nothing but a gross abuse of the process of law, as it has been lodged on the very same set of facts and transactions which are already the subject matter of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is submitted that the complainant had advanced certain amounts to the petitioner in connection with contractual work and, towards repayment thereof, the petitioner had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. Upon dishonour of the cheque for insufficiency of funds, the complainant instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which has been registered as Case No. 331/2022 before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, where the matter is presently pending 3 at the stage of complainant's evidence. It is contended that, during the pendency of the said proceedings, the complainant has lodged the present FIR under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code on the very same allegations, which is legally impermissible. 4. Learned counsel further submits that the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating are conspicuously absent in the present case. It is argued that there was never any dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioner at the inception of the transaction. The parties were admittedly engaged in business dealings, and the amount was advanced to facilitate execution of contractual work. It is further submitted that out of the total amount of 41,50,000/- allegedly ₹ advanced by the complainant, the petitioner has already repaid a sum of 23,50,000/-, which by itself negates any allegation of dishonest ₹ intention or wrongful gain. According to the learned counsel, the dispute, if any, is purely contractual and civil in nature, relating to recovery of money, for which the complainant has already invoked the remedy under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. It is also submitted that the petitioner had been granted anticipatory bail by this Court in connection with the impugned FIR, taking note of the nature of the allegations. Learned counsel further contends that the complainant had obtained certain blank signed cheques and papers from the petitioner as security, which have subsequently been misused to initiate multiple criminal proceedings. It is argued that the present prosecution has been instituted only to exert 4 undue pressure upon the petitioner and to convert a purely civil dispute into a criminal prosecution for the purpose of recovery of money. 6. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the transactions in question pertain to the period between 2015 and 2022, whereas the impugned FIR came to be lodged only on 18.10.2025, without any plausible explanation for such inordinate delay. It is contended that the belated registration of the FIR, coupled with the pendency of the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the identical cause of action, clearly demonstrates the mala fide intention of the complainant. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned FIR, the consequential charge-sheet and all further criminal proceedings arising therefrom be quashed in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the allegations contained in the FIR, read along with the material collected during investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that the complainant and the petitioner had known each other for several years and, taking advantage of the relationship of trust, the petitioner repeatedly induced the complainant to part with substantial amounts of money on the pretext that the same was required for execution of railway contracts. It is contended that the petitioner obtained an aggregate amount of 41,50,000/- from the ₹ complainant over a period of time and, despite repeated assurances, 5 failed to repay the outstanding amount of 18,00,000/-. He further ₹ submits that during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer inspected the place of occurrence, recorded the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, and seized the original documents relied upon by the complainant. It is submitted that although the petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by this Court and thereafter cooperated with the investigation, the material collected during investigation disclosed sufficient grounds to prosecute him. Accordingly, after completion of investigation, Charge-sheet No. 56/2026 dated 28.02.2026 was filed before the competent Court for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. It is further submitted that the pendency of proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does not, by itself, bar prosecution for the offence of cheating where the allegations prima facie disclose dishonest inducement and deception. According to the learned State counsel, the plea that the dispute is purely civil or contractual in nature constitutes a matter of defence which can only be examined during trial upon appreciation of evidence. Therefore, no case is made out for exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the FIR, charge-sheet or the consequential criminal proceedings. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 10. The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, 6 FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.). 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof cannot be quashed. 12. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has 7 authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with great caution and self-restraint, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice. 13. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these 8 parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law. 14. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., this Court is of the considered opinion that the present case does not warrant interference. A perusal of the FIR, the charge-sheet and the material collected during the course of investigation prima facie reveals that the complainant and the petitioner were admittedly known to each other for a considerable period of time and, on the strength of the relationship of trust reposed in the petitioner, the complainant allegedly advanced substantial amounts aggregating to 41,50,000/- from time to ₹ time for execution of railway contractual works. The investigation further reveals that although the petitioner returned certain amounts aggregating to 23,50,000/-, he allegedly continued to retain the ₹ balance amount of 18,00,000/- and, towards discharge of his liability, ₹ issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. Significantly, when the said cheque was presented for encashment, it was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. Prima facie, therefore, the material on record indicates that despite acknowledging his liability by issuing the cheque, the petitioner failed to ensure its honour. 15. The sequence of events, namely partial repayment followed by issuance of a cheque which ultimately stood dishonoured, cannot, at 9 this stage, be viewed in isolation or accepted as conclusively establishing the petitioner's bona fides. On the contrary, these circumstances constitute material requiring appreciation during trial and are incapable of being adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. 16. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that since proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are already pending, the subsequent prosecution under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code deserves to be quashed. This submission does not merit acceptance. The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a statutory offence arising from the dishonour of a cheque upon fulfilment of the statutory conditions prescribed therein, whereas the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC rests upon allegations of dishonest inducement and deception. Merely because both proceedings emanate from the same commercial transaction does not ipso facto render one destructive of the other. Whether the petitioner possessed the requisite dishonest intention from the inception of the transaction, whether he induced the complainant to part with money on false assurances, whether the subsequent issuance of the cheque was merely a device to postpone repayment, and whether the ingredients of cheating are ultimately established are all matters which necessarily require appreciation of oral and documentary evidence during trial. These disputed factual issues cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 10 17. Equally untenable is the submission that the dispute is purely civil in nature. It is trite that the existence of a civil remedy or pendency of civil or statutory proceedings does not, by itself, extinguish criminal liability where the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, the Court is required only to ascertain whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation, if accepted at their face value, disclose the commission of the alleged offence. The truthfulness, correctness or otherwise of those allegations is a matter for trial. The defence sought to be projected by the petitioner that substantial repayment had already been made, that the cheque was issued merely as security, or that the complainant has misused blank signed documents are all matters of evidence and constitute defences which are required to be established before the trial Court. Such disputed questions of fact cannot be examined by this Court while exercising its limited jurisdiction under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. 18. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that the extraordinary jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is to be exercised with great caution, sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases. The High Court, while considering a petition for quashing, cannot undertake a meticulous appreciation of evidence, evaluate the correctness of allegations or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only required to examine whether the uncontroverted allegations, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court further 11 cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be interdicted at the threshold merely because the accused raises a plausible defence or asserts that the dispute is civil in nature. More recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court, while exercising inherent jurisdiction, cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact, assess the evidentiary value of the material collected during investigation or record findings which properly fall within the exclusive domain of the trial Court. Unless the allegations are so absurd or inherently improbable that no offence is made out even on their plain reading, interference under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. is wholly unwarranted. 19. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is satisfied that the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation cannot be said to be inherently improbable or so absurd as to warrant quashing at the threshold. The charge-sheet discloses prima facie material indicating repeated financial transactions between the parties, substantial monetary advances, partial repayments, issuance of a cheque towards discharge of liability and its subsequent dishonour for insufficiency of funds. 20. Prima facie, the conduct attributed to the petitioner cannot be brushed aside at this stage as constituting merely a civil dispute. The fact that the petitioner admittedly repaid only a part of the amount and thereafter issued a cheque which was dishonoured, while simultaneously withholding payment of the remaining amount, is a 12 circumstance which the prosecution is entitled to rely upon during trial to establish its case. Whether such conduct ultimately establishes dishonest intention or merely amounts to breach of contractual obligations is a matter to be determined on the basis of evidence led before the trial Court. This Court cannot, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, record any finding in favour of the petitioner on such disputed factual aspects. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the allegations in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the charge-sheet disclose a prima facie case warranting a full-fledged trial. None of the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for exercise of inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings are attracted in the facts of the present case. 22. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. It is, however, clarified that all observations made herein are confined solely to the adjudication of the present petition under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the case. The learned trial Court shall decide the matter independently on the basis of the evidence adduced before it, uninfluenced by any observations contained in this order. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu