1 CGHC010279952026 2026:CGHC:31653-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 919 of 2026 1 - Director Khadi Gramodyog, Hatri Chowk, Police Station Road, District Raigarh (C.G.) 2 - Khadi Gramodyog Bhandar, Gram Seva Samiti, Bal Ashram Pariser, Kachhari Chowk, Near Hospital Chauk, Raipur, (C.G.) ... Petitioners versus Savitri Devi W/o Late Deendayal Kheerwal Aged About 75 Years R/o Sadar Market Hatri Chowk, Police Station Road, Raigarh, Tahsil And District Raigarh (C.G.) ---Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, Judge Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge 24/07/2026 1. Present is a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioners challenging the order dated 02.07.2026, passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9 of 2025, whereby the miscellaneous appeal filed by the petitioners has been dismissed and the order VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.07.29 11:27:57 +0530 2 dated 19.05.2025, passed by Rent Controlling Authority, Raigarh in Case No. 9/A-90(7)/2022-23 has been affirmed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that, the respondent filed an application for eviction and vacant possession of the subject premises situated at Sheet No. 43, Plot No. 23/1, Area 2400 sqft, bearing house Nos. 84/3 and 84/4 situated at Raigarh. It is the case of the respondent that through a decree dated 09.03.2019, passed in Civil Suit No. 35-A/2007, the subject property was obtained by her in family partition. The subject shop was obtained by the petitioners from her mother-in-law Gulab Devi on the monthly rent of Rs. 35/- and the tenancy started since long back. Despite repeated requests, the petitioners have not paid the enhanced rent and the landlady refused to accept the meager amount of rent. The suit shop is recorded in the name of the respondent in revenue records and she is the owner of the said property. She is required the suit shop for her own and her grandchildren. Her mother-in-law has died on 01.01.2011 and even thereafter the tenancy agreement was not executed by the petitioners from the respondent. On 10.11.2022, a legal notice was served, despite that the petitioners have not vacated the suit shop and therefore, the application has been field by the respondent before the Rent Controlling Authority, Raigarh. During pendency of the proceedings, a preliminary objection was raised by the petitioners regarding maintainability of the application filed by the respondent with the averments that the jurisdiction regarding claim of the petitioners is with the civil court and not with the Rent Controlling Authority as the respondent herself has averred in her application that the petitioners are encroachers. The judgment and decree dated 3 09.03.2019, passed in Civil Suit no. 35-A/2007 has not been informed to the petitioners and no tenancy agreement was executed between the petitioners and the respondent and there is no relationship of landlady and tenant between them and therefore, the application of the respondent is not maintainable. 3. After hearing the parties, the learned Rent Controlling Authority, Raigarh rejected the preliminary objection vide its order dated 19.05.2025 holding that the respondent became the landlady after death of the original landlady and the suit shop comes in the share of the respondent, therefore, she is the landlady of the suit shop. The said order dated 19.05.2025 was challenged by the petitioners by filing miscellaneous appeal before the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur, which has also been dismissed vide order dated 02.07.2026 and the same is under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority were wholly without jurisdiction as no landlady-tenant relationship existed between the parties. The respondent herself pleaded that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants/encroachers, in which event the appropriate remedy was a civil suit before the competent Civil Court and not proceedings under the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Despite this fundamental jurisdictional defect, the Rent Controlling Authority proceeded with the matter without assigning any reason for assuming jurisdiction. It was further submitted that both the Rent Controlling Authority and the Rent Control Tribunal 4 exercised jurisdiction without first determining the foundational jurisdictional fact of the existence of a landlady-tenant relationship. The respondent's own pleadings describing the petitioners as unauthorized occupants were inconsistent with the invocation of the special statutory remedy under the Rent Control Act, rendering the impugned orders illegal and without jurisdiction. 5. Learned Senior Advocate further argued that the respondent adopted mutually destructive pleas by simultaneously alleging unauthorized occupation and seeking eviction under the Rent Control Act. Such inconsistent pleadings are impermissible in law, and if the petitioners were indeed unauthorized occupants, the respondent's remedy lay before the competent Civil Court by way of a suit for possession. It is also submitted that the authorities failed to decide the petitioners' preliminary objection regarding maintainability as a threshold issue and ignored material pleadings and evidence showing that the original tenancy was under Late Smt. Gulab Devi, with no proof of any fresh tenancy or attornment in favour of the respondent. The findings are therefore perverse and suffer from non-application of mind. It was further submitted that the Tribunal failed to examine the legality of the eviction notice issued by the respondent. The impugned orders have consequently resulted in a manifest failure of justice by compelling the petitioners to face proceedings before a forum lacking inherent jurisdiction, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. 5 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition and gone through the pleadings. 7. The main contention raised by the petitioners is that the Rent Controlling Authority lacked inherent jurisdiction as there existed no relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. It is urged that since the respondent herself described the petitioners as unauthorized occupants/encroachers, the only remedy available to her was by way of a civil suit for possession and not an application under the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. 8. On a careful examination of the pleadings, we are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. A reading of the eviction application as a whole demonstrates that the respondent has specifically pleaded that the suit shop was originally let out by her mother-in-law, Late Smt. Gulab Devi, to the petitioners on a monthly rent of Rs.35/-, that after the death of the original landlady and by virtue of the decree dated 09.03.2019 passed in Civil Suit No.35-A/2007, the suit property fell to the respondent's share, her name was duly mutated in the revenue records, and thereafter she stepped into the shoes of the original landlady. It has further been pleaded that despite repeated demands, the petitioners neither paid rent to the respondent nor vacated the premises after service of legal notice. 9. The expression "illegal occupant" or "encroacher" occurring in certain portions of the application cannot be read in isolation. The pleadings are required to be construed as a whole and not by picking out stray expressions divorced from their context. When the entire application 6 is read harmoniously, the foundation of the respondent's claim is that the petitioners initially entered the premises as tenants under Late Smt. Gulab Devi and, after termination of tenancy and continued unauthorized retention of possession, they became unauthorized occupants. Such description by itself does not amount to an admission that there never existed any relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that pleadings must be read as a whole and not in a truncated manner. A sentence or expression cannot be torn out of context to defeat the substance of the pleadings. The Court must ascertain the true nature of the dispute from the entirety of the pleadings and not from isolated averments. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “13. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. * * * 15. There cannot be any compartmentalization, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to 7 ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.” 11. The further submission that no fresh tenancy agreement was executed between the respondent and the petitioners after the death of the original landlady is equally devoid of merit. It is well settled that on transfer of ownership, whether by succession, partition, inheritance or decree of a competent court, the transferee or successor landlady automatically acquires the rights of the original landlady and attornment by the tenant is not a condition precedent for creation or continuation of the jural relationship. The tenancy continues by operation of law, and the tenant cannot deny the title of the successor landlady merely because no fresh lease deed has been executed. 12. In the present case, the respondent has specifically pleaded and placed reliance upon the decree of partition dated 09.03.2019 and the consequential mutation entries to establish that she became the owner and landlady of the suit premises. Whether the petitioners accepted her as landlady, whether rent was thereafter tendered or refused, and whether there was attornment are matters touching 8 upon the merits of the eviction proceedings, which necessarily require adjudication upon appreciation of evidence. Such disputed questions cannot be conclusively determined merely on a preliminary objection seeking rejection of the proceedings at the threshold. 13. The coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Nirmala Ratre v. Amrit Lal Wadhwani, 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 998, has held that:- “16. The other ground as raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the application is not maintainable for want of written rent agreement between the parties in view of Section 4 of the Act of 2011. The petitioner has also not raised any objection with regard to maintainability of the petition for want of written tenancy agreement in her reply to the application for eviction. It will be beneficial to glance Section 4 of the Act of 2011, which reads as under:— 4. Tenancy Agreement.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882), no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, let or take on rent any accommodation except by an agreement in writing. (2) Where, in relation to a tenancy created before the commencement of this Act,~ (a) an agreement in writing was already entered into shall be filed before the Rent Controller. (b) no agreement in writing was entered into, the landlord and the tenant shall enter into an agreement in writing with regard to 9 that tenancy and file the same before the Rent Controller; Provided that where the landlord and the tenant fail to present jointly a copy of tenancy agreement under clause (a) or fail to reach an agreement under clause (b) such landlord and the tenant shall separately file the particulars about such tenancy. (3) Every agreement referred to in sub- section (1) or required to be executed under sub-section (2) shall be in such format and in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.” 17. Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act of 2011 provides that the agreement referred in subsection (1) or under sub-section (2), time and its format will be prescribed. The format of agreement has been prescribed under the Rules i.e. Chhattisgarh Rent Control Adaptation Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules of 2016"), which came into force by notification dated 01/03/2016 and have been framed in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 13A of the Act of 2011. Rule 14 of the Rules of 2016 provides for an agreement, which reads as under: 14. Agreement.- According to sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act, every agreement shall be in FORMAT-1 and it shall be presented before the Rent Controller within a period of one month from the date of execution by the landlord.” 10 18. The format of an agreement and the period for its presentation before the Rent Controlling Authority was provided under the Rules of 2016 (which came in effect only on 01/03/2016) whereas the application for eviction has been filed on 15/06/2015. In the present case, the tenancy is of somewhere of 2009 by oral agreement, whereas Rules of 2016 came into force after filing of the application for eviction, therefore, the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 2011 will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case.” 14. The Rent Controlling Authority, while rejecting the preliminary objection, has recorded a prima facie finding that the respondent became the landlady after the property came to her share in the partition and that the eviction application disclosed a cause falling within the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. The Tribunal has independently examined the pleadings and affirmed the said view by holding that the remaining objections raised by the petitioners are matters requiring evidence during trial and cannot be adjudicated as preliminary issues. We find no jurisdictional error in the approach adopted by the authorities below. 15. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory and not appellate. The High Court does not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted only where the subordinate court has acted without jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction, committed patent perversity or manifest miscarriage of justice. With respect to the scope of interference under the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the 11 Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that: “49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. 12 (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or 13 fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict 14 administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 16. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:- 15 “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” 17. In the present case, the impugned orders merely reject the petitioners' preliminary objection and direct that the dispute be decided on evidence. No final adjudication on the existence of landlady-tenant relationship or the respondent's entitlement to eviction has yet been made. The petitioners shall have full opportunity to file their defence, lead evidence and raise all permissible legal and factual objections before the Rent Controlling 16 Authority. Therefore, no prejudice has been caused by relegating the parties to trial. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the eviction application, on its plain reading, discloses a prima facie raises triable issues falling within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controlling Authority under the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. We do not find any patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error or manifest miscarriage of justice warranting interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Judge ved