1 2026:CGHC:4820 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 12 of 2026 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Gudhiyari, District Raipur C.G. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Lalit Agrawal S/o Late Shri Shyam Sundar Agrawal Aged About 56 Years R/o Qr. No. 13/10, 14/10, Sector- 10, Uday Society, Tatibandh, Raipur, District Raipur C.G. 2 - Pankaj Agrawal S/o Shri Lalit Agrawal Aged About 28 Years R/o Qr. No. 13/10, 14/10, Sector- 10, Uday Society, Tatibandh, Raipur, District Raipur C.G. ... Respondent(s) For State/Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vinod Tekam, Govt. Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Ms. Fouzia Mirza, Sr. Advocate, along with Mr. Ahmed Ayaan Mirza, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. Judgment on Board 28/01/2026 1. The State has filed the present acquittal appeal under Section 419(1) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, against the impugned judgment dated 20.12.2024 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, District Raipur, in Special Sessions Case No. 04/2024, whereby the learned trial court has ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.02.27 10:44:16 +0530 2 acquitted the respondents/accused persons from the charge under Section 420, 485 of I.P.C., and Section 103 and 104 of the Trade Mark Act, 1999. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on the basis of a complaint lodged at Police Station Gudhiyari, Raipur, it was alleged that the accused persons, namely Lalit Agrawal, owner of Pankaj Ispat Private Limited, Gogawn, and its Director Pankaj Agrawal, were illegally manufacturing and selling iron rods by affixing the mark “SAIL TMT 500 d” thereby falsely representing the products as those of Steel Authority of India Limited and deriving unlawful commercial gain. It was alleged that such activities were being carried on prior to 02.04.2013. On the basis of the said complaint, Crime No. 134/2013 was registered for offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 468, 473, 475, 485 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 103(a) to (f), 104 and 108 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the matter was taken up for investigation. During the course of investigation, a search was conducted at the premises of Pankaj Ispat Limited, Gogawn, Raipur, from where iron rods of various specifications bearing the mark “SAIL TMT 500 d” weighing about 109 metric tons, were seized along with rolls (dies) bearing the said mark. Iron rods marked “SAIL TMT 500” loaded in Truck No. CG 04 JC 8002 and Truck No. GJ 06 Z 7106, allegedly meant for sale, were also seized. In addition, the CPU of the office computer and the DVR of the CCTV cameras 3 installed at the premises were taken into custody. The accused persons were duly arrested, and upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the competent Court for trial. 3. The case was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, from where the same has been transferred to the learned trial Court for its trial. 4. The learned trial court has framed the charge against the accused persons on 29.04.2014 for the offence under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Mark Act, 1999, and Sections 420 and 485 of the IPC. The accused persons challenged the charge by filing criminal revision No. 223/2014 before the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, which was decided on 07.08.2015, and the charge for the offence under Section 420 and 485 of IPC was quashed. With respect to the same offence another complaint was filed by the Enforcement Directorate, Government of India, before the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, under Section 45 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and cognizance was taken in Criminal Case No. 807/2015, and then under the provisions of Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the case was committed to the learned trial Court for its trial. After recording evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the case was fixed for defence evidence. 4 The order dated 07.08.2015 passed in Criminal Revision No. 223/2014, by the learned 9th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur was challenged before this Court in WPCR No. 484/2019, which was decided on 22.10.2019 and the order dated 07.08.2015 was set aside, and order framing charge by the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 420 and 485 of IPC was maintained. Thereafter, the parties were again provided an opportunity of hearing, and on 17.12.2019, the charge under Section 420 and 485 of IPC was again framed. The opportunity to examine, re- examine and re-cross-examine the witnesses was provided to the parties, and the defence sought re-cross-examination of the investigating officer Mukesh Khare only, and does not want to re- cross-examine the other witnesses who have already been cross- examined. The witness Mukesh Khare was re-examined, and he was cross-examined on 28.05.2022, and the prosecution’s evidence was closed. Despite taking time to produce defence witnesses when the accused persons did not produce the defence witnesses, their right to lead defence evidence was closed, and the case was fixed for final hearing. 5. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses in its favour. Statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. have also been recorded, in which they denied the circumstances that appear against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely 5 implicated in the offence. They further pleaded that their company is not making the rod in the name of SAIL and not using its mark. Due to business rivalry, their competitor has collided with the police and falsely implicated them in the offence. 6. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused persons of the charged offences vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.12.2024, holding that the seized iron die had not been produced before the Court during the evidence, there was no evidence that the said die of “SAIL TMT 500 d” was kept in safe custody after sealing it, and the prosecution could not establish the misuse of the trade mark of SAIL by the accused persons, but the relevant evidence had not been produced. The accused persons were acquitted by giving the benefit of the doubt. Hence, the present acquittal appeal has been filed by the State. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/State would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Some minor omissions and contradictions do not affect the credibility of the prosecution’s case, as the witnesses have substantially supported the case of the prosecution. The die of “SAIL TMT 500 d” was seized from the premises of the accused persons, and the truck found in the premises of the accused persons was loaded 6 with “SAIL TMT 500 d” marked iron rods. He would further submit that the learned trial Court has misappreciated the evidence of the witnesses. He would further submit that PW-3 Narendra Kumar Mehta, who is the complainant, have clearly stated that when they had gone to the factory premises of the accused persons they found the die and in some of dies there was Pankaj TMT mark and in some the dies SALE TMT 500 d mark, they also found a loaded truck in the factory premises which was loaded with “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark. The evidence of PW-3 Narendra Kumar Mehta is supported by the evidence of PW-1 Shiv Charan, PW-4 Amit Kumar, PW-5 Anurag Sharma, and PW-6 Ranjan Bharti, who duly supported the prosecution case, yet the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused persons by giving them the benefit of doubt. Non-production of die or iron rod before the Court does not dilute the prosecution’s case, and on this ground, the evidence of prosecution witnesses cannot be disbelieved. In the present case, there is ample material and evidence against the respondents/accused persons to convict them of the offence in question and therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/accused persons supported the impugned judgment and has submitted that after adverting to the entire facts and evidence available on 7 record, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons, which needs no interference. 9. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court including the impugned judgment of acquittal. 10. The allegation against the accused persons in the present case is that the accused persons were unauthorizedly using the “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark and manufacturing iron rods for which they are not entitled, and selling the said iron rods to the customers. On 02.04.2013, a raid was conducted, and the iron rods having “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark and die were allegedly seized from the factory premises of the accused persons. The learned trial Court has elaborately considered the presence of the investigating officer on the spot on 02.04.2013 itself is doubtful, the information supplied by the CBI with respect to the alleged offence have not been produced in the case, lodging of the written complaint Ex.D/1, by Narendra Kumar Mehta PW-3 on the spot is not supported by the investigating officer RK Mishra PW-15. The trial Court has also considered the discrepancies in the Panchnama Ex.P/4, which was prepared on 02.04.2013 at about 19:15 hours, but the FIR Ex.P/29 is registered on 21:30 hours. The “SAIL TMT 500 d” die was seized at about 19:50 hours vide seizure memo Ex.P/6, and the iron rod loaded in the truck bearing No. CG 04 JC 8002 was 8 seized at 20:35 hours vide seizure memo Ex.P/10. Another truck bearing No. GJ 06 Z 7106, loaded with “SAIL TMT 500 d” marked iron rods, was seized at 21:50 hours vide seizure memo Ex.P/11. The learned trial Court has further considered that, as per the evidence of Mukesh Khare, PW-14, the investigation was started after registration of the FIR, and when the FIR itself was registered on 02.04.2013 at about 21:30 hours, the presence of the investigating officer, PW-14, before that time makes the prosecution’s case doubtful. 11. The learned trial Court has further considered that from the evidence of PW-1 Shiv Charan, it transpires that he too has reached on the spot after registration of the FIR, and the evidence of the complainant Narendra Kumar Mehta, PW-3, is not supported by the evidence of another investigating officer, R. K. Mishra, PW-15. 12. The part of the iron rod on which “SAIL TMT 500 d” was embossed were seized after cutting that part from the entire length of iron rod and sealed on the spot, whereas as per the evidence of Narendra Kumar Mehta PW-3 there was no search proceeding on the spot and the seizure of the iron rod vide seizure memo Ex.P/10 and Ex.P/11 has not been found proved. 9 13. Further, the said “SAIL TMT 500 d” die was neither produced before the Court, nor has any reason been assigned for its non- production. Even though there is no evidence as to where the said die is kept. Even though there is no evidence of either the Malkhana register or Malkhana Moharir. The Case of the prosecution is based on illegal trading of iron rod which mark of “SAIL TMT 500 d” by manufacturing it by using forged die, but the relevant material has not been produced before the Court. 14. The learned trial Court has further observed in its judgment that three pieces of iron rod having mark of “SAIL TMT 500 d” were sent to State FSL for its examination which was said to have been seized on 02.04.2013 but the seizure of the same has not been found proved and when the seizure of the said iron rod itself is suspicious, the FSL report loses its efficacy. Considering the entire evidence, the learned trial Court has held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the respondent accused persons have been acquitted of the alleged offences by giving the benefit of doubt. 15. When this Court examined the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is found that PW-1, Shiv Charan, had turned hostile and had not duly supported the prosecution’s case; his evidence is shaky. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had not seen the “SAIL TMT 500 d” trademark registration certificate. TMT is 10 the procedure of manufacturing iron rod and various manufacturing companies are using TMT. 16. PW-2 A Shreedhar Rao is the accountant at Pankaj Ispat Limited. He stated in his evidence that at Pankaj Ispat Limited, the iron rod in the name of Atlas TMT is manufactured, he maintains the account of the company, and except for the Atlas TMT iron rod, they do not manufacture the iron rod of any other mark. 17. PW-3, Narendra Kumar Mehta, have stated in his cross- examination that at the time he made a complaint to the police, Ex.P/5, he did not give any registered certificate of the SAIL trade mark. The police personnel have gone there on the spot along with him, and he reached on the spot at about 02:00 pm. The written complaint of Ex.D/1 was prepared inside the factory premises, and it was given after completion of the entire proceeding. At the time of proceeding Mr. S. Ramchrandranan and officers of the legal cell of Bhilai Steel Plant were with him. In para 9 of his cross-examination, he admitted that the articles which were seized on the spot do not bear the SAIL registered trade mark. 18. PW-2, Amit Kumar, though has stated that he was with the search party when the factory premises of the accused persons were inspected and found “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark iron rod and die in 11 the factory premises. But in cross-examination, he admitted that he does not know about SAIL trademarks. He voluntarily stated that in the registered trademark, there is a logo of the company. 19. PW-6, Ranjan Bharti, is the AGM Vigilance at Bhilai Steel Plant. He was a member of the search team who stated that when they entered the factory premises, they found two trucks there loaded with “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark iron rods. They also found a die of the said mark. In cross-examination, he stated that there were no members of the legal department of SAIL. He did not know about the provisions of trade mark Act. He did not see the registration certificate of SAIL or the authorization to use the “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark. He admitted that there is a separate logo/mark of SAIL, which was registered. He further admitted that the iron rod and die, which were seized from the factory premises of Pankaj Ispat, do not bear the logo/mark of SAIL. He also admitted that SAIL also manufactures the iron rod in its own name from private rolling mills, which were under contract with SAIL. He did not know whether the rolling mill could use TMT 500 d or not. He also did not see the “SAIL TMT 500 d” trademark registration certificate. 20. PW-14, Mukesh Khare, the investigating officer have stated in his evidence that on 02.04.2013, he prepared a panchnama Ex.P/4 and seized a die of Atlas 500 ISI and its first, fifth and sixth holes, “SAIL TMT 500 d” embossed. Two loaded trucks loaded with 12 “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark iron rod were also seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/10 and Ex.P/11. On 03.04.2015, a die was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/7 and Ex.P/8. On 03.04.2013 itself total of 78 tons of iron rod having “SAIL TMT 500 d” mark were seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/9, and three pieces of Atlas 500 ISI mark iron rod have also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/12.The computer set, CPU, and DVR of cctv have also been seized. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. The seized pieces of iron rod were sent for their chemical examination to FSL Raipur, from where report Ex.P/28 was received, and after completion of the investigation charge-sheet was filed. In cross-examination, he stated that during the investigation, the trademark registration document had not been provided to him. He did not know about the procedure for investigation under the trademark act, and he has not obtained any permission from the registrar trade mark. In his further cross-examination, he admitted that he had not carried out any investigation with respect to the “SAIL TMT 500 d” registration number and trademark. He has not sent the seized articles to the Registrar trademark for its examination. He also admitted that the FIR was registered on the basis of the complaint made by the officers of Steel Authority of India Limited. He also admitted that the witnesses Narendra Kumar, Shiv Charan, Neeraj Mittal, Amit Kumar, Anurag Sharma, Ranjan, Shubhen and Sunil Kumar are all attached with SAIL. 13 21. PW-15 R. K. Mishra recorded the Dehati Nalishi Ex.P/3 on the written complaint of Narendra Kumar PW-3. 22. From perusal of the entire material available on the record and consideration of the trial Court, the view taken by the learned trial Court is one of the plausible under the facts and circumstances of the case. 23. In the case of “Mallappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka” 2024 (3) SCC 544, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the principles laid down in the case of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra” 1984 (4) SCC 116, and held in para-44 and 45 of its judgment that: “44. It would be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra12, wherein the "Panchsheel" or five principles of circumstantial evidence were laid down as follows: (SCC p. 185, para 153). "153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical 14 but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra13 where the observations were made: (SCC p. 807, para 19) ‘19. ... Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.' (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 45. The circumstances in this case are far from conclusive and a conclusion of guilt could not be drawn from them. To sustain a conviction, the court must form the view that the accused "must have" 15 committed the offence, and not "may have". As noted in Sharad Birdichand Sarda¹2, the distinction between "may have" and "must have" is a legal distinction and not merely a grammatical one.” 24. Taking into consideration the findings recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, I do not find any reason to admit the acquittal appeal. 25. Applying the law governing the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram" reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, has held as follows:- "8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all." 26. In the case of “Jafarudheen and Others Vs. State of Kerala”, reported in 2022 (8) SCC 440, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal in judgement at para 25, which reads as under :- 16 “25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., the Appellate Court has to consider whether the Trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that ensures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.” 27. Further, in the case of “Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Shyam Bihari & Others”, 2023 (8) SCC 197, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 27 of its judgement that :- “27- It is trite law that in an appeal against acquittal, the power of appellate court to reappreciate evidence and come to its own conclusion is not circumscribed by any limitation. But it is equally settled that the appellate court must not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because a contrary view is permissible, particularly, where the view taken by the trial court is a plausible view based on proper appreciation of evidence and is not vitiated by ignorance/misreading of relevant evidence on record.” 28. After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment passed by the learned trial court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position as held in case of Kistoora Ram (Supra), Jafarudheen (Supra) and Shyam 17 Bihari (supra), that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial court taking one view favoured the accused, reversion of the findings of acquittal by the appellate court considering the other possible view, is not permissible in law. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the judgment impugned, acquitting the accused persons/respondents, is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal being devoid of merits the same is dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Alok