1 CGHC010413952025 2026:CGHC:31936-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1993 of 2025 1 - Aniruddha Dhanwar S/o Shri Bhagat Ram Aged About 27 Years Present Aged 32 Years, R/o Laldipa Amaghat, Thana - Tamnar, Distt.- Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate Raigarh, Distt.- Raigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajendra Patel, Advocate. For State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Dy. Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board 27/07/2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice. 1 Vide order dated 31.10.2025, the appeal was admitted for final hearing. Though the matter was listed for consideration of I.A. No. 01/2025, an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, however, with the consent of the parties, the appeal is being finally heard as the appellant has been in jail since 16.09.2019. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2025 is disposed of. 2 The present appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed by the appellant against the ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.07.29 17:23:20 +0530 2 impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.09.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No.15/2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code Imprisonment for Life and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine Additional R. I. of 01 month. 3 The brief facts of the case are that, on 15.09.2019, the father of the deceased, namely Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), lodged a report at Police Station Tamnar alleging that he had come to the house of his daughter Shanti Dhanwar and her husband Aniruddh Dhanwar, to attend the Chhathi ceremony of their son and was staying there. In the night of 14.09.2019 at about 10:00 p.m., after returning from the field, he was informed by the accused's sister Rukmani Dhanwar that the accused had assaulted his wife Shanti Dhanwar with a tangi on the back of her neck following a quarrel. On entering the house, he found his daughter lying unconscious with a bleeding injury on the back of her neck. Based on the report (Ex.P/11), FIR was registered initially under Section 307 of the IPC against the accused. The injured was immediately taken to Community Health Centre, Tamnar, where PW-7 Dr. Abhishek Patel medically examined her and found an incised wound measuring 8 × 2 × 2 cm on the posterior aspect of the neck caused by a sharp-edged weapon and referred her to District Hospital, Raigarh for better treatment. Despite treatment, she succumbed to the injuries on 25.10.2019. Thereafter, merg proceedings were initiated, inquest was conducted and the dead body was sent for post-mortem 3 examination. PW-8 Dr. Devaraj Behera conducted the post-mortem and found a sutured wound on the back of the neck with fracture of the C-5 spine, torn spinal ligament and swollen spinal cord with blood clots. The doctor opined that the death was caused due to shock resulting from septicemia consequent to the neck injury and that the death was homicidal in nature. Consequently, the offence was converted to one under Section 302 of the IPC. 4 The spot map of the place of occurrence was prepared by the Investigating Officer vide Ex.P/22. During the course of investigation, one iron tangi produced by the accused was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P/1 in the presence of witnesses and blood-stained soil, plain soil and another iron tangi were seized from the place of occurrence vide seizure memo Ex.P/2. The seized tangi was sent for query to PW-7 Dr. Abhishek Patel, who opined in his query report Ex.P/7 that the injury sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the said tangi and that the injury was of such a serious nature that it was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. The seized articles, namely, the tangi, blood-stained soil and plain soil, were forwarded for chemical examination to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur. As per the FSL report Ex.P/20, blood was detected on the blood-stained soil, whereas no blood was detected on the tangi and the plain soil. 5 Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded and after completion of the usual investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gharghoda, District Raigarh for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 of the IPC. The case was committed to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gharghoda, District Raigarh for its trial. 4 6 The learned trial Court framed charge against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The accused abjured the guilt, denied the charge and claimed to be tried. 7 In order to prove the charge against the accused, the prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 8 After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the accused and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 9 Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which cannot be made the basis to convict him for the offence in question. He would further submit that there is no eye-witness to the incident and the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, which does not form a complete chain pointing towards the guilt of the appellant. He would further submit that the material witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and the seizure of the alleged weapon of offence and the medical evidence are not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the commission of the offence. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC deserves to be set aside by extending the benefit of doubt to him. In the alternative, he would further submit that even if the prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the offence would not travel 5 beyond the scope of Section 304 of the IPC. Therefore, by altering his conviction from the offence under Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 of the IPC, his sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone. 10 On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes and would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Though some of the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile, the evidence of the remaining witnesses is fully reliable and is duly corroborated by the medical and documentary evidence. It is further submitted that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a tangi, the weapon of offence was seized from him and the medical evidence establishes that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the said weapon. Therefore, there is ample evidence against the appellant that he committed the murder of the deceased. The learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and passed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence, which needs no interference. 11 We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 12 The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of deceased Shanti Dhanwar was homicidal in nature? 13 The trial Court, after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, particularly relying upon the testimony of Dr. Abhishek Patel (PW-7), who first examined the injured, and Dr. Devaraj Behera (PW-8), who conducted the post-mortem examination, 6 has come to the conclusion that the deceased sustained a sharp-cut injury on the posterior aspect of her neck and that her death was caused due to shock resulting from septicemia consequent to the said injury. Both the doctors have categorically opined that the injury could not have been caused by a fall and that the death was homicidal in nature. Their medical evidence stands duly corroborated by the testimony of Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), Sanjay Dhanwar (PW-3) and other evidence on record, which establishes that the deceased sustained the fatal injury in the house of the accused and later succumbed to the same during treatment. As such, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the death of deceased Shanti Dhanwar was homicidal in nature is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 14 Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question, which the learned trial Court has recorded in the affirmative by relying upon the testimony of Pusau Dhanwar (PW-17), Sanjay Dhanwar (PW- 3), Prem Sagar Rathia (PW-2) and the medical evidence of Dr. Abhishek Patel (PW-7) and Dr. Devaraj Behera (PW-8). Though Rukmani Dhanwar (PW-1) did not support the prosecution case, the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses clearly establishes that the deceased sustained the fatal tangi injury in the house of the appellant, was immediately taken for treatment and ultimately succumbed to the injury. 7 15 In the case of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2023) Live Law (SC) 861 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 33 and 34 has held as under: “33. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, states as under: "106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him.(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket, The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word "especially" means facts that are pre- eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, "especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience.” 16 The seizure of the tangi from the appellant and the medical opinion that the injury could have been caused by the said weapon further corroborate the prosecution case. As such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who had caused the fatal injury to the deceased. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 8 17 The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and their conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants? 18 The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana 1 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 19 The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana2 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative 1 (2002) 3 SCC 327 2 (2009) 15 SCC 635 9 in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 10 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 20 Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 21 Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh 3 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in 3 (2017) 3 SCC 247 11 a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly. ” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal 4 (2017) 3 SCC 2472024:CGHC:9062 DB 11 Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal 12 altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 22 In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intention and not knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 23 Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv)The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 13 24 According to the medical evidence, the deceased had sustained a single incised injury on the posterior aspect of her neck measuring 8 × 2 × 2 cm, resulting in fracture of the C-5 spinous process, rupture of the spinal ligament and injury to the spinal cord, which ultimately caused her death due to shock consequent to septicemia. The evidence on record further establishes that immediately before the incident, the appellant had demanded money from the deceased for consuming liquor and, upon her refusal, assaulted her with a tangi on the neck. From the evidence of the witnesses, it emerges that on the night of the incident, while the appellant and the deceased were having dinner, a dispute arose between them, during which the appellant caused injuries to the deceased. The post-mortem report reveals that only one injury was found on the body of the deceased, and the appellant did not repeat the blow. The deceased died after more than one month of the incident. Thus, the act of the appellant squarely falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, and it cannot be held that the appellant had the intention to cause the death of the deceased. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the act of the appellant would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC instead of Section 302 of the IPC. 25 Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and sentenced for the period already undergone by him. 26 The appellant is reported to be in jail since 16.10.2019. He shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 27 The criminal appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein above. 14 28 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Aniruddha Dhanwar is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29 The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Alok